Strobl v. Farrow et al Doc. 27 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 NICHOLAS STROBL, an individual, No. 2:13-cv-01436-MCE-EFB 12 Plaintiff. 13 ORDER ٧. 14 JOSEPH A. FARROW, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the 15 California Highway Patrol; DENNIS PONTIUS, individually and in his 16 official capacity as an officer of the California Highway Patrol; MATTHEW 17 STOVER, individually and in his official capacity as a Sergeant of the California 18 Highway Patrol; ROBERTO GOMEZ, individually and in his official capacity 19 as an officer of the California Highway Patrol; and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 20 individually and in their capacities as law enforcement officers and/or 21 personnel for the California Highway Patrol, 22 Defendants. 23

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Through the present action, Plaintiff Nicholas Strobl seeks damages against three different California Highway Patrol different officers as a result of excessive force allegedly employed by the officers following a fight that occurred at the R15 Bar in

Sacramento on May 19, 2012. California Highway Patrol Commissioner Joseph A.

Farrow is also named as a Defendant. Plaintiff asserts causes of action premised on violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, along with violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as various pendent state claims. On May 5, 2014, Defendant Farrow filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint on grounds it fails to state a claim against Farrow on which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 16). The remaining Defendants filed their own Motion to Dismiss ten days later, on May 15, 2014 (ECF No. 18).

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Both Motions request, as an alternative to dismissal, that Plaintiff's action herein be stayed pending the resolution of misdemeanor criminal charges pending against Plaintiff as a result of the incident underlying this case. According to Defendants, those charges include alleged violations of California Penal Code sections 242 (Battery) and 243(b) (Battery against police officer). See People of the State of California v. Nicholas Von Strobl (Sacramento County Superior Court Case No. 12M06946, filed October 22, 2012.² Defendants argue that Plaintiff's conviction in those proceedings could affect his ability to maintain the present matter either under the so-called Heck rule or pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court refused to permit a litigant to proceed with civil charges if those charges are inconsistent with a litigant's prior criminal conviction, unless that conviction was subsequently reversed. Additionally, under Rooker-Feldman, a federal district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court, so if the civil charges are tantamount to such an appeal they could be improper on that ground as well. See, e.g., Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). Consequently, according to Defendants, under either Heck or Rooker-Feldman, if ///

¹ All further references to "Rule" or "Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

² An online docket sheet for the criminal proceedings is attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Stephen C. Pass filed in support of Defendant Farrow's Motion.

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Plaintiff is convicted of battery, or of battery against a police officer, that conviction could preclude the claims Plaintiff is making through this lawsuit.

Significantly, the Court's own review of the Sacramento Superior Court's current online docket sheet indicates that Plaintiff did in fact go to trial on June 23, 2014, on the pending misdemeanor charges. Following what appears to be a three-day jury trial, Plaintiff was found guilty on June 27, 2014, of both the battery and battery against a police officer charges, as well as on an additional count for violating California Penal Code 148(a)(1) (resisting arrest).

Both the criminal charges against Plaintiff and the civil lawsuit he has filed in this Court appear to arise from the same underlying facts. Plaintiff's convictions may well impugn his ability to maintain all or part of this lawsuit depending on the circumstances of that conviction. Consequently, the Court must first decide to what extent Plaintiff's civil claims remain viable after those convictions before determining any of the other issues raised by Defendants in their motions.

To that end, the parties are directed to meet and confer within fifteen (15) days after the date this Order is electronically filed. The parties are further directed to file a joint statement with the Court not later than fifteen (15) days after they meet and confer. That statement should advise the Court of the particulars surrounding resolution of Plaintiff's criminal charges, as well as Plaintiff's intentions concerning his continued prosecution of the present action, and whether or not he intends to appeal his misdemeanor convictions, so that the Court can determine how the instant matter should proceed forward. In the meantime, since in the Court's view Plaintiff's criminal convictions will, in all likelihood, significantly affect his ability to maintain the present civil case at this time, Defendants' pending Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 16 and 18, are DENIED without prejudice to being renewed in whole or in part after the implications of Plaintiff's criminal convictions have been addressed.

1	Finally, any obligation on Defendants' part to answer the currently operative Firs
2	Amended Complaint is stayed pending further notice from the Court.
3	IT IS SO ORDERED.
4	Dated: January 26, 2015
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7	MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., CHIEF JUDGE
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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