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11 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 12 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

15 **THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,**

17 Plaintiff,

18 v.

19 **THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; EDMUND
 20 GERALD BROWN JR., Governor of
 California, in his official capacity; and
 21 XAVIER BECERRA, Attorney General of
 California, in his official capacity,**

22 Defendants.

Case No. 2:18-cv-00490-JAM-KJN

**DECLARATION OF TOM K. WONG IN
 SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
 OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
 MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
 INJUNCTION**

Judge: Honorable John A. Mendez
 Action Filed: March 6, 2018

1 I, Tom K. Wong declare as follows:

2 1. I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this declaration. If called as a
3 witness, I could and would testify competently to the matters set forth below.

4 2. I am an Associate Professor with tenure at the University of California, San Diego
5 (UCSD). I work in the political science department, which is consistently ranked by U.S. News &
6 World Report as one of the top ten political science departments nationally. I am also the Director
7 of the International Migration Studies Program Minor at UCSD.

8 3. I am an expert on immigration. I have written two peer-reviewed books and
9 several peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, and reports on this subject. My most recent
10 book analyzes 31,193 roll call votes on immigration-related legislation in Congress from 2005 to
11 present, which makes it the most comprehensive analysis to date on contemporary immigration
12 policies in the United States.

13 4. I received a Ph.D. in political science at the end of the 2010-2011 academic year. I
14 was a post-doctoral research fellow during the 2011-2012 academic year. I joined the political
15 science department at UCSD during the 2012-2013 academic year. I served as an advisor to the
16 White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders (WHIAAPI), where I worked
17 on the immigration portfolio, during the 2015-2016 academic year. I was promoted to the rank of
18 Associate Professor with tenure at UCSD during the 2016-2017 academic year.

19 5. I have attached a true and complete copy of my curriculum vitae as Exhibit A to
20 this Declaration.

21 **Sanctuary Policies**

22 6. Whereas there are no universally accepted definitions of what sanctuary policies
23 are, these policies are generally understood to delimit the conditions under which local law
24 enforcement agencies engage in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. Sanctuary policies
25 can, for example, restrict local law enforcement agencies from using resources for the purposes of
26 enforcing federal immigration law. Sanctuary policies can also restrict local law enforcement
27 agencies from responding to notification requests, wherein Immigration and Customs
28 Enforcement (ICE) issues a request to a local law enforcement agency to notify ICE of the

1 pending release of a suspected undocumented immigrant at least 48 hours prior to release.
2 Sanctuary policies can also restrict local law enforcement agencies from responding to
3 immigration detainers, wherein ICE issues a request to a local law enforcement agency to keep an
4 individual in custody for up to 48 business hours (and potentially beyond the time they would
5 have otherwise been released). Sanctuary policies can also delimit the conditions under which a
6 local law enforcement agency can transfer an individual into ICE custody. Moreover, sanctuary
7 policies can also delimit the conditions under which a local law enforcement agency can share
8 non-publicly available information about an individual with ICE when doing so is not required by
9 federal law.

10 7. As the California Values Act (SB 54) states, “California law enforcement agencies
11 shall not: Use agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, or
12 arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes,” which includes detaining an individual on
13 the basis of a hold request, responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or
14 other information unless that information is available to the public, and providing personal
15 information about an individual unless that information is available to the public, subject to
16 certain specified exceptions in the statute. The California Values Act is thus a policy that delimits
17 the conditions under which local law enforcement agencies engage in the enforcement of federal
18 immigration laws.

19 **The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy**

20 8. Debates over sanctuary policies tend to center on the impact that these policies
21 have on crime. Those who are opposed to sanctuary policies often argue that these policies
22 increase crime. However, there is currently no evidence that I am aware of that meets rigorous
23 social science research standards that shows that sanctuary policies increase crime—evidence
24 showing that sanctuary policies increase crime does not exist. In fact, the existing scholarly
25 literature, including my own work, suggests that sanctuary policies can decrease crime, thereby
26 improving public safety.

27 9. I recently analyzed an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) dataset on
28 sanctuary jurisdictions obtained via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The FOIA

1 request was filed by the Immigrant Legal Resource Center. Using these data, I examined the
2 relationship between sanctuary policies and a broad range of indicators, including crime. My
3 results were published in a report entitled, *The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the*
4 *Economy*.¹

5 10. These data show that crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties
6 compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. Moreover, the data show that economies are
7 stronger in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties—from higher
8 median household income, less poverty, and less reliance on public assistance, to higher labor
9 force participation, higher employment-to-population ratios, and lower unemployment.

10 11. The FOIA data include 2,492 counties nationwide that ICE distinguishes by their
11 “Current Detainer/Notification Acceptance Status.”² Of California’s fifty-eight counties, fifty-
12 three are characterized by ICE as either not willing to accept notification or detainer requests. Of
13 these fifty-three: one is characterized as not willing to accept notification and detainer requests;
14 six are characterized as not willing to accept detainer requests, but not notification requests;
15 eleven are characterized as willing to accept notification requests, but not detainer requests; and
16 thirty-five are characterized as “Considering, but (currently) not willing to accept (I-247N)
17 Notifications and/or (I-247D) detainers.” The FOIA data were current as of December 2015,
18 which precedes the introduction, passage, and enactment of the California Values Act.
19 Altogether, out of these 2,492 counties, 608 are sanctuary jurisdictions, meaning jurisdictions that
20 do not accept notification or detainer requests. Data on crime come from the FBI Uniform Crime
21 Reporting Program and data on social and economic indicators come from the American
22 Community Survey (ACS) 5-Year Estimates. I use coarsened exact matching (CEM) to
23 statistically match sanctuary counties to comparable non-sanctuary counties. CEM is a method
24 used for improving causal inferences that estimates the sample average treatment effect on the
25 treated, or SATT. CEM statistically matches sanctuary counties to comparable non-sanctuary

26 _____
27 ¹ Wong, Tom K. 2017. *The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy*. Center for American Progress:
Washington, DC.

28 ² These counties are home to 92 percent of the total population in the United States and 95 percent of the total
foreign-born population in the United States.

1 counties; compares differences in outcomes between sanctuary counties and the matched non-
2 sanctuary counties; allows us to evaluate these differences while controlling for differences in the
3 size of the total population, the foreign-born percentage of the population, and the percentage of
4 the population that is Hispanic/Latino; and then uses the results of the analysis to estimate the
5 effect that being a sanctuary county has on crime and our other outcomes of interest.

6 12. The table below reports the results of the CEM analysis. In the table, “SATT”
7 indicates the sample average treatment effect on the treated and “SE” indicates the standard error
8 of the estimate. A *p*-value of less than .05 is considered statistically significant.

9

	SATT	SE	<i>p</i> -value
Crimes Per 10,000 People	-35.5	5.9	0.000

10

11

12 13. The data are clear: crime is lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable
13 non-sanctuary counties. There are 35.5 fewer crimes per 10,000 people in sanctuary counties
14 compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly statistically significant (*p* <
15 .001), which means that it is systematic and non-random.

16 14. This result was reported in the *Washington Post* in a January 27, 2017 article
17 entitled, “Trump says sanctuary cities are hotbeds of crime. Data say the opposite.”³ The finding
18 of 35.5 fewer crimes per 10,000 people in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-
19 sanctuary counties measures crime using both property crimes and violent crimes per the FBI
20 Uniform Crime Reporting Program data. The *Washington Post* was also specifically interested in
21 murders. After further analyzing the data, the data showed that there were approximately 1 fewer
22 murders per 100,000 people in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary
23 counties.

24 15. These results were also used by the *Washington Post* in a February 8, 2017 article
25 that fact checked President Trump’s statement that sanctuary policies “breed crime.” The article
26 concludes, “It’s one thing to raise concerns about the impact of sanctuary policies, but Trump

27 ³ [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/27/trump-says-sanctuary-cities-are-hotbeds-of-crime-
28 data-say-the-opposite/?noredirect=on](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/27/trump-says-sanctuary-cities-are-hotbeds-of-crime-data-say-the-opposite/?noredirect=on)

1 goes too far declaring that the cities ‘breed crime.’ He not only makes a correlation, but also
2 ascribes a causation, without facts to support either.”⁴

3 16. Whereas my work on the effects of sanctuary policies focuses at the county level,
4 there is other research that shows that there is no statistically significant relationship between
5 sanctuary policies and increased crime at the city level.⁵ Regarding research on the effects of
6 sanctuary policies at the city level, Attorney General Jeff Sessions, in remarks delivered on July
7 12, 2017, stated, “According to a recent study from the University of California, Riverside, cities
8 with these policies have more violent crime on average than those that don’t.”⁶ After learning
9 about these remarks, I helped bring them to the attention of the authors of the University of
10 California, Riverside study. The authors quickly penned an article in *The Hill* writing, “As the
11 lead authors of this study, we find it necessary to address this claim, since it is factually
12 inaccurate [...] Our study found no relationship between sanctuary policies and crime [...] There
13 was no statistically significant effect for these policies on property crime or violent crime.”⁷

14 17. In addition to crime, my research also examined a range of social and economic
15 indicators.

	SATT	SE	p-value
Median Household Income	4352.7	575.1	0.000
Median Household Income—White, non-Latino	2836.1	568.3	0.000
Median Household Income—Latino	1328.9	736.4	0.000
Poverty	-2.337	0.306	0.000
Poverty—White, non-Latino	-1.361	0.222	0.000
Poverty—Latino	-2.966	0.721	0.000
Food Stamps/SNAP	-2.559	0.296	0.000
SSI	-0.879	0.127	0.000
Children Under 18 in Households w/Public Assistance	-4.967	0.548	0.000
Labor Force Participation	2.456	0.345	0.000
Labor Force Participation—White, non-Latino	2.546	0.339	0.000
Labor Force Participation—Latino	1.241	0.741	0.094

25 ⁴ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/02/08/trumps-claim-that-sanctuary-cities-breed-crime/?utm_term=.921292fbdf67

26 ⁵ Gonzalez, Benjamin, Loren Collingwood, and Stephen Omar El-Khatib. “The politics of refuge: Sanctuary cities, crime, and undocumented immigration.” *Urban Affairs Review* (2017): 1078087417704974.

27 ⁶ <https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-las-vegas-federal-state-and-local-law>

28 ⁷ <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/immigration/342043-how-conservative-media-and-jeff-sessions-got-it-wrong-on>

Employment-to-Population Ratio	3.103	0.369	0.000
Employment-to-Population Ratio—White, non-Latino	3.165	0.359	0.000
Employment-to-Population Ratio—Latino	0.939	0.733	0.200
Unemployment	-1.056	0.159	0.000
Unemployment—White, non-Latino	-0.829	0.129	0.000
Unemployment—Latino	1.015	0.425	0.017

18. Median household income is approximately \$4,353 higher in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly statistically significant ($p < .001$). Median household income for White, non-Hispanic/Latino households is also statistically significantly higher in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. Median household income for Hispanic/Latino households is also statistically significantly higher in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties.

19. The poverty rate is approximately 2.3 percent lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly statistically significant ($p < .001$). The poverty rate for White, non-Hispanics/Latinos is also statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. The poverty rate for Hispanics/Latinos is also statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties.

20. Public benefits usage is also lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)⁸ usage is approximately 2.6 percent lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly statistically significant ($p < .001$). Supplemental Security Income (SSI)⁹ usage is approximately 0.9 percent lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly statistically significant ($p < .001$). Moreover, the percentage of children under 18 in households with public assistance is approximately 4.9 percent lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly statistically significant ($p < .001$).

⁸ Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: <https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program-snap>

⁹ Supplemental Security Income: <https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/>

1 21. Labor force participation is approximately 2.5 percent higher in sanctuary counties
2 compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly statistically significant ($p <$
3 $.001$). Labor force participation is calculated by dividing the number of people who are employed
4 or who are currently looking for work by the working-age population (16 or older). Labor force
5 participation among White, non-Hispanics/Latinos is also statistically significantly higher in
6 sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. While labor force
7 participation among Hispanics/Latinos is, on average, higher in sanctuary counties compared to
8 comparable non-sanctuary counties, this result is not statistically significant ($p = .094$).

9 22. The employment-to-population ratio is approximately 3.1 percent higher in
10 sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly
11 statistically significant ($p < .001$). The employment-to-population ratio is calculated by dividing
12 the number of people in the labor force who are employed by the working-age population. The
13 employment-to-population ratio among White, non-Hispanics/Latinos is also statistically
14 significantly higher in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. While
15 the employment-to-population ratio among Hispanics/Latinos is, on average, higher in sanctuary
16 counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties, this result is not statistically significant
17 ($p = .200$).

18 23. Unemployment is approximately 1.1 percent lower in sanctuary counties compared
19 to comparable non-sanctuary counties. This result is highly statistically significant ($p < .001$).
20 Unemployment is the percentage of those who are in the labor force, but who are currently not
21 employed. Unemployment among White, non-Hispanics/Latinos is also statistically significantly
22 lower in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties. However,
23 unemployment among Hispanics/Latinos is higher in sanctuary counties compared to comparable
24 non-sanctuary counties, this result is not statistically significant ($p = .017$).

25 24. Altogether, the data indicate that:

- 26 • Crime is statistically significantly lower in sanctuary counties compared to
27 comparable non-sanctuary counties;

28

- Those who are opposed to sanctuary policies continue to argue that these policies increase crime; however, evidence showing that sanctuary policies increase crime does not exist;
- It is important to note that there is also no clear evidence that shows that crime is lower when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration enforcement¹⁰;
- Local economies—from higher median household income, less poverty, and less reliance on public assistance, to higher labor force participation, higher employment-to-population ratios, and lower unemployment—are stronger in sanctuary counties compared to comparable non-sanctuary counties.

The “Chilling Effects” of Interior Immigration Enforcement

25. In 2005, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) articulated its position on the role of state, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in enforcing federal immigration law as follows: “local law enforcement should not be involved in the enforcement of civil immigration laws since such involvement would likely have a chilling effect on both legal and illegal aliens reporting criminal activity or assisting police in criminal investigations.”¹¹

26. In 2006, the immigration committee of the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), a professional association that includes many of the largest LEAs in the United States, concluded:

“Immigration enforcement by local police would likely negatively effect and undermine the level of trust and cooperation between local police and immigrant communities. If the undocumented immigrant’s primary concern is that they will be deported or subjected to an immigration status investigation, then they will not come forward and provide needed assistance and cooperation. Distrust and fear of

¹⁰ Miles, Thomas J., and Adam B. Cox. “Does immigration enforcement reduce crime? Evidence from secure communities.” *The Journal of Law and Economics* 57, no. 4 (2014): 937-973. See also, Treyger, Elina, Aaron Chalfin, and Charles Loeffler. “Immigration Enforcement, Policing, and Crime.” *Criminology & Public Policy* 13, no. 2 (2014): 285-322.

¹¹ <https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=209673>

1 contacting or assisting the police would develop among legal immigrants as well.
2 Undoubtedly legal immigrants would avoid contact with the police for fear that
3 they themselves or undocumented family members or friends may become subject
4 to immigration enforcement. Without assurances that contact with the police
5 would not result in purely civil immigration enforcement action, the hard won
6 trust, communication and cooperation from the immigrant community would
7 disappear. Such a divide between the local police and immigrant groups would
8 result in increased crime against immigrants and in the broader community, create
9 a class of silent victims and eliminate the potential for assistance from immigrants
10 in solving crimes or preventing future terroristic acts.”¹²

11 27. Recent research provides evidence of the “chilling effects” described by the IACP
12 and MCCA.

13 28. I recently conducted a representative survey of undocumented Mexican nationals
14 in San Diego County.¹³ The survey was fielded between September 2017 and November 2017
15 and includes 594 respondents. In the survey, I embedded an experiment in order to better
16 understand how interior immigration enforcement impacts undocumented immigrants. In the
17 experiment, respondents were randomly assigned to one of two groups. In one group ($n = 298$
18 respondents), questions were prefaced with, “If the San Diego Police Department and the San
19 Diego County Sheriff’s Department said they WILL NOT WORK WITH ICE on deportation
20 raids, would you be more or less likely to...” In the second group ($n = 296$ respondents),
21 questions were prefaced with, “If the San Diego Police Department and the San Diego County
22 Sheriff’s Department WERE WORKING TOGETHER WITH ICE on deportation raids, would
23 you be more or less likely to...” An experiment such as this is superior to analyzing observational
24 survey data (i.e., survey data that is not based on an experimental design) because asking

25 _____
26 ¹² https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/MCC_Position_Statement.pdf

27 ¹³ A survey is considered representative if the survey sample accurately reflects the larger population of interest.
28 Representativeness results when the survey sample is randomly selected from the larger population of interest so that
each respondent has an equal probability of selection. This requires creating a sample frame (i.e., enumerating the
larger population of interest). The sample frame from which respondents were randomly selected includes
approximately 73,000 undocumented Mexican nationals in San Diego County.

1 respondents about one scenario is insufficient for determining how their behavior may or may not
2 change based on the second scenario; asking respondents about one scenario and then the second
3 scenario would likely produce biased results because responses related to the first scenario would
4 likely influence responses to the second scenario (e.g., “I said I would do this in the first scenario,
5 so maybe I should say I wouldn’t do that in the second scenario”); random assignment to one of
6 the two groups balances the two groups across the broad range of covariates (e.g., age, gender,
7 etc.) that need to be controlled for in observational analysis; and random assignment to one of the
8 two groups means that differences in responses can be casually attributed to the variation in the
9 two scenarios (i.e., the treatment effect that results when local law enforcement officials do the
10 work of federal immigration enforcement). Respondents were asked about reporting a crime they
11 witnessed to the police; reporting a crime they were a victim of to the police; using public
12 services that require them to disclose their personal contact information; doing business that
13 requires them to disclose their personal contact information; participating in public events where
14 police may be present; placing their children in after-school or day-care programs (among those
15 with children); and looking for a new job. The table below provides the exact text.

If the San Diego Police Department and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department [said THEY WILL NOT WORK WITH ICE] / [WERE WORKING TOGETHER WITH ICE] on deportation raids, would you be more or less likely to...
Report a crime that you witnessed to the police? Report a crime that you were a victim of to the police? Use public services (e.g., go to City Hall) that required you to give your personal contact information? Do business (e.g., open a bank account, get a loan) that required you to give your personal contact information? Participate in public events where police may be present? Place your children in an after-school or day-care program? Look for a new job?

24 29. If local law enforcement officials “WERE WORKING WITH ICE” to do the work
25 of federal immigration enforcement, 60.8 percent of undocumented immigrants are *less likely* to
26 report a crime they witnessed to police ($p < .001$) and 42.9 percent are *less likely* to report being a
27 victim of a crime to police ($p < .001$).

1 30. If local law enforcement officials say “THEY WILL NOT WORK WITH ICE” to
2 do the work of federal immigration enforcement, 71.8 percent are *more likely* to report a crime
3 they witnessed to police ($p < .001$) and 70.8 percent are *more likely* to report being a victim of a
4 crime to police ($p < .001$).

5 31. These results appeared in the *Washington Post* in an April 27, 2018 article entitled,
6 “Sanctuary cities don’t ‘breed crime.’ They encourage people to report crime.”¹⁴

7 32. These results are consistent with the IACP and MCCA positions described above.
8 They are also consistent with previous research that shows that undocumented women who are
9 victims of violent crimes¹⁵ and undocumented women who are victims of sexual assault or
10 domestic violence¹⁶ are less likely to report crimes if law enforcement officials are also doing the
11 work of federal immigration enforcement.

12 33. Moreover, if local law enforcement officials “WERE WORKING WITH ICE” to
13 do the work of federal immigration enforcement:

- 14 • 69.9 percent are *less likely* to “Use public services (e.g., go to City Hall) that required
15 you to give your personal contact information”;
- 16 • 63.9 percent are *less likely* to “Do business (e.g., open a bank account, get a loan) that
17 required you to give your personal contact information”;
- 18 • 68.3 percent are *less likely* to “Participate in public events where policy may be
19 present”;
- 20 • 42.9 percent are *less likely* to “Place your children in an after-school or day-care
21 program” (among those with children); and
- 22 • 52.1 percent are *less likely* to “Look for a new job.”

23 34. These results are also consistent with a growing number of studies on how interior
24 immigration enforcement impacts undocumented immigrants. Several of these studies examine

25 ¹⁴ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/24/sanctuary-cities-dont-breed-crime-they-encourage-people-to-report-crime/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8360b5956ae5

26 ¹⁵ Messing, Jill Theresa, David Becerra, Allison Ward-Lasher, and David K. Androff. “Latinas’ perceptions of law
27 enforcement: Fear of deportation, crime reporting, and trust in the system.” *Affilia* 30, no. 3 (2015): 328-340.

28 ¹⁶ Vishnuvajjala, Radha. “Insecure communities: how an immigration enforcement program encourages battered
women to stay silent.” *Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice* 32, no. 1 (2011).

(continued...)

1 the impact of state-level laws. For example, research on California’s Proposition 187, which was
2 passed in 1994, showed that tuberculosis patients who feared that going to a physician would
3 result in an immigration enforcement action were four times more likely to delay seeking care.¹⁷
4 Research on Arizona’s SB 1070 showed that Mexican-origin adolescent mothers were less likely
5 to take their babies to the doctor following the passage of the law in 2010¹⁸ and that SB 1070
6 negatively affected health-seeking behaviors among Hispanics/Latinos by increasing fear,
7 decreasing resident’s mobility, and by decreasing trust in public institutions.¹⁹ Similarly, research
8 on Alabama’s HB 56 showed a decline in the use of county public health services among
9 undocumented immigrants in the wake of the passage of the law in 2011, including services for
10 communicable diseases and sexually transmitted infections, even though the utilization of these
11 services was allowed under the law.²⁰ Other studies have examined the impact of local policies,
12 such as the 287(g) program. For example, a study of the public health effects of the local
13 implementation of the 287(g) program found that Hispanic/Latino expectant mothers sought
14 prenatal care later during pregnancy, and with lower quality care, than non-Hispanic/Latino
15 expectant mothers.²¹ More generally, research has shown how fear of separation due to
16 deportation can have far-reaching and negative impacts not only on undocumented immigrants,
17 but also on American citizen children in mixed-status families. As it relates to health, research has
18 shown that fear of deportation decreases Medicaid use among the eligible American citizen
19 children of noncitizen parents.²² As it relates to education, research has shown that children in

20 ¹⁷ Asch, Steven, Barbara Leake, and Lillian Gelberg. “Does fear of immigration authorities deter tuberculosis patients
21 from seeking care?” *Western Journal of Medicine* 161, no. 4 (1994): 373.

22 ¹⁸ Toomey, Russell B., Adriana J. Umaña-Taylor, David R. Williams, Elizabeth Harvey-Mendoza, Laudan B.
23 Jahromi, and Kimberly A. Updegraff. “Impact of Arizona’s SB 1070 immigration law on utilization of health care
24 and public assistance among Mexican-origin adolescent mothers and their mother figures.” *American Journal of
25 Public Health* 104, no. S1 (2014): S28-S34.

26 ¹⁹ Hardy, Lisa J., Christina M. Getrich, Julio C. Quezada, Amanda Guay, Raymond J. Michalowski, and Eric Henley.
27 “A call for further research on the impact of state-level immigration policies on public health.” *American Journal of
28 Public Health* 102, no. 7 (2012): 1250-1253.

²⁰ White, Kari, Justin Blackburn, Bryn Manzella, Elisabeth Welty, and Nir Menachemi. “Changes in Use of County
Public Health Services Following Implementation of Alabama’s Immigration Law.” *Journal of Health Care for the
Poor and Underserved* 25, no. 4 (2014): 1844-1852.

²¹ Rhodes, Scott D., Lilli Mann, Florence M. Simán, Eunyoung Song, Jorge Alonzo, Mario Downs, Emma Lawlor et
al. “The impact of local immigration enforcement policies on the health of immigrant Hispanics/Latinos in the United
States.” *American Journal of Public Health* 105, no. 2 (2015): 329-337.

²² Vargas, Edward D. “Immigration enforcement and mixed-status families: The effects of risk of deportation on
Medicaid use.” *Children and Youth Services Review* 57 (2015): 83-89.

(continued...)

1 mixed-status families face greater barriers to educational success²³; that the American citizen
2 children of undocumented parents often share the risks and limitations associated with
3 undocumented immigration status²⁴; and that the stress caused by immigration raids can sap the
4 attention of students and thus affect their academic performance.²⁵

5 35. Altogether, the data indicate that:

- 6 • When local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration
7 enforcement, undocumented immigrants are less likely to report crimes to the police,
8 even when they are victims;
- 9 • The chilling effects that result when local law enforcement officials do the work of
10 federal immigration enforcement are far reaching: 69.9 percent are *less likely* to “Use
11 public services (e.g., go to City Hall) that required you to give your personal contact
12 information”; 63.9 percent are *less likely* to “Do business (e.g., open a bank account,
13 get a loan) that required you to give your personal contact information”; 68.3 percent
14 are *less likely* to “Participate in public events where policy may be present”; 42.9
15 percent are *less likely* to “Place your children in an after-school or day-care program”
16 (among those with children); and 52.1 percent are *less likely* to “Look for a new job.
- 17 • A growing body of evidence makes clear that interior immigration enforcement has
18 negative implications for a wide range of help-seeking behaviors—for example,
19 inhibiting access to critical health services—which not only affects undocumented
20 immigrants, but American citizen children in mixed-status families.

21 **Conclusion**

22 36. There is no clear evidence to suggest that sanctuary policies “breed crime” (or that
23 crime is lower when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal immigration
24 enforcement).

25 _____
26 ²³ Mapp, Susan, and Emily Hornung. “Irregular immigration status impacts for children in the USA.” *Journal of Human Rights and Social Work* 1, no. 2 (2016): 61-70.

27 ²⁴ Enriquez, Laura E. “Multigenerational Punishment: Shared Experiences of Undocumented Immigration Status Within Mixed-Status Families.” *Journal of Marriage and Family* 77, no. 4 (2015): 939-953.

28 ²⁵ Capps, Randolph, Rosa Maria Castaneda, Ajay Chaudry, and Robert Santos. “Paying the price: The impact of immigration raids on America’s children.” (2007).

1 37. Instead, the data show that crime is lower in sanctuary counties compared to
2 comparable non-sanctuary counties.

3 38. Moreover, when undocumented immigrants are told that local law enforcement
4 officials are “NOT WORKING WITH ICE on deportation raids,” they are more likely to report
5 crimes they witness, as well as crimes they are victims of, to police.


6 39. This affirms the position of the IACP and the MCCA: when undocumented
7 immigrants feel secure enough to cooperate with law enforcement, it makes it easier for law
8 enforcement officers to do their jobs.

9 40. Thus, by delimiting the conditions in which local law enforcement officials in
10 California will work with ICE, laws such as the California Values Act can improve public safety.

11 41. Furthermore, as research continues to uncover how interior immigration
12 enforcement impacts not only undocumented immigrants, but also American citizen children in
13 mixed-status families, it is becoming increasingly clear that laws such as the California Values
14 Act—by mitigating the negative implications on help-seeking behavior among undocumented
15 immigrants, which results when local law enforcement officials do the work of federal
16 immigration enforcement—can positively affect the lives of all Californians.

17 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is
18 true and correct and that this declaration was executed on May 4, 2018 in San Diego, California.

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TOM K. WONG

EXHIBIT A

TOM K. WONG, PH.D.

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ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

2017 - **ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE**
University of California, San Diego

2012 - 2017 **ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE**
University of California, San Diego

OTHER POSITIONS

2013 - **DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION STUDIES PROGRAM MINOR**
University of California, San Diego

2016 **ADVISOR, IMMIGRATION PORTFOLIO**
WHITE HOUSE INITIATIVE ON ASIAN AMERICANS AND PACIFIC ISLANDERS

EDUCATION

2011 **PH.D. IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**
University of California, Riverside
Focus in Comparative Politics, International Relations, and Research Methods
Dissertation: *Immigration Control in the Age of Migration*

2005 **B.A. IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**
University of California, Riverside
Focus in International Relations
Magna Cum Laude

BOOKS

(2) Tom K. Wong. 2016. *The Politics of Immigration: Partisanship, Changing Demographics, and American National Identity*. Oxford University Press.

[NPR](#), [ABC News/Yahoo.com](#), [LA Times](#), [Univision](#), [Monkey Cage](#)

(1) Tom K. Wong. 2015. *Rights, Deportation, and Detention in the Age of Immigration Control*. Stanford University Press. [Oxford Law blog](#)

JOURNAL ARTICLES

(7) Tom K. Wong, Angela Garcia, and Carolina Valdivia. *forthcoming*. "The Political Incorporation of Undocumented Youth," *Social Problems* (conditional accept).

(6) Tom K. Wong and Hillary Kosnac. 2017. "Does the Legalization of Undocumented Immigrants in the US Encourage Unauthorized Immigration from Mexico? An Empirical Analysis of the Moral Hazard of Legalization," *International Migration* vol. 55 no. 2: 159-173.

- (5) Tom K. Wong and Angela Garcia. 2016. "Does Where I Live Affect Whether I Apply? The Contextual Determinants of Applying for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)," *International Migration Review* vol. 50 no. 3: 699-727.
[C-Span](#), [Associated Press](#)
- (4) Tom K. Wong, Donald Kerwin, Jeanne M. Atkinson, and Mary Meg McCarthy. 2014. "Paths to Lawful Immigration Status: Results and Implications from the PERSON Survey," *Journal of Migration and Human Security* vol. 2 no 4: 287-304.
[NBC News.com](#)
- (3) Tom K. Wong. 2014. "The Politics of Interior Immigration Enforcement," *California Journal of Politics and Policy* vol. 6 no 3: 381-399.
- (2) Tom K. Wong and Justin Gest. 2013. "Organizing Disorder: Indexing Migrants' Rights and International Migration Policy," *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal* vol. 28 no 1: 257-269.
- (1) Tom K. Wong. 2012. "The Politics of Interior Immigration Control in the United States: Explaining Local Cooperation with Federal Immigration Authorities," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* vol. 38 no. 5: 737-756.

BOOK CHAPTERS

- (4) Tom K. Wong. 2014. "Conceptual Challenges and Contemporary Trends in Immigration Control." In *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (3rd edition), edited by James F. Hollifield, Philip Martin, and Pia Orrenius. Stanford University Press.
- (3) Tom K. Wong. 2014. "Nation of Immigrants or Deportation Nation? Analyzing Deportations and Returns in the United States, 1892-2010." In *The Nation and Its Peoples: Citizens, Denizens, and Migrants*, edited by John S.W. Park and Shannon Gleeson. Routledge.
- (2) James F. Hollifield and Tom K. Wong. 2014. "The Politics of International Migration: How Can We 'Bring the State Back In'?" In *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines* (3rd edition), edited by Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield. Routledge.
- (1) Karthick Ramakrishnan and Tom K. Wong. 2010. "Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants." In *Taking Local Control: Immigration Policy Activism in U.S. Cities and States*, edited by Monica W. Varsanyi. Stanford University Press.

WORKS UNDER REVIEW/IN PROGRESS (SELECTED LIST)

- Tom K. Wong and Justin Gest. "Looks Skin Deep: Do Immigrant Legislators Better Represent Immigrant Interests?"
- Tom K. Wong and Carolina Valdivia. "In Their Own Words: A Nationwide Survey of Undocumented Millennials," Working Paper 191, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies.
[New York Times](#), [Washington Post](#), [The Hill](#), [La Opinión](#), [Univision](#), [NBC News.com](#)
- Tom K. Wong. "President Obama's Executive Actions on Immigration and the 2016 Presidential Election." This project uses a nationally representative survey of Latinos ($n = 820$) and Asians ($n = 950$) fielded in late to analyze how knowing someone who is undocumented and potentially eligible for legal

status via programs like DAPA affects the civic engagement of Latino and Asian citizens. The survey was fielded by GfK and commissioned w/Dan Hopkins and Efren Perez.

Tom K. Wong. “Mobilizing Low-Propensity Voters of Color” and “Governing Diversity.” These projects examine how demographic changes are reshaping the American electorate and how policymakers are responding. The former project includes multiple voter mobilization experiments utilizing direct voter contact run during the 2016 presidential cycle. These experiments analyze interventions designed to convey the urgency of voting to Latino, Asian, and immigrant-origin voters using political discourse around immigration policy and refugee admissions.

w/Justin Gest. “International Migrants Bill of Rights.” This project aims to create cross-national indicators on government respect for and recognition of the human rights of migrants. Funding from the World Bank (obtained by Gest) will be used to pilot a 58 item index across 5 countries.

REPORTS

Tom K. Wong et al. 2017. *DACA Recipients’ Economic and Educational Gains Continue to Grow*. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress.

Tom K. Wong. 2017. *The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy*. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress.

Tom K. Wong et al. 2016. *New Study of DACA Beneficiaries Shows Positive Economic and Educational Outcomes*. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress.

Tom K. Wong et al. 2015. *Results from a Nationwide Survey of DACA Recipients Illustrate the Program’s Impact*. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress.

Tom K. Wong. 2014. *Statistical Analysis Shows that Violence, Not Deferred Action, Is Behind the Surge of Unaccompanied Children Crossing the Border*. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress.

Tom K. Wong et al. 2013. *Undocumented No More: A Nationwide Analysis of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)*. Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress.
[C-Span](#), [Associated Press](#)

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Tom K. Wong. 2017. “The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy,” *Migration and Citizenship: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship* vol. 5 no. 2.

James F. Hollifield and Tom K. Wong. 2012/2013. “International Migration: Cause or Consequence of Political Change,” *Migration and Citizenship: Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship* vol. 1 no. 1.

Tom K. Wong. 2012. “The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians.” In *The Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice*, edited by Lavina Stan and Nadya Nedelsky. Cambridge University Press.

Karthick Ramakrishnan, Dino Bozonelos, Louise Hendrickson, and Tom K. Wong. 2008. “Inland Gaps: Civic Inequalities in a High Growth Region,” *Policy Matters* vol 2 no 1.

Karthick Ramakrishnan and Tom K. Wong. 2007. "Immigration Policies Go Local: The Varying Responses of Local Governments to Undocumented Immigration." Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity. Working Paper Series on Immigration.

RESEARCH GRANTS (AS A FACULTY MEMBER)

- \$341,127, Multiple Funders, "U.S. Immigration Policy in the 21st Century," 2017-2019
- \$22,500, UCSD USMEX Fellowship, 2016-2017
- \$16,000, UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, 2015-2016
- \$365,000, MacArthur Foundation, 2015-2017 (partially awarded, terminated after the DAPA program was enjoined by the Supreme Court)
- \$25,000, UCSD Frontiers of Innovation Scholars Program Grant, 2015-2016
- \$15,000, UCSD Faculty Career Development Program Grant, 2014-2015
- \$30,000, Unbound Philanthropy, 2014
- \$100,000, Department of Homeland Security, 2013
- \$30,000, Center for American Progress, 2013
- \$10,000, UCSD Center for International, Comparative, and Area Studies Grant, 2013
- \$10,000, UCSD Academic Senate, 2013
- \$1,500, UCSD Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Grant, 2013

TEACHING AT UCSD

- Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Teaching Award, 2014-2015
- The Politics of Immigration (upper-division, 280 students)
- International Human Rights Law: Rights of Migrants (upper-division, 200 students)
- The Politics of Multiculturalism (upper-division, 100 students)
- Immigration Politics and Policy (graduate seminar, 4 students)
- Undergraduate Honors Seminar (upper-division, 15 students)

INVITED PRESENTATIONS (SELECTED)

- 2018** | "Migrant Rights Database." Comparative Politics Workshop, University of Chicago, April 25, 2018.
- Author Meets Critics. Center for the Study of International Migration, UCLA, March 2, 2018.
- 2017** | "The Future of U.S. Immigration Policy in the Age of Trump." Citizenship and Equality Colloquium, University of Colorado, November 16, 2017.
- "The Determinants and Effects of Sanctuary Policies." Cornell University, November 9-10, 2017.
- "The Determinants and Effects of Sanctuary Policies." Presentation at the 2017 APPAM Fall Research Conference, Chicago, IL, November 2-4, 2017.

“Immigration and the U.S. Constitution.” Seminar at the Robert H. Smith Center for the Constitution at James Madison’s Montpelier, Orange, VA, July 31-August 2, 2017.

“The Determinants of U.S. Immigration Policy.” University of California, Santa Barbara, June 1, 2017.

“Paths to Legal Status for Undocumented Immigrants.” Presentation at the CLINIC annual conference, Atlanta, GA, May 25, 2017.

“The Effects of Sanctuary Policies on Crime and the Economy.” Presentation at the Sanctuary Cities Convening, New York City Council, New York, NY, March 27-28, 2017.

“The Future of U.S. Immigration Policy in the Age of Trump.” Yankelovich Center for Social Science Research, University of California, San Diego, March 15, 2017.

“Child Migration.” World Migration Report workshop, International Organization for Migration (IOM) Geneva, Switzerland, March 9-10, 2017.

“The Politics of Immigration.” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, San Diego Program Committee, University of California, San Diego, February 9, 2017.

2016 | “Post-Election Panel.” Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS), University of California, San Diego, November 21, 2016.

“Mobilizing Immigrant Communities in the Age of Trump.” Tulane University, October 14, 2016.

“Immigrant Integration and the Obama Administration: DACA, DAPA, and Implications for the 2016 Presidential Election.” Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, UCLA, April 28, 2016.

“Mobilizing Low-Propensity Voters of Color: Towards an Electorate That Reflects a Changing America.” Presentation at the Asian Americans Advancing Justice conference, Los Angeles, CA, March 31, 2016.

“Immigrants in American Society.” Presentation at KPBS, San Diego, CA, March 21, 2016.

“Immigration Policy.” Presentation to Mi Familia Vota, Riverside, CA, January 14, 2016.

2015 | “The European Refugee Crisis.” Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS), the European Studies Program, the Lifelong Learning Program of the EU, and the Scholars Strategy Network (SSN), University of California, San Diego, October 27, 2015.

“U.S. Immigration Politics and the 2016 Presidential Election.” Presentation at the Wilson Center, Washington DC, October 26, 2015.

“The Political Incorporation of Undocumented Youth.” Presentation at the “Challenging Borders” conference, University of California, Riverside, October 23, 2015.

“The Consequences of Inequality: Why Does it Matter and How.” Symposium on Capital in the 21st Century with Thomas Piketty, University of California, San Diego, October 22, 2015.

“U.S. Immigration Politics and Policy.” Presentation at the U.S. Consulate in Tijuana, October 13, 2015.

“UC National Summit on Undocumented Students.” University of California Office of the President, May 7-8, 2015.

“Irregular Migration.” Presentation at the “Politics and Policies of International Migration: Europe and the U.S.” conference, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium, April 28-29, 2015.

“Opportunities and Limits of the Executive Actions Proposed by President Obama.” Presentation at the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, Mexico, April 13-14, 2015.

“Administrative Relief Implementation and Impact Project.” Presentation at the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), New York, NY, March 25, 2015.

“Research Roundtable.” Presentation at the “Ready America: Implementing Immigration Action” conference, Washington DC, February 9-11, 2015.

2014 | “Insights from Implementing DACA for Administrative Relief.” Presentation at the National Immigrant Integration Conference, Los Angeles, CA, December 16, 2014.

“Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.” American Immigration Council (AIC), Washington, D.C., November 7, 2014.

“Immigration Policy and the November 2014 Midterm Elections.” California Immigrant Policy Center (CIPC), October 29, 2014.

“The Many Paths to Legal Status: Results and Implications from the PERSON Survey.” Presentation to the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), New York, NY, September 29, 2014.

“The Congressional Politics of Interior Immigration Enforcement.” Presentation at the “Migration During Economic Downturns” workshop, German Historical Institute, Washington, DC, April 4-5, 2014.

“Mapping DACA Renewals.” Presentation to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), March 13, 2014.

“Latino Politics: Left, Right, or Down the Middle?” Presentation at the Hispanic Radio annual conference, San Diego, CA, March 10, 2014.

2013 | “Undocumented No More: A Nationwide Analysis of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.” Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS), University of California, San Diego, October 2, 2013.

“DACA Turns 1.” Presentation at the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC, August 15, 2013. **[Televised on CSPAN]**

“The Prospects for Comprehensive Immigration Reform.” Presentation at the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mexico City, Mexico, August 12, 2013.

“A Look at the Stats: How Will Congressional Representatives Vote on Comprehensive Immigration Reform?” Presentation at the “Changing Face of America” conference, University of California, Berkeley, May 3, 2013.

“Will Comprehensive Immigration Reform Pass? Predicting Legislative Support and Opposition to CIR.” Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS), University of California, San Diego, April 29, 2013.

“Race, Ethnicity, the 2012 Elections, and the Politics of Comprehensive Immigration Reform.” Presentation at the *Beyond the Headlines* speaker series, UCLA, February 26, 2013.

“International Migrants Bill of Rights (IMBR) Initiative.” Georgetown Law School, Washington, DC, February 8-9, 2013.

2012 | “Immigration Policy After the 2012 Elections.” Center for the Study of International Migration, UCLA, November 16, 2012.

“PBS Need to Know 2012 Election Special: America by the Numbers.” Presentation for KPBS at the Jo and Vi Jacobs Center, San Diego, CA, October 10, 2012.

“Immigrants in American Society.” Presentation at the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) field office, Dallas, TX, March 6, 2012.

2011 | “The Radical Right and the Politics of Immigration Control in Europe.” University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, June 16-17, 2011.

“Conceptual Challenges and Contemporary Trends in Immigration Control.” Presentation at the “Immigration Policy in an Era of Globalization” conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, TX, May 18-20, 2011.

“Enforcing Like a State: A Mixed-Methods Study of the Politics of Immigration Control.” Presentation at the University of California Center for New Racial Studies conference, UCLA, April 21, 2011.

“Immigration Enforcement in the Age of Obama.” Center for Ideas and Society, University of California, Riverside, March 8, 2011.

2010 | “The Politics and Determinants of Immigration Control: Evidence from 25 Immigrant-Receiving Democracies.” Department of Political Science and the Center for Research on Immigration, Population, and Public Policy, University of California, Irvine, December 1, 2010.

“States, Irregular Migrants, and a Theory of Selective Immigration Control: Evidence from European Gateway Cities.” Presentation at the “Beyond Arizona: Laws Targeting Immigrants in the US and Europe” conference at the Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity, University of California, Berkeley, October 25, 2010.

2009 | “Immigration Control in Industrialized Democracies: What Explains Their Variations.” Presentation at Metropolis, an initiative of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa, Canada, December 2, 2009.

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

- Reviewer: *National Science Foundation*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *American Politics Research*, *Du Bois Review*, *International Migration*, *International Migration Review*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies*, *Journal of Politics*, *Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics*, *Law & Social Inquiry*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *Russell Sage Foundation*, *Social Identities*, *Social Problems*
- Advisory Board, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS), 2012-present
- Advisory Board, Integrated Voter Engagement study, 2016-present
- Advisory Board, Unbound Philanthropy, 2015-2017
- APSA, Executive Committee, Migration and Citizenship Section, Treasurer, 2012-2015
- APSA, Migration and Citizenship Section Program Chair, 2018
- Editorial Board, *Journal of Migration and Human Security (JMHS)*, 2014-present
- Editorial Board, *Politics, Groups, and Identities (PGI)*, 2016-present
- Executive Committee, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (CCIS), 2015-present
- MPSA, International Relations and Domestic Politics Section Program Chair, 2016
- WPSA, (Im)Migration and Citizenship Section Program Chair, 2015, 2017
- WPSA, Dissertation award committee, 2016