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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
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11	VINCENT ANTHONY CALLENDER,	No. 2:17-cv-00274 CKD P
12	Plaintiff,	
13	v.	<u>ORDER</u>
14	DR. BECKEL, et al.,	
15	Defendants.	
16		
17	Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to	
18	42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is proceeding in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this court	
19	pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is now	
20	before the court.	
21	I. Screening Standard	
22	The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a	
23	governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The	
24	court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally	
25	"frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek	
26	monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).	
27	A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.	

Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

II. Analysis

On February 16, 2017, the court dismissed plaintiff's original complaint with leave to amend because plaintiff failed to allege specific details "as to when or how" his constitutional rights were violated by prison psychologists and psychiatrists in the course of six years of Enhanced Outpatient Treatment. ECF No. 8 at 2. Instead of identifying the specific actions taken by each named defendant, plaintiff has expanded the scope of his first amended complaint by naming defendants at three different correctional institutions, including Atascadero State Hospital which is not even within the jurisdiction of this court. Plaintiff generally complains about the level of psychiatric care he has received for his mesophonia, or hypersensitivity to sounds, tinnitus, and depression. See ECF No. 13 at 8-35.

In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care, "a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to permit the court to infer that (1) plaintiff had a "serious medical need," and that (2) individual

defendants were "deliberately indifferent" to that need. <u>Jett v. Penner</u>, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir.2006). A showing of merely inadvertent or even negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. <u>Estelle</u>, 429 U.S. at 105–06; <u>Frost v. Agnos</u>, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir.1998). A difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical treatment amount to a constitutional violation. <u>See</u>, <u>e.g.</u>, <u>Toguchi v. Chung</u>, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); <u>Sanchez v. Vild</u>, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

For these reasons, the court once again finds the allegations in plaintiff's first amended complaint to be too vague and conclusory to state a claim for relief. Furthermore, the court has determined that the first amended complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), the first amended complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file a second amended complaint.

III. Leave to Amend

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, he should carefully read this screening order and focus his efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above. Plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the second amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's second amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files a second amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in a second amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

- 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint, ECF No. 13, is dismissed for failure to state a claim; and
- 2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "Second Amended Complaint"; plaintiff must file an original and two copies of the second amended complaint; failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

Dated: January 19, 2018

21 CAROLYN K. DELANEY

22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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