

1 Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th
2 Cir. 2010) (en banc), the United States Supreme Court recently observed:

3 Whatever liberty interest exists [in parole] is, of course, a *state*
4 interest. There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be
5 conditionally released [on parole] before the expiration of a valid sentence,
6 and the States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners. *Id.* at 7.
7 When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause
8 requires fair procedures for its vindication – and federal courts will review
9 the application of those constitutionally required procedures. . . .

10 Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. ____ (2011) (per curiam) (citing Greenholtz v.
11 Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979))
12 (emphasis in original).

13 The Court held:

14 . . . In the context of parole, we have held that the procedures
15 required are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a prisoner subject to a
16 parole statute similar to California’s received adequate process when he
17 was allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of
18 the reasons why parole was denied. 442 U.S. at 16. “the Constitution,”
19 we held, “does not require more.” *Ibid.* Cooke and Clay received at least
20 this amount of process: They were allowed to speak at their parole
21 hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded access to
22 their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole
23 was denied. (citations omitted).

24 That should have been the beginning and the end of the federal
25 habeas courts’ inquiry into whether Cook and Clay received due
26 process. . . .

27 Id.

28 The Court added that “[n]o opinion of ours supports converting California’s ‘some evidence’ rule
29 into a substantive federal requirement” and “. . . it is no federal concern . . . whether California’s
30 ‘some evidence’ rule of judicial review (a procedure beyond what the Constitution demands) was
31 correctly applied” because “a ‘mere error of state law’ is not a denial of due process.” *Id.* (citing
32 Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 121, n.21 (1982)). Thus, in cases challenging the denial of parole,
33 the only issue subject to federal habeas review is whether the inmate received the procedural due
34 process protections of notice and an opportunity to be heard. There is no other clearly
35 established federal constitutional right in the context of parole.

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1 In this case, petitioner claims that his federal due process rights were violated
2 because the denial of parole was not based on “some evidence.” Petitioner does not argue that he
3 was denied any of the procedural protections required by the federal constitution. Even if he did,
4 the record clearly establishes that petitioner was provided with the basic Greenholtz protections
5 of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Because the federal constitution requires nothing more
6 in the parole context, the petition must be denied.

7 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s petition for
8 a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) be denied.

9 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
10 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days
11 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
12 objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of
13 objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal.
14 See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

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16 DATED: January 26, 2011

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18 **CRAIG M. KELLISON**
19 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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