

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKY VAN TRAN,  
Petitioner,  
v.  
DAVID BAUGHMAN,  
Respondent.

No. 2:17-cv-1925 JAM KJN P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se, with a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his 2012 conviction. On February 11, 2020, the undersigned recommended that the original petition be denied. On April 25, 2020, petitioner’s motions to amend<sup>1</sup> and for stay were denied without prejudice. Petitioner has now renewed his motion to stay, and also filed a notice of exhaustion. As set forth below, petitioner’s motion for stay should be denied.

Plaintiff’s Unexhausted Claim

In his notice, petitioner claims that on May 11, 2020, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 27.) Petitioner states that he seeks

---

<sup>1</sup> If a new petition is filed when a previous habeas petition is still pending before the district court without a decision having been rendered, then the new petition should be construed as a motion to amend the pending petition. Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 888 (9th Cir. 2008). The Woods holding is not extended to a situation where the district court has ruled on the initial petition, and proceedings have begun in the Court of Appeals. Beaty v. Schriro, 554 F.3d 780, 782-83 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 364 (2009).

1 judicial review of the state appellate court’s decision on the claims raised in the instant petition,  
2 and will file his claim in this court following the California Supreme Court’s decision. (ECF No.  
3 27 at 1.) Petitioner did not provide any state court case numbers, copies of a petition filed in  
4 either the California Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court, or a copy of the decision  
5 by the California Court of Appeal. In his motion for stay, petitioner identifies the unexhausted  
6 claim as his due process rights were violated when the jury’s special circumstances finding was  
7 unsupported by the evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner was the actual  
8 shooter. (ECF No. 26 at 3.)

9 Motion for Stay

10 In his motion for stay, petitioner now seeks stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber,  
11 544 U.S. 269 (2005). (ECF No. 26.) No opposition was filed by respondent.

12 A district court may, in limited circumstances, stay a mixed petition pending exhaustion of  
13 unexhausted claims if: (1) “the petitioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust;” (2) “his  
14 unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious;” and (3) “there is no indication that the petitioner  
15 engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278; Mena v. Long, 813  
16 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding courts also have discretion to stay and hold in abeyance  
17 fully unexhausted petition under Rhines). Each of these three conditions must be satisfied  
18 because, as the court emphasized, “even if a petitioner had good cause for that failure, the district  
19 court would abuse its discretion if it were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are  
20 plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277.

21 “The case law concerning what constitutes ‘good cause’ under Rhines has not been  
22 developed in great detail.” Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Blake v.  
23 Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2014) (“There is little authority on what constitutes good  
24 cause to excuse a petitioner’s failure to exhaust.”)) The Supreme Court has addressed the  
25 meaning of good cause only once, stating in dicta that “[a] petitioner’s reasonable confusion  
26 about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’” to excuse his  
27 failure to exhaust. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005) (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at  
28 278). The Ninth Circuit has provided limited guidance. Under Ninth Circuit law, the “good

1 cause” test is less stringent than an ‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard. Jackson v. Roe, 425  
2 F.3d 654, 661-62 (9th Cir. 2005).

3 Initially, petitioner attempts to argue that his unexhausted claim is contained in the instant  
4 petition, rendering it a mixed petition and requiring the court to grant petitioner leave to either  
5 return to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claim or abandon the unexhausted claim. (ECF  
6 No. 26 at 2.) Petitioner is mistaken. Petitioner raised four claims in the instant petition: two  
7 claims related to the alleged violation of petitioner’s right against self-incrimination (claims I and  
8 III); and his other two claims concerned the admission of evidence (claims II and IV). (ECF No.  
9 1.) Petitioner did not raise either a due process claim or an insufficiency of the evidence claim in  
10 the context of the special circumstances finding in the instant petition. (Id.) Indeed, petitioner  
11 affirmatively pled that he fully exhausted each of the four claims presented in the instant petition.  
12 (ECF No. 1 at 7-17.) Thus, the instant petition is not a mixed petition, but is fully exhausted.

13 In the April 30, 2020 order, the court addressed petitioner’s request for stay under Kelly v.  
14 Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), but also provided petitioner with the conditions he must  
15 meet in order to obtain a stay under Rhines. (ECF No. 25 at 2 n.2.) In the instant motion,  
16 petitioner failed to address each condition required under Rhines. Petitioner fails to demonstrate  
17 good cause for his failure to earlier exhaust his new claim. Indeed, he offers no explanation for  
18 his failure to include the claim in the instant petition. He argues that this “unexhausted claim is  
19 potentially meritorious because it raises a violation of his constitutional right to due process,”  
20 which is insufficient to demonstrate the claim’s merit. (ECF No. 26 at 3.) However, even if the  
21 court were to find petitioner had good cause (which it would not) to pursue a potentially  
22 meritorious insufficiency of the evidence claim, petitioner has utterly failed to demonstrate he did  
23 not engage in intentional dilatory litigation tactics. Because petitioner was aware of the facts  
24 surrounding the underlying crime, and whether or not petitioner was the actual shooter, petitioner  
25 fails to explain his failure to raise this claim earlier.

26 But significantly, review of the state courts website reveals that no habeas petition has  
27 been filed by petitioner in the California Supreme Court on May 10, 2020, or any other date.<sup>2</sup>

---

28 <sup>2</sup> The court may take judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute

1 Rather, the website reflects only petitioner’s direct appeal, People v. Tran, S235100; the petition  
2 for review was denied by the California Supreme Court on July 13, 2016. Id. The search by  
3 petitioner’s name revealed no other filings by him in the California Supreme Court.

4 Petitioner did file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, In  
5 re Ricky Tran on Habeas Corpus, No. C091450, which was denied on February 21, 2020. But  
6 when the appellate court case number C091450 is entered in the California Supreme Court  
7 website, which cross-references appellate court case numbers, no habeas case filing in the  
8 California Supreme Court by petitioner is found. Because petitioner has not filed his petition in  
9 the California Supreme Court, contrary to his statement, the undersigned cannot find that  
10 petitioner has not intentionally engaged in dilatory litigation tactics.

11 Because petitioner fails to meet all three conditions required for a stay under Rhines, the  
12 motion for stay should be denied.

13 Pending Findings and Recommendations

14 Once the district court rules on the instant findings and recommendations, the undersigned  
15 will forward the February 11, 2020 findings and recommendations (ECF No. 19) to the district  
16 court for review.<sup>3</sup>

17 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s motion for stay (ECF  
18 No. 26) be denied.

19 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge  
20 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days  
21 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written  
22 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned  
23 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the


---

24 because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot  
25 reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b), including undisputed information posted on  
26 official websites. Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.  
27 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the docket sheet of a California court. White v.  
Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010). The address of the official website of the California  
state courts is [www.courts.ca.gov](http://www.courts.ca.gov).

28 <sup>3</sup> Petitioner filed objections on March 23, 2020 (ECF No. 24); respondent did not file a reply.

1 objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The  
2 parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to  
3 appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

4 Dated: August 31, 2020

5   
6 \_\_\_\_\_  
7 KENDALL J. NEWMAN  
8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

9 /tran1925.sty.d

10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28