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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

MORRIS MESTER,

No. 2:16-CV-0651-TLN-CMK-P

Plaintiff,

vs.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

GABRIEL WILLIAMS, et al.,

Defendants.

_____ /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint (Doc. 11).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied

1 if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon
2 which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must
3 allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support
4 the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is
5 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague
6 and conclusory.

8 I. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

9 Plaintiff names the following prison doctors as defendants: (1) Dr. Church; (2) Dr.
10 Williams; (3) Dr. Williamson; (4) Dr. Nguyen; and (5) Dr. Mansour. Plaintiff complains that
11 these doctors are not providing him adequate medical care. Specifically, he challenges the
12 doctors' decision not to provide him with injections for chronic arthritic hip pain. In this regard,
13 documents attached to plaintiff's complaint reflect that injections were not indicated because
14 plaintiff's "pain is too diffuse and there is no specific injection that will take away the pain."

16 II. DISCUSSION

17 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the
18 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
19 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
20 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment ". . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts
21 of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
22 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
23 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with
24 "food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." Toussaint v. McCarthy,
25 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only
26 when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official's act or omission must be so serious

1 such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities; and (2)
2 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
3 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison
4 official must have a "sufficiently culpable mind." See id.

5 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
6 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at
7 105; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental
8 health needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is
9 sufficiently serious if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant
10 injury or the ". . . unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d
11 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994).
12 Factors indicating seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition
13 is worthy of comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner's daily
14 activities; and (3) whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See
15 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

16 The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases
17 than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with
18 medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,
19 974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to
20 decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.
21 1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See
22 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical
23 treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference.
24 See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also
25 demonstrate that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

26 Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

1 rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a
2 difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate
3 course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,
4 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

5 In this case, it is clear from the documents attached to the complaint that plaintiff
6 was being provided health care. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint amounts to a difference
7 of opinion with the medical providers regarding the effectiveness of injections. Such a dispute
8 does not give rise to a cognizable constitutional claim.

10 III. CONCLUSION

11 Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be
12 cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of
13 the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

14 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed
15 for failure to state a claim.

16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
17 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days
18 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
19 objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of
20 objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal.
21 See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

22
23 DATED: February 3, 2017

24 
25 **CRAIG M. KELLISON**
26 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE