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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
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7 DEAN ALEXANDER, et al.,

8 Plaintiffs,

9 v.

10 FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM,  
11 INC., et al.,

12 Defendants.

Case No. [05-cv-00038-EMC](#)

**REDACTED/PUBLIC VERSION**

**ORDER GRANTING FINAL  
APPROVAL AND PLAINTIFFS'  
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES**

Docket No. 185, 204

13 Previously, the Court conditionally granted Plaintiffs' motion for final approval and  
14 deferred ruling on Plaintiffs' motion for fees, costs, and incentive awards. *See* Docket No. 215  
15 (order). The Court has now received updated information from Plaintiffs regarding the response  
16 rate as well as additional information related to fees. *See, e.g.*, Docket Nos. 234, 243-44  
17 (supplemental declarations). Having reviewed that information, the Court hereby rules as follows.

18 **I. FINAL APPROVAL**

19 It appears that one late claim was submitted (*i.e.*, past the May 27, 2016, claims filing  
20 date). That claim is worth approximately \$148,000. *See* Docket No. 244 (2d Supp. Myette Decl.  
21 ¶ 13). It is not clear from the papers submitted whether the parties have agreed to credit that  
22 claim. Assuming that the parties have not so agreed, the Court hereby orders that that claim be  
23 deemed valid. At best, the claim was submitted only a few days late, and the Court sees no  
24 prejudice to any party or class member in recognizing the claim.

25 Accordingly, final approval is now granted outright. Plaintiffs have made additional  
26 efforts to reach out to nonclaiming class members. After those additional efforts, 98% of the net  
27 settlement fund is being claimed. *See* Docket No. 244 (2d Supp. Myette Decl. ¶ 12). There are  
28 only approximately 100 people who have not filed claims. *See* Docket No. 244 (Ross Decl. ¶ 7).

1 All reasonable efforts to contact these individuals have been exhausted.

2 **II. FEES, COSTS, AND INCENTIVE AWARDS**

3 The Court grants the incentive awards requested by Plaintiffs – *i.e.*, \$10,000 to each  
4 original named Plaintiff and \$1,500 to Plaintiff Marjorie Pontarolo. The incentive awards are  
5 reasonable given the time and effort each individual invested in the litigation, which has lasted  
6 more than ten years.

7 The remaining issue for the Court is fees/costs. Plaintiffs have asked to be awarded 22%  
8 of the global settlement fund – *i.e.*, \$49.83 million.<sup>1</sup> As the Court previously noted, fee awards in  
9 megafund cases present difficult questions.

10  
11 “[W]hen a common fund is extraordinarily large, the application of a  
12 benchmark or standard percentage may result in a fee that is  
13 unreasonably large for the benefits conferred.” *In re Copley*  
14 *Pharm., Inc.*, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1407, 1413 (D. Wyo. 1998). “[A]bsent  
15 unusual circumstances, the percentage will decrease as the size of  
16 the fund increases’[]. This sliding scale . . . is explained in part by  
17 economies of scale. It is not one hundred fifty times more difficult  
18 to prepare, try, and settle a \$150 million case than it is to try a \$1  
19 million case.” *Id.* “[I]n many instances the increase [in recovery]  
20 is merely a factor of the size of the class and has no direct  
21 relationship to the efforts of counsel.” *In re Prudential Ins. Co.*  
22 *America Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions*, 148 F.3d 283, 339 (3d  
23 Cir. 1998).

24 Docket No. 215 (Order at 14).

25 Although a percentage award in a megafund case can be 25% or even as high as 30-40%,  
26 typically the percentage award in such a case is substantially less than the 25% benchmark  
27 applicable to typical class settlements in this Circuit. *See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Jewell*,  
28 No. 90 CV 957 JAP/KBM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27624, at \*64 (D.N.M. Mar. 2, 2016) (noting  
that, “[i]n mega fund cases, courts in other districts have awarded between 10% and 15% of a  
mega fund,” but acknowledging that “[s]ome courts . . . have awarded percentage fees of more  
than 15% in mega fund cases,” *e.g.*, 30 and 31 1/3%); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043,

<sup>1</sup> At the hearing on final approval and fees, Plaintiffs confirmed that the fees awarded would be apportioned with all attorneys who worked on or contributed to the *Alexander* case, *i.e.*, not just the Leonard Carder firm but also other firms who worked on or contributed to *Alexander* via the MDL (*e.g.*, the MDL Omnibus work).

1 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (identifying cases ranging between \$53 and \$198 million in value, with  
2 percentages ranging from 2.8 to 40%; approximately half of those cases had percentages less than  
3 25%). Indeed, Judge Koh has found there is “persuasive evidence that ‘the median attorney’s fee  
4 award in a sample of 68 ‘megafund’ class action settlements over a 16-year period was 10.2%.”  
5 *In re High-Tech Empl. Antitrust Litig.*, No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118052,  
6 at \*50 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) (also citing a study where the mean award was 12%). Notably,  
7 Judge Koh rejected evidence from a different study indicating that the mean and median fee  
8 percentages awarded were 17.8% and 19.5%. *See id.* at \*48-50 (noting that the “study spanned  
9 just two years” and “the sample size in the . . . study is only eight”). This data suggests that a  
10 proposed award of 22%, while not without precedent, is well above the typical range in a  
11 megafund case.

12 For the reasons noted above, in megafund cases, the lodestar cross-check assumes  
13 particular importance. In the instant case, the bulk of counsel’s efforts took place in conjunction  
14 with the MDL. Plaintiffs argue that a portion of the MDL Omnibus work should be attributed to  
15 the *Alexander* case, which is a fair contention. The question is what percentage. Originally,  
16 Plaintiffs asserted that 25-30% of the MDL Omnibus work should be allocated to *Alexander*. This  
17 estimate was “based on a qualitative analysis of the portion of the MDL omnibus work that would  
18 have been performed in the *Alexander* case had it been litigated as a stand-alone matter.”<sup>2</sup> Docket  
19 No. 234 (Ross Decl. ¶ 11); *see also* Docket No. 185 (Mot. at 19) (“Counsel estimates that between  
20 25% and 30% of the Omnibus work in the MDL was reasonable and necessary to the litigation of  
21 *Alexander*.”). Under that analysis, Plaintiffs asserted a then-lodestar of between \$12.4 to \$14  
22 million.<sup>3</sup>

23 However, in supplemental briefing filed pursuant to a Court order, Plaintiffs maintained  
24 that it was actually fair to allocate █████ of the MDL Omnibus work to the *Alexander* case because

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26 <sup>2</sup> Although the Ross declaration has been filed under seal, this portion of the declaration does not  
27 contain any confidential information.

28 <sup>3</sup> Portions of the following two paragraphs shall be maintained under seal. Consistent with the  
Court’s prior sealing order, Plaintiffs shall apply to the Court to lift this sealing (which should be  
on or about June 15, 2016). *See* Docket No. 233 (order).

1 [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED]

4 [REDACTED] Under this analysis, the asserted lodestar is  
5 approximately \$19.3 million.

6 This change is significant. The more that can be allocated from the MDL, the greater the  
7 lodestar in *Alexander*, which in turn reduces the multiplier requested. More specifically, under  
8 Plaintiffs’ original calculations (*i.e.*, 25-30% of the MDL Omnibus work being allocated),  
9 Plaintiffs sought a multiplier in the range of 3.5 to 4. *See* Docket No. 185 (Mot. at 18). With a  
10 [REDACTED] allocation of the Omnibus work, the multiplier is reduced to 2.59. *See* Docket No. 234 (Ross  
11 Decl. ¶ 18).

12 The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs’ assertion of the [REDACTED] re-allocation arose, in part,  
13 based on the Court’s order deferring ruling on fees. *See* Docket No. 215 (Order at 16) (“Plaintiffs  
14 could provide additional information as to how much of the Omnibus work has been allocated to  
15 other cases (*i.e.*, to ensure that counsel will not get double recovery) and the size of the respective  
16 recoveries in the other case which grew out of the MDL, including how much the proposed  
17 recovery in the *Alexander* (*i.e.*, California) case was compared to all other cases in the MDL.”).  
18 However, the Court views the [REDACTED] as simply supportive of Plaintiffs’ original allocation of  
19 25-30% – reflecting the amount of work that would need to have been done in *Alexander* – and  
20 concludes that the 25-30% original allocation is the most reasonable and accurate approach. This  
21 assessment of the lodestar is based on what time in the MDL was reasonable and necessary for the  
22 *Alexander* case.

23 As noted above, the 25-30% allocation results in a claimed lodestar in the range of \$12.4 to  
24 \$14 million. In performing the lodestar cross-check, however, the Court applies the more  
25 conservative lodestar figure proposed by Plaintiffs – \$12.4 million. It does so for several reasons.  
26 First, it is not clear that substantial billing judgments were exercised by firms other than Leonard  
27 Carder. Moreover, the allocation of the MDL Omnibus work turns in part on judgment; it is a soft  
28 number. Having reviewed the nature and description of the MDL Omnibus work (which included,

1 e.g., over 100 depositions of FedEx officers and employees), the Court concludes that the more  
2 conservative estimate is appropriate.

3 Based on the \$12.4 million lodestar, Plaintiffs are asking for a multiplier of approximately  
4 4 to get to the requested \$49.93 million in fees. The Court concludes that this multiplier is not  
5 warranted for several reasons. First, a more typical multiplier for a megafund case is less 3 or less.  
6 See, e.g., *Vizcaino*, 290 F.3d at 1051 n.6 (in cases where the common fund is \$50-200 million, in a  
7 majority of cases, the multiplier was in the 1.5-3.0 range); *In re Cendant Corp. Prides Litig.*, 243  
8 F.3d 722, 742 (3d Cir. 2001) (indicating that lodestar multiplier of 1.35 to 2.99 common in  
9 megafunds over \$100 million). Second, Plaintiffs' lodestar is calculated on current billing rates  
10 which compensates in part for the delay and length of this litigation. Third, as indicated above,  
11 the size of the lodestar has been influenced by the number of attorneys involved in this case.<sup>4</sup>

12 Rigorous billing judgment should be exercised where multiple counsel are involved; the risk of an  
13 inflated lodestar, even where the Court takes the most conservative estimate proffered by the  
14 Plaintiffs, counsels caution in applying an extraordinary multiplier. Finally, Plaintiffs' counsel  
15 will likely receive additional fee awards as the other cases stemming from the MDL are resolved.

16 Nevertheless, the Court concludes that a multiplier at the high end of the range – *i.e.*, 3 – is  
17 proper. The instant case involves compelling circumstances. For example, Plaintiffs' counsel  
18 have vigorously litigated this case for approximately 11 years, including in MDL proceedings, and  
19 counsel undertook a sizeable risk, having to appeal the case after losing on summary judgment  
20 before ultimately prevailing. In addition, Plaintiffs have incurred substantial additional fees/costs  
21 since the motion for final approval was brought. Finally, and most importantly, Plaintiffs' counsel  
22 provided a high quality of representation and obtained excellent results. Notably, no objection to  
23 the fee request was filed.

24 Applying a multiplier of 3 to the \$12.4 million lodestar, the Court awards \$37.2 million in  
25 fees.<sup>5</sup> This represents 16.4% of the common fund, consistent with the higher end of awards in

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>4</sup> Forty-five law firms were involved in the MDL proceedings; three firms were designated co-lead  
28 counsel, and three additional firms served on the steering committee.

<sup>5</sup> Even if the enhanced lodestar of \$19.3 million is used, the award reflects a multiplier of nearly 2,

1 megafund cases as discussed above and well within the range of reasonableness.

2 **III. PROPOSED ORDER**


3 For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants final approval and grants fees/costs and  
4 incentive awards as itemized above. Plaintiffs shall immediately submit a revised proposed order,  
5 *see* Docket No. 245 (proposed order), for the undersigned’s signature.

6 A courtesy copy of the sealed order is being provided to the parties, as well as to the  
7 following objectors: Henrik Zohrabians and Rafick El-Hani and El-Hani Services, Inc.  
8 (collectively, “El-Hani”). Consistent with the terms of the protective order previously agreed to,  
9 *see* Docket No. 240 (stipulation and order), Mr. Zohrabians and El-Hani shall not disclose the  
10 confidential information in this order while the Court’s sealing order of April 28, 2016, remains in  
11 effect.

12 This order disposes of Docket Nos. 185 and 204.

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14 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

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16 Dated: June 15, 2016

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19 EDWARD M. CHEN  
20 United States District Judge

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a number within the typical range in megafund cases.