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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11	LINA GLADKIHK, No. 2:10-cv-00852-MCE-DAD
12	Plaintiff,
13	v. <u>MEMORANDUM AND ORDER</u>
14	NATIONAL CITY MORTGAGE, et al.,
15	Defendants.
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19	This action arises out of a mortgage loan transaction in
20	which Plaintiff Lina Gladkihk ("Plaintiff") purchased and
21	financed a home in 2004. Presently before the Court is a Motion
22	by Defendants Green Tree Servicing LLC, Federal National Mortgage
23	Association, National City Mortgage Company, and PNC Mortgage
24	Company (collectively, "Defendants") to Dismiss the claims
25	alleged against them in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint for
26	failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
27	pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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#### BACKGROUND<sup>1</sup>

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3 Plaintiff purchased a home and financed the mortgage in late 2004. In mid-2009, Plaintiff requested a loan modification from 4 Defendant National City Mortgage. After attempting to comply 5 with the requirements of the trial loan modification period, 6 Plaintiff was notified her loan was sold to Defendant Green Tree, 7 who failed to honor the terms of her modification with National 8 9 City Mortgage. Plaintiff's property was ultimately sold in April 2010, and she never received notice of the sale. Plaintiff 10 further alleges that she did not receive the required disclosures 11 at the time of financing the home (2004), and requests equitable 12 tolling as to her TILA claim. 13

## STANDARD

17 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 18 Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the 19 20 nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and 21 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 22 to relief," to "give the defendant fair notice of what 23 the...claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." 24 111 25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> <sup>1</sup> The factual assertions in this section are based on the allegations in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint unless otherwise specified.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 1 2 citations and quotations omitted). Though "a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion" need not contain "detailed factual 3 allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of 4 his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and 5 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 6 cause of action will not do." Id. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. 7 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 2869 (1986)). A plaintiff's "factual 8 9 allegation must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 10 Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) ("[T]he pleading must 11 12 contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of 13 action.")). 14

Further, "Rule 8(a)(2)...requires a 'showing,' rather than a 15 blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some 16 17 factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing...grounds on 18 which the claim rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal 19 20 citations omitted). A pleading must then contain "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 21 Id. at 570. If the "plaintiffs...have not nudged their claims 22 23 across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint 24 must be dismissed." Id.

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Once the court grants a motion to dismiss, they must then 1 2 decide whether to grant a plaintiff leave to amend. Rule 15(a) authorizes the court to freely grant leave to amend when there is 3 no "undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the 4 movant." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 5 In fact, leave to amend is generally only denied when it is clear that the 6 deficiencies of the complaint cannot possibly be cured by an 7 See DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 8 amended version. 9 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992); Balistieri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F. 2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) ("A complaint should 10 not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond 11 doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 12 his claim which would entitle him to relief.") (internal 13 citations omitted). 14

## ANALYSIS

18 Plaintiff alleges violations of state and federal law and requests relief accordingly. However, the issue before the Court 19 20 is not the substance of these various claims, but whether 21 Plaintiff has plead enough facts on the federal claim as a 22 general matter, for any to stand. While the complaint does not 23 need detailed factual allegations, it must still provide 24 sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See 25 supra. 26 111

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# A. TILA Claim

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Plaintiff seeks to rescind her loan and recover damages pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1600 <u>et. seq</u>. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim is time-barred because civil damages are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and claims for rescission have a three-year statute of limitations.

9 For a plaintiff to collect civil damages from a defendant 10 who failed to provide disclosures mandated by TILA, the statute of limitations requires plaintiff to file suit within one year 11 from the "date of occurrence" of the alleged violation. 12 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). The "date of occurrence" is the date the 13 transaction is consummated, which in the case of a mortgage loan, 14 15 is when the plaintiff closed on the loan. See Walker v. Washington Mut. Bank FA, 63 F. App'x. 316, 317 (9th Cir. 2003). 16

To sustain a claim for rescission under TILA, a consumer may elect to cancel their residential mortgage loan within three days of either the consummation of the transaction or delivery of required disclosures and rescission forms. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)(3). If the required disclosures are not provided, then the right to cancel the transaction extends to three years after the date the loan closed. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).

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In the instant case, Plaintiff is time-barred from asserting any damages under TILA, as the date of occurrence (the date of the loan transaction) was more than one year from the date the case was filed, and more than three years after any material disclosures should have been provided and Plaintiff should have subsequently discovered the omission.

7 However, to save her claim, Plaintiff argues that equitable tolling should apply to suspend the statutes of limitations. 8 The 9 Ninth Circuit has held that "the doctrine of equitable tolling 10 may, in appropriate circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or had reasonable opportunity to 11 discover the fraud or nondisclosures that form the basis of the 12 TILA action." King v. State of California, 784 F.2d 910, 915 13 14 (9th Cir. 1986). In determining justifiable application of the equitable tolling doctrine, a court "focuses on whether there was 15 excusable delay by the plaintiff." Johnson v. Henderson, 16 314 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002). To establish excusable delay, 17 the plaintiff must show "fraudulent conduct by the defendant 18 resulting in concealment of the operative facts, failure of the 19 20 plaintiff to discover the operative facts that are the basis of 21 his cause of action within the limitations period, and due diligence by the plaintiff until discovery of those facts." 22 23 Federal Election Com'n v. Williams, 104 F.3d 237, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1996). 24 111 25

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1 Here, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate she conducted the requisite due diligence. In the Second Amended Complaint, 2 Plaintiff argues she did not have a reasonable opportunity to 3 discover any TILA violations within the one year statute of 4 limitations because they "did not reveal" themselves "until 5 within the past year." (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff does 6 7 not provide any further facts or information about the documents 8 she read and reviewed, or any conduct on her part, that suggests excusable delay occurred. Plaintiff's lack of information about 9 her conduct leaves the Court an insufficient basis to invoke 10 equitable tolling. While Plaintiff suggests Defendants concealed 11 12 facts about the mortgage, she has not shown a scintilla of due 13 diligence on her part. Equitable tolling will not be applied, and thus the statute of limitations period has run. Accordingly, 14 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's TILA claim is granted. 15

There are few material differences between Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint in regards to the TILA claim, and it is clear to this Court that no amendment will cure Plaintiff's deficiencies with respect to TILA's definitive statutes of limitations. As a result, leave to amend this cause of action is denied.

# B. Plaintiff's Remaining Causes of Action

25 Plaintiff's federal claim presently dismissed, the Court 26 declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 27 state causes of action.

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The Court need not address the merits of Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss with respect to the remaining state law causes of action,
as those issues are now moot.

## CONCLUSION

As a matter of law, and for the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 31) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's TILA claim is dismissed without leave to amend, and therefore the case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk is ordered to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 26, 2011

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, (R.) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE