1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 JEAN MARC VAN DEN HUEVEL. No. 2:14-cv-1555-TLN-EFB-PS 13 Plaintiff. 14 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION v. TO REOPEN 15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 16 Defendant. 17 This matter is before the Court pursuant to Plaintiff Jean Marc Van Den Heuvel's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Reopen¹. (ECF No. 25.) The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's evidence and 18 19 arguments. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Motion to Reopen. (ECF No. 20 25.) 21 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 22 In February of 2014, Plaintiff filed a claim in small claims court against Shingle Springs Tribal Wellness, alleging injury from negligent dental treatment. (ECF No. 1-1.) The case was 23 24 removed from small claims court to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, and the United States of America ("Defendant") was substituted as defendant pursuant 25 26 to 42 U.S.C. § 223(g) (substituting the United States as defendant for employees of the Public 27 ¹ Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and thus the Court liberally construes Plaintiff's letter to the Court Clerk as a Motion to Reopen under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (holding 28 that federal courts are instructed to construe pro se pleadings liberally). 1

Health Service sued for conduct within the scope of their employment). (ECF Nos. 1, 1-2, and 1-3.)

In October of 2014, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), alleging that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 10.) On December 3, 2014, a hearing on Defendant's motion was held where Plaintiff conceded that he had not filed an administrative claim. (ECF No. 21 at 5.) In February of 2015, Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan issued his Findings and Recommendations ("F & R"), advising that Defendant's motion to dismiss be granted. In March of 2015, this Court adopted the F & R and granted the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Reopen in May of 2015. (ECF No. 25.)

II. ANALYSIS

The issue is whether Plaintiff has provided a sufficient basis demonstrating he has met the statutory administrative claim requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), thereby conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the Court. The FTCA waives the United States' immunity for certain tort claims, subject to certain requirements. (ECF No. 21 at 3.) Section 2675(a) of the FTCA provides that before a litigant may pursue an injury claim for money damages against the United States, the litigant must first have "presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim [must] have been finally denied by the agency in writing[,] and sent by certified or registered mail." 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The FTCA administrative claim requirement is jurisdictional and — because the FTCA waives sovereign immunity — must be strictly construed in favor of the United States. *Brady v. United States*, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide new evidence to demonstrate he has overcome the administrative appeal requirement. Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his administrative claim form (the "form") filed on December 3, 2014, the same day as the hearing on the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 25 at 9.) The form sets forth the outline of his claim, but there is no indication that there has been a decision on the claim; the form is unsigned by Plaintiff, and there are no markings to even indicate receipt by the United States Department of Health and Human

Services. (ECF No. 25 at 9.) Plaintiff also attaches his letter to the administrator which requests an initial review of the claim. (ECF No. 25 at 6–8.) Finally, Plaintiff's Motion to Reopen does not allege there has been a final denial of the administrative claim. (ECF No. 25 at 1.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the FTCA by exhausting his administrative remedies. III. **CONCLUSION** For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES the Motion to Reopen. (ECF No. 25.) IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: July 20, 2015 Troy L. Nunley United States District Judge