


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85. In addition to its real time capabilities, the [REDACTED] offering can subsequently analyze large volumes of data in order to reconstruct session content as needed from the captured collections of packets. This would include e-mail, web browsing, voice over IP (VoIP), and other common kinds of Internet communication.³⁶

86. It would, in my judgment, be an error to evaluate the capabilities of this configuration – substantial though they are – solely on the basis of the equipment deployed by AT&T to the [REDACTED] Room. The AT&T documents clearly indicate the presence of an [REDACTED] network, apparently operating at [REDACTED].³⁷ This network, while much smaller than AT&T’s CBB Internet backbone network, is nonetheless quite substantial.

87. The [REDACTED] backbone was logically distinct from the AT&T Common Backbone (CBB), but this does not necessarily mean that it had dedicated physical transmission facilities. It most probably operated over AT&T’s standard optical fiber-based transmission systems, but using different high speed services – in effect, different circuits – than the CBB. If this network were carrying nothing more than a subset of AT&T’s normal commercial traffic, they might not have

³⁶ [REDACTED]

³⁷ Klein Exh. C, pp. 6, 12, 42.

1 felt the need to do more – it has long been considered permissible to transmit *Sensitive but*
2 *Unclassified Information (SUCI)* over separate fiber-based transmission paths. Had there been
3 greater sensitivity about the data, it might have been protected in other ways, for instance by means
4 of link encryption.

5 88. The obvious and natural design for a massive surveillance system for IP-based data,
6 and the one most cost-effective to implement, would in my judgment be comprised of the
7 following elements: (1) massive data capture at the locations where the data can be tapped, (2) high
8 speed screening and reduction³⁸ of the captured data at the point of capture in order to identify data
9 of interest, (3) shipment of the data of interest to one or two central collection points for more
10 detailed analysis, and (4) intensive analysis and cross correlation of the data of interest by very
11 powerful processing engines at the central location or locations. The AT&T documents
12 demonstrate that equipment that is well suited for the first three of these tasks was deployed to [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] and, with high probability, to other locations. I infer that the fourth element also exists at
14 one or more locations.

15 89. Staff to analyze the data would probably be based at the central locations. There
16 would be no need to station analysts (as distinct from field support personnel) in the [REDACTED] rooms
17 where the data was collected. It is likely that the data were directly available for analysis by staff of
18 the agency that funded the [REDACTED] (which runs counter to normal practice in the case of
19 CALEA); otherwise, there would have been no need for a private [REDACTED], separate from the
20 CBB.


21 90. The [REDACTED] technology could potentially be used in a number of different ways, some
22 of which could be welfare-enhancing. The concern that must be raised in this case is that, in
23 conjunction with the diversion of large volumes of traffic described in the Klein Declaration and
24 the Klein Exhibits, this configuration appears to have the capability to enable surveillance and
25 analysis of Internet content on a massive scale, including both overseas and purely domestic traffic.
26

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28 ³⁸ The [REDACTED] appears to be ideally suited to this role. It is, as previously noted, designed to apply a large collection of tests against a huge volume of data at very high speed.

1 parties. Peering is usually a bilateral business and technical arrangement, where two
2 providers agree to accept traffic from one another, and from one another's
3 customers (and thus from their customers' customers)

4 97. In the figure below, AT&T and Backbone B are *peers*. They have agreed to
5 exchange traffic for their respective customers. Traffic from AT&T customer 1 to AT&T customer
6 2 is *on net* traffic – it remains on AT&T's network. Traffic from AT&T customer 1 to customer 3
7 (a customer of backbone B) is *off net* traffic.

8 **FIGURE 4**



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18 98. In the figure, ISP C is a *transit customer* of AT&T. ISP C pays AT&T to carry its
19 traffic, not only to AT&T customers, but to customers of other ISPs as well (such as, for example,
20 Customer 3). In the context of this discussion, AT&T can regard traffic from Customer 4 to
21 Customers 1 and 2 as being on net, in the sense that it does not traverse a peering connection.

22 99. It is perhaps also worth noting that AT&T and its peers and their many transit
23 customers do not merely connect to the Internet; rather they *are* the Internet. The Internet is not a
24 single, huge and over-arching network, but rather a collection of independent networks that
25 collectively comprise a worldwide communications stratum.

26 100. Again, the last page of Exhibit B provides a list of CBB [REDACTED] that were to
27 be split and diverted to the [REDACTED] Configuration. The sizes of these circuits are listed,
28 with some at [REDACTED], some at [REDACTED], and some at [REDACTED]. These

1 are all quite substantial circuits – the [REDACTED] are apparently on a par with the largest circuits that
2 were in widespread use in AT&T’s CBB Internet backbone at the time.

3 101. Traffic to and from several very large Internet providers at that time [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED] was delivered over OC-48 circuits. Traffic to and from
5 another group of large providers [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] was delivered over [REDACTED] circuits. Traffic to and from smaller, but still quite substantial,
7 providers [REDACTED] was delivered over [REDACTED] circuits.

8 102. Large Internet backbone providers typically use direct interconnects (private
9 peering) to exchange traffic with their largest “trading partners in bits,” the firms with which they
10 exchange the largest volume of traffic. For providers where the volume of traffic exchange at some
11 location is large enough to warrant peering arrangements, but not large enough to justify the cost of
12 a separate circuit for private peering, it is customary instead to interconnect with multiple peers at a
13 so-called “public peering point” in order to exchange traffic with multiple providers there.⁴¹ AT&T
14 was connected to [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] configuration.

17 103. At the point where I left Genuity in July 2001 (some eighteen months before these
18 splitters were deployed), I was intimately familiar with our traffic exchange patterns with other
19 providers. Our measurement instrumentation ranked with the very best in the industry at that time.
20 It is possible to draw many inferences about traffic flows among other providers from one’s own
21 traffic exchanges.

22 104. Based on my experience at Genuity, I believe that the traffic that was diverted
23 represented all, or substantially all, of AT&T’s peering traffic in the [REDACTED]

24 105. I base my reasoning on the knowledge of Genuity’s peering traffic patterns, and on
25 my general understanding of peering traffic patterns in the industry. As of July 2001, our three
26 largest peers were WorldCom, AT&T and Sprint, collectively representing 50-60% of our traffic.

27
28 ⁴¹ See Marcus, *Designing Wide Area Networks and Internetworks: A Practical Guide*,
Addison Wesley, 1999, pages 280-282 (Exhibit S).