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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH HILL,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

PEOPLEREADY, INC,

 Defendant.

No. 2:23-cv-306-DAD-KJN PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS;
ORDER STAYING DISCOVERY

(ECF No. 7.)

Presently before the court are the scope of the pleadings and scheduling of this case.¹

Regarding the former, the court has considered the parties’ positions from their briefing and the arguments made at the May 16, 2023 hearing. (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 11.) For the reasons stated below, the court recommends plaintiff’s motion to amend be DENIED and the case be allowed to proceed on plaintiff’s claim under Cal. Lab. Code § 98.6 only. The court also recommends that the doe defendants be DISMISSED from this case.

Regarding scheduling, all discovery in this matter, including the parties’ obligations to transmit initial disclosures, is STAYED until resolution of these findings and recommendations by the district judge. Once the F&Rs are resolved, the undersigned will lift the stay and issue the scheduling order for this case.

¹ This matter was referred to the undersigned per 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 302(c)(21).

1 **Background**

2 Plaintiff filed a complaint in California Superior Court against defendant PeopleReady,
3 Inc. and two Doe defendants, asserting claims under (i) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation
4 of his First Amendment rights and (ii) Cal. Labor Code § 98.6, which prohibits retaliation against
5 employees who report violations of state or federal laws or regulations. Plaintiff alleges he was
6 fired in 2022 after he informed his supervisors he would be contacting the Labor department to
7 report PeopleReady’s alleged failure to pay him his full wages. Defendant denies the allegations,
8 contending it fired plaintiff pursuant to his status as an at-will employee. (See ECF Nos. 1; 10.)

9 Shortly after answering the complaint, defendant removed to this court pursuant to both
10 federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) The court found the case ripe for
11 scheduling and ordered a joint statement from the parties. (ECF No. 6.)

12 Plaintiff then moved to amend his complaint, seeking to add a Title VII retaliation claim
13 and to clarify his § 1983 claim based on similar facts stated in the original complaint. (ECF No.
14 7.) Defendant opposed, arguing the Title VII and § 1983 claims were not cognizable and so
15 amendment would be futile. (ECF No. 8.) Defendant also contended a motion on the pleadings
16 would be proper on the First Amendment claim asserted in the original complaint, as § 1983
17 claims cannot lie against private parties like PeopleReady. Finally, PeopleReady contended the
18 court should dismiss Doe defendants (two of plaintiff’s former supervisors) because they are
19 disfavored in federal court. (Id.) The court stated it would take up the scope of the pleadings at
20 the upcoming scheduling conference. (ECF No. 9.)

21 At the May 16, 2023 hearing, plaintiff reasserted his intent to seek amendment of the
22 complaint and maintain his First Amendment claim under § 1983, contending it, the Title VII
23 claim, and the Labor Code claim were all viable claims. Defendant admitted that the Labor Code
24 claim should proceed to discovery, but reasserted its opposition to amendment and requested the
25 court clarify the scope of the pleadings.²

26 _____
27 ² The court construes the parties briefing and statements at the May 16th hearing as defendant’s
28 request for judgment on the pleadings on the § 1983 claim in the original complaint. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 7(b) (noting a motion must be made (A) in writing unless made during a hearing or trial;
(B) state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order; and (C) state the relief sought).

1 **I. Scope of the Pleadings**

2 **Legal Standards**

3 After the first amended pleading of right, “a party may amend its pleading only with the
4 opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to amend
5 “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West,
6 Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). However, leave to amend may be denied when any of the
7 following factors are at play: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party,
8 (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether there has been previous amendment. United States v.
9 Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff’s proposed amendments are
10 futile if the amended complaint would be subject to dismissal. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d at
11 995. “The test for futility is identical to the one used when considering the sufficiency of a
12 pleading challenged under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Karol v. Med-
13 Trans, 2012 WL 3862148, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2012).

14 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint fails to state a claim if it either lacks a cognizable legal
15 theory or sufficient facts to allege a cognizable legal theory. Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d
16 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must
17 contain more than “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the
18 elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In
19 other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
20 conclusory statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, a
21 complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
22 plausible on its face.” Id. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the well-pleaded factual
23 allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and construe the complaint in the
24 light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283 (1986). The court is
25 not, however, required to accept as true “conclusory [factual] allegations that are contradicted by
26 documents referred to in the complaint,” or “legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the
27 form of factual allegations.” Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009).

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1 After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for
2 judgment on the pleadings. The court inquires whether the complaint at issue contains “sufficient
3 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.” Harris v.
4 Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) A Rule 12(c) motion follows the same
5 standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102,
6 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). Thus, it may be predicated on either (1) the lack of a cognizable legal
7 theory, or (2) insufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. Mays v. Wal-Mart Stores,
8 Inc., 354 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901
9 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

10 Analysis

11 Accepting the facts asserted in plaintiff’s proposed first amended complaint as true,
12 allowing plaintiff to amend and assert the claims therein would be futile. Corinthian Colleges,
13 655 F.3d at 995. Additionally, the § 1983 claim in the original complaint is not cognizable and
14 should be dismissed. Harris, 682 F.3d at 1131.

15 For plaintiff’s proposed retaliation claim under Title VII, the court looks to the text of the
16 retaliation statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 “Other unlawful employment practices” provides:

17 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
18 discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has
19 opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
20 this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.

21 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (emphasis added). In other words, this provision only protects employees
22 “from retaliation for complaining about the types of discrimination [Title VII] prohibits.” Harris
23 v. Treasure Canyon Calcuim Company, 132 F.Supp.3d 1228, 1246 (D. Id. 2015) (citing Hamm v.
24 Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (7th Cir. 2003) (overruled on other
25 grounds)). Plaintiff’s proposed retaliation claim would fail because he alleges defendant
26 retaliated against him after plaintiff threatened to report the company’s failure to pay wages to the
27 Labor Department, and Title VII does not protect against this kind of act. Thus, the district judge
28 should deny plaintiff’s proposed amendment as futile. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d at 995.

1 As to plaintiff's proposed claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, these generally do not lie against
2 a private individual or business entity that does not act under color of state law. See Franklin v.
3 Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, plaintiff cannot allege a claim for violations
4 of his First Amendment rights against defendant PeopleReady. Given this fact, the district judge
5 should deny plaintiff's motion to amend and dismiss the Section 1983 claim from the original
6 complaint. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d at 995; Harris, 682 F.3d at 1131.

7 **II. Doe Defendants**

8 Named defendant PeopleReady seeks dismissal of the two Doe defendants described in
9 the complaint. The court concurs. The use of Doe pleading is disfavored in federal court,
10 especially where the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629
11 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Under California law, a cause of action for retaliation "lies only
12 against the employer, not against the supervisor through whom the employer commits the tort."
13 Lloyd v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 172 Cal. App. 4th 320, 330 (2009).

14 If plaintiff uncovers information during discovery that indicates a named individual may
15 be liable for a claim associated with this case, plaintiff may file a motion to amend the complaint
16 to add these individuals and claims.

17 **III. Case Scheduling and Discovery Obligations**

18 The court will table the scheduling order for the time being, and will not order the parties
19 to a settlement conference at this time. As discussed at the hearing, the scope of this case is
20 pegged to the district judge's final order on these findings and recommendations, which require
21 an objections period and time for the district judge to review. Given that the district judges in this
22 court are dealing with a backlog of criminal and civil matters, resolution of these findings and
23 recommendations may take some time. Because of this likely delay, the undersigned finds it
24 unwise to set discovery dates in this case at this time. Initial disclosures are not required at this
25 time either, as those disclosures may look different depending on the ultimate scope of the claims.
26 Finally, though the court appreciates the parties' willingness to attend a settlement conference
27 with a magistrate judge, ordering the parties to one now is unwise until after the pleadings are set,
28 as the scope of any settlement will also depend on the scope of the claims found cognizable.

