

1 Cir. 1984). “[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
2 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” *Jackson v. Arizona*,
3 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotations omitted), *superseded by statute*
4 *on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); *Neitzke*, 490
5 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded,
6 has an arguable legal and factual basis. *Id.*

7 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the
8 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of
9 what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S.
10 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

11 However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more
12 than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual
13 allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Id.* (citations
14 omitted). “[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that
15 merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” *Id.* (alteration in original)
16 (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure*, 1216 (3d
17 ed. 2004)).

18 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
19 relief that is plausible on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl.*
20 *Corp.*, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
21 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
22 misconduct alleged.” *Id.* (citing *Bell Atl. Corp.*, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing a complaint
23 under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,
24 *Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trs.*, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), as well as construe the pleading
25 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor, *Jenkins v.*
26 *McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

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1 **II. Screening Order**

2 Plaintiff alleges that, on April 27, 2015, deputy district attorney Scott Schweibish made
3 false statements in court. ECF No. 13 at 1-2. He claims that Schweibish made these statements
4 during an ex-parte proceeding and in connection with a declaration of probable cause used to
5 support a hold on plaintiff’s bail release. *Id.* at 2. Plaintiff alleges this false testimony deprived
6 him of his liberty interest in posting bail. *Id.* at 4.

7 These allegations do not state a cognizable claim. Prosecutors are absolutely immune
8 from civil suits for damages under § 1983 which challenge activities related to the initiation and
9 presentation of criminal prosecutions. *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976). This
10 extends to prosecutorial conduct during bail proceedings. *See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons*, 509 U.S.
11 259, 273 (1993) (“We have not retreated, however, from the principle that acts undertaken by a
12 prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in
13 the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute
14 immunity.”). Further, assuming that Schweibish acted as a witness during the relevant
15 proceeding, he is protected by the Supreme Court’s holding in *Briscoe v. Lahue*, wherein it
16 emphasized that testifying government officials – like police officers and prosecutors – were
17 protected from section 1983 liability based on their witness testimony. 460 U.S. 325, 342-343
18 (1983) (“Subjecting government officials, such as police officers, to damages liability under
19 § 1983 for their testimony might undermine not only their contribution to the judicial process but
20 also the effective performance of their other public duties.”).

21 The court notes that the caption of the complaint indicates the existence of other
22 defendants, namely “John Does 1-100”, but there are no explicit allegations against any Doe
23 defendants in the body of the complaint.

24 **III. Leave to Amend**

25 This is plaintiff’s second complaint and he is no closer to identifying a cognizable claim
26 upon which this action might proceed. Indeed, the only defendant explicitly mentioned in the
27 amended complaint is, as noted above, immune from suit under section 1983. Accordingly, the
28 court finds that granting further leave to amend would be futile. *Plumeau v. School Dist. # 40*,

1 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997) (denial of leave to amend appropriate where further
2 amendment would be futile).

3 **IV. Conclusion**

4 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the previous findings and recommendations
5 (ECF No. 10) are VACATED and it is hereby RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed
6 with prejudice.

7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
8 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days
9 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
10 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
11 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections
12 within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. *Turner v.*
13 *Duncan*, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); *Martinez v. Ylst*, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

14 DATED: May 1, 2018.

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16 EDMUND F. BRENNAN
17 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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