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5	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
6	EASTERN DISTRICT	OF CALIFORNIA
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8	DATATEL SOLUTIONS, INC., a California corporation,	2:12-CV-01306-GEB-EFB
10	Plaintiff,	
11	V.	ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY WITHDRAWAL MOTION; AND
12	KEANE TELECOM CONSULTING, LLC, a	DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND COUNTERCLAIM ¹
13	New Jersey limited liability company; OUTREACH TELECOM AND ENERGY, LLC, a New Jersey	
14	limited liability company,	
15	Defendants.	
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17	OUTREACH TECHNOLOGY, LLC, a Florida limited liability	
18	company, as successor in interest to KEANE TELECOM	
19	CONSULTING, LLC, a New Jersey limited liability company, and	
20	to OUTREACH TELECOM AND ENERGY, LLC, a New Jersey limited	
21	liability company,	
22	Counter-Plaintiff,	
23	V.	
24	DATATEL SOLUTIONS, INC., a California corporation,	
25	Counter-Defendant.	
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This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

Murphy, Campbell, Alliston & Quinn ("Murphy Campbell") moves under Local Rule 182(d) for an order allowing it to withdraw as counsel of record for Defendants and Counterclaimant. The Local Rule prescribes: "[w]ithdrawal as attorney is governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California . . . " E.D. Cal. R. 182(d). Murphy Campbell specifically seeks withdrawal under subsections (C)(1)(d) and (C)(1)(f) of Professional Conduct Rule 3-700. The motion is unopposed.

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I. WITHDRAWAL MOTION

Murphy Campbell argues the firm's clients have made it "unreasonably difficult [for the firm] . . . to carry out the employment effectively" and "have breache[d] an agreement or obligation to . . . [pay] [legal] fees." (Mot. to Withdraw. 2:15-18, ECF No. 40-1 (citing Cal. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3-700(C)(1)(d),(f).)

Stephanie L. Quinn, a member of Murphy Campbell, declares: "the lead attorney handling this matter . . .[,] George A. Guthrie," left Murphy Campbell "on August 1, 2013, taking the file in this matter with him under the representation that a substitution of counsel form would be forthcoming." (Decl. of Stephanie L. Quinn in Support of Mot. to Withdraw ("Quinn Decl.") If 3, 7 ECF No. 40-2.) Quinn further declares that Murphy Campbell has repeatedly attempted to communicate with Defendants' representative, Peter Keane, to have him sign a substitution of counsel form or indicate that he wishes Murphy Campbell to continue representing Defendants in this action; however, Keane has not responded. (See id. at II 4, 5, 6, 13, 14, 17, 18; see

also Quinn Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 40-3.) Quinn also declares: "there has been an outstanding balance [of legal fees Defendants owe Murphy Campbell] since February 2013. Murphy Campbell continues to send invoices requesting payment (the most recent on September 13, 2013) pursuant to the parties' legal services agreement, but Defendants have failed to and refused to pay the invoices." (Id. at ¶ 12.)

Quinn declares that Murphy Campbell "sent a letter to . . . Keane, [on February 4, 2014,] . . . advising him" that the firm would be filing a motion to withdraw as counsel, and "if [the] motion [were] granted, [Defendants'] answer and cross complaint could immediately be stricken and default entered against them." (Id. at ¶ 20; see Quinn Decl. Ex. 5 ECF No. 40-3.) Quinn further declares that the letter "provided [Defendants] the court mandated [scheduling] deadlines [prescribed in this case]." (Quinn Decl. ¶ 20; see Quinn Decl. Ex. 5 ECF No. 40-3.) Quinn declares Murphy Campbell mailed the letter to Defendants' current address and to an alternate address at which the firm believes Keane receives mail. (Quinn Decl. ¶ 20.) Quinn also declares Murphy Campbell emailed the letter to addresses that the firm has used in the past to communicate with Keane. (Id.)

Murphy Campbell's evidence evinces that the firm's "client[s] . . . [have] render[ed] it unreasonably difficult for [Murphy Campbell] to carry out the employment effectively, [and] . . . [have] breache[d] an agreement or obligation . . . to [pay legal] fees." Cal. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3-700(C)(1)(d),(f). Therefore, the motion is granted.

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II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Further, on January 8, 2014, Plaintiff was issued an order to show cause ("OSC") requiring Plaintiff "to explain why this action should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Order to Show Cause 1:24-25, ECF No. 37.) The OSC issued because Plaintiff alleges in its Complaint that it is suing two limited liability companies ("LLC") and that diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; however, Plaintiff fails to allege the citizenship of each member of the LLC Defendants. As stated in the OSC, the Ninth Circuit held in Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006), that "[a]n LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens." In addition, review of the Counterclaim reveals that Counterclaimant is an LLC and alleges diversity jurisdiction exists over the counterclaim without alleging the citizenship of its owners/members. Therefore the Complaint and Counterclaim are dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Murphy Campbell's withdrawal motion is granted, and the Complaint and Counterclaim are dismissed. Plaintiff is granted fourteen (14) days from the date on which this Order is filed to file an amended complaint addressing the deficiency in its dismissed complaint.

Dated: February 28, 2014

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

Senior United States District Judge

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