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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTOINE D. JOHNSON,  
Petitioner,  
v.  
J. SALAZAR,  
Respondent.

No. 2:17-cv-1310 JAM KJN P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding without counsel, filed this application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in which he challenged the validity and constitutionality of the sentence imposed by the Western District of Washington. This action was dismissed on March 19, 2018, and judgment was entered. (ECF No. 21, adopting ECF No. 16.) On July 9, 2018, petitioner filed his seventh motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner’s prior 60(b) motions were denied on June 6, 2018. (ECF No. 47, adopting ECF No. 37.) As discussed below, the undersigned recommends that petitioner’s seventh motion be denied, and that any further filing by petitioner in this closed case be disregarded.

Petitioner’s Appeals

On August 6, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed petitioner’s appeals, as follows:

1 These related appeals are from the denial of appellant’s disguised  
2 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and subsequent Federal Rule of Civil  
3 Procedure 59(e) motion. The requests for a certificate of  
4 appealability (Docket Entry Nos. 2 and 6 in No. 18-15508, and  
5 Docket Entry No. 2 in No. 18-16107) are denied because appellant  
6 has not shown that “jurists of reason would find it debatable  
7 whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a  
8 constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable  
9 whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”  
10 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. §  
11 2253(c)(2); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012);  
12 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003); United States v.  
13 Winkles, 795 F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.  
14 Ct. 2462 (2016); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir.  
15 2008); Porter v. Adams, 244 F.3d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001)  
16 (order). Any pending motions are denied as moot. DENIED.

17 (ECF No. 57.) Thus, no appeals remain pending at the present time.

#### 18 Rule 60(b) Motion

19 Under Rule 60(b), a party may seek relief from judgment in limited circumstances.  
20 Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005). Rule 60(b) applies to habeas proceedings, but  
21 only in conformity with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), including  
22 the limits on successive federal petitions set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at  
23 529. A purported Rule 60(b) motion seeking to reopen the judgment of an initial habeas petition  
24 brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 or 2255 is in essence a successive petition, under 28  
25 U.S.C. § 2244(b) where it “seeks to add a new ground for relief,” or “if it attacks the federal  
26 court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits . . . .” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532.

27 Relief under Rule 60 “is to be used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest  
28 injustice and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances” exist. Harvest v. Castro,  
531 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted) (addressing  
reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1) - (5)). Reconsideration is not appropriate when a movant  
relies on arguments previously raised; that is, a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle  
permitting the unsuccessful party to reiterate arguments previously presented. See Maraziti v.  
Thorpe, 52 F.3d 252, 255 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court properly denied Rule 60(b)(6) motion  
because movant “merely reiterated the arguments that he had already presented to the district  
court”).

1 Here, petitioner claims that his motion should not be construed as a second or successive  
2 habeas application because his motion is based on the ground of mistake under Rule 60(b)(1),  
3 which by its terms does not affect the “finality of the judgment or suspend its operation,” quoting  
4 Smith v. Stone, 308 F.2d 15, 17-18 (9th Cir. 1962).<sup>1</sup> (ECF No. 52 at 1.) Petitioner contends that  
5 this court was required to apply the Chevron<sup>2</sup> deference doctrine in evaluating his claim, that the  
6 failure to do so was an error of law requiring correction, and such error constitutes a “mistake”  
7 under Rule 60(b)(1). (ECF No. 52 at 2.)

8 The undersigned is not persuaded. Petitioner’s motion is nothing more than another  
9 transparent attempt to attack the final decision of the district court.<sup>3</sup> Thus, petitioner’s motion is  
10 construed as a successive petition. Under Ninth Circuit Rule 22-3, “[i]f an unauthorized second  
11 or successive section 2254 petition or section 2255 motion is submitted to the district court, the  
12 district court may, in the interests of justice, refer it to the Court of Appeals.” Id. (emphasis  
13 added). The undersigned does not find that the interests of justice warrants transfer of the motion  
14 to the court of appeals. Rather, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the motion. This court  
15 does not have jurisdiction to consider the successive petition without prior authorization by the  
16 Ninth Circuit. Petitioner must obtain authorization from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals  
17 before he can proceed with a second or successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).

18 No Response to Further Filings by Petitioner

19 Judgment was entered in this action on March 19, 2018. Petitioner’s appeals have been  
20 addressed by the appellate court. (ECF No. 57.) Petitioner has unsuccessfully sought to set aside  
21 the judgment on several occasions, and the undersigned recommends that his last motion be  
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23 <sup>1</sup> In Smith, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court has discretion to find whether there  
24 exists a sufficient showing of inadvertence or excusable neglect, and held there was no abuse of  
discretion in the district court’s refusal to reopen the case. Id.

25 <sup>2</sup> Chevron v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

26 <sup>3</sup> Indeed, this is not the first time that petitioner has argued that Chevron deference should apply.  
27 Petitioner raised Chevron deference in his petition for writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court.  
28 (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Petitioner also argued Chevron deference in at least two of his prior motions  
for relief under Rule 60(b). (ECF Nos. 26 at 1; 29 at 3-4; 6.)

1 denied. Based on this record, the undersigned recommends that any further filing by petitioner,  
2 aside from his objections to the instant findings and recommendations, be disregarded in this  
3 closed case.

4 Request for Certificate of Appealability

5 In the event petitioner chooses to appeal an order adopting these findings and  
6 recommendations, the undersigned recommends the district court deny a certificate of  
7 appealability.

8 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a certificate of appealability may issue only when the  
9 petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. With  
10 respect to claims rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists  
11 would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack  
12 v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4  
13 (1983)). For procedural rulings, a certificate will issue only if reasonable jurists could debate (1)  
14 whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and (2) whether the  
15 court’s procedural ruling was correct. Id.

16 The issue of whether petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion should be treated as a successive  
17 petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby is not debatable among reasonable jurists and, therefore, does  
18 not warrant the issuance of a certificate of appealability.

19 Conclusion

20 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:


- 21 1. Petitioner’s motion to set aside judgment (ECF No. 52) be denied;
- 22 2. Any further filings by petitioner in this closed case be disregarded; and
- 23 3. A certificate of appealability be DENIED.

24 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge  
25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days  
26 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written  
27 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

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1 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.”<sup>4</sup> If petitioner files  
2 objections, he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why  
3 and as to which issues. A certificate of appealability may issue under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 “only if  
4 the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.  
5 § 2253(c)(3). Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after  
6 service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the  
7 specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951  
8 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

9 Dated: August 16, 2018

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12 KENDALL J. NEWMAN  
13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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26 <sup>4</sup> Petitioner previously filed five different objections to the May 4, 2018 findings and  
27 recommendations. Petitioner is cautioned that each party may file one set of objections.  
28 Therefore, if petitioner chooses to file objections, he must include all of his objections in one  
document. If petitioner again files multiple objections, the court will only consider the objections  
he files first.