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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT MITCHELL JR.,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
v.  
  
DAVID J. SHULKIN, Secretary of  
Veterans Affairs,  
  
Defendant.

No. 2:17-cv-1239-JAM-EFB PS

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915.<sup>1</sup> His declaration makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1) and (2). *See* ECF No. 2. Accordingly, the request to proceed *in forma pauperis* is granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

Determining that plaintiff may proceed *in forma pauperis* does not complete the required inquiry. Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if it determines the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. As discussed below, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim and must be dismissed.

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<sup>1</sup> This case, in which plaintiff is proceeding *in propria persona*, was referred to the undersigned under Local Rule 302(c)(21). *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

1           Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519,  
2 520-21 (1972), a complaint, or portion thereof, should be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it  
3 fails to set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl.*  
4 *Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41  
5 (1957)); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of  
6 his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of  
7 a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to  
8 relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are  
9 true.” *Id.* (citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate based either on the lack of cognizable  
10 legal theories or the lack of pleading sufficient facts to support cognizable legal theories.  
11 *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

12           Under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in  
13 question, *Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees*, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the  
14 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor,  
15 *Jenkins v. McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). A pro se plaintiff must satisfy the pleading  
16 requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a  
17 complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled  
18 to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon  
19 which it rests.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).

20           Applying these standards here, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to state  
21 a claim. Plaintiff filed this employment discrimination action against defendant the Secretary of  
22 United States Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”), alleging that he was subjected to racial  
23 discrimination and a hostile work environment while working for the VA. ECF No. 1. The  
24 “Statement of Claim” section of the complaint, rather than providing factual allegations, merely  
25 states “See Attached ‘Reports of Contact,’” which are appended to the complaint. The four  
26 Reports of Conduct indicate that plaintiff, who worked for the VA as an addiction therapist, felt  
27 he was mistreated by other VA employees. For example, in one report plaintiff describes disputes  
28 between himself and other employees—including plaintiff’s supervisor, Dr. Tara Neavins—

1 regarding the appropriate treatment of two patients. *Id.* at 8. Plaintiff claims that he had a plan  
2 for treating the patients, but other employees subjected plaintiff to questioning and required him  
3 to explain his clinical decisions. *Id.* He claims that he was being singled out and that the  
4 questions were the “direct result of the color of [his] skin.” *Id.*

5 Another report details a meeting plaintiff subsequently had with Dr. Martin Leamon, who  
6 appears to be the director of plaintiff’s department, and Dr. Neavins. *Id.* At the meeting, plaintiff  
7 expressed his frustrations regarding how others were treating him, and informed Dr. Leamon that  
8 he wanted to be treated the same as his colleagues. *Id.* Dr. Leamon allegedly responded by  
9 stating, “That’s just it, you do want to be treated different than you are being treated.” *Id.*  
10 Plaintiff contends that Dr. Leamon’s statement confirmed that plaintiff has “been the victim of  
11 discrimination, harassment, and subjected to a hostile and toxic work environment . . . based on  
12 the color of [his] skin, by Dr. Tara Neavins . . . .” *Id.*

13 A third report describes an incident where plaintiff found Dr. Neavins accessing his  
14 computer. *Id.* at 14. When plaintiff asked Dr. Neavins why she was accessing his computer, she  
15 stated that she was turning down music that was playing through the computer. *Id.* Plaintiff  
16 claims, however, that Dr. Neavins’ explanation was a lie because plaintiff witnessed her  
17 accessing computer files. Plaintiff further states that she is in mediation with Dr. Neavins  
18 regarding a prior dispute and suggests that Dr. Neavins may have been trying to access  
19 documents related to the mediation. *Id.*

20 The last report concerns a dispute plaintiff had with other employees during a retreat. *Id.*  
21 Dr. Neavin allegedly brought up a previous conflict plaintiff had with another employee named  
22 Caren. During the prior conflict, Caren allegedly stated that plaintiff had no right to make clinical  
23 decision regarding a patient since he was only an addiction therapist and not a nurse. *Id.* at 17.  
24 During the retreat, another prior altercation, which plaintiff refers to as the “Hang Town”  
25 conversation, was raised by a different employee. Plaintiff contends that raising these prior  
26 disputes caused an environment that was “*really hostile and racially charged.*” *Id.* (emphasis in  
27 original).

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1           Also appended to the complaint is an email dated October 30, 2016, from Dr. Neavins to  
2 plaintiff and another African American employee. In the email, Dr. Neavins asks if plaintiff and  
3 the other employee had “seen the green rag” for the “large group room (B-119). *Id.* at 11.  
4 Plaintiff “view[s] this email as Dr. Neavins associating ‘A rag’ to the color of [his] skin (Black)”  
5 because the email was sent to the only two African American clinicians working in the building.”  
6 *Id.*

7           Although the complaint does not assert any particular cause of action, the reports  
8 appended to the complaint suggests that plaintiff seeks to assert a hostile work environment claim  
9 under Title VII claim. To state a Title VII claim predicate on a hostile work environment, a  
10 plaintiff must allege (1) that he “was subjected to verbal or physical conduct based on race or  
11 national origin; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; (3) that the conduct was ‘sufficiently severe  
12 or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive work  
13 environment.’” *Galdamez v. Potter*, 415 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff must  
14 demonstrate that the work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. *Id.* In  
15 assessing whether the environment was objectively hostile, the court looks “to all of the  
16 circumstances, including the frequency, severity, and nature (*i.e.*, physically threatening or  
17 humiliating as opposed to merely verbally offensive) of the conduct.” *Id.*

18           The documents appended to plaintiff’s complaint reflect that plaintiff was involved in  
19 various work-related disputes, which plaintiff attributes to racial animus. The complaint,  
20 however, is devoid of any factual allegations demonstrating that the work-related disputes were  
21 sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the condition of plaintiff’s employment. Further, the  
22 Reports of Conduct do not reflect that plaintiff’s work environment was objectively hostile. The  
23 few incidents described in the reports, which occurred over the course of a year, do not involve  
24 threatening or humiliating conduct. Instead, they largely reflect disagreements as to the  
25 appropriate course of care for patients. Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for  
26 failure to state a claim.

27           Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint, if he can allege a cognizable legal  
28 theory against a proper defendant and sufficient facts in support of that cognizable legal theory.

1 *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (district courts must afford pro  
2 se litigants an opportunity to amend to correct any deficiency in their complaints). Should  
3 plaintiff choose to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint shall clearly set forth the  
4 allegations against defendant and shall specify a basis for this court's subject matter jurisdiction.  
5 Any amended complaint shall plead plaintiff's claims in "numbered paragraphs, each limited as  
6 far as practicable to a single set of circumstances," as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  
7 10(b), and shall be in double-spaced text on paper that bears line numbers in the left margin, as  
8 required by Eastern District of California Local Rules 130(b) and 130(c). Any amended  
9 complaint shall also use clear headings to delineate each claim alleged and against which  
10 defendant or defendants the claim is alleged, as required by Rule 10(b), and must plead clear facts  
11 that support each claim under each header.

12 Additionally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to prior pleadings in order to  
13 make an amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be  
14 complete in itself. This is because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the  
15 original complaint. *See Loux v. Rhay*, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Accordingly, once  
16 plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original no longer serves any function in the case.  
17 Therefore, "a plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not  
18 alleged in the amended complaint," *London v. Coopers & Lybrand*, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir.  
19 1981), and defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. *Ferdik v.*  
20 *Bonzelet*, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Finally, the court cautions plaintiff that failure to  
21 comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court's Local Rules, or any court order  
22 may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed. *See E.D. Cal. L.R. 110.*

23 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

- 24 1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* (ECF No. 2) is granted.
- 25 2. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with leave to amend, as provided herein.
- 26 3. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended  
27 complaint. The amended complaint must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must

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1 be labeled "First Amended Complaint." Failure to timely file an amended complaint in  
2 accordance with this order will result in a recommendation this action be dismissed.

3 DATED: August 23, 2018.

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5 EDMUND F. BRENNAN  
6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
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