

1 supervisor, a CT Technician, “made an erroneous error by administration a contrast dye without
2 appropriately ruling out an allergy. . . .” Id. Plaintiff states that his employment was terminated
3 for improperly accessing patient confidential computerized records on November 25, 2015. See
4 id.

5 Plaintiff alleges he was subject to a collective bargaining agreement which
6 provided that union employees could only be terminated for “just cause.” Id. Plaintiff utilized
7 the union grievance process and, on April 27, 2016, plaintiff was granted the right to proceed with
8 arbitration of his claim that defendant lacked just cause for his termination. See id. at 5. Plaintiff
9 claims that, ultimately, he was “denied the right to go to Arbitration.” Id.

10 Plaintiff alleges four claims for relief as follows:

11 First Claim Wrongful termination in violation of public policy, California
12 Labor Code § 232.5.

13 Second Claim Wrongful termination in violation of public policy, California
14 Labor Code § 1102.5.

15 Third Claim Breach of contract and implied covenant of good faith
16 and fair dealing.

17 Fourth Claim Unfair business practices, California Business & Professions
18 Code § 17200, et seq.

19 See id. at 5-8.

20 II. DISCUSSION

21 Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a first amended complaint. According to plaintiff:

22 Plaintiff’s 1st Amended Complaint is a major revision from the
23 original, correcting several material errors and deficiencies in light of new
24 facts obtained. Defendant’s initial disclosures and multiple supplemental
25 disclosures thereafter, that were not known or available to Plaintiff at the
26 time the original Complaint was filed.

27 ECF No. 50, pg. 1.

28 Plaintiff has attached a proposed first amended complaint to his motion. See ECF No. 50-1, pgs.
7-38.

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1 In the proposed first amended complaint, plaintiff re-states the four claims for
2 relief alleged in the original complaint. See id. Plaintiff also adds for the first time a new claim
3 for defamation. See id. at 34-36. According to plaintiff, “[I]t appears DEFENDANT may have
4 intentionally, and maliciously contributed to PLAINTIFF losing his position as a volunteer
5 Firefighter in Butte County with Cal Fire where he swore an oath to protect the citizens of his
6 community.” Id. at 35. Plaintiff claims defendant’s accusation against him concerning his access
7 to confidential patient information was “fraudulent” and appears to form the basis of his
8 defamation claim. See id. at 35-36. Plaintiff does not specify the allegedly defamatory statement.

9 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may amend his or her
10 pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days of serving the pleading or, if the pleading is
11 one to which a responsive pleading is required, within 21 days after service of the responsive
12 pleading, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A), or within 21 days after service of a motion under Rule
13 12(b), (e), or (f) of the rules, whichever time is earlier, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B).

14 In all other situations, a party’s pleadings may only be amended upon leave of
15 court or stipulation of all the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Where leave of court to amend
16 is required and sought, the court considers the following factors: (1) whether there is a reasonable
17 relationship between the original and amended pleadings; (2) whether the grant of leave to amend
18 is in the interest of judicial economy and will promote the speedy resolution of the entire
19 controversy; (3) whether there was a delay in seeking leave to amend; (4) whether the grant of
20 leave to amend would delay a trial on the merits of the original claim; and (5) whether the
21 opposing party will be prejudiced by amendment. See Jackson v. Bank of Hawai’i, 902 F.2d
22 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). Leave to amend should be denied where the proposed amendment is
23 frivolous. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987).

24 It is undisputed that leave of court is required at this juncture of the litigation,
25 after the case has been scheduled, discovery has closed, and defendant has moved for summary
26 judgment. Having considered the factors outlined above, the Court finds that plaintiff’s delay
27 was not intentional but more likely the result of his pro se status. The Court finds that any
28 prejudice to defendant is minimal and outweighed by other factors.

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6. Because the Court has re-opened the pleading stage of this litigation, the matter is no longer at issue on plaintiff's original complaint and, as a result, defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 32) based on claims raised in the original complaint is no longer properly before the Court and is stricken; without prejudice to renewal of such motion in the future, and

7. Upon the filing of an answer to any second amended complaint, the Court will issue an order re-opening discovery as to the new defamation claim only and setting a new dispositive motion filing deadline.

Dated: May 27, 2020



DENNIS M. COTA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE