

1		The C	Court tentatively GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART BSA's motion	
2	for judgment on the pleadings; GRANTS BSA's motion for summary judgment and DENIES			
3	Wrenn's motion for summary judgment.			
4		The parties shall each have fifteen minutes to address the following questions:		
5	1.	The parties argue about the Boy Scouts of America's ("BSA") and Plaintiff's rights to the use of the term SCOUT or SCOUTING in their respective marks.		
6 7 8		a.	Does the Court adjudicate the parties' dispute using the traditional rubric of a trademark infringement analysis or does the Court adjudicate the dispute by reference to the rights bestowed upon the BSA by receipt of a Congressional charter?	
9		b.	Does the BSA intend only to introduce the charter as "evidence of the strength	
10			and fame of the Boy Scouts and its marks"? (<i>See</i> BSA MSJ Reply at 7 n.13.) Why aren't the protection afforded by the charter sufficient to remove this case	
11			from the traditional infringement analysis? (See, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Teal, 374 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (E.D. Penn. 1974).)	
12		c.	Does the anti-dissection analysis apply to the rights given to BSA under the charter? <i>See Girl Scouts of the United States of America v.</i> Hollingsworth, 188	
13			F. Supp. 707, 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (granting protection to Girls Scouts of American over term 'Scout' due to Congressional charter); <i>but see Adolph</i>	
14 15			<i>Kastor & Bros. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n</i> , 138 F.2d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 1943) ("there might be some question whether the word, 'Scout,' taken by itself, was within the clause 'words of phrases used by the Boys Scout of American in carrying	
16			out its program.' True, it is part of 'words and phrases' so used; but whether the statute meant to go so far as to protect a single word broken from its context, might be open to debate.")	
17 18		d.	On what legal basis does Plaintiff contend that the cases cited by BSA rendering their words or phrases as protected marks under the charter are "inapposite	
19			because they involve situations where a commercial entity used marks or emblems on merchandise rather than competing scouting groups"? (<i>See</i> MSJ	
20			Opp. Br. at 5 n.7.) Is that a distinction without a difference?	
21		e.	Does the language of the BSA's Congressional charter differ in a legally significant way from the language of the charter granted to the United States Olympic Committee over the specific term "Olympic" versus the unspecified	
22			term, "words and phrases"?	
23	2	applies to bar analysis of any of the component parts of the marks independently. The Court does not render advisory opinions about whether a portion of disputed marks is generic. <i>See Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization</i> , 59 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 1995). What are the marks the Court must analyze? Is it YOUTHSCOUTS versus BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA (and CUB SCOUTS and		
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25 26				
26 27	EAGLE SCOUT)?			
27 28	3.	3. How should the Court treat the BSA's disclaimer of the term "scout" in its 'VARSITY SCOUT' mark? How should the Court treat the Patent and Trademark Office's denial of registration for 'SCOUTING/TV'?		

Do the parties have anything further they wish to address? 4. IT IS SO ORDERED. Juy S White Dated: October 8, 2008 JEFFREY S. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE