-GGH	Carlon e	t al v.	Taylor,	Bean a	and V	/hitake	r Morto	gage C	orpor	ation, et	al

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9	EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10	
11	JULIA M. CARLON, CHRISTINE M.) Case No. 2:11-CV-00499-JAM-GGH
12	CARLON,)) <u>REMAND ORDER</u>
13	Plaintiffs,)
14	V.))
15	TAYLOR, BEAN & WHITAKER MORTGAGE) COMPANY, CENTRAL LOAN)
16	ADMINISTRATION AND REPORTING,) OCWEN LOAN SERVICE, LLC, and)
17	DOES 1 through 100,)
18	Defendants)
19	This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Central Loan
20	Administration and Reporting ("CENLAR") and OCWEN Loan Servicing,
21	LLC's ("OCWEN") (collectively "Defendants") Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
22	#5) Plaintiffs Julia Carlon and Christine Carlon's (collectively
23	"Plaintiffs") Complaint (Doc. #1, Exhibit A) pursuant to Federal
24	Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Also before the Court is
25	
26	Defendants' Motion to Expunge the Recorded Lis Pendens (Doc. #6),
² 0	
	Defendants' Motion to Expunge the Recorded Lis Pendens (Doc. $#6$),

Plaintiffs oppose both motions (Docs. #10, 11).¹ For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief under Federal Law, depriving this Court of original jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

6 This action arises out of a residential mortgage taken out on 7 Plaintiffs' property, located at 4329 Figwood Way in Sacramento, 8 California. See Plaintiff's Complaint, Doc. #1, Exhibit A 9 ("Comp.") at ¶ 2. During 2009 and 2010, Defendants CENLAR and 10 OCWEN began servicing Plaintiffs' loan, which was originated by 11 non-moving Defendant Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corporation, after Taylor Bean & Whitaker Mortgage Corporation suddenly rejected 12 one of Plaintiffs' mortgage payments. Id. at ¶¶ 2-8, 13-16. 13 14 Plaintiffs were unable to contact Defendant CENLAR after it began 15 servicing their loan, and therefore did not make loan payments 16 between August 2009 and January 2010 because they did not know 17 where to send their money. Id. at ¶¶ 13-20. When Plaintiffs 18 received a statement of the amount in arrears on their loan, they 19 were unable to pay the total. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. Plaintiffs 20 unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a modification of the 21 obligation with Defendant OCWEN, which lead to the filing of this case. Id. at 20-26. 22

Defendants properly removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1441, as Plaintiffs pled a cause of action in their

25 26

27

23

24

1

2

3

4

5

28 $\| ^{1}$ This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was originally scheduled for June 1, 2011.

1 complaint under a federal statute, 12 U.S.C. section 2601. Doc. #1.² 2 3 4 II. OPINION 5 Α. Legal Standard 6 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 7 A party may move to dismiss an action for failure to state a 8 claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of 9 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss, the 10 court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw 11 all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), ove<u>rruled on other grounds by</u> 12 13 Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Assertions that are mere "legal conclusions," however, 14 15 are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 16 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, a 17 18 plaintiff needs to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief 19 that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 20 Dismissal is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to state a claim 21 supportable by a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica 22 Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 23 Upon granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 24 claim, the court has discretion to allow leave to amend the 25 complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 26 ² Although Defendants' removal may have been untimely, Plaintiffs 27 did not move to remand and thereby waived their right to challenge the removal. More importantly, the removal was substantively 28 proper, and therefore the timeliness was not addressed sua sponte

by this Court at the time the case was removed.

"Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment." <u>Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc.</u>, 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

2. Jurisdiction

It is well settled that a court "ha[s] an independent obligation to address <u>sua sponte</u> whether [it] has subject-matter jurisdiction." <u>See</u>, <u>e.g.</u>, <u>Dittman v. California</u>, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir.1999).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1441, "a defendant may remove an 10 11 action filed in state court to federal court if the federal court 12 would have original subject matter jurisdiction over the action." Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th 13 14 Cir. 2009). When a district court has original jurisdiction over a 15 claim, it "shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 16 claims that are so related to claims in the action . . . that they 17 form part of the same case or controversy" 28 U.S.C. § 18 1367(a). However, a court has discretion to "decline to exercise 19 supplemental jurisdiction over a claim [] if: . . . (3) the 20 district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 21 jurisdiction . . . ," id. at § 1367(c), and it is appropriate to remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "at any time before 22 23 final judgment . . . " Id. at 1447(c).

24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

B. Claims for Relief

25

.

1. <u>Federal Claim</u>

26 Plaintiffs seek relief for a violation of 12 U.S.C. section 27 2601, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"). Comp. 28 at ¶¶ 68-73. Plaintiffs allege Defendant CENLAR "fail[ed] to

1 notify Plaintiffs of the assignment, sale, or transfer of the 2 mortgage servicing rights relating to [their loan] at least fifteen (15) days before making that change" Id. at ¶¶ 70, 72. 3 4 This transfer occurred sometime prior to January 18, 2010. Id. at ¶¶ 20, 70, 72. Defendants properly point out that Plaintiffs' 5 6 conclusory allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendants' Points and Authorities in Support of their 7 8 Motion to Dismiss, Doc. #5, at pg. 9-10. Specifically, Plaintiffs do not plead actual damages which resulted from Defendant's alleged 9 10 violation of RESPA, a requirement to maintain a cause of action 11 under RESPA. See Singh v. Washington Mutual Bank, 2009 WL 2588885 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2009). Accordingly, Defendants' motion to 12 dismiss is granted, and Plaintiffs' claim under RESPA is dismissed. 13

14 Allowing amendment in this case would be futile. Eminence 15 Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 16 2003). Plaintiffs' claim is barred by RESPA's one-year statute of 17 limitations, as the complaint was filed on January 18, 2011, and 18 the last alleged violation of RESPA by Defendant CENLAR occurred 15 days prior to January 18, 2010, at the latest, which was more than 19 20 one year prior to the filing of Plaintiff's complaint. 12 U.S.C. § 21 2614; see also Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 988 F.2d 680 22 (9th Cir. 1993) (authorizing sua sponte dismissal of a complaint as 23 time-barred by the statute of limitations). Accordingly, 24 Plaintiffs' RESPA claim is dismissed with prejudice.

25

2. <u>State Law Claims</u>

26 Plaintiffs assert six causes of action against Defendants 27 under California law for breach of contract, breach of covenant of 28 good faith and fair dealing, negligence, declaratory relief,

1 violation of civil code section 2924, and violation of business and 2 professions code section 17200. See Comp. As set forth above, Plaintiffs' only claim asserted against Defendant CENLAR under 3 4 federal law has been dismissed without leave to amend. Additionally, on July 28, 2011, this Court issued an Order 5 6 dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Taylor, Bean & 7 Whitaker Mortgage Company, which included a claim under RESPA, due to Plaintiffs' failure to timely serve their complaint. Doc. #22. 8 9 Therefore, Plaintiffs' only federal claim in this case, which was 10 the basis for removal, has been dismissed as to all Defendants.

11 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1367, this Court exercises its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' 12 13 remaining claims, which all arise under state law. Accord Keen v. 14 American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., 2010 WL 624306, at *1 (E.D. 15 Cal. Feb. 18, 2010) ("In the usual case in which federal law claims 16 are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors will point 17 toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.") (internal citations omitted). 18

Accordingly, this Court will not address the merits of the remaining issues raised in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

C. Motion to Expunge

21

24

25

In light of this Court's remand, Defendants' Motion to Expunge is dismissed without prejudice to re-file in state court.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court no longer has original jurisdiction over this action and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law

1	claims. Accordingly, the Court REMANDS this action back to the
2	Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento.
3	The Clerk shall close this case.
4	
5	IT IS SO ORDERED.
6	dinm,
7	Dated: August 4, 2011
8	OOHN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	
1	