Doc. 6

While Marty's submission to the Court is all but incomprehensible, it appears to relate a claimed criminal conspiracy related to the alleged "kidnapping" of Marty's granddaughter. Marty alleges that the Superior Court has "been acting as a private commercial fictional court of consent" and seeks permanent injunction preventing both the Court and County from "continuing any hostile presentments and criminal conspiracy and racketeering activities against Libellant and his family." It also seeks orders dismissing, voiding, expunging and vacating court and public records involving some twenty different individuals and/or cases. Moreover, Marty's action seeks a writ of execution for damages allegedly totaling some 500 billion dollars, and Marty further seeks an order compelling the El Dorado County Recorder to record all maritime liens, commercial liens, and all other documents allegedly executed in his favor into the public record. ///

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¹While Marty's Motion itself is silent on this issue, his TRO Checklist appears to indicate that an expedited hearing is necessary because the "County is threatening to adopt child out and deny due process rights". No further explication of this claim is made, not to mention whether there is any immediate danger of such adoption occurring such that a regularly noticed, as opposed to emergency request, will not suffice. The propriety of a temporary restraining order, in particular, hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury (Simula, Inc. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999)) that must be imminent in Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

First, as a procedural matter, Marty has not complied with the provisions of Eastern District Local Rule 231 in seeking a temporary restraining order. While Marty has filed a TRO Checklist and purports to have included both an Affidavit detailing his efforts to provide notice, as required by Rule 231(c)(5), and an Affidavit in support of the existence of an irreparable injury pursuant to subsection (c)(4), no such Affidavits has been presented to the Court. Nor has a separate Complaint been filed, or any proposed order with provision for bond. Marty's request for temporary restraining order fails given those procedural shortcomings alone.

Second, in order to qualify for injunctive relief, Marty must, at minimum, demonstrate a "fair chance of success" that his claims will ultimately prevail on their merits. See, e.g.,

Johnson v. Calif. State Bd. Of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430

(9th Cir. 1995). This means that Marty must demonstrate some likelihood of obtaining a favorable result in her case in chief.

Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F.Supp.

1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

239 F.3d 1004, 1005, fn. 3 (9th Cir. 2001). No matter how severe or irreparable the injury asserted, an injunction should never issue if the moving party's claims are so legally untenable that there is virtually no chance of prevailing on the merits. State of Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A. 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975).

The inherent implausibility of the claims asserted by Marty makes it impossible for this Court to conclude there is any likelihood she will ultimately prevail.

Consequently the requested temporary restraining order cannot issue on that basis as well.

Given all the foregoing, Marty's Motion for Emergency Injunction is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2010

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, R.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE