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8	UNITED STAT	ES DISTRICT COURT
9	EASTERN DIST	RICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11	MARSHALL LOSKOT,	No. 2:13-CV-00213-JAM-JFM
12	Plaintiff,	
13	v.	ORDER AWARDING FEES AND COSTS
14	ANNIE'S PANDA GARDEN; SHIH KUN WANG and HONG YING WANG,	
15	as Co-Trustees under that certain DECLARATION OF TRUST	
16	executed September 21, 1993; and SU NI ZHENG, an	
17	individual dba ANNIE'S PANDA GARDEN,	
18	Defendants.	
19	Derendants.	
20	Plaintiff Marshall Loskot	("Plaintiff") sued Defendants'
21	restaurant for architectural b	arriers allegedly violating the
22	Americans with Disabilities Ac	t ("ADA") and California law. The
23	parties settled pursuant to a	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68
24	offer. Plaintiff now moves fo	r fees and costs. ¹
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27	¹ This motion was determined to oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R.	be suitable for decision without
28	scheduled for May 6, 2015.	wab
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1	I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2	Plaintiff visited Defendants' restaurant on multiple
3	occasions in 2012. Compl.(Doc. $#2$) ¶ 2. After sending a letter
4	advising of architectural barriers he encountered as a person who
5	uses a wheelchair and receiving no response, Plaintiff brought
б	suit seeking injunctive relief and statutory damages. Compl.
7	\P 20. The parties filed no motions, but engaged in negotiations
8	and settled the claims as to injunctive relief. See Frankovich
9	Decl. (dated January 15, 2015) Exh. A. Following the pretrial
10	conference, Defendants also extended an offer of judgment as to
11	damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (Doc. #23),
12	which Plaintiff accepted (Docs. ##24, 26). Plaintiff now moves
13	for an award of fees and costs consistent with that Rule 68
14	agreement (Doc. #31). Defendants oppose the motion (Doc. #35).
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15 16	II. OPINION
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16 17 18	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement
16 17 18 19	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, and second, that attorney
16 17 18 19 20	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, and second, that attorney Thomas E. Frankovich's hourly rate is too high.
16 17 18 19 20 21	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, and second, that attorney Thomas E. Frankovich's hourly rate is too high. A. <u>Prior Settlement of Attorney's Fees</u>
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, and second, that attorney Thomas E. Frankovich's hourly rate is too high. A. <u>Prior Settlement of Attorney's Fees</u> The Court interprets a settlement agreement "according to
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, and second, that attorney Thomas E. Frankovich's hourly rate is too high. A. <u>Prior Settlement of Attorney's Fees</u> The Court interprets a settlement agreement "according to the objective intent of the parties." <u>Gallagher v. San Diego</u>
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, and second, that attorney Thomas E. Frankovich's hourly rate is too high. A. <u>Prior Settlement of Attorney's Fees</u> The Court interprets a settlement agreement "according to the objective intent of the parties." <u>Gallagher v. San Diego</u> <u>Unified Port Dist.</u> , 2009 WL 2781553, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31,
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, and second, that attorney Thomas E. Frankovich's hourly rate is too high. A. <u>Prior Settlement of Attorney's Fees</u> The Court interprets a settlement agreement "according to the objective intent of the parties." <u>Gallagher v. San Diego</u> <u>Unified Port Dist.</u> , 2009 WL 2781553, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing <u>Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, Or.</u> , 7 F.3d 152
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26	Defendants oppose Plaintiff's fee application on two grounds: first, that the parties entered into a prior settlement inclusive of attorney's fees and costs, and second, that attorney Thomas E. Frankovich's hourly rate is too high. A. <u>Prior Settlement of Attorney's Fees</u> The Court interprets a settlement agreement "according to the objective intent of the parties." <u>Gallagher v. San Diego</u> <u>Unified Port Dist.</u> , 2009 WL 2781553, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing <u>Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, Or.</u> , 7 F.3d 152 (9th Cir. 1993)). The parties here have evidenced an objective

assertion that the parties entered into a prior agreement is 1 2 unsupported. They provide a May 2014 email from Mr. Frankovich's 3 legal assistant stating, "This is ti [sic] verify that the case has settled for \$8750, we will send a General Release. [sic]" 4 5 See Opp. Exh. A. Defendants' claim that this settlement amount б was memorialized in October 2014, see Opp. at 2, but the document 7 they provide does not reference this \$8750 and instead states that "[a]ttorneys' fees, costs and litigation expenses remain 8 9 before the Court." Mot. Exh. at 3. Furthermore, the parties 10 later entered into the Rule 68 agreement that provides, "the 11 parties have agreed to resolve the issues of attorney's fees cost 12 and litigation expenses by a fee application." Doc. #26 at 1. 13 The Court therefore concludes that the parties have evidenced an 14 objective intent to resolve the issue of fees by this fee 15 application.

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B. Hourly Rates

17 The parties apparently agree that the loadstar method is 18 appropriate for calculating fees in this case. See Hall v. City 19 of Fairfield, 2014 WL 1286001, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2014) 20 (citing Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 21 (9th Cir. 1975)). Plaintiff has requested that Mr. Frankovich's 22 hourly rate be set at \$400 per hour. See Mot. at 10. Defendants 23 argue that the prevailing rate in the Sacramento community for 2.4 ADA cases is \$250 per hour. Opp. at 2.

25 "A court awarding attorney fees must look to the prevailing 26 market rates in the relevant community." <u>Bell v. Clackamas Cty.</u>, 27 341 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). The prevailing rate for an 28 ADA barriers case in Sacramento for an experienced attorney such as Mr. Frankovich is \$300. <u>See Johnson v. Allied Trailer Supply</u>,
2014 WL 1334006, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2014); <u>Jones v. Cty. Of</u>
<u>Sacramento</u>, 2011 WL 3584332, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2011).

4 The Court has considered Mr. Frankovich's experience and reputation, but finds \$400 per hour to be excessive. A rate of 5 6 \$400 is generally reserved for "complicated civil rights cases 7 litigated by attorneys with thirty or more years of experience." See Johnson, 2014 WL 1334006, at *5 (collecting cases); Jones, 8 9 2011 WL 3584332, at *6 (finding that \$350 was reasonable for an 10 attorney with more than twenty years of experience in a police 11 brutality case with multiple claims and defendants that proceeded 12 to trial). In contrast, this ADA case was not complicated. 13 Accord Yates v. Vishal Corp., 2014 WL 572528, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 14 Feb. 4, 2014) (characterizing Mr. Frankovich's ADA practice to 15 include "simple" cases which he has "reduced . . . to a kind of 16 routine") (quotation marks omitted); see Joint Pretrial Statement 17 at 3:6 (noting that this case arose from "nearly identical ADA 18 deficiencies" as a previous case litigated by a different 19 plaintiff). The Court also declines to go as low as \$250, because Defendants have not provided a comparable case or other 20 21 evidence that \$250 per hour is an appropriate rate. Defendants 22 cite Loskot v. D&K Spirits, LLC, 2011 WL 567364 (E.D. Cal. 15, 23 2011), but that case held that \$250 per hour was reasonable 24 because the matter had resolved by default judgment. See id. at 25 *5. The Court therefore calculates Mr. Frankovich's loadstar at 26 \$300 per hour.

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1	C. Other Aspects of the Fee Application
2	Defendants do not challenge any other aspects of the fee
3	application. The Court has reviewed the breakdown of the hours
4	billed, the rates billed for Mr. Frankovich's paraprofessionals,
5	the enumerated costs, and the other aspects of the fee
6	application, and finds them to be reasonable.
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8	III. ORDER
9	For the reasons set forth above, the Court awards Plaintiff
10	reasonable attorney's fees and costs in the following amounts:
11	Fees: \$13,302
12	Costs: \$ 1,930
13	Total: \$15,232
14	IT IS SO ORDERED.
15	Dated: May 11, 2015
16	Joh a Mendes
17	OHN A. MENDEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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