IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 SHAI ALKEBU-LAN,

Plaintiff,

No. 2:11-cv-0291 LKK KJN P

VS.

K. DICKINSON, Warden, et al.,

Defendants.

Defendants. ORDER

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

On April 16, 2013, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations herein which were served on all parties and which contained notice to all parties that any objections to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within fourteen days. Plaintiff has filed objections to the findings and recommendations.

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, this court has conducted a <u>de novo</u> review of this case. Upon careful review of the entire file, the court declines to adopt the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations.

The magistrate judge found Plaintiff's allegations that he faced "imminent" danger of serious

physical injury to be unsubstantiated because, at the time of filing the initial complaint, "the alleged danger had been 'imminent' for a period of two years, and the only relief sought by plaintiff was damages." Findings & Recommendations, ECF NO. 41, at 5. This court cannot agree with the magistrate judge's interpretation of Plaintiff's original complaint.

In Plaintiff's original complaint, Plaintiff claimed that his "life has been under imminent danger of serious physical injury" "from 11-25-2008 to present" because Defendants "subjected Petitioner to a series of psychological and physical tortures, including lacing his canteen with hallucin[o]genic drugs which caused mental health issues/placement, [and] near death." Pl's Compl., ECF No. 1, at 3. As relief, Plaintiff requested, in part, "the termination of all employees/defendants involved and the disbanding of all State of California prison unions which condoned this criminal behavior." <u>Id.</u> at 3-4.

The fact that Plaintiff alleged that he faced "imminent" danger for a period of two years before he filed his original complaint does not cut against his argument that the danger was imminent. Plaintiff's complaint appears to allege that the Defendants' actions were continuous and ongoing over the course of those two years prior to the initial filing. As such, any resulting "danger of serious physical injury" that Plaintiff faced over the course of those two years was likely ongoing as well. The alleged ongoing nature of Defendants' actions bolsters, as opposed to diminishes, Plaintiff's claims that the danger he faced was "imminent." See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007) ("a prisoner who alleges that prison officials continue with a practice that has injured him or others similarly situated in the past will satisfy the 'ongoing danger' standard and meet the imminence prong of the three-strikes exception").

Although Plaintiff's request that the court terminate "all employees/defendants involved" and disband "all State of California prison unions which condoned this criminal behavior" is, to say the least, overbroad, it appears to this court to be a clear request for injunctive relief, in addition to Plaintiff's request for damages.

As to Plaintiff's second amended complaint, the magistrate judge found that "Plaintiff did

not seek injunctive relief," but instead, "seeks only damages . . . without reference to any current danger of serious physical injury." Findings & Recommendations, ECF NO. 41, at 5.

Plaintiff, however, does seek injunctive relief in his second amended complaint. Plaintiff asks the court to "terminate Defendants" and to "rule an injunction to end all CDCR unions and for the federal government to take control of all CDCR prisons and California's prison industrial complex." Pl's Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 24, at 3. Again, even though Plaintiff's requested relief is more than unlikely to be granted, it does present a request for injunctive relief, in addition to his sought damages.

Furthermore, Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief refers, at least in part, to the allegations in his second amended complaint that he "has lost some vision in his right eye, has emotional breakdowns, and suffered a heart attack" as a result of Defendants' administration of unwanted medications to Plaintiff. See id. at 6, 8, 11, 12. At this threshold stage, the court finds that Plaintiff's assertions regarding his lost vision, emotional breakdowns, and prior heart attack sufficiently demonstrate that he alleges a current danger of serious physical injury. See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1057 ("§ 1915(g) merely establishes a threshold procedural question and does not ask the court to evaluate the merits of the suit").

In any event, the explicitness with which a prisoner plaintiff requests injunctive relief should not determine whether he has sufficiently alleged an "imminent danger of serious physical injury." One can imagine a scenario in which a prisoner plaintiff, who has previously filed three insufficient lawsuits, would then file a clear and genuine claim that he faces imminent serious physical injury at the hands of a defendant. If that plaintiff fails to specifically request that the court enjoin the defendant's behavior, or fails to properly articulate his desire that the behavior cease, that failure should not diminish the sufficiency of his primary and basic assertion that he faces an imminent danger of serious physical injury. To find otherwise would be to create, by a judicial sleight of hand, additional hurdles for the prisoner plaintiff to overcome: in addition to showing that he is "under imminent danger of serious physical injury," as required by the statute, the court would also be

implicitly requiring the plaintiff to allege that he wishes that threat would stop, by a court order enjoining said behavior.

For these reasons, the court DECLINES to adopt the magistrate judge's April 16, 2013 finding that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an "imminent danger of serious physical injury" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The court REMANDS this case to the magistrate judge for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 9, 2013.

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT