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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ICONFIND, INC.,

Plaintiff,

No. CIV S:2:11-cv-0319-GEB-JFM

vs.

GOOGLE, INC.,

Defendant.

ORDER

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The court held a hearing on July 28, 2011 on two discovery disputes. Daniel Baxter and Anna Folgers appeared for plaintiff. Kenneth Maikish appeared for defendant. Upon review of the joint discovery statements, upon hearing the arguments of counsel and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This patent infringement suit is proceeding on plaintiff's February 3, 2011 complaint and defendant's March 24, 2011 counterclaims. On June 4, 2011, the parties filed a joint discovery statement concerning the inclusion of a prosecution bar in a protective order. On July 21, 201, the parties filed a joint discovery statement concerning the number of interrogatories propounded by plaintiff.

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1 DISCUSSION

2 A. Prosecution Bar

3 The parties first dispute the inclusion of a prosecution bar in a protective order.  
4 Defendant Google proposes adding the prosecution bar. Plaintiff Iconfind opposes its inclusion.

5 The prosecution bar, as initially proposed by Google, reads:

6 Any person reviewing any of an opposing party’s Confidential Materials,  
7 Confidential Outside Counsel Only Materials or Source Code (all of which shall  
8 also be automatically designated as “Prosecution Bar Materials”) shall not, for a  
9 period commencing upon receipt of such information and ending one year  
10 following the conclusion of this case (including any appeals) engage in any  
11 Prosecution Activity (as defined below) on behalf of a party asserting a patent in  
12 this case. Furthermore, any person reviewing any of an opposing party’s  
13 Prosecution Bar Materials shall not, for a period commencing upon receipt of  
14 such information and ending one year following last reviewing such Prosecution  
15 Bar Material engage in any Prosecution Activity involving claims on a method,  
16 apparatus, or system that involve coding, categorizing, and/or retrieving  
17 information from a computer network.

18 Prosecution Activity shall mean any activity related to the competitive  
19 business decisions involving the preparation or prosecution (for any person or  
20 entity) of patent applications relating to coding, categorizing, and/or retrieving  
21 information from a computer network or advising or counseling clients regarding  
22 the same, including but not limited to providing any advice, counseling or  
23 drafting of claims for any patent application, reexamination, or reissue  
24 application. Notwithstanding the above, with respect to any reexamination  
25 relating to the patent-in-suit in this matter, an attorney who reviews an opposing  
26 party’s Prosecution Bar Materials may participate in such a reexamination to the  
extent limited to assisting reexamination counsel with respect to issues relating to  
the characterization of the prior art but, in no event, relating to amending or  
adding additional claims. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent any attorney  
from sending nonconfidential prior art to an attorney involved in patent  
prosecution for purposes of ensuring that such prior art is submitted to the U.S.  
Patent and Trademark Office (or any similar agency of a foreign government) to  
assist a patent applicant in complying with its duty of candor. Nothing in this  
provision shall prohibit any attorney of record in this litigation from discussing  
any aspect of this case that is reasonably necessary for the prosecution or defense  
of any claim or counterclaim in this litigation with his/her client. The parties  
expressly agree that the Prosecution Bar set forth herein shall be personal to any  
attorney who reviews Prosecution Bar Materials and shall not be imputed to any  
other persons or attorneys at the attorneys' law firm. It is expressly agreed that  
attorneys who work on this matter without reviewing Prosecution Bar Materials  
shall not be restricted from engaging in Prosecution Activity on matters that fall  
within the Prosecution Bar.

Joint Statement, Ex. A at 10-11.

1           1.     Applicable Legal Standards

2           A party seeking a protective order has the burden of showing good cause for its  
3 issuance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The same is true for a party seeking to include in a protective  
4 order a provision effecting a prosecution bar. In re Deutsche Bank Trust Co., 605 F.3d 1373,  
5 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Despite provisions in protective orders that specify that information  
6 designated as confidential may be used only for purposes of the current litigation, courts  
7 recognize that “there may be circumstances in which even the most rigorous efforts of the  
8 recipient of such [sensitive] information to preserve confidentiality in compliance ... with a  
9 protective order may not prevent inadvertent compromise.” Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1378.  
10 Accordingly, courts authorize the inclusion of prosecution bars in protective orders as a less  
11 drastic alternative to the disqualification of counsel or experts. See, e.g., Cummins-Alison Corp.  
12 v. Glory Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23653, at \*29-30 (E.D. Ill. 2003). “The determination of  
13 whether a protective order should include a patent prosecution bar is a matter governed by  
14 Federal Circuit law,” and a party seeking to include a prosecution bar in a protective order  
15 carries the burden of showing good cause for its inclusion. Deutsche Bank, 605 F.3d at 1378.

16           a.     “Competitive Decisionmaking”

17           In order to prevail, Google must show that the prosecution bar is necessary in  
18 light of the risk presented by the disclosure of proprietary competitive information. To show this  
19 risk, Google must first present sufficient facts to demonstrate that counsel here are involved in  
20 “competitive decisionmaking” for Iconfind. The Federal Circuit defines “competitive  
21 decisionmaking” as “shorthand for a counsel’s activities, association, and relationship with a  
22 client that are such as to involve counsel’s advice and participation in any or all of the client’s  
23 decisions (pricing, product design, etc.) made in light of similar or corresponding information  
24 about a competitor.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465, 1468 n.3 (Fed. Cir.  
25 1984). Deutsche Bank refined U.S. Steel by clarifying that not every patent prosecution attorney  
26 is necessarily involved in competitive decisionmaking. 605 F.3d 1379. In so finding, the court

1 distinguished administrative and oversight duties from activities in which counsel play a  
2 “significant role in crafting the content of patent applications or advising clients on the direction  
3 to take their portfolios.” Id. at 1379-80. The court explained that the latter group of activities –  
4 including “strategically amending or surrendering claim scope during prosecution”– posed a  
5 more significant risk of inadvertent disclosure than the former. Id. In order to determine the  
6 risk, the court is required to “examine all relevant facts surrounding counsel’s actual preparation  
7 and prosecution activities, on a counsel-by-counsel basis.” Id. at 1380.

8 b. Scope of the Prosecution Bar v. Risk to Opposing Party

9 Once a risk of inadvertent disclosure has been shown, under Deutsche Bank,  
10 which represents the controlling law in this dispute, Google then bears the burden of showing as  
11 a threshold matter that the proposed prosecution bar “reasonably reflect[s] the risk presented by  
12 the disclosure of proprietary competitive information.” 605 F.3d at 1381. This threshold inquiry  
13 essentially measures whether a prosecution bar is reasonable: that is, that “the information  
14 designed to trigger the bar, the scope of activities prohibited by the bar, the duration of the bar  
15 and the subject matter covered by the bar reasonably reflect the risk presented by the disclosure  
16 of proprietary competitive information.” Id. If the moving party meets this threshold  
17 requirement, the court must then weigh the risk of inadvertent disclosure by individuals involved  
18 in competitive decisionmaking against the potential injury to the party deprived of its counsel of  
19 choice. Id.

20 2. The Parties’ Positions

21 a. Iconfind

22 Generally, Iconfind opposes the proposed prosecution bar as sweeping and  
23 unnecessary. It argues that, as phrased, Google’s prosecution bar would bar *any person* that has  
24 accessed *confidential* information from participating on behalf of *any client* in *any activity*  
25 related to those *matters that fall within the Prosecution Bar*.

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1 Specifically, Iconfind argues that:

- 2 • Proper measures currently exist to protect against inadvertent  
3 disclosure through the terms of the protective order;
- 4 • The proposed prosecution bar is overbroad in that applies to not  
5 just “Highly Confidential” information, but also to those that are  
6 merely “Confidential”;
- 7 • As phrased, the bar applies not just to counsel, but to “any person.”  
8 Iconfind argues that there is no evidence that counsel (or any  
9 expert / consultant) is or will be involved in any competitive  
10 decision-making: there are no pending patent applications,  
11 Iconfind cannot file for any continuation of the patent-in-suit or  
12 any reissue application that could broaden the claims of the patent-  
13 in-suit. Even if the prosecution bar was limited to counsel, only  
14 two of the four attorneys for Iconfind passed the patent bar and,  
15 thus, are eligible to prosecute patents;
- 16 • The bar applies to prosecution and reexamination activities for any  
17 possible client, not just Iconfind. This argument is too reaching as  
18 to counsel. This argument also creates an undue burden on  
19 Iconfind who would have to hire a separate law firm to conduct  
20 two separate legal actions concerning the same matter.  
21 Additionally, any information revealed by Google in this case is  
22 irrelevant to a reexamination proceeding by definition; and
- 23 • The subject matter of the barred activities is too broad.

24 Assuming the court finds that a prosecution bar is necessary, Iconfind asks that it  
25 be limited to apply: (1) to Prosecution Activities (as defined by Google) with respect to Iconfind  
26 and not any other client that a party may in the future represent; (2) cover only “Highly  
Confidential” (or Source Code) information; and (3) exclude reexamination proceedings.

27 b. Google

28 Google counters that a prosecution bar is necessary because primary counsel for  
29 Iconfind are prominent plaintiffs’ attorneys who have a history of filing suit against Google.  
30 It then argues that the prosecution bar is bi-lateral and narrowly tailored, consisting of three  
31 parts:

- 32 • A prohibition on persons who have actually viewed confidential

1 information<sup>1</sup> from working on additional prosecution for Iconfind  
2 until one year after the resolution of this matter;

- 3 • A prohibition on persons who have actually viewed confidential  
4 material from working on prosecution matters for anyone on  
5 technology similar to what is covered by the patent-in-suit for a  
6 period of one year after the last time the confidential material was  
7 viewed by that person (regardless of whether the case remains  
8 ongoing); and
- 9 • A limited prohibition on persons who have actually viewed  
10 confidential information from participating in a reexamination of  
11 the patent-in-suit save with respect to the characterization of the  
12 prior art. Google states that this balances Iconfind's interests in not  
13 having to bring two sets of counsel up-to-speed on prior art with  
14 Google's interest in protecting its internal and confidential  
15 technical documents.

16 3. Analysis

17 Before defending the scope of the proposed prosecution bar, which it does at  
18 length in the joint statement, Google bears an initial burden of demonstrating that the risk of  
19 inadvertent disclosure necessitates the inclusion of a prosecution bar. As discussed earlier, this  
20 determination is made on a counsel-by-counsel basis. As to this issue, Google argues only that  
21 primary counsel for Iconfind are prominent plaintiffs' attorneys who have a history of filing suit  
22 against Google. This type of argument, however, has been rejected by numerous courts. See  
23 SmartSignal Corp. v. Expert Microsystems, Inc., 2006 WL 1343647, at \*6 (N.D. Ill. May 12,  
24 2006) (denying plaintiff's proposed prosecution bar despite defendant's outside counsel  
25 representing the defendant in patent prosecution work and representation of more than fifty  
26 clients on biotechnology matters, including the area involved in the underlying action); AFP  
Advanced Food Products LLC v. Snyder's of Hanover Manufacturing, Inc., 2006 WL 47374, at  
\*2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) (denying defendant's prosecution bar that would prevent the plaintiff's  
attorneys from prosecuting new patents for the plaintiff for a period of two years based on

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<sup>1</sup> In response to Iconfind's argument that only "Highly Confidential" information be covered, Google proposes a new category called "Prosecution Bar Material," which consists of designated Confidential Materials, Confidential Outside Counsel Only Materials or Source Code.

1 insufficient facts).

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3           There is no reason for the court to believe that Iconfind’s counsel will not strictly  
4 follow the protective order and refrain from using, either inadvertently or intentionally, Google’s  
5 confidential information. Furthermore, barring Iconfind’s counsel from prosecuting similar  
6 patents for any period of time following this suit or from the time they viewed the confidential  
7 information, without some tangible reason or good cause other than the general threat of  
8 inadvertent misuse of discovered materials, is the exact type of overly broad and generalized fear  
9 rejected by the Federal Circuit in U.S. Steel, In re Sibia and Deutsche Bank.

10           Because Google has not met its initial burden of showing that there exists a risk  
11 of inadvertent disclosure (i.e., that Iconfind’s counsel participate in “competitive  
12 decisionmaking”) the court does not find that a prosecution bar is necessary.

13 B.     Number of Interrogatories

14           In their second discovery dispute, the parties are in disagreement as to the number  
15 of interrogatories plaintiff served on defendant on May 17, 2011.

16       1.     The Parties’ Positions

17           On May 17, 2011, plaintiff served on defendant its First Set of Interrogatories No.  
18 1-16. On May 26, 2011, Google objected to the requests on the basis that many of IconFind’s  
19 interrogatories contain discrete subparts, thereby far exceeding the 25-interrogatory limit of  
20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33. Google informed IconFind that it would respond to what it  
21 counted as the first 25 interrogatories and then object to the remaining ones. At the May 30,  
22 2011 meet and confer, IconFind requested that Google stipulate to seventy-five interrogatories.  
23 Google declined the request. Thus, in an effort to expedite discovery, IconFind withdrew all but  
24 what amounted to (by Google’s calculations) 25 interrogatories.

25           IconFind does not agree with Google that their interrogatories contain subparts.  
26 However, if the court finds that they do, IconFind seeks leave to serve an additional fifty

1 interrogatories (for seventy-five total).

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3 2. Analysis

4 The court has reviewed the interrogatories at issue. Assuming, without deciding,  
5 that Google's contentions are correct, the court hereby grants plaintiff leave to serve an  
6 additional fifty interrogatories, for seventy-five interrogatories total.

7 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

- 8 1. The proposed order shall not include a prosecution bar; and
- 9 2. Plaintiff is granted leave to serve an additional fifty interrogatories.

10 DATED: August 8, 2011.

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13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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