To establish a right to habeas relief due to a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. An assessment of an attorney's performance "requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 689. "Failure to anticipate a change in existing law does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel." Ruff v. Armontrout, 77 F.3d 265, (8th Cir. 1996).

Pursuant to <u>Strickland</u>, petitioner's trial counsel's performance must be assessed based on the legal landscape existing at the time of petitioner's trial. 466 U.S. at 689. Petitioner was tried in 1984. <u>Batson</u> was not decided until 1986. Evaluating trial counsel's performance based on caselaw that had not yet been decided at the time of trial would run counter to <u>Strickland</u>'s directive.

Petitioner argues that <u>Batson</u> applies to his case because it imposes the same obligations on counsel as did <u>People v. Wheeler</u>, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978), California's predecessor to <u>Batson</u>, decided six years prior to his trial. <u>Wheeler</u> held that the "use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution." <u>Id.</u> at 276-77. Petitioner asserts that a <u>Wheeler</u> motion serves as an implicit objection under <u>Batson</u>, and that a petitioner who makes a <u>Wheeler</u> objection also preserves his federal constitutional claim. At issue here however, is an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, not a substantive <u>Batson</u> claim. Similarities between the standards of <u>Wheeler</u> and <u>Batson</u> notwithstanding, the governing law at the time of petitioner's trial was <u>Wheeler</u>, not <u>Batson</u>. Any similarity between the two cases does not obviate <u>Strickland</u>'s requirement that counsel's performance be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of trial.

Petitioner further argues that Batson applies to his case under Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). In Griffith, the Supreme Court held that Batson applies to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final when Batson was decided. Id. at 322. Petitioner's case was pending on appeal when <u>Batson</u> was decided. The rationale in <u>Griffith</u> however, does not support the application of Batson to petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel subclaim. In Griffith, the Supreme Court reasoned that similarly situated defendants must be treated equally. Id. at 323. Therefore, "all defendants whose cases are pending on direct appeal at the time of a law changing decision should be entitled to invoke the new rule." <u>Id.</u> at 322. Petitioner however, would not have benefitted from Batson when it was decided because he did not raise a Batson or Wheeler claim on direct appeal. See, e.g., Thomas v. Moore, 866 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1989). Moreover, unlike the defendant in Griffith whose claim on appeal was a substantive challenge to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges at trial, petitioner is raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nothing in Griffith supports the retroactive application of Batson to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court has reviewed all of petitioner's arguments in support of the application of <u>Batson</u> to the ineffective assistance of counsel subclaim of claim D and finds that they lack merit. The Court concludes that <u>Batson</u> does not apply. Accordingly, the Court directs the parties to submit further briefing in relation to the subclaim, as previously ordered. Petitioner shall file a surreply within 45 days of the date of this Order. Respondent shall file a response within 45 days of the date of service of petitioner's surreply.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 4, 2011

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IEFFREY S. WHATALL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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