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The purpose in issuing a temporary restraining order is to preserve the <u>status quo</u> pending a fuller hearing. The cases contain limited discussion of the standards for issuing a temporary restraining order due to the fact that very few such orders can be appealed prior to the hearing on a preliminary injunction. It is apparent however, that requests for temporary restraining orders which are not <u>ex parte</u> and without notice are governed by the same general standards that govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. <u>See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.</u>, 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.); <u>Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. United States Dist. Court</u>, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J. dissenting); <u>Century Time Ltd. v. Interchron Ltd.</u>, 729 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

The legal principles applicable to a request for injunctive relief are well established. To prevail, the moving party must show either a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the movant's favor. See Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 700 (9th Cir. 1997); Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). The two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale with the focal point being the degree of irreparable injury shown. Oakland Tribune, 762 F.2d at 1376. "Under any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury." Id. In the absence of a significant showing of possible irreparable harm, the court need not reach the issue of likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

Here, plaintiff asserts that possessing a copy of the chrono authored by Rios puts him at risk of harm, as "[t]he chrono contains information that could endanger the life of Plaintiff should his cell-mates or the prison population" learn its contents. (ECF No. 104 at 5.) He seeks to be single-celled for the rest of this litigation to protect him from this risk.² However, plaintiff

motion is properly before the undersigned for disposition by order.

² It appears that plaintiff is referring to the chrono earlier identified as defendants' Exhibit B, authored by Rios on January 27, 2007 and documenting plaintiff's participation in a meeting

kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). Although prison officials have an obligation to protect inmates from attack by other inmates, see Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 412 (9th Cir.1988), plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the threat of physical or other injury to him resulting from being double-celled is more than speculative. See Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury."). A presently existing actual threat must be shown, although the injury need not be certain to occur. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130–31 (1969); FDIC v. Garner, 125 F.3d 1272, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1997).

More fundamentally, the harm for which plaintiff seeks injunctive relief – the threat of attack from other inmates – is outside the scope of the First Amendment claim at issue in this action. In addition, as a general rule this court is unable to issue an order against individuals who are not parties to a suit pending before it. Zenith, supra, 395 U.S. 100. Nothing before the court indicates that Rios, the only remaining defendant, is responsible for deciding whether plaintiff is single- or double-celled. Plaintiff cannot, by this motion, enjoin persons who are not defendants in the underlying action, based on claims that are not set forth in the operative complaint.

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held by known gang members. (See ECF No. 83 at 8-9.) The court earlier denied defendants' motion for a protective order as to this chrono, noting that it "does not name or describe any particular inmate and does not cite any information from confidential sources." (ECF No. 77 at 3.)

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order (ECF No. 104) is denied.

Dated: June 10, 2013

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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