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7	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10	RANDY ROGERS and ERNEST No. 2:10-cv-00903-MCE-KJM
11	SCAMBLER,
12	Plaintiffs,
13	v. <u>MEMORANDUM AND ORDER</u>
14	BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION aka BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
15	Defendant.
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17	The present action arises from telephone communications
18	between Ernest Scambler ("Plaintiff") 1 and Bank of America, N.A.
19	("Defendant"). Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion
20	to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint for
21	failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
22	pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) 2 . For the reasons set
23	forth below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
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25	¹ While the caption lists another named Plaintiff, Randy Rogers, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint indicates that Rogers
26	has since died and is no longer asserting claims in this matter. (Pl.'s First Am. Compl. \P 1.)
27	² Because oral argument will not be of material assistance,
28	the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

BACKGROUND³

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3	Plaintiff alleges that in July 2008, Defendant began calling
4	him on his cellular telephone. In these calls Defendant would
5	ask to speak with an individual other than the Plaintiff. Each
6	time Defendant called, Plaintiff informed Defendant it had the
7	wrong number and that Plaintiff did not know the individual with
8	whom Defendant wished to speak.
9	In September 2008, Plaintiff started receiving automated
10	messages from Defendant. These messages stated:
11	Please contact Bank of America at 866-953-2716, Monday through Friday, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., Central
12	Standard Time. Once again our number is 866-953-2716. Thank you.
13	mank you.
14	(Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶ 38.)
15	Plaintiff claims he contacted Defendant numerous times to
16	request Defendant stop calling his number. Despite his requests,
17	Plaintiff continued receiving automated calls from Defendant. In
18	Count I of the First Amended Complaint ⁴ , Plaintiff alleges that
19	these telephone calls violated the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection
20	Practices Act ("Rosenthal Act").
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24	³ The factual assertions in this section are based on the allegations in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint unless
25	otherwise specified.
26	⁴ The Court recognizes Defendant's request for judicial
27	notice of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed in this action. Because the Complaint was filed in this proceeding, judicial notice is not necessary for the Court to take it into
28	consideration.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 3 Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted 4 5 as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 6 7 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing 8 9 that the pleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the...claim is and the grounds upon 10 which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). 11 While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 12 does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's 13 14 obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitlement to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 15 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 16 not do. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 17 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Factual allegations 18 19 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 20 level. Id. at 21 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004) ("The 21 pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of 22 23 facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action"). 24 25 /// 26 /// 27 111

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If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must 1 2 then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The court should "freely give[]" leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad 3 faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant,...undue 4 prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of...the amendment, 5 [or] futility of the amendment...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman 6 7 v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the 8 9 complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). 10

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's conduct "constitute[s] 14 numerous and multiple violations of the Rosenthal Act⁵." (Pl.'s 15 First Am. Compl. ¶ 48.) Plaintiff specifically alleges Defendant 16 violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶ 44.), which 17 18 is incorporated into the Rosenthal Act through § 1788.17 of the 19 California Civil Code. Section 1698d of Title 15 of the United States Code prohibits a debt collector from engaging in "any 20 21 conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, 22 or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt." 23 ///

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⁵ In addition to the deficiencies discussed herein, the court finds Plaintiff's general allegation that Defendant's conduct constituted numerous and multiple violations of the Rosenthal Act troubling. By not specifying the particular section(s) Defendant allegedly violated, Plaintiff may have failed to provide Defendant fair notice of the claims.

1 The purpose of the Rosenthal Act is "to prohibit debt 2 collectors from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the collection of consumer debts." Cal. Civ. Code 3 § 1788.1(b). The Rosenthal Act defines "debt collector" as "any 4 person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on 5 behalf of himself or herself or others, engages in debt 6 collection." Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c). The act defines "debt 7 collection" as "any act or practice in connection with the 8 9 collection of consumer debts." Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(b).

As a threshold requirement, the issue here is whether 10 Plaintiff sufficiently alleges facts in his First Amended 11 Complaint to establish that Defendant is a "debt collector" 12 contacting Plaintiff for the purpose of "debt collection" as 13 these terms are defined by the Rosenthal Act. In alleging that 14 Defendant is a debt collector, Plaintiff states that "Defendant, 15 in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of 16 17 himself, herself, or others, engages in debt collection...[and] is therefore a debt collector as that term is defined by [the 18 19 Rosenthal Act]." (Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) By itself, this 20 statement is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under the 21 Rosenthal Act. Plaintiff merely recites the definition of "debt collector" and concludes that Defendant engages in the conduct 22 23 required to satisfy the definition. Plaintiff does not provide any facts demonstrating that Defendant, in the ordinary course of 24 25 business, regularly participates in debt collection. Plaintiff's 26 conclusory statement, made without any factual support, does not 27 satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) pleading requirements.

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Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint also fails to 1 2 sufficiently allege that the telephone calls were for the purpose of debt collection. According to Plaintiff, the alleged 3 telephone calls involved either Defendant asking to speak with an 4 individual other than the Plaintiff or an automated message 5 requesting the recipient call Defendant during its business 6 hours. Nothing in these allegations indicate that the purpose of 7 the calls was to collect a debt. 8

Plaintiff invites this court to infer that Defendant's 9 purpose for calling Plaintiff was to collect a debt. Plaintiff 10 alleges: 1) that an unknown individual owed a "debt" to 11 Defendant; 2) that said unknown individual defaulted on this 12 "debt" sometime before July 2008; 3) and that Defendant began 13 calling Plaintiff's cell phone in July of 2008, requesting to 14 speak with the unknown individual. (Pl.'s First Am. Compl. 15 ¶¶ 19-21.) Plaintiff fails, however, to provide any facts 16 indicating that the unknown individual owed a "debt" to 17 Defendant. Rather, Plaintiff states that the unknown individual 18 19 owed financial obligations to Defendant, and "these alleged 20 obligations were money, property, or their equivalent...and therefor" constituted a "debt" as that term is defined by the 21 22 Rosenthal Act. Again, Plaintiff is simply reciting a definition 23 provided by the Rosenthal Act and making a conclusory statement that Defendant satisfies the definition without providing any 24 25 facts. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(d). With no factual support 26 for Plaintiff's conclusions, this Court cannot properly infer 27 that the calls were made for the purpose of collecting a debt. 28 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

Plaintiff contends that even if this court is unable to 1 "draw a reasonable inference", the First Amended Complaint is 2 sufficient because "the plaintiff expressly alleges that the 3 reason for these calls were [sic] in connection with collecting a 4 debt." (Resp. In Opp'n To Def.'s Mot.) Plaintiff fails to 5 specify any facts supporting his conclusion that these calls 6 related to debt collection. As already stated, a conclusory 7 statement, made without factual support, is not sufficient to 8 9 survive a 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiff's allegations appear to be no more than "labels and conclusions," which will not do. <u>See Iqbal</u>, 129 S. Ct. at 12 1949. The pleadings contained within Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are insufficient to raise a right to relief beyond the level of sheer speculation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED with leave to amend. The hearing scheduled for September 16, 2010 is accordingly taken off calender.

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Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint not later than twenty (20) days after the date this Memorandum and Order is filed electronically. If no amended complaint is filed within said twenty (20)-day period, Count I of Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend, and without further notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2010

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, MR.) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE