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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM LEASURE,

Petitioner,

No. 2:10-cv-2847 MCE DAD P

vs.

MICHAEL MARTEL,

Respondent.

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

_____ /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the decision of the California Board of Parole Hearings (hereinafter “Board”) to deny him parole at his parole consideration hearing held on March 12, 2009. Petitioner claims that the Board’s decision violated both the Ex Post Facto Clause and his right to due process. The matter has been fully briefed by the parties and is submitted for decision. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied on his due process claim and that his Ex Post Facto claim be dismissed without prejudice.

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1 I. Procedural Background

2 Petitioner is confined pursuant to a 1991 judgment of conviction entered against
3 him in the Los Angeles County Superior Court following his conviction on two counts of second
4 degree murder. (Doc. 1, Ex. A.) Pursuant to that conviction, petitioner was sentenced to fifteen
5 years to life in state prison. (Id.)

6 The parole consideration hearing that is placed at issue by the instant federal
7 habeas petition was held on March 12, 2009. (Doc. 1-2.) Three days prior to that hearing, on
8 March 9, 2009, the Los Angeles County Superior Court granted petitioner’s habeas corpus
9 petition challenging the denial of his parole at a suitability hearing held in 2008. (Doc. No. 1 at
10 10.) In its order, the Los Angeles County Superior Court found that there was no evidence in the
11 record before the Board in 2008 that petitioner was then a current danger to society. (Doc. 1-4 at
12 1-4.) The Superior Court remanded the matter to the Board “to reconsider its decision and to
13 conduct a new hearing within ninety days to determine Petitioner’s eligibility for parole in
14 accordance with the requirements of due process.” (Id. at 4.) However, the parties were unaware
15 of the Superior Court’s order when they appeared three days later at petitioner’s next regularly
16 scheduled parole suitability hearing, on March 12, 2009. (Doc. No. 1 at 11.)

17 Petitioner appeared at and participated in the hearing on March 12, 2009. (Doc.
18 No. 1-2 at 6, et seq.) Following deliberations held at the conclusion of that hearing, the Board
19 panel announced their decision to deny petitioner parole for three years as well as the reasons for
20 that decision. (Id. at 139-48.) Subsequently, petitioner challenged the Board’s March 12, 2009
21 decision in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, apparently explaining to the Superior Court
22 that its March 9, 2009 decision was not known to the parties at the time of his March 12, 2009
23 parole hearing. According to petitioner, the Superior Court

24 ordered the Board to conduct a new hearing compliant with its
25 order. However, after a series of motions and orders in the trial
26 court, it vacated its order for a new hearing because the herein-
contested March 12, 2009, hearing – despite the Board’s having
reached the same conclusion based on the same findings that the

1 trial court had rejected – allegedly complied with due process, a
2 conundrum the trial court proposed to resolve by directing:
3 “Petitioner is free to challenge the validity of the Board’s March
12, 2009, order and to raise every issue he deems appropriate
[again].”

4 (Id.; see also Doc. No. 1-4 at 6.)

5 Petitioner then challenged the Board’s March 12, 2009 decision to deny him
6 parole in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
7 (Answer, Ex. 1.) Therein, petitioner claimed that the Board’s decision to deny him parole
8 violated his right to due process because there was insufficient evidence before the Board that he
9 posed a current risk to public safety if released. (Id.) In addition, petitioner argued that the
10 Board’s decision to defer his next parole suitability hearing for three years violated the Ex Post
11 Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. (Id.) The Los Angeles County Superior Court
12 denied the petition in a decision addressing the merits of petitioner’s claims. (Answer, Ex. 2.)
13 Petitioner subsequently challenged the Board’s 2009 decision in a petition for writ of habeas
14 corpus filed in the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District. (Answer, Ex.
15 3.) That petition was denied with citations to In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181 (2008), In re
16 Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241 (2008), In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1070-71 (2005), and In re
17 Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616 (2002). (Answer, Ex. 4.) Petitioner subsequently filed a petition
18 for review in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. 5.) That petition was summarily
19 denied. (Answer, Ex. 6.)

20 On October 21, 2010, petitioner filed his federal application for habeas relief in
21 this court.

22 II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

23 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a
24 judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the
25 United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the
26 interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct.

1 13, 16 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,
2 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

3 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal
4 habeas corpus relief:

5 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a
6 person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
7 not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on
8 the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
9 claim -

8 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
9 an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
10 determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

11 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
12 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
13 State court proceeding.

12 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists
13 of holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the state court decision. Stanley v.
14 Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06
15 (2000)). Nonetheless, “circuit court precedent may be persuasive in determining what law is
16 clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at
17 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)).

18 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a
19 rule contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme
20 Court precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640
21 (2003). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may
22 grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme
23 Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.¹

24
25 ¹ Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be
26 overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence
presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)).

1 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360
2 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ
3 simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court
4 decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that
5 application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v.
6 Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal
7 habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that
8 the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit
9 precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of
10 the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)
11 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for
12 obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s
13 ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was
14 an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
15 disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.

16 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a
17 reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v.
18 Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazy, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th
19 Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because
20 of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by
21 considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”).

22 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state
23 court judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.
24 2004). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning
25 from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the
26 reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

1 banc). “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied
2 relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence
3 of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at
4 784-85. This presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other
5 explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker,
6 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides
7 no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to
8 determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860;
9 Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is
10 not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can
11 determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at
12 853. Where no reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of
13 “showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct.
14 at 784.

15 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a
16 petitioner’s claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a
17 federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v.
18 Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir.
19 2003).

20 III. Scope of Review Applicable to Due Process Challenges to the Denial of Parole

21 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that
22 deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A litigant alleging a
23 due process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property interest
24 protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon the
25 deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson,
26 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989).

1 A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the
2 United States Constitution “by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty,’” or from “an
3 expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,
4 221 (2005). See also Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). The United States
5 Constitution does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a parole date, even
6 one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
7 Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (There is “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted
8 person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”). However, a
9 state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, “creates a presumption that parole release
10 will be granted” when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a
11 constitutional liberty interest. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12. See also Allen, 482 U.S. at 376-78.

12 California’s parole scheme gives rise to a liberty interest in parole protected by the
13 federal Due Process Clause. Pirtle v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 611 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th
14 Cir. 2010); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Swarthout v.
15 Cooke, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 859, 861-62 (2011) (finding the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
16 this regard to be a reasonable application of Supreme Court authority); Pearson v. Muntz, 639
17 F.3d 1185, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Swarthout v. Cooke did not disturb our precedent that
18 California law creates a liberty interest in parole.”) In California, a prisoner is entitled to release
19 on parole unless there is “some evidence” of his or her current dangerousness. In re Lawrence,
20 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1205-06, 1210 (2008); In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616, 651-53 (2002).

21 In Swarthout, the Supreme Court reviewed two cases in which California
22 prisoners were denied parole - in one case by the Board, and in the other by the Governor after
23 the Board had granted parole. Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 860-61. The Supreme Court noted that
24 when state law creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
25 requires fair procedures, “and federal courts will review the application of those constitutionally
26 required procedures.” Id. at 862. The Court concluded that in the parole context, however, “the

1 procedures required are minimal” and that the “Constitution does not require more” than “an
2 opportunity to be heard” and being “provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied.”
3 Id. (citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). The Supreme Court therefore rejected Ninth Circuit
4 decisions that went beyond these minimal procedural requirements and “reviewed the state
5 courts’ decisions on the merits and concluded that they had unreasonably determined the facts in
6 light of the evidence.” Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862. In particular, the Supreme Court rejected
7 the application of the “some evidence” standard to parole decisions by the California courts as a
8 component of the federal due process standard. Id. at 862-63. See also Pearson, 639 F.3d at
9 1191.²

10 IV. Petitioner’s Claims

11 A. Due Process

12 Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief on the grounds that the Board’s 2009
13 decision to deny him parole, and the findings upon which that denial was based, were not
14 supported by “some evidence” that he posed a current danger to society if released from prison.
15 (Doc. 1 at 26-41.) However, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Swarthout this court may not
16 review whether California’s “some evidence” standard was correctly applied in petitioner’s case.
17 131 S. Ct. at 862-63; see also Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 642
18 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court held in [Swarthout v.] Cooke that in the
19 context of parole eligibility decisions the due process right is *procedural*, and entitles a prisoner
20 to nothing more than a fair hearing and a statement of reasons for a parole board’s decision[.]”);
21 Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir. 2011) (under the decision in Swarthout,

23 ² In its per curiam opinion the Supreme Court did not acknowledge that for twenty-four
24 years the Ninth Circuit had consistently held that in order to comport with due process a state
25 parole board’s decision to deny parole had to be supported by “some evidence,” as defined in
26 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), that bore some indicia of reliability. See Jancsek v.
Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d
895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In Jancsek . . . we held that the process that is due in the parole
rescission setting is the same as the Supreme Court outlined in Superintendent v. Hill”)

1 California's parole scheme creates no substantive due process rights and any procedural due
2 process requirement is met as long as the state provides an inmate seeking parole with an
3 opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was denied); Pearson, 639
4 F.3d at 1191 (“While the Court did not define the minimum process required by the Due Process
5 Clause for denial parole under the California system, it made clear that the Clause’s requirements
6 were satisfied where the inmates ‘were allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest
7 the evidence against them, were afforded access to their records in advance, and were notified as
8 to the reasons why parole was denied.’”)

9 The federal habeas petition pending before the court in this case reflects that
10 petitioner was represented by counsel at his 2009 parole suitability hearing. (Doc. 1-2 at 5.) As
11 noted above, the record also establishes that at that hearing petitioner was given the opportunity
12 to be heard and received a statement of the reasons why parole was denied by the Board panel.
13 According to the United States Supreme Court that is all the process that was due petitioner
14 under the Constitution. Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. 862; see also Miller, 642 F.3d at 716; Roberts, 640
15 F.3d at 1045-46; Pearson, 640 F.3d at 1191. Therefore, it now plainly appears that petitioner is
16 not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to his due process claim. For these reasons, the
17 pending petition should be denied with respect to that claim.

18 B. Ex Post Facto Violation

19 Petitioner's next claim for relief is that application of the provisions of California
20 Proposition 9, also known as Marsy's Law, at his 2009 parole hearing violated the Ex Post Facto
21 Clause of the United States Constitution because it increased the deferral period for his next
22 parole suitability hearing and resulted in his serving a longer prison sentence. (Doc. 1 at 41.) As
23 discussed below, the undersigned finds this claim must be dismissed because petitioner is a
24 member of the class in Gilman v. Fisher, No. CIV S-05-830 LKK GGH (Gilman), a class action
25 lawsuit which addresses this issue.

26 //

1 The Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto
2 Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
3 Constitution if it: (1) punishes as criminal an act that was not criminal when it was committed;
4 (2) makes a crime’s punishment greater than when the crime was committed; or (3) deprives a
5 person of a defense available at the time the crime was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497
6 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). The Ex Post Facto Clause “is aimed at laws that retroactively alter the
7 definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.” Himes v. Thompson, 336
8 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 620 (9th Cir. 2002)).
9 See also Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504 (1995). The Ex Post Facto Clause is
10 also violated if: (1) state regulations have been applied retroactively; and (2) the new regulations
11 have created a “sufficient risk” of increasing the punishment attached to the crimes. Himes, 336
12 F.3d at 854. The retroactive application of a change in state parole procedures violates ex post
13 facto only if there exists a “significant risk” that such application will increase the punishment
14 for the crime. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 259 (2000).

15 Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison in 1991,
16 seventeen years prior to the passage of Marsy’s Law in November 2008. Marsy’s Law amended
17 California law governing parole deferral periods. See Gilman v. Davis, 690 F. Supp.2d 1105,
18 1109–13 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining
19 enforcement of Marsy’s Law, to the extent it amended former California Penal Code §
20 3041.5(b)(2)(A)), rev’d sub nom. Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2011).
21 Prior to the enactment of Marsy’s Law, the Board deferred subsequent parole suitability hearings
22 with respect to indeterminately-sentenced inmates for one year unless the Board determined it
23 was unreasonable to expect that parole could be granted the following year. If that determination
24 was made, the Board could then defer the inmate’s subsequent parole suitability hearing for up to
25 five years. See Cal. Pen. Code § 3041.5(b)(2) (2008). Marsy’s Law, which applied to petitioner
26 at the time of his 2009 parole suitability hearing, amended § 3041.5(b)(2) to impose a minimum

1 deferral period for subsequent parole suitability hearings of three years, and to authorize the
2 Board's deferral of a subsequent parole hearing for up to seven, ten, or fifteen years. Id. §
3 3041.5(b)(3) (2010).

4 One of the claims presented by the plaintiffs in the class action Gilman case is that
5 the amendments to § 3041.5(b)(2) regarding parole deferral periods imposed under Marsy's Law
6 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because "when applied retroactively, [they] create a significant
7 risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the original crime." (Gilman, Doc. No.
8 154-1 at 13 (Fourth Amended/Supplemental Complaint), Doc. No. 183 (Mar. 4, 2009 Order
9 granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a Fourth Amended/Supplemental Complaint.)) With
10 respect to this Ex Post Facto claim, the class in Gilman is comprised of "all California state
11 prisoners who have been sentenced to a life term with possibility of parole for an offense that
12 occurred before November 4, 2008." (Gilman, Doc. No. 340 (Apr. 25, 2011 Order amending
13 definition of class.)) The Gilman plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including a
14 permanent injunction enjoining the Board from enforcing the amendments to § 3041.5(b) enacted
15 by Marsy's Law and requiring that the Board conduct a new parole consideration hearing for
16 each member of the class. (Gilman, Doc. No. 154-1 (Fourth Amended/Supplemental Complaint)
17 at 14.)

18 In a class action for injunctive relief certified under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal
19 Rules of Civil Procedure a court may, but is not required to, permit members to opt-out of the
20 suit. Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 487 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994). In certifying the Gilman class,
21 the district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the requirement of Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2)
22 that "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
23 the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
24 respecting the class as a whole." (See Gilman, Doc. No. 182 (Mar. 4, 2009 Order certifying class
25 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), Doc. No. 257 (June 3, 2010 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
26 Memorandum affirming district court's order certifying class.)) According to the district court in

1 Gilman, the members of the class “may not maintain a separate, individual suit for equitable
2 relief involving the same subject matter of the class action.” (Gilman, Doc. No. 296 (Dec.10,
3 2010 Order) at 2; see also Doc. No. 278 (Oct. 1, 2010 Order), Doc. No. 276 (Sept. 28, 2010
4 Order), Doc. No. 274 (Sept. 23, 2010 Order.)) There is no evidence before the court at this time
5 in this habeas action suggesting that petitioner has requested permission to opt out of the Gilman
6 class action lawsuit.

7 Rather, petitioner alleges he is a California state prisoner who was sentenced to a
8 life term in state prison with the possibility of parole for an offense that occurred before
9 November 4, 2008. (Pet. at 1.) Accepting petitioner’s allegations as true, he is a member of the
10 Gilman class. Similar to the plaintiffs in Gilman, petitioner in this habeas action alleges that
11 Marsy’s Law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because, when applied retroactively, it creates a
12 risk of increasing the length of his punishment. Petitioner asks the court to issue a writ of habeas
13 corpus. However, even if the court found that the Board’s 2009 three-year deferral of petitioner’s
14 next parole suitability hearing violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, it would not entitle petitioner to
15 release on parole. Because his Ex Post Facto claim concerns only the timing of petitioner’s next
16 parole suitability hearing, success on that claim would not necessarily result in determinations
17 that petitioner is suitable for release from custody on parole. Rather, petitioner’s equitable relief
18 would be limited to an order directing the Board to conduct a new parole suitability hearing and
19 enjoining the Board from enforcing against petitioner any provisions of Marsy’s Law found to be
20 unconstitutional. This is the same relief petitioner would be entitled to as a member of the
21 pending Gilman class action. (See Gilman, Doc. No. 154–1 (Fourth Amended/Supplemental
22 Complaint) at 14.)

23 Therefore, it appears clear that petitioner’s rights will be fully protected by his
24 participation as a class member in the Gilman case. Accordingly, the court recommends that
25 petitioner’s Ex Post Facto claim presented by him in this federal habeas action be dismissed
26 without prejudice to any relief that may be available to him as a member of the Gilman class.

1 See Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1979) (“A court may choose not to exercise its
2 jurisdiction when another court having jurisdiction over the same matter has entertained it and
3 can achieve the same result.”); see also McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991)
4 (“Individual suits for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional prison
5 conditions cannot be brought where there is an existing class action.”); Gillespie v. Crawford,
6 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.1988) (“To allow individual suits would interfere with the orderly
7 administration of the class action and risk inconsistent adjudications.”); Johnson v. Parole Board,
8 No. CV 12–3756–GHK (CW), 2012 WL 3104867, at * (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2012)
9 (recommending dismissal of petitioner’s Ex Post Facto challenge to Proposition 9 “without
10 prejudice in light of the ongoing Gilman class action.”) (and cases cited therein), report and
11 recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 3104863 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).

12 V. Conclusion

13 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

- 14 1. Federal habeas relief be denied as to petitioner’s due process claim; and
- 15 2. Petitioner’s claim that his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause were violated
16 by the Board’s 2009 decision to defer his next parole consideration hearing for a period of three
17 years be dismissed without prejudice to any relief that may be available to petitioner as a member
18 of the class in Gilman v. Fisher, 05-0830 LKK GGH P.

19 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
20 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen
21 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
22 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
23 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections
24 shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file
25 objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.

26 ////

1 Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
2 1991).

3 In any objections he elects to file, petitioner may address whether a certificate of
4 appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule
5 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a
6 certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant); Hayward v.
7 Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (prisoners are required to obtain a certificate of
8 appealability to review the denial of a habeas petition challenging an administrative decision
9 such as the denial of parole by the parole board).

10 DATED: October 5, 2012.

11
12 
13 _____
14 DALE A. DROZD
15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14 DAD:8:
15 leasure2847.hc