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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLTON DWAYNE FIELDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DIRECTOR OF CDCR,
Defendants.

No. 2: 18-cv-0653 KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of \$350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff's trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to plaintiff's trust account. These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time

1 the amount in plaintiff's account exceeds \$10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.
2 § 1915(b)(2).

3 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
4 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
5 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
6 "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
7 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

8 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
9 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
10 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an
11 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
12 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
13 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
14 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.
15 2000) ("[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably
16 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless."); Franklin, 745 F.2d at
17 1227.

18 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "requires only 'a short and plain
19 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the
20 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic
21 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
22 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than "a
23 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations
24 sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. However, "[s]pecific
25 facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what
26 the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
27 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal quotations marks omitted).
28 In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the

1 complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the pleading in the light most
2 favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other
3 grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

4 Named as defendants are the Director of the California Department of Corrections and
5 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Chief Deputy Warden Sexton, the CDCR and the Warden of California
6 State Prison-Sacramento (“CSP-Sac”). The complaint contains two claims. First, plaintiff alleges
7 that he has been denied single cell housing in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff
8 alleges that he has exhausted administrative remedies as to claim one.

9 Second, plaintiff alleges that he is in the Enhanced Outpatient Program (“EOP”) for
10 mentally ill inmates. Plaintiff also alleges that he is classified as a sensitive needs inmate, who
11 has been housed on a sensitive needs yard (“SNY”). Plaintiff alleges that CDCR has a new
12 policy to place EOP/SNY inmates on the general population (“GP”) yard. Plaintiff alleges that
13 placing him in a GP yard puts him in danger. Plaintiff alleges that he has not exhausted
14 administrative remedies as to claim two because of “immediate threat to safety/no time.”

15 Plaintiff seeks money damages and injunctive relief.

16 For the reasons stated herein, plaintiff’s claims against defendant CDCR are barred by the
17 Eleventh Amendment. Under the Eleventh Amendment, states and state agencies enjoy sovereign
18 immunity from private suits for damages or injunctive relief in federal court, unless the State has
19 waived or Congress has validly overridden such immunity. Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,
20 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
21 with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court....” Id. Moreover, Congress did not
22 override sovereign immunity with respect to § 1983 suits. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
23 Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67, 71 (1989) (“We cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to disregard
24 the well-established immunity of a State from being sued without its consent. ... We hold that
25 neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).
26 Accordingly, CDCR cannot be sued in this instance. The undersigned herein recommends
27 dismissal of defendant CDCR.

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1 Turning to claim one, plaintiff has not linked any defendant to the alleged deprivation.

2 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

3 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes
4 to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the
5 deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
6 Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
7 law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

8 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
9 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
10 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (“Congress did not intend § 1983
11 liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent.”); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (no
12 affirmative link between the incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy
13 demonstrating their authorization or approval of such misconduct). “A person ‘subjects’ another
14 to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an
15 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is
16 legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy,
17 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

18 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of
19 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant
20 holds a supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional
21 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979)
22 (no liability where there is no allegation of personal participation); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d
23 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978) (no liability where there is no evidence of personal participation), cert.
24 denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of
25 official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673
26 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (complaint devoid of specific factual allegations of personal
27 participation is insufficient).

28 Claim one is dismissed with leave to amend because plaintiff has failed to link any
defendant to the alleged deprivation. In other words, plaintiff does not specifically allege that any
defendant denied his request for single cell housing. If plaintiff files an amended complaint,

1 plaintiff must name as defendants those persons who allegedly failed to provide him with single
2 cell housing, why they did so, and how they were allegedly on notice that plaintiff needed single
3 cell housing. Plaintiff may not rely on exhibits to state his claims.

4 For the reasons stated herein, claim two should be dismissed based on plaintiff's failure to
5 exhaust administrative remedies.

6 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), "[n]o action shall be brought with
7 respect to prison conditions under ... [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
8 confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are
9 available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

10 Proper exhaustion of available remedies is mandatory, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731,
11 741 (2001), and "[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other
12 critical procedural rules[.]" Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The Supreme Court has
13 also cautioned against reading futility or other exceptions into the statutory exhaustion
14 requirement. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6. Moreover, because proper exhaustion is necessary,
15 a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise
16 procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93.
17 "[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies prisoners 'must complete the administrative
18 review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules,' [] - rules that are defined not
19 by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process itself." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218
20 (2007) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88). See also Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027
21 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The California prison system's requirements 'define the boundaries of proper
22 exhaustion.'" (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218).

23 Because plaintiff concedes that he has not exhausted administrative remedies as to his
24 claim challenging his placement on a GP yard, this claim should be dismissed.

25 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions
26 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
27 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how
28 each named defendant is involved. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976). There can be no

1 liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a
2 defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371; May v. Enomoto, 633
3 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore,
4 vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not
5 sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

6 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
7 make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
8 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This requirement exists
9 because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ramirez
10 v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) ("an 'amended complaint
11 supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.'" (internal citation
12 omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any
13 function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim
14 and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

15 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

16 1. Plaintiff's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

17 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of \$350.00 for this action. Plaintiff
18 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
19 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court's order to the
20 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently
21 herewith.

22 3. Claim one is dismissed with leave to amend.

23 4. Within thirty days from the date of this order, plaintiff shall complete the attached
24 Notice of Amendment and submit the following documents to the court:

25 a. The completed Notice of Amendment; and

26 b. An original and one copy of the Amended Complaint.

27 Plaintiff's amended complaint shall comply with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the
28 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must

1 also bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.”

2 Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order may result in the
3 dismissal of this action.


4 5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to assign a district judge to this action.

5 IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant CDCR and claim two, challenging
6 plaintiff’s alleged placement on a GP yard, be dismissed for the reasons discussed above.

7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
8 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days
9 after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections
10 with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
11 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that
12 failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District
13 Court’s order. *Martinez v. Ylst*, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

14 Dated: May 4, 2018

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KENDALL J. NEWMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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v.
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NOTICE OF AMENDMENT

Plaintiff hereby submits the following document in compliance with the court's order
filed _____.

DATED: _____ Amended Complaint

Plaintiff