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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
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11	LINNIE STAGGS, as Administrator of	No. 2:11-cv-00414-MCE-KJN	
12	the ESTATE OF ROBERT E. STAGGS, Deceased, and MELISSA		
13	STAGGS,	MEMORANDUM AND ORDER	
14	Plaintiffs,		
15	V.		
16	DOCTOR'S HOSPITAL OF MANTECA, INC., et al.,		
17	Defendants.		
18		I	
19	Through this action, Plaintiffs Linnie Staggs, as administrator of the Estate of		
20	Robert E. Staggs, and Melissa Staggs (collectively, "Plaintiffs") seek redress from		
21	defendant Doctor's Hospital of Manteca, Inc. ("DHM"), and a number of individual		
22	defendants regarding the medical treatment and subsequent death of Robert E. Staggs		
23	("Decedent") while in custody at the Sierra Conservation Center ("SCC"). Presently		
24	before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 102) and		
25	Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended T	hird Amended Complaint ("ATAC") by	
26	Defendants Sattah, DHM and Benak. ¹		
27	¹ The Court ordered Plaintiffs to file an Amended Third Amended Complaint to clarify the intent and effect of certain allegations in Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint pursuant to the stipulated		

²⁸ and effect of certain allegations in Plaintiffs Third A understanding of all parties. ECF No. 77.

1	For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to
2	Amend ("Motion"). As a result, the Motions to Dismiss are DENIED as moot. ²
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4	BACKGROUND
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6	In their ATAC, Plaintiffs allege causes of action for violations of the Eighth and
7	Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, violation of California Government
8	Code section 845.6, negligence, violation of California Civil Code section 2.1, and
9	wrongful death. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that various medical officials at SCC and
10	DHM were deliberately indifferent and negligent in diagnosing and treating Decedent's
11	multiple liver diseases. They aver that Defendants' decision to subject Decedent to a
12	risky biopsy procedure resulted in excruciating pain and suffering and, ultimately,
13	Decedent's untimely death.
14	The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' First and Fifth Claims for Relief for
15	violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to state a claim. In doing
16	so, the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
17	claims. ECF No. 88. On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the dismissal of
18	Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, finding that it properly stated a claim that Defendants St.
19	Clair, Bangi, Krpan and Benak were deliberately indifferent to Decedent's right to
20	adequate and necessary healthcare. ECF No. 94.
21	Shortly after the Court re-opened this action, Defendants filed their instant
22	Motions to Dismiss and Plaintiffs filed their current Motion to Amend, all of which were
23	timely opposed. Plaintiffs' proposed Fourth Amended Complaint seeks to include new
24	claims under § 1983 on behalf of Plaintiffs, in their individual capacities, for deprivations
25	of Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to familial association with
26	Decedent, as well as the loss of companionship they suffered as a result of Decedent's
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28	² Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

death. Furthermore, Plaintiffs seek to add § 1983 claims against Defendants Sattah and
 DHM for their deliberate indifference to Decedent's serious medical needs. The
 Proposed Fourth Amended Complaint also omits one sentence from the previous
 complaint regarding general rates of survival for individuals afflicted with one of
 Decedent's medical conditions.

STANDARD

9 Generally, a motion for leave to amend a pleading is subject to Rule 15(a), which 10 provides that "[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires." 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts interpret Rule 15(a) with "extreme liberality." Eminence 12 Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit 13 applies this liberal policy of amendment of pleadings so long as the case management 14 scheduling order setting the deadline for amendment of pleadings has not passed. 15 Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). If the movant 16 articulates a reason why amendment is needed, the "burden then shifts to the opposing 17 party to persuade the court that 'justice' requires denial." Stoddart v. Express Services, 18 Inc., No. 2:12–cv–01054, 2015 WL 1812833 at *2 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 2015).

19 In exercising its discretion to permit or deny a party to amend its pleading, Ninth 20 Circuit courts consider five factors: (1) whether the amendment was filed with undue 21 delay; (2) whether the movant has requested the amendment in bad faith or as a dilatory 22 tactic; (3) whether the movant was allowed to make previous amendments which failed 23 to correct deficiencies of the complaint; (4) whether the amendment will unduly prejudice 24 the opposing party; and (5) whether the amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 25 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Whether amendment will unduly prejudice the opposing party 26 is the most important factor in a court's analysis under Rule 15(a). Eminence Capital, 27 316 F.3d at 1052.

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1	ANALYSIS
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3	Plaintiffs argue that they need to amend their complaint to include additional
4	claims under § 1983 and add a new claim for loss of companionship. They also seek to
5	omit a paragraph from the ATAC concerning the general survival rate of patients with
6	one of Decedent's medical conditions. Since Plaintiffs have articulated a reason why
7	amendment is needed, Defendants must persuade the Court that justice requires denial
8	of Plaintiffs' Motion. Stoddart v. Express Services, Inc., 2015 WL 1812833 at *2. To that
9	end, Defendants principally argue that the Foman factors of prejudice, futility and undue
10	delay militate in favor of denying Plaintiffs' Motion. Setting the Foman factors aside,
11	Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs should not be permitted to amend the ATAC to
12	remove allegations about the survival rate of patients with one of Decedent's medical
13	conditions. As explained below, Defendants' arguments are unpersuasive.
14	A. The <u>Foman</u> Analysis
15	DHM and Dr. Sattah argue that they would be prejudiced by the proposed
16	amendments because of stipulations that the § 1983 claims alleged in previous
17	complaints did not apply to them and because the events that engendered those claims

18 occurred nearly six years ago. Defendants' arguments are not well-taken.

Ninth Circuit courts have found undue prejudice where the "parties have engaged 19 in voluminous and protracted discovery prior to amendment" and where filing an 20 amended complaint would have led to "the nullification of prior discovery, increase the 21 burden of necessary future discovery," or required the relitigation of a previous suit. 22 <u>Utterkar v. Ebix</u>, 14-CV-02250, 2015 WL 5027986 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2015). 23 Defendants do not and cannot point to any of these potentially deleterious effects in 24 opposing the instant Motion. The parties have not yet engaged in any discovery. 25 Furthermore, Plaintiffs' proposed § 1983 claims depend upon essentially the same 26 alleged conduct as the negligence claims previously asserted against Dr. Sattah and 27 DHM. There is thus no risk that amendment would substantially increase the burden of 28

necessary future discovery or that Defendants will be prejudiced in their ability to defend
 against these allegations. <u>See id.</u>

Finally as to undue prejudice, although it is true that Plaintiffs' repeatedly
stipulated that § 1983 claims alleged in previous complaints did not apply to DHM and
Dr. Sattah, those stipulations were limited to the previous complaints to which they
related. <u>See, e.g.,</u> ECF No. 79. More importantly, Defendants have failed to meet their
burden of showing that their reliance on those stipulations would now prejudice them
with respect to Plaintiffs' proposed Fourth Amended Complaint.

9 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to establish that granting
10 Plaintiffs' Motion will result in undue prejudice. Defendants must therefore make a
11 strong showing that one of the remaining <u>Foman</u> factors favors denial of Plaintiffs'
12 Motion in order to defeat the presumption in favor of granting the Motion. <u>Eminence</u>
13 <u>Capital</u>, 316 F.3d at 1052. They have not.

Defendant Benak's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion on the grounds of futility is
moot. Benak argues that Plaintiffs' proposed Second Cause of Action is futile because
Plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim for failure to summon medical care against a health
care provider under California Government Code section 845.6. ECF No. 109.
Plaintiffs, however, have expressly waived their claim under Government Code section
845.6 with respect to Benak. ECF No. 110, at 3. Accordingly, Benak has failed to
establish that Plaintiffs' proposed amendments are futile.³

Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs unduly delayed bringing § 1983 claims
against Dr. Sattah and DHM. However, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that
denying leave to amend solely on the grounds of undue delay is an abuse of discretion.
<u>Bowles v. Reade</u>, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999); <u>United States v. Webb</u>, 655 F.2d
977, 980 (9th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, Defendants cannot meet their burden of
persuading the court that justice requires denial based solely on an argument of undue

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 ³ In accordance with their waiver, the Court directs Plaintiffs to ensure that their Fourth Amended
 Complaint removes any reference to Defendant Benak in their Second Cause of Action.

delay. <u>Stoddart v. Express Services, Inc.</u>, No. 2:12–cv–01054, 2015 WL 1812833 at *2
 (E.D. Cal. April 20, 2015). Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend thus survives the Foman analysis.

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B. Survival Rate Allegations

Defendants DHM and Sattah alternatively assert that if Plaintiffs are permitted to
amend their complaint, the Court should forbid them from deleting the allegations about
survival rates contained in Paragraph 39 of the ATAC. Defendant Sattah argues that the
Court should strike any changes to Paragraph 39 as a sham, while DHM suggests that
<u>United States v. McKeon</u>, 738 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1984) forbids a party from altering
factual allegations made in previous pleadings.

Both of Defendants' arguments are baseless. Defendant Sattah provides no
evidence that removing the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 would make a sham
out of Plaintiffs' proposed Fourth Amended Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiffs' decision to
delete allegations about the survival rates of patients with hepatocellular carcinoma does
not create a contradiction that supports a finding of any kind of fraud. <u>See Stearns v.</u>
Select Comfort Retail Corp., 763 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1144-45.

16 Furthermore, McKeon does not forbid a plaintiff from changing or deleting 17 previously pled factual allegations in an amended complaint. Instead, McKeon 18 explained that previous pleadings constitute "the admissions of a party-opponent and 19 are admissible" to show that a plaintiff changed her stories. 738 F.2d 26, 31. Here, 20 Defendants may exploit at trial Plaintiffs' decision to remove the survival rate allegations. 21 Defendants cannot seriously contend, however, that Plaintiffs are forbidden from 22 removing such allegations from an amended complaint. Because Defendants have 23 failed to meet their burden of showing that justice requires denying Plaintiffs leave to 24 amend, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion.

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1	CONCLUSION	
2	CONCLUSION	
3	For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs' Motion (ECF No. 102) is GRANTED.	
4	Plaintiffs are directed to file their Fourth Amended Complaint no later than twenty (20)	
5	days from the date this order is electronically filed. Defendants' pending Motions to	
6	Dismiss (ECF Nos. 98, 99, 103) are accordingly DENIED as moot. If Defendants choose	
7	to challenge Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint under Rule 12, the Court expects that	
8	Defendants will file a single, coordinated challenge on behalf of all parties.	
9	IT IS SO ORDERED.	
10	Dated: November 9, 2015	
11	In and	
12	MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., CHIEF JUDGE	
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
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