[her] father's suit of similar interest." "[I]n the absence of a legitimate reason to recuse [], 'a judge should participate in cases assigned." United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, judges "are as bound to recuse

24

25

26

Doc. 61

[themselves] when the law and facts require as [they] are to hear cases when there is no reasonable factual basis for [their] recusal." *Id.* "In analyzing [a] § 455(a) disqualification motion[], [the court] employ[s] an objective test: 'whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned."" *Clemens v. United States Dist. Court*, 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Herrington v. Cnty of Sonoma*, 834 F.2d 1488, 1502 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation omitted)). Section 455(a) analysis is fact driven. *Id.* "[S]peculation" and "prior rulings in . . . another proceeding" are generally insufficient for a § 455(a) recusal. *See id.* at 1178-79 (internal quotation omitted).

Here, having carefully reviewed plaintiff's complaint and the pending motion, the court concludes that no reasonable person could "perceive[] a significant risk that the [undersigned] will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits." *Id.* at 1178 (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, the undersigned does not recuse herself and this motion is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 21, 2012.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE