1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----00000----11 12 JOHN SOKOLOSKI and GAIL CIV. NO. 2:14-1374 WBS CKD SOKOLOSKI, 13 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: Plaintiffs, MOTION TO REMAND 14 v. 15 PNC MORTGAGE, a division of PNC 16 BANK, NA and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, 17 Defendant. 18 19 ----00000----20 21 Plaintiffs John Sokoloski and Gail Sokoloski initiated 22 this action in Yuba County Superior Court against defendant PNC 23 Mortgage, bringing claims arising out of the threatened 2.4 foreclosure of their home. Defendant removed this action on the 25 basis of diversity jurisdiction, (Docket No. 1), and plaintiffs 26 now move to remand, (Docket No. 6).1 27 Because oral argument will not be of material 28 assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 1

"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district . . . where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, if "it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases where complete diversity exists between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Because the parties agree that complete diversity exists, the sole issue in this matter is whether the amount in controversy requirement is met. As the party seeking removal, defendant "has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000." Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, plaintiffs' Complaint seeks \$1000 in statutory damages. (Not. of Removal Ex. A ("Complaint") ¶ 31 (Docket No. 1).) However, plaintiffs also seek an unspecified amount of actual damages, attorney's fees, punitive damages, and injunctive relief, including an injunction to prevent defendant from foreclosing upon plaintiffs' home. (Id. ¶¶ 31-48.)

"In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation." Cohn, 281 F.3d at 839 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S.

E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(q).

Under either approach, defendant has demonstrated that the amount in controversy requirement is met here. First, defendant has shown that the property was used to secure a loan of \$150,000. (Def.'s Req. for Judicial Notice ("RJN") Ex. A. (Docket No. 7-1).)² Although the property value may have decreased somewhat since then, it is more likely than not that the property's current value exceeds \$75,000, especially considering plaintiffs present no evidence to the contrary.

333, 347 (1977)). Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a

litigation." Reyes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Civ. No. 10-1667

JCS, 2010 WL 2629785, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2010); see also

1973) (determining that the amount in controversy requirement was

indebtedness on the loan or the fair market value of the property

courts have split in looking to either the fair market value of

foreclosure, "the value of the property is the object of the

Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, 483 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir.

exceeded the statutory minimum). Since Garfinkle, district

the property or the amount of indebtedness to determine the

amount in controversy. See Reyes, 2010 WL 2629785, at *5

(describing disagreement and listing cases).

satisfied because either the amount of the plaintiff's

Second, defendant has produced evidence that plaintiffs' remaining indebtedness on the home is \$74,569.89.

The court will take judicial notice of the Deed of Trust because it is a matter of public record whose accuracy cannot be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Lingad v. Indymac Fed. Bank, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1146 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (determining that a deed of trust was a publicly recorded document properly subject to judicial notice).

(Arthur Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 1 (Docket No. 8-1).) Although this amount by itself does not exceed the jurisdictional minimum, when combined with the \$5,215.50 in attorney's fees and costs plaintiffs have already incurred, as well as the \$1,000 in statutory damages plaintiffs seek, the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000.

Accordingly, because defendant has demonstrated that it is more likely than not that the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000, this court has diversity jurisdiction and must deny plaintiffs' order to remand.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to remand be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

Dated: August 6, 2014

WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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If a statue underlying plaintiffs' claim authorizes an award of attorneys' fees, the court may include such fees when determining the amount in controversy. Galt G/S v. JSS

Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998). If plaintiffs prevail on their Rosenthal Act claim, they will be entitled to attorneys' fees. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(e). Although plaintiffs argue that it would be too speculative to estimate the full amount of attorney's fees they may recover, they concede that the \$5,215.50 in attorney's fees and costs already incurred may be included in determining the amount in controversy.