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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Elizabeth D. LaPorte, Magistrate Judge

Oracle USA, Inc.; et al.,

Plaintiffs,

VS. NO. C 07-1658 PJH (EDL)

SAP AG, et al.,

Defendants.

San Francisco, California Tuesday, January 26, 2010

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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Tuesday - January 26, 2010

1:15 p.m.

THE CLERK: Calling Civil 07-1658, Oracle Corporation versus SAP AG.

Counsel, please state your appearances for the record.

MR. HOWARD: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Geoff
Howard appearing for Oracle. With me is Zach Alinder and Tom
Hixson.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. McDONELL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jason
McDonell for defendants. With me is Scott Cowan, Jane Froyd,
Patrick Delahunty, and all the way in the back Robert
Middlestaedt.

THE COURT: Good morning -- or good afternoon.

All right. Well, we've got a lot to cover, and I have matters on at 2:00. I moved this up. Well, I have quite a few things going on simultaneously, unfortunately. So, even with that amount of time, you know, we need to kind of march through it. And let's just, I think, take it one by one starting with the plaintiffs' motions.

A modification protective order, I -- my tentative view is that that statutory section does not apply because, that defendants are relying on, because that's when you're trying to get discovery through that procedure.

And I think, although Foltz isn't dealing with an issue where the discovery would go to another court in the United States, it, nonetheless, does talk about the applicable public policy as far as modifying a protective order being overall a more efficient way to let related litigation have

access to the same material that's already been discovered.

So we're not talking it's much more efficient, less burdensome. The question -- there are some policy considerations that -- although I don't think the law, the statutory provision in the case like the Supreme Court case in Intel applies but I think, yes, it's true that foreign jurisdictions, I think maybe without exception, but generally limit discovery quite more so than the United States. They don't have the pleasure of having endless hearings like we've all had here, and just for tossing around megabytes, and so forth, of information as a starter, but -- as I understand it. But, nonetheless, I certainly wouldn't be forcing any court in Europe to do any particular thing, admit the evidence, consider it, whatever.

So I'm inclined to modify the order but I'm thinking that, perhaps, it can be done in steps and nobody really refined their positions on that.

I think initially what Oracle was asking for, as I understand it, is to show the material to its own lawyers who are familiar with the various European jurisdictions that might

be appropriate for advice on whether to go ahead; and if so, where.

Is that -- I think that's the immediate issue, and I wonder whether it wouldn't be appropriate to just modify it for that. I think in one of the cases, I think it was CBS

Interactive, there was something like that necessary to prepare and file its litigation, although in that case it was in the State Court. And that would be without prejudice to expanding that.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, Mr. Hixson will address that for us.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HIXSON: Yeah. Your Honor, Oracle would be amendable to that if the Court prefers to phase things. It's true, as we stated in our motion, that the most immediate use would be to provide these discovery materials to European counsel to advise on those decisions.

THE REPORTER: I'm sorry. I need you to slow down, please.

MR. HIXSON: Okay. Certainly.

And at that point, if we determine that we want to make further use of them, we can come back to this Court and seek an additional modification.

I would add, since the Court did mention CBS

Interactive, the concern in that case was that the plaintiff

was going to file collateral litigation that would involve additional parties who weren't in the first case. And, so, the Court in modifying the protective order flagged the concern that these other parties could have access to confidential documents. That situation isn't present here because it would be the same defendants likely or affiliates in Europe.

THE COURT: Well, that's true. But I'm just not sure. I mean, it's, I guess, possible that nothing will and ultimately be filed.

MR. HIXSON: It's likely that something will be filed. We have -- that's correct. We haven't reached a definitive conclusion.

THE COURT: But we don't no where either.

I mean, other language that I saw that might be something to consider is, I think it was *Linerboard*, something like that, about the Court keeping some of -- this Court keeping some authority to ensure the confidentiality continuing.

So, I mean, what I'm suggesting is, I didn't try to come up with precise wording along those lines; but I think that if I do take this approach, I would like the parties to meet and confer and just, you know, use -- there's some things that we could borrow from. And I would hope you could agree; or if not agree, at least come very close to it.

But do you want to address the underlying? Because

I do view this as one of the more clear-cut, from my point of view, motions, unfortunately for you, against your side. And I do want to move to some of this other murkier and more complicated stuff, mind you.

MS. FROYD: Sure. With regard to 1792 in Intel, we do think 1792 is the appropriate standard because it deals with cases --

THE COURT: Yeah. I just -- I'm just -- I really don't agree.

MS. FROYD: If you don't want to hear, that's fine.

THE COURT: I could be wrong of course, but I --

MS. FROYD: So even if you -- sure. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

So, even if you disagree with that position, the discretionary factors that the Supreme Court advises courts to consider are the same sorts of discretionary factors that court's consider in the cases that Oracle brings. They look to whether or not the foreign jurisdiction would be receptive to the discovery sought.

Does Oracle's request circumvent foreign proof
gathering restrictions? And right now, based on the particular
proposed order presented to you, it's very broad. It covers
all discovery in this case, not a limited subset of discovery
as some of the cases that they cite where there are
modification. It was for particular deposition testimony,

particular documents.

Here they also -- the proposed order at least does not tell you who will be bringing the case. They say that it is between the parties and their affiliates; but we don't know which Oracle entity, and it might not be the Oracle entities here. We don't know the specific cause of action. It simply says arising out of similar allegations.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, let me just -- I mean, I think the approach, the phasing approach, that I just discussed would moot all of that for the time being.

I'm not sure that any of that will make any difference. I mean, I most likely will allow Oracle to use the information in a -- if they decide in a foreign tribunal. But it's kind of -- I think we're putting the cart a little bit before the horse because specifically we don't know which jurisdiction. I suppose they vary somewhat, although I do think probably, as a general rule, they all have more limited proof gathering than we do. But other than that, they do have differences.

But I think that, you know, that's one of the factors. I'm not sure that those factors -- I don't think that I have to apply them or that that law is directly applicable, but I do think they're worthy of some consideration. But I think that the *Foltz* considerations probably outweigh them.

And, you know, some of these -- most of these -- I

think the only ones that might weigh against it would be, you know, it's sort of -- using our discovery in some other forum almost inherently circumvents foreign proof gathering; but, again, that's not a factor I have to apply and it's only one of many.

There's no burden whatsoever, really, since it's already been produced; and, you know, depending what happens, some of these other -- these other factors are going to probably weigh in favor.

So -- but I think that, as of now, I think that I would just like to see you propose an order that is limited to allowing that without prejudice to broadening it; and I am indicating I very likely would allow it to be actually used and leave it up to -- my view, if they don't want the assistance, that's fine. Then they can just say no. I mean, they don't have to let Oracle file it, they don't have to consider it, they don't have to read it, et cetera.

So, I mean, that's where I don't -- and there's no added burden. So, I mean, that's where I probably would allow it. But I think that some safeguards along the lines that I just mentioned could be in their including. So I'd like some proposed language, you know, with the Court like, I think, in Linerboard keeping some authority or shorten the confidentiality, et cetera.

MS. FROYD: And there's also specific restrictions

in the EDPM Antitrust Litigation case that they raise. Again, 1 those restrictions describe the sort of who, what, where, 2 3 when --THE COURT: Well, I mean, I would, you know --4 MS. FROYD: -- types of things that defendants 5 thought were lacked in the particular protective order offered 6 7 to the judge now. THE COURT: Well, and I don't know, you know, I 8 haven't considered whether those are appropriate or not. I 9 think that was Judge Hamilton's case, so I didn't -- and there 10 were some things that might apply and some that might not, so I 11 haven't really given it much thought. 12 13 But I would like to have you all --14 MR. HIXSON: Sure. We'll try. 15 THE COURT: -- try to agree. And if not, you can 16 try to minimize your agreements and give me very specific, you 17 know, like in a joint letter what you proposed. But I would hope that you could agree. 18 19 MR. HIXSON: Your Honor, we'll meet and confer with 20 defendants about language on this phasing approach that the Court has indicated. 21 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 Thank you, Your Honor. MS. FROYD: THE COURT: 24 Thank you.

So let's get on to the next. So I think we're on to

the Trainor deposition, but there's kind of multiple somewhat discrete issues.

MR. COWAN: We've packaged it as six issues. I think both parties looked at it that way, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HIXSON: I'm happy to go through them in order
if --

THE COURT: Why don't we go through them one by one in order, yeah.

MR. HIXSON: Okay. The first area that we moved on relates to the steps that Mr. Trainor took to ensure that he didn't use knowledge gained as PeopleSoft's in-house counsel to provide advice to SAP and TomorrowNow with respect to the PeopleSoft licensing agreements.

And the reason for this line of questions is the evidence produced by defendants, including the unredacted portions of some of these e-mails, that suggest that Mr. Trainor was providing information to other people at TomorrowNow; and then that, in conjunction with his own testimony, that at the time of these e-mails in 2005 he didn't have the PeopleSoft license terms. This raised the inference that, in fact, he was providing information, which is concerning to plaintiffs.

And, so, he did state in his deposition that he did not disclose any confidential information, but Oracle wanted to

cross-examine him about that more than just a blanket statement that he didn't because the e-mail suggests that maybe he did; and, so, we asked him questions about steps that he could take. Steps, for example, could include an ethical wall --THE COURT: Right. MR. HOWARD: -- or a practice.

THE COURT: Well, and I think I previously indicated that that question itself I would probably overrule, and I am

inclined to overrule that.

I don't -- I mean, one issue that runs through some of this from the defendants' side is: Where is the anticipation of litigation to trigger work product?

Now, I do think, to the extent -- and let me just preface that. Obviously, he had a lawyer advising him on how to answer questions at the deposition; and, so, that would be protected by attorney-client privilege right now --

MR. McDONELL: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- but that's different from what he knew at the time when, you know, when he was doing what he was doing, and I don't think we can presume that litigation was anticipated.

MR. McDONELL: May I respond, Your Honor?

THE COURT: And some of his, I guess, subsequent declaration is beginning to draw that distinction, I think.

MR. McDONELL: It does, Your Honor.

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specific example, the question was: What did you do to compartmentalize PeopleSoft information from SAP TomorrowNow information? And we have two levels of concern about that.

The first level is he answered the exact question twice. And we even quote it verbatim in our brief, including at page 7 where the question was: (reading)

kept all confidential information secure?"

I'm reading from line 15 of page 7 of our opposition
brief.

"What steps did you take to ensure that you

And he answered by saying that, I'll paraphrase now, that his process was simply to not disclose it.

So he answered that question more than once; and then, you know, we all know, it goes without saying, he was an attorney acting for successive clients so there were sensitivity issues.

When they came back in repetitious questioning and asked the same question a little differently, you know, "How in your mind did you compartmentalize things," the concern became that he had been instructed on the record by plaintiffs' counsel that under no circumstances should you disclose PeopleSoft issues.

THE COURT: All right. I want to address that specifically before you go on.

First, I do think they were allowed to get a little

bit more beyond, and not necessarily a lot more, and I'm not going to give advisory opinions on what follow up could be done; but I wouldn't authorize, you know, just whatever -- you know, any amount of follow up, there could be issues with it.

But I think that the answer, "I simply ensured I did not disclose that information," I think it's fair to ask, "Well, exactly what steps did you take to ensure that?" And I think he can answer that, what did he do at the time.

As far as Oracle instructing him not to reveal any Oracle confidences, I think, it seems to me, you have to do something about it. I mean, withdraw that. You know, there is an attorneys' eyes only provision, and so forth; but I mean, if you want to pursue this, you can't simultaneously threaten him not to reveal anything.

I mean, he should take whatever cautions he can; but to the extent you're probing and something comes up, he says, well, for example -- I just think you can't have it both ways, I agree.

MR. HIXSON: Your Honor, we're not trying to have it both ways. The questions about what steps did he take to avoid relying on his memory was directed to his employment at SAP. So we're not asking about what he did at PeopleSoft.

THE COURT: I understand, but I think you're going to have to -- I mean, I think that -- I forget exactly what you asked for on that score, but I think there's some truth to

that.

MR. McDONELL: You're spot on, Your Honor. The concern is, if privilege were not an issue at all and confidences weren't an issue at all, this witness could go back and say everything he ever knew about what went on at PeopleSoft and then talk about what he did at SAP and/or TomorrowNow and compare and contrast and talk freely.

We don't have that situation. The witness, to his credit, was being cautious and trying to draw a line where he was ensuring that he was being prudent in his answer. And whether he can give any more answer without getting into details or not remains to be seen. He's answered the question twice --

THE COURT: Well, I don't --

MR. McDONELL: -- that that was his process.

THE COURT: I don't quite agree with you that he fully answered the question. I think he did begin to answer the question, but I think they're entitled to probe a little bit more but not probably a whole lot more.

I mean, I don't think -- you know, what's he supposed to say? I had a lobotomy on a part of my brain. I mean, you're basically just trying to prove that it's impossible to do. You know, I don't think you need a whole lot on this.

But at the same time, if he comes out with something

that does, arguably, reveal the content of a piece of information he had at Oracle because you're asking him a question which could be a natch -- that could be a natural and inadvertent thing. I don't think that you can threaten him with some kind of sanctions at the same time. MR. HIXSON: We have no intention of threatening Mr. Trainor. And we can frame our questions in a way that it's clear we're just asking about --

THE COURT: And it's pretty long ago, right? What are asking about, 2000 --

MR. HIXSON: 2005.

THE COURT: So, I mean, I don't know how much the secrets then are still highly secret now. I mean, I don't know. But that's five years ago in a tech field. That seems like a long time.

MR. HIXSON: It certainly is a number of years.

Again, we can ask follow-up questions about what steps he took at TomorrowNow without getting into asking him about PeopleSoft confidential information.

MR. McDONELL: And then our companion request that goes throughout all of these questions is for some guidance from the Court that this not be an open-ended thing, that they get to the core of what they really seem to be going for here and then --

THE COURT: I can't --

MR. McDONELL: -- stop. Because otherwise we'll be back here in endless cycles.

THE COURT: I can't really give you any specific guidance other than to say that I would guess that a handful of questions would be sufficient, but I can't give an advisory opinion in advance.

But, I mean, for example, if there's specific steps that you think he could have taken but didn't, and he doesn't volunteer them, well, then you can say: Did you set up an ethical wall? Did you, you know, have a tainting? Or whatever kind of things. You know, I mean, I think they should be focused.

I do -- I agree that he began to answer the question. I think it got cut off a little bit soon. I'm not blaming anybody because these are -- I hate depositions of lawyers.

MR. McDONELL: And one way in which the Court could put some kind of objective boundaries around this is limiting the time of this deposition. We're really talking about six questions here. We think it's really excessive to ask to go back at this witness for half a day. We, frankly, thought one hour's time should be enough to ask these questions and any reasonable followups.

THE COURT: Is that -- are there any other questions that we're talking about now?

MR. HIXSON: It's the whole -- the six categories of questions. The problem with a one-hour time limit is that his previous deposition was -- a lot of it was taken up with objections and arguments by counsel rather than the witness testifying substantively.

THE COURT: Right. Well, I don't know. I mean, I would think that two hours would be plenty; and unless it turns out that, you know, the large majority of that is pauses for consultations and objections, and so forth; but, I mean, that would have to be predominant.

Okay.

MR. HIXSON: Okay.

THE COURT: So what's the next issue?

MR. HIXSON: The next one is communications with prospective customers. And here this dealt with Depo Exhibit 1681 where Mr. Trainor was asked about a statement he made to Waste Management. It appeared in the writing that he was telling them that it was to their advantage to give TomorrowNow access to the PeopleSoft source code. And at the deposition we asked him if that's what he meant, and he backed away and he said he didn't necessarily agree with how we were characterizing that communication.

Here we're asking him not about what's in his head but the meaning of a statement he made to a prospective customer.

THE COURT: Right. And I think it's been a little 1 bit coming together here. I think that he should testify as to 2 what he meant at the time as opposed to -- you know, I think 3 the issue is -- I mean, I don't think it's relevant what he 4 thinks now; is it? It's his frame of mind then, it seems to 5 me, is what's relevant. 6 MR. McDONELL: And he's offered to give that 7 8 testimony --THE COURT: Right. 9 MR. McDONELL: -- now that there's been 10 11 clarification on it. THE COURT: Right. Okay. And I don't see why he 12 13 should have to testify what he thinks about it now, and it 14 would be impossible probably for him to segregate, you know, 15 trial strategy in preparation for his, you know, defense and 16 all the rest, or his ethical issues currently. So, I think, that's what I'd order, what he did then --17 18 MR. HIXSON: Okay. 19 THE COURT: -- what he thought then. 20 Okay. And then --21 MR. HIXSON: I can move on to misrepresentations to 22 customers. 23 THE COURT: Yes. MR. HIXSON: We asked two questions here. 24 25 narrow question concerning a statement to Waste Management that

TomorrowNow's rights to use PeopleSoft software come entirely by way of Waste Management's license with PeopleSoft, and then we moved to a broader question about whether TomorrowNow ever misrepresented facts to customers. And both of those he was instructed not to answer.

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For this and all of the remaining ones I'm going to talk about today, the common theme is that the defendants have invoked work product but we're missing the litigation. There's no showing of what lawsuit or threatened lawsuit was anticipated at the time, and that's the predicate showing for work product.

But for work product, he's a witness who's being asked about a percipient question: Did you misrepresent a fact? Not a legal opinion about the doctrine of misrepresentation but did TomorrowNow say something that was untrue. And the defendants haven't identified the anticipated litigation that would give rise to a work product claim there. And clearly it's not privileged because we're asking about a communication between TomorrowNow and somebody else.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. McDONELL: Okay. But they're oversimplifying the issue, Your Honor. They take what was a nonprivileged communication of a statement of kind of a negotiating position, which is well known in this case that TomorrowNow took the position with its customers that it was the customer's

responsibility to determine to what extent they could get access to information to TomorrowNow. That's nonprivileged. Those communications occurred with the customers.

THE COURT: Okay. And I think he's saying he will say that it's true that TomorrowNow took the position.

MR. McDONELL: Absolutely. He will say that.

THE COURT: Now --

MR. McDONELL: Then the question goes -- probes deeper to get behind it, which wants to then go into behind the scenes at SAP/TomorrowNow and say: Okay. Was that really your position or what was going on behind the scenes? Were there going to be situations where -- you know, what was your legal analysis? Were you always going to insist on that or what were the risks, the legal risks, of not taking that position?

THE COURT: Well, I just -- I mean, this is all too nebulous for me. I mean, he can answer, you know, questions of -- I mean, I think what you say is he can answer based on nonprivileged facts. He can't answer on -- based on -- he can't reveal -- I mean, there is no work product. I guess, though, there would be attorney-client privilege. I mean, if he as a lawyer was advising his client, and so forth, about what they should or shouldn't do, you can't get into that.

So -- and, I think, you say it will be worthless to them to get based just on the facts; but, I mean, I don't -- you know, it may be true, but I think that's all he can do. He

can answer about the facts, but he can't give -- I don't think there's a work product because there's no anticipation of litigation.

There's possibly some attorney-client privilege to the extent there were discussions, again, within the Legal Department advising a client and the salespeople what they should and shouldn't say. That would be privileged.

MR. McDONELL: There is that and it could reach back to the PeopleSoft employment as well if, and this is all pure speculation because I don't know this, but if he had information, confidential information, from PeopleSoft that bears on the question of whether, you know, IP rights in this context are derivative, he's protecting that too; and we want him to continue to --

THE COURT: Well, he should, but I think that's kind of Oracle pursues that at its own risk in my opinion, so....

MR. HIXSON: Fair enough, and we don't intend to infringe or violate our own privilege; but this, again, loops in with the what steps did you take.

THE COURT: I just don't think I can go any further than that. So what's the next --

MR. HIXSON: The next one is the indemnification policy, and this relates to a PowerPoint presentation where there was a statement that the indemnification policy was, quote, a key term, no removing this, in a presentation that

Mr. Trainor and others made to TomorrowNow salespeople. And 1 our question to him is just whether that was an accurate 2 description of TomorrowNow's negotiating position, was that a 3 key term, no removing this. 4 5 THE COURT: Right. And I think that calls for a yes-or-no answer and I don't see why he can't answer that. 6 7 MR. McDONELL: He can answer that, but they can't drill then down into the confidential discussions that he had 8 as an attorney with his clients about the background of that 9 position. 10 11 THE COURT: Well, I think that's right; isn't it? 12 MR. HIXSON: We would -- we're not asking him to 13 reveal attorney-client privilege communications. But, for 14 example, if he were aware of negotiations between TomorrowNow 15 and another customer concerning whether that was a key term, 16 that's nonprivileged because it's TomorrowNow and somebody else 17 talking with each other.

THE COURT: Well, if it's concerning -- I mean, he could ask, "Did you drop your insistent or didn't you," or something like that.

MR. McDONELL: That question was not asked, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. And that would be a factual question that I think could be answered.

What the -- you know, if there were legal

discussions about why it was a key term internally, that would probably be attorney-client privileged; but -- you know, the extent that, again, advice to the client, but the facts about whether it was a term that was insisted on, uniformly or not, that would be discoverable. And, of course, the PowerPoint presentation wasn't priveledged.

MR. HIXSON: And that's all we're asking for.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's move on.

MR. HIXSON: The next one is compliance with ethical obligations. And this one came out of Exhibit 1181, which was a long e-mail from Spencer Phillips to someone else at TomorrowNow saying that he had spoken with Scott Trainor and here's what Trainor had said, and it consists of a couple of pages recounting PeopleSoft's practices with respect to its license agreement. And, again, this gave rise to the suggestion that Mr. Trainor had not complied with his ethical obligations.

So point blank we asked him. We asked him if he felt that he had, and if he had narrated what Mr. Phillips was attributing to Mr. Trainor, if Mr. Trainor had said that, would he had felt comfortable with that. And here, again, I think the Tardiff v. County of Knox case draws the appropriate line here, that we're not asking him about decisions made in litigation.

There's, again, no anticipative litigation that

defendants have pointed to. We were asking for his view at the time about his ethical obligations and whether he believed that conduct would comply with them. And Tardiff does draw that line between a lawyer -- litigation counsel making a decision in the course of pursing a lawsuit and then hypotheticals and questions about what the attorney believed his obligations to be, and that is the line that we want to enforce.

THE COURT: Well, I think one issue is, again, as I said before, he can answer only as to his understanding at the time, not now. I mean, presumably he's gotten legal advice since.

MR. McDONELL: And that is in the record, Your Honor, in the declarations.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. McDONELL: As you pointed out, he does have his own counsel now.

THE COURT: Yeah. So he can answer as to his understanding at the time; but, I don't know, comfortable, I mean, that's kind of a very vague term, it seems to me.

MR. HIXSON: We can refine that to a more precise question.

MR. McDONELL: But the thing we're concerned about is putting this attorney witness in a position where they're kind of boxing him in through various approaches to try to force him to do an extemporaneous legal analysis here today.

THE COURT: Right. And I can't -- I mean, I'm sure they are trying to box him in. That's what people do at depositions; and, to some extent, that's, you know, that's part of this. But I think I've drawn as clear a distinction as I can that you can only ask about his understanding at the time, not now.

MR. HIXSON: That's fine, Your Honor.

again, I really don't like depositions of lawyers. I disapprove of them. I think that they're just -- there are all sorts of reasons why they're just -- I mean, look at all of us. I mean, you have he was a lawyer, then we have all these lawyers, and me. We're all -- you know, per question the amount of legal analysis and time and versus how much substance you really get out of any of this, it's highly disproportionate, I would say, and mostly, you know, a huge burden on the system that really is not worth the candle.

So, if you push this too far, you will run into that attitude from me because I really think it's, you know, it's just so full of peril; but, unfortunately, he is at the intersection of some relevant stuff here, so....

MR. McDONELL: Yes. And because we're at these crossroads and we're getting guidance from Your Honor, which is greatly appreciated, I just want to let everyone in the room know that it is not at all unlikely that there will be

additional instructions to this witness not to answer questions.

THE COURT: Well, and I can't give any further, you know, advice because it has to be a question-by-question thing; but I just hope you can, you know, get over this and, you know, get on to more productive pursuits.

But, okay. So what else do we have to --

MR. HIXSON: Well, next we have the questions about what we've called the willfulness of copyright infringement.

We asked about whether SAP or TomorrowNow took steps to determine whether a particular customer's allowance or access to software was copyright infringement or whether they did this in connection with contract negotiations.

There we've identified that the defendants'
privilege and work product objections were overbroad. For
example, if TomorrowNow is talking with a customer, such as
Waste Management, and shares with them some kind of analysis
about what Waste Management can do, that's not privileged.
That's waived and that's something that we should be allowed to
ask about, or if there's work done not in connection with the
Legal Department at SAP or TomorrowNow; but we were shut down
at the very foundation of those questions before we could get
to the point of knowing of whether or when privilege applies.

It may be that there was no analysis done or maybe that something was shared with the customer, but that's

relevant to the case.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I generally agree, although it's also -- I think, you, I take it, agree that his discussions about the legal strategy for interacting with customers is off limits.

MR. HIXSON: Well, attorney-client privilege questions are not what we're asking for there.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. McDONELL: The concern here, Your Honor, is they didn't ask the question in that way that set it up as asking for nonprivileged information as counsel suggests in the example he gave.

THE COURT: Well, I think you need to do that. And
I'm just -- you know, I think that that's the distinction. So
you can ask for the nonprivileged. I would agree that anything
actually conveyed to the customer can't be privileged.

MR. McDONELL: And, so, when they ask a question and they're starting to get into the privileged area, I don't want them to ask questions that are so specific as to start to reveal the content of any analysis. So the concern is, when they bake into their question: Did you do an analysis of a specific customer of a specific legal issue --

THE COURT: The answer to that --

MR. McDONELL: -- or copyright --

THE COURT: -- yes or no, is not privileged. Okay.

If they said, "What was the result of that analysis," unless --1 if it was conveyed to the customer, it's not privileged. 2 was kept in-house, it is privileged. I mean, you all have to 3 4 go step-by-step. MR. McDONELL: You know, although, the "yes" answer 5 to that question starts to say, "Okay. Now we know you studied 6 7 the copyright issue. What else did you say?" 8 THE COURT: I don't think so. I don't really think 9 so. 10 MR. McDONELL: So we'll take it one question at a 11 time, hopefully with yes-or-no answers, Your Honor. MR. HIXSON: Fine. 12 13 The last item, Your Honor, relates to two documents 14 where there were redactions and we had --15 THE COURT: Yes. 16 MR. HIXSON: -- asked defendants to provide them to 17 the Court for in-camera inspection and they've done that, 18 Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Yes. Yes, I have looked at them. 20 guess I want to hear from -- I know you haven't seen them and, so, this is kind of a one-way discussion, but I guess I want to 21 22 hear. 23 MR. McDONELL: This is my favorite kind of argument, Your Honor. 24 25 (Laughter)

MR. McDONELL: Your Honor, two points. One of these 1 2 documents was not the subject of the testimony in the deposition of Scott Trainor at all, and it was just something 3 4 they throw in just apparently because they wanted to. THE COURT: So this is your procedural discussion. 5 MR. McDONELL: This is my procedural argument. 6 7 without waiver for me to argue the other side of this issue, if 8 necessary, which I'm hoping it's not. But, Your Honor, it wasn't. So they've submitted to 9 the Court nonetheless and we've addressed it on its merits. 10 11 have submitted declarations. THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's take the first one. 12 13 The e-mail chain involving Mia Lee. 14 MR. McDONELL: Yes. 15 THE COURT: Okay. On the first page there's a redaction. 16 17 MR. McDONELL: There is, and that is the only redaction in the entire thread. 18 THE COURT: Right. And, you know, I guess I'm just 19 20 wondering whether actually the only redaction -- that most of 21 that could be unredacted except for the one, two, the third sentence of the first paragraph or the last sentence of the 22 23 first paragraph. MR. McDONELL: The last sentence of the first 24 25 paragraph?

THE COURT: Right. Starting with "Apparently." And 1 you know, I may be missing something. I mean, these are all --2 MR. McDONELL: May I have a moment, Your Honor, to 3 read? 4 5 THE COURT: Yes. I mean, line-drawing exercises where the lines aren't completely clear, but.... 6 MR. McDONELL: I would ask Your Honor to consider 7 8 the possibility of keeping redacted the second sentence of the second paragraph which starts to get into content with 9 reference to certain material, which I think is a counterpart 10 11 for the one Your Honor identified as keeping privileged. THE COURT: Okay. All right. 12 13 MR. McDONELL: With that, we would agree with that, 14 Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. I guess -- well, let 16 me just say the one reason that I am -- was leaning against 17 that initially was the prior sentence, which will be 18 unredacted, "I suspect the nature of this initial call is largely sales and nature, " to me that casts the whole thing 19 20 primarily in a nonlegal light, in a business light. MR. McDONELL: "Largely" doesn't mean "entirely," 21 22 Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: True. MR. McDONELL: And then if you look at the content 24

of the next sentence, you see something a little different.

THE COURT: All right. I think you're right. Okay. 1 So that's the ruling on that. 2 And then the second document is a little bit more 3 redacted. And, I guess, first I just have a process question. 4 To the extent that there's, you know, attachments, are these --5 MR. McDONELL: They were not --6 7 THE COURT: -- produced or not produced? 8 MR. McDONELL: They are not an issue at this time, Your Honor. 9 MR. HIXSON: It was not raised by our motion. 10 It's 11 just the redactions. 12 THE COURT: Because let's say hypothetically there 13 was some track change type of information, you know, who did 14 what to a certain document --15 MR. McDONELL: I'm a little bit handicapped, Your Honor, because those attachments, which as they are, are 16 17 not before the Court and there's no motion directed to them. THE COURT: I'm just -- and I guess my feeling is 18 19 this is a sort of tempest in a teapot under those 20 circumstances. 21 MR. McDONELL: Your Honor, Mr. Delahunty informs me 22 the attachments have been withheld as privileged and have not 23 been challenged, so I think that flips the switch in our direction. 24 25 And I don't have that information in MR. HIXSON:

front of me. 1 THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I think that it just -- I 2 3 guess what I don't know -- I mean, this is -- let's see, you're claiming work product because how is it anticipation of 4 litigation? 5 MR. McDONELL: It is -- it's also -- it's privileged 6 7 as well, Your Honor. It's a communication between this 8 nonattorney witness and the transactional attorney working in contract --9 10 THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I'm going to not redact 11 it, both because I think it probably is attorney-client privilege and I also think it will be useless to you. 12 13 MR. McDONELL: So you said you're -- you said you're 14 going to not redact it. I think you --15 THE COURT: I did. 16 MR. McDONELL: -- intended to say you will not 17 unredact it. 18 THE COURT: I'm going to leave it as is redacted. 19 It will do you no good, believe me. 20 MR. HIXSON: It would do me no good? MR. McDONELL: So that concludes that issue. 21 22 THE COURT: Yes. Okay. 23 MR. McDONELL: All right. Thank you. MR. HOWARD: Shift change, Your Honor. I'll address 24 the last part of --25

THE COURT: Why don't I get to have a shift change? 1 2 (Laughter) MR. HOWARD: We'd work with you on that, Your Honor, 3 4 if the request is being made. We were remiss, Your Honor, at the beginning and let 5 me just say that there are -- is at least one member of the 6 7 press corps in the audience, and counsel have conferred and 8 we're not asking the Court at this time to seal the courtroom but reserve our right to do that depending on how argument 9 10 goes. 11 THE COURT: All right. But you should know that I don't think I've ever yet sealed the courtroom in eleven years. 12 13 MR. HOWARD: In part why we're not making the 14 request, but we thought Your Honor should be aware. 15 (Laughter) 16 THE COURT: All right. I mean, other than in 17 criminal matters where something is under seal but, I mean, in 18 civil litigation type of things like this. 19 Okay. So we're on to the RFAs? 20 MR. HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think on -- the first issue is the copy issue? 22 23 MR. HOWARD: Yes. THE COURT: And I think now plaintiff is willing to 24 25 use a dictionary definition and, I think, defendants have said

something like they're willing to use a commonsense understanding.

MR. COWAN: Yeah. Just the plain meaning of the term "copy," Your Honor, is something we're willing to accept.

THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, I guess, I will say this:
Again, the purpose of an RFA, of course, is to pin someone down
and the party never wants to be pinned down but that's what
they're for. And I have to say that overall I felt that
defendants were being evasive and trying mightily but crossing
the boundaries into not fairly answering the questions.

MR. COWAN: If I --

THE COURT: I mean, I understand the incentive and, you know, that's not surprising that you would not want to be pinned down; but I think that overall I would -- I think that a lot of the, you know, answers weren't sufficient and were too evasive.

And, I mean, of course, Oracle wants these to use in front of a jury and, of course, you don't want anything that's clear enough that the jury goes, "A ha," but I think that's the dynamic I see in there.

MR. COWAN: If I can respond to that, Your Honor, because -- and I can certainly see how the Court could see that by -- at first blush, but the real issue is -- Rule 36 says in the effective admission, "A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established." And, so, we've been very, very

careful, I think, in trying to admit those things that we believe to be true and don't dispute in any way.

And, so, the issue, for example, with "copy," when the act at issue in the request is really asking about downloading, we admitted to downloading; but their previous definition of "copy" was so broad that it would include downloading and a lot of other things. So if we admitted to copying, we would be admitting to something other than downloading.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then I think -- I mean, for an example like that I think you ought to be able to agree on something, whether it's changing the definition, which the plaintiffs have indicated a willingness to do, or specifying "copy" in the sense of downloading; you know, copy by downloading.

In other words, those things; but you still, I don't think have the right to avoid the word "copy" altogether. And, so, I think that that's -- and I will say, on the other hand, I'm not, and you probably could foresee this, I'm not going to deem all these things admitted.

MR. HOWARD: No, Your Honor. I understand that.

But on that point, what Your Honor just said is exactly what we asked. We asked, "Did you get a copy of a tax update by downloading?" And they said, "We acquired a tax update posted by PeopleSoft by downloading." And, so, that is obtaining a

copy by downloading.

THE COURT: Well, they want to avoid using the word "copy" at this point --

MR. HOWARD: Exactly right.

THE COURT: -- but I think you have to use it in that context.

MR. COWAN: And, again, the reason why we did it in that context is we were dealing with the old definition that was multifarious; and given that the Court is limiting the definition to the plain meaning, we certainly -- we don't have a problem saying, "Yes, we took a copy by downloading." In that instance I think it's the majority of time; but that way it's specific enough that we don't get to trial and they try to paint our activities with such a broad brush that we don't have our ability to explain what, in fact, we did. And that's the underlying issue, Judge, in all of these definitional issues.

THE COURT: All right. Well, then what next? I mean, the "fix" and the "update" don't seem particularly vague and ambiguous to me.

Now, you know, you seem to be raising the issue rather that there's testing in quality assurance within -- with subsets of the fix but, yet, the deposition witnesses weren't drawing those distinctions. So I am troubled by that.

MR. COWAN: What I've done, because we've had this issue come up in other hearings on other things, and I've

prepared a demonstrative that analogizes what we're talking about with respect to fixes with something that I think everybody, including the jury, can understand. And if you can give me three minutes to run through this, I'd like to do that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COWAN: Here's a copy.

Your Honor, there's a number of terms here that we've given you that, and I agree, at first blush is kind of hard to understand what we're talking about when we're talking about master fix, we're talking about fix, we're talking about --

THE COURT: First class, second class, third class, all weekend.

MR. COWAN: Right. I understand.

So, hopefully, because we obviously have to convince a jury about the details of what we've done and try to explain it in a way the jury can understand it, so the purpose of this demonstrative is to take that approach.

A master fix is much like a generic grocery list, and that's what we have on this first page. It's basically just identifying a need. What is the problem? In the grocery list, you need groceries. That's the description of the fix. Then what do you need? You need these things.

Well, if you go to the next analogy following this grocery analogy, the fix, as it's defined, is actually just

like the grocery bag. All it is, is a number assigned to something that holds other things, and the individual things that go in the fix are specific things; and we've listed them here, such as the DAT file, the DMS file, the SQR file, the project file.

When you go to start looking at specific customers or consumers in the nature of groceries, what do those customers get as a result of that master fix? The problem.

The problem is you're out of groceries. You need -- generally, these group of customers need milk, eggs, beans, and cereal.

You go here on page 3, fix objects for consumer A. That consumer only needs the milk and the cereal. So it would only need, for example, for that fix, the SQR file and the project file. Customer or consumer B on 4 needs different things.

But look here (indicating). Here's the important thing. They need milk but that customer wants soy milk, not whole milk.

THE COURT: So, but -- okay. So I understand your point, but isn't this kind of -- the way that this ought to be gotten at, it seems to me, is along the lines of guidance I've given you before, which is, this really goes to not whether you did something or not but the quantity of it, was it done sometimes, always. I mean --

MR. COWAN: We admitted that and we admitted it at the object level; and where we could admit at least once or

some of the time or the majority of the time, we actually did that.

And if you look at their motion at -- let me find it --

THE COURT: I just -- I think -- I mean, the problem

I have with your answer is that it's completely

incomprehensible to a jury; and it also -- the extent not

admitted, denied, I mean, it results in a nonadmission even

though most of this is true.

I mean, that -- I mean the -- I think what Oracle is trying to get at is that you would take something from one consumer and share it with others. Now the extent that it was one or two versus twenty versus a million, I think your answer to that is, "That depends."

Okay. But it's still what's happened. And, so, this is where I think -- I guess I don't think the answer is satisfactory. It's not sufficient. It's too -- it's too impossible. The jury won't know what an object is. Maybe they will by the end of this trial. But, you know, it just -- it avoids what you should have to really admit in requests for admission; but there may be a way -- you know, I --

MR. COWAN: And I found the place in their motion, Judge. It's on page 26 of their motion.

THE COURT: 26 of?

MR. COWAN: Of Oracle's motion.

1 THE COURT: Plaintiffs' papers? Yes. And you look in the middle of the 2 MR. COWAN: page there beginning at line 12. 3 THE COURT: 4 Right. MR. COWAN: We admit it, for some of the objects, 5 meaning more than one, and to the extent -- this is just an 6 7 exemplar. For example, when they ask for majority, we would 8 respond, because the requests for admission were admit at least one, and the next request was admit some, and then the next 9 10 request was admit that a majority. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Now, this one you're pointing to has to do with a generic environment, which is a similar issue 12 but --13 14 MR. COWAN: But it's the exact same issue, and the 15 issue is: Are we discussing this at a fix or update level or 16 are we discussing it at an object level? 17 Because we can admit at an object level, but they're 18 asking us to admit it at a fix level. They are asking us to 19 admit it at the grocery bag level. But the substance of this 20 case, what is potentially copyrightable is not the bag. It's the contents of the baq. 21 22 And, so, we're focused on what we did and all of 23 their RFAs --

MR. COWAN: -- are focused on what TomorrowNow did

Well --

THE COURT:

with the objects, not with the fixes.

THE COURT: Yeah, but why is it that your actual high-level, highly knowledgeable people at deposition didn't draw this distinction?

MR. COWAN: Because they're talking about -depending on the nature of the question, they could be talking
about the overall process of how they assembled the fix, which
has all these objects in it; but it's a component-by-component
construction.

THE COURT: Well, I guess, I feel just -- I feel that there's probably a middle ground, although I shouldn't say middle. I think far more towards Oracle's side of this.

In other words, I think there may be a little bit of something to what you're saying, but I don't think it justifies these kind of unusable answers.

MR. COWAN: The concern --

THE COURT: Essentially you've taken these very technical distinctions, which may have a little bit of merit, although the bigger picture, they're being -- the result is distortion, where things that should be admitted aren't admitted in appearance to the jury. I mean, it just is unclear and gobbledygook, you know, in what you're admitting and what you're denying, and that's the problem with it.

So I'm not satisfied. I think a lot better needs to be done. I'm not sure exactly -- I don't think it's -- I guess

I ought to here from you. I'm not sure that -- it's true that the witnesses, I think, might not have been trying to be as precise as this RFA calls for, but --

MR. HOWARD: Well, Your Honor, if I may address that. I mean, there is this new issue that has emerged through their opposition that we're very concerned about; and that is, that we took their representations about what this SAS database had in terms of these fixes and we went and we spent an untold amount of money and time examining these witnesses using the terms that we were asked to use, and now the -- now we're getting denials because we used those terms.

And if I could just compare the two categories at issue in the motion. On the fix RFAs that we're discussing right now, they object essentially that we're not talking about objects. On the second category where we ask about objects, they say that that's too much work to do and it's burdensome.

And if, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, and we haven't gotten to that; right?

MR. HOWARD: Yes. And I just wanted to put those in relief because if we go back to early 2008, counsel said to Judge Legge, for example, "If you want to look at every master fix we have ever provided, it may take a second to open, but you go through and see every fix that was provided."

The witnesses testified the same way. Catherine

Hyde in her declaration to Your Honor in July 2009 declares the same way. They use the language of fix, interchangeable with master fix and that's the basis in which we examined them.

It creates -- so, Your Honor, I think that they should be required to answer on the basis of fix, which is the terminology. This distinction that's being drawn between "fix" and "fix container" is evasive and it really does -- it would unwind all of the discovery we have taken so far in the case.

And if they're determined to do that, then I do think that we ought to have an opportunity to brief that to Your Honor. We see it as tantamount to the type of motion that Your Honor heard from them.

THE COURT: Well, I don't -- I mean, I don't think it is tantamount. It's different, but whether it's serious is a different issue, but -- and I'm not sure I understand the idea that this unwinds all the past discovery.

What is your response to that?

MR. COWAN: It's real quick. It doesn't,

Your Honor. And he said -- Mr. Howard indicated that, you

know, they used the terms that they were asked to use. They

used the terms they selected in questioning our witnesses, not

terms we told them to use.

THE COURT: Well, but I still think that -- but, nonetheless, the witnesses could have said, "I don't know what you mean by that. A fix is merely a container and inside it

are a bunch of objects and we" -- you know, they didn't say
that, and these were people -- director of PeopleSoft Support
Services, and so forth. I mean, it's -MR. COWAN: We're not denying, Your Honor. I want
to make clear --

THE COURT: Now, to my mind you are switching gears on that and I don't think it's justified and it's problematic.

MR. COWAN: We're not denying that the terms "fixes" and "updates" were regularly used at TomorrowNow. We've never said that. The issue is: What are they asking? What is the focus on?

And on page 10 of their reply brief, plaintiffs' reply brief, I think really cuts to the chase, and in page 14 -- I'm sorry, page 11 of the demonstrative I gave you is really good.

THE COURT: You know, it's after 2:00 o'clock and we're not even through the first set of motions, and I've got a lot of people who have 2:00 o'clock hearings. I tried to warn you about the amount of time. So I don't know what to do about this.

MR. COWAN: This will take one second and then I'll be done on this issue, Your Honor, because it relates to all these definitional issues just so you can understand where we're coming from.

And I'll just read it to you. Mr. Howard in

questioning one of the witnesses says: (reading)

"When I say 'fix,' I'm referring to the objects that comprise the functionality that's being delivered to the client."

And, again, what he's saying is, he's referring to the contents of the grocery bag, given my analogy, not the bag itself.

And, so, when we answered these requests for admission, we're answering them based upon the focus of this case, which is: What did TomorrowNow do allegedly with Oracle's alleged copyright material? And if you want to focus on that, you have to focus at the object level. You can't focus at the fix level, and here's why:

If you look at page 11 on the demonstrative, this is one type of object in one fix for Waste Management. It has nine -- or one example of one type of object in a Waste Management fix. There are seven SQR files in that fix. How each one of those were done may differ depending on what development and testing was done.

They're asking us to admit something at a fix level when, in fact, you've got to look at what happened at the object level to determine whether that's true or not. And, so, if we admit it at the fix level, then we will, by virtue, have to admit, even though --

THE COURT: Well, I can't --

MR. COWAN: -- we would dispute it at the object 1 level. 2 3 THE COURT: I don't -- I can't. This is not helping me decide. 4 5 MR. COWAN: Okay. THE COURT: I'm sorry, but it just isn't. 6 7 I don't think I can tell you anything more right now 8 than that I think your answers are too evasive. I don't know whether Oracle could change this to something like, "Admit that 9 10 for some fixes or updates or the components thereof," or 11 something like that. I mean, that's infringement it seems. MR. HOWARD: Right. I think we can work with --12 13 THE COURT: But so that you don't avoid -- you know, 14 you clutter up -- because this answer, whether intentional or 15 not, like all the other answers that are at issue, results in 16 something that really is a gobbledygook, unusable by the jury 17 to figure out what you admitted and what you didn't. And, so, 18 I think something like that is probably the best solution. 19 MR. COWAN: And, so, Your Honor, are you suggesting 20 that we work together to try to address some of the concerns --21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 -- we have and revise their request? MR. COWAN: 23 THE COURT: Yes. But I am trying to tell you that I mostly agree with Oracle. I very little agree with you. I 24

think there's a few grains of correctness that it's not exactly

as precise as it could be, but I think mostly what's happening 1 is those are being used to leverage giving evasive and 2 unhelpful answers. That's my view of this. 3 MR. HOWARD: We'll take that and work with it, 4 Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 7 MR. HOWARD: How would you like to proceed? THE COURT: Well, I mean, I think the generic 8 environment -- let's see... It seemed to me, again, that there 9 10 could be an agreement that the definition "generic environment" 11 could be tweaked a little bit, that it had some limitations on customer scope and purpose. I mean, it's very parallel to what 12 I was just saying. 13 14 MR. HOWARD: As to that one, Your Honor, we did not 15 make up that term. 16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. HOWARD: That's a term that they use. I agree. 18 THE COURT: MR. HOWARD: And if you look at their answer, I 19 20 think it just -- it just ignores what the common meaning was within the company. We asked about generic environments. 21 22 answer in terms of an environment specific to TomorrowNow's 23 retrofit support of specific customers. Our question is not limited to retrofit support. 24

goes to environments, which the witnesses are crystal clear

about in their testimony, that are not named for or used for 1 the support of specific customers, whether that is in the 2 retrofit model or the critical support model. 3 So the complaint that we made that up and it's --4 5 THE COURT: Right. MR. HOWARD: -- not fair to use, we just think it's 6 7 wrong. 8 THE COURT: Right. No. It's true, and it's even used in the answer. 9 10 MR. COWAN: But we do -- because we admit that to 11 the extent we can admit it, we do; and to the extent we have to qualify it, we do, and the rule allows us to do that. 12 13 Again, they're trying to shoehorn what might be some 14 specific conduct into a broader context. 15 THE COURT: Well, I really -- you know what? I just 16 I don't know what to do right now. It's 2:11. I've given 17 you -- I mean, this -- these motions turned into, you know, the 18 equivalent of about 20 motions, and it's very burdensome on the Court, and I feel like I made a mistake authorizing these, I 19 20 can tell you. Now we're more than an hour into this and we're 21 not even half way through. So I'm not sure how to proceed. 22 We've got other people waiting. 23 MR. COWAN: I think on this issue, Your Honor, we've got the direction from the Court in terms of --24

THE COURT: But I think I'm -- I mean, I probably

lean even more in Oracle's favor on this issue. I mean, I 1 really -- I think "generic environments" were -- has been used 2 a lot, and I think they're understandable, and I think the 3 answer should include those terms. It might be that there's 4 some slight tweaking. I'm not even sure about that. 5 MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I'm trying to figure out a 6 way to get through this. Should we come back and schedule with 7 8 Your Honor? I mean, I think the parties, unfortunately, and we recognize the burden and --9 10 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. HOWARD: -- I would say you haven't authorized 11 three of these motions --12 13 THE COURT: I know. 14 MR. HOWARD: -- but I think that we need to -- we 15 need an order from the Court because we've got some things --16 THE COURT: I know. I know. I know. 17 MR. HOWARD: -- that are stacked up. Should we ask 18 Your Honor to reschedule us for the remaining issues? No. Well, I'm just thinking maybe 19 THE COURT: No. 20 I'll take the other -- the two motions from the other parties. We'll take a recess in this case, but then I'll try to bring 21 22 you back again. 23 MR. HOWARD: Okay. THE COURT: And I do have, I think, maybe just one 24 25 Case Management, so I might take that at 3:00 and then keep

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going.
 1
                 MR. HOWARD: Very well, Your Honor.
 2
                 MR. COWAN: That makes sense.
 3
                 THE COURT: Believe me, I don't want to put this
 4
      aside and take it up again.
 5
                 MR. HOWARD: Okay.
 6
 7
                 MR. COWAN:
                             Okay.
 8
                 MR. HOWARD: Fair enough.
                 THE COURT: That would be a disaster from my point
 9
     of view.
10
11
                 MR. HOWARD: Thank you for being able to take the
      additional time, Your Honor.
12
13
                 THE COURT: All right. Okay.
14
                 THE CLERK:
                            Court's in recess.
15
                        (Recess taken at 2:14 p.m.)
16
                     (Proceedings resumed at 2:51 p.m.)
17
                 THE COURT: All right. Any new developments?
                 MR. HOWARD: No, Your Honor.
18
19
                 THE COURT: You haven't settled the case?
20
                 MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, it's 20 minutes later.
21
                                 (Laughter)
22
                 THE COURT:
                             Yes.
23
                 MR. COWAN:
                             I'm not going to revisit what we talked
      about before the break in the sense of rearguing anything I've
24
      already reargued.
25
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THE COURT: Especially if you've already reargued it, yes.

MR. COWAN: I understand. I understand.

And I think the Court understands our positions, but disagrees with many of them, and I've taken to heart what the Court has said so far.

I just want to make sure that we understand on the first part of the motion relative to the RFAs, the definitional piece of it, what you're ordering us to do; and if I can summarize what that is, then hopefully we're not back here again or facing some motion to deem what we supplement admitted.

The issue in the definitions you've acknowledged, and I think Oracle's agreed, to go on "copy" to a plain meaning term.

On "fix" and "update" you have agreed with Oracle's definition of that and overruled defendants' objections to those terms.

On "generic environment" you acknowledge there's some room for meet and confer on that relative to the fact that those environments were used for some subset or specific customers, which was the scope issue.

THE COURT: Yeah, although I'm looking at my notes and what my -- I did have a feeling this issue environment -- you're saying, well, it was used for retrofit support and

limitations on customer's scope and purpose. I don't know that that's contrary to what they're asking you to admit. I mean, that's sort of an argument, but it wasn't as big a deal or something. But is that really -- what in the wording of admit is wrong about this?

MR. COWAN: Our concern is the only RFAs that are at issue in the motion relate only to the retrofit environment the way we read them; and, therefore, we believed that our answers needed to be qualified to make sure that we're all on the same page there.

But I think we can get at this issue and address the Court's concerns and preference and, hopefully, meet our obligations, as the Court expects us to under the rules, by, once we get to a point on a definition on that issue, incorporating the words from their request in our answer because that seems to be the biggest concern they have and, obviously, one the Court has focused on.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COWAN: The concern I have is, as we get into summary judgment motion practice and trial, if we're not afforded the opportunity at this time, even if we use their words, to have some other qualifying language, whether it be in the objection piece or as a separate sentence in the answer that could be taken out for purposes of trial once

Judge Hamilton rules how these admissions would be used.

THE COURT: Well, I think if it's in the objections and then she -- you know, she'll either decide whether she wants the address those or not is that -- do you have any problem with it being in the objections as opposed to the answer?

MR. HOWARD: No, Your Honor, as long as it's a valid objection, which is really what we're here talking about.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HOWARD: So the answer --

MR. COWAN: Well, it's more of a qualification.

It's not an objection at that point. It's a qualification of our answer, and that's -- I don't care where we put it as long as we have a record of, "Hey, when we're admitting these things using your words, this is what we mean." And that's really the crux of it.

And I understand the Court is not pleased with how we've done it to this point. I want to get it right but I also want to preserve our ability to not have it misconstrued in a way that we didn't intend it to admit.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, if I may, I have a -- we need to move on, I think. I have a concern that we're just moving the evasion from one place in the document to another. We need to have straightforward answers to the questions. They can explain those answers; but if the answer to the question is that they did use generic environments, which we all know they

did, then they need to say that and I'm not sure what the 1 objection is to that. 2 3 THE COURT: Right. MR. HOWARD: I guess my suggestion would be, 4 Your Honor is going to issue an order, and I think we've all 5 heard what you've said, and we need to get down to the business 6 of getting these updated based on your order. There's some 7 things that depend on it. 8 9 THE COURT: Yeah. I can't -- I mean, I just can't give you -- this is just too much for the Court to rewrite 10 11 these things. MR. COWAN: And I'm not asking that, Your Honor. 12 13 THE COURT: So I just can't give you more. We have 14 to move on. I can't give you more than I've given you. 15 MR. COWAN: Can I get one clarification, not on the 16 requests themselves but on what are --17 THE COURT: But I definitely -- I just -- I 18 definitely agree that you have to go ahead and not -- and use 19 the words in your response that have been used throughout the

definitely agree that you have to go ahead and not -- and use the words in your response that have been used throughout the litigation and the witnesses have used without any problem, like "generic environment," and so forth.

And, as I say, they might be, and I can't keep them

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straight in my head anymore, some places where it wouldn't be inconsistent with that to say "portions of," or something, like we discussed before, as long as it's -- but it's basically an

admission as opposed to something that's unclear what it is.

And I am concerned with -- I do share Mr. Howard's concern that I don't want to just move the problem to a different point, but at the same time I can't really give you more guidance than that right now.

MR. COWAN: Rule 36(a)(4) says: (reading)

"When good faith requires that a party
qualify an answer or deny only a part of a

matter, the answer must specifically specify the
part admitted and qualify or deny the rest."

I don't interpret --

THE COURT: That's correct, but it has to be in good faith and it can't be manipulated to create something that's unusable.

MR. COWAN: Understood. And that's what -- I was trying to get clarification from the Court in terms of if we have the answer period and then if we have the qualification that follows it, then at least we're not in the situation back to the fix issue where we're admitting something as to the fix, even though one or two objects of the fix may be affected when there's 10 objects in that fix, for example. Otherwise, we get to trial or in summary judgment and they're going to say, "You admitted it as to all 10."

THE COURT: You know, I just -- my opinion -- when we started with you're not going to reargue what you've already

reargued, we've now reargued it even more. So I just -- you 1 know, there comes a point where we need to move on, so.... 2 3 MR. COWAN: But are you -- and I understand, and I 4 want to do that, but what I don't want to be in a position we're having something admitted. Are you saying we can't 5 qualify it? 6 7 THE COURT: I'm not saying that --8 MR. COWAN: Okay. **THE COURT:** -- but I'm saying the qualifications you 9 made so far are not acceptable, and I'm not doing anything more 10 11 than that and you'll just have to take the guidance that I was able to give you now and do the best you can. 12 13 MR. COWAN: I hate to keep pressing this issue, but 14 when you say, "Qualifications we made so far," are you talking 15 about you haven't read all the requests but you're talking 16 about the ones that have been presented in the motion? 17 THE COURT: I've only dealt with the ones that are in the motion. I haven't looked at anything that was not the 18 19 subject of the briefing. 20 MR. COWAN: Quoted to the motion. 21 THE COURT: Quoted to the motion, right. Okay. Because, I mean, from what you 22 MR. COWAN: 23 just said, I could see Oracle saying, "You've got to take out all your answers and you can never say that again." 24 THE COURT: Well, you may. I don't know. 25 I have no

idea whether the other answers that they -- I mean, were these 1 2 meant to be examples? MR. HOWARD: Well, that's just it, Your Honor. 3 mean, I thought we were clear about that. They are just 4 examples and, so, they're all categorical. They're all framed 5 the same way. 6 7 THE COURT: To the extent that -- I've looked at 8 these examples. MR. COWAN: Okay. 9 THE COURT: I've given you my thoughts on these 10 11 I agree with Oracle that the answers were not examples. proper. So I'm granting the motion with that regard; and to 12 13 the extent that these are exemplars of other similar things, I 14 would rule the same way, but I have not looked at any of those 15 other similar things. So I am not -- I am not -- I haven't 16 looked at those at all. 17 MR. COWAN: Okay. Okay. But if they are, in fact, 18 THE COURT: similar, which they probably are, then I would make the same 19 20 ruling. 21 In some ways it's back to some of MR. COWAN: Yeah. 22 the same issues, but we'll take the Court's quidance and do our 23 very best. 24 THE COURT: Yeah. You can't -- I mean, the Court

cannot look at 500 plus RFAs.

MR. HOWARD: Which is why we made no effort to put 1 that in front of you. 2 3 MR. COWAN: Nor am I asking that. We're not asking that. 4 5 Thank you. Thank you. THE COURT: Can we move on now? 6 7 MR. COWAN: Yes, we can. 8 The other issue in the RFA is the burden issue, Your Honor, that we haven't addressed. 9 10 THE COURT: Right. And I'm not very sympathetic to 11 the burden issue because I do agree with Oracle's basic fundamental point that you made your bed, you lie in it. 12 13 wouldn't -- you know the Court tried to get stipulations. 14 tried to find ways to reduce the burden. You wouldn't go along 15 with those; and, so -- and as far as burden, you know, it's 16 proportionate to what? It's proportionate to, you know, 17 potentially a billion in damages. 18 So I'm just -- as a general rule, I would like to see a way to reduce the burden somehow, and I'm open to that; 19 20 but my overall I'm not terribly sympathetic to that argument. 21 I agree with Oracle's basic point. 22 MR. COWAN: Let me break these things down, then, 23 where we make sure we're talking about the same thing. On the second part, the burden part, there's a 24 25 request in the fifth set. Requests 4 through 63 deal solely

with downloads and have no relationship to any other requests contained in this motion.

There's no use of any of those requests as examples in the motion. They don't make any specific arguments about those requests specifically, other than referring to them generally, and you haven't -- to the extent you haven't looked at the actual requests in the exhibits, there's nothing in front of the Court on the motions themselves for the Court to decide that.

But, generally, the requests 4 through 63 say that for a given file path where downloaded files are located, admit that all the files came from customer connection. And then they ask us to go through all these file paths, which, by the way, we went to the burden and gave them the file paths. So we're back to a download-by-download analysis of millions of downloads, which is exact same issue that the Court has already ruled on.

THE COURT: Well, I see one thing that I -- one thought that occurred to me is maybe the way to avoid the burden but not is -- and what I have a feeling is probably true, admit that it is likely that the vast majority of the files were obtained at some point and then that might end this whole controversy.

MR. COWAN: Yeah. They're right now asking us to do it on a path-by-path basis.

THE COURT: Okay. But, I mean, isn't it the reality
that we know the vast majority but you don't know if it's

100 percent versus 99 percent?

MR. COWAN: And we've admitted that, I think,

Your Honor, or not vast majority but certainly admitted

THE COURT: Right, but that's what I'm saying. In other words, you know, majority still leaves potentially 49 percent. So what I'm saying is, isn't it true that the vast majority?

MR. COWAN: Depending on a given file path, likely the vast majority and depending on time. That's one we have to go look at those things in that context.

THE COURT: Well, then maybe you can -- you should -- you know, again, I would think you could meet and confer on this, but come up with an answer that says, "For this time period we admit the vast majority," and then I don't know that you need to go out and look at every one.

MR. HOWARD: Yeah. Your Honor, I think we would accept vast majority certainly if the evidence bears it out. The issue -- the issue that was framed in our papers was that when we asked them to admit that they all came from the Web site, they said that it was likely that the majority did but they didn't undertake the burden of evaluating.

Then we followed up with a follow-on RFA --

majority.

THE COURT: That's right. 1 MR. HOWARD: -- and said, "Admit that you don't have 2 access to readily obtainable information indicating that it was 3 not originally download." So in the sense it's the same --4 5 THE COURT: Right, and I agreed with Oracle on that, I didn't see how you could refuse to answer either of 6 7 those. To me it was inconsistent, and I just -- I don't think 8 that that's what -- readily accessible is not the same as burdensome as it's been interpreted up until now, I don't 9 10 think, in this context. I'm not talking about --11 MR. COWAN: There's two issues. One is the readily accessible information --12 13 THE COURT: Right. 14 MR. COWAN: -- that is requested in the request --15 THE COURT: Right, RFA, yeah. 16 MR. COWAN: -- in the RFA, and then the readily 17 accessible documents that would be used to get that 18 information. We've conceded the documents are readily 19 accessible. We've produced those. 20 The question is, to answer their request you have to 21 go through -- because the rule is --22 THE COURT: Well, let me --23 MR. COWAN: I've got it highlighted. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. COWAN: It's 36-4. The last sentence of 36-4,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, the thing is this: You can readily obtain the information. I mean, at least this is one way of reading this. It's just that it would take an enormous amount of time, but it's right there at your fingertips. It's just extremely burdensome.

MR. COWAN: If it's knowable.

THE COURT: That's different from readily obtainable. But I still think -- I mean, I think that I agree with Oracle, that I can't understand why, then, you can't answer that you can't do it because it's too vast for you to look at.

MR. COWAN: On a file-by-file basis?

THE COURT: Well, I agree with what Oracle said in its reply. I don't know that I need to be more specific than that. I agree with that. I think it was inconsistent to first give the one answer and then give the second answer. So I don't need to give any more detail. I agree with them.

MR. COWAN: Because they're effectively shifting -if that's the case, they're effectively shifting the burden -their burden of proof to us.

THE COURT: I don't see how that is. I mean, first you say it's not -- you don't have the information. And then they say, "Admit you don't have the information," and then you say you won't admit that. I mean, that's what your argument

is; right?

MR. HOWARD: That's what they're arguing.

THE COURT: To me I agree with that.

MR. COWAN: They said, "Admit you don't have any readily obtainable information to answer this request." The answer is we do have readily obtainable information. We don't have -- the information sought in the request is not readily obtainable. I now understand, based on the Court's interpretation of 36-4, that you're not equating information that knows or can readily obtain as being analogous to burdensome.

THE COURT: I mean, maybe -- you know, I think it's an interesting question, but I don't -- I mean, there's no case law that says that; is there?

MR. COWAN: Your Honor, we've cited the cases that we've cited in our response are the only cases we could find on this issue, but it doesn't take away the burdensome argument of requiring us to go --

THE COURT: So what I suggest -- I've given you several options for avoiding the burden. You can come up with something along the lines of the vast majority, or you can answer -- now maybe I'm forgetting the nuances and really, I think, this is too many motions and small tiny points to bring to the Court to try to address in one hearing, and I think you're, you know....

So -- you know, I mean, keep in mind, like most judges, I'm dealing with many other motions today. I have complex summary judgment motions in a patent case tomorrow. I had criminal matters all morning. I have a search warrant waiting behind me. I spent as much time over the weekend as I could, but now it's three days later -- I mean, two days later.

So, I mean, I can't reiterate and give you more detail than I've already given you. I basically agree with Oracle. It may be that I'm -- you know, there's slight difference in wording between "readily obtainable manner" and "readily obtainable something else." I can't keep that straight any more. If so, you're entitled to make that correction, but the basic thrust I did agree with.

MR. COWAN: Okay. Then -- but what I hear the Court saying is you're not ordering us to go through file by file if we're willing to do it in some quantifiable general order.

THE COURT: Some more use -- exactly. Something -- I think that would be the preferable approach, I mean, for everybody; wouldn't it?

MR. HOWARD: Yes, Your Honor. And I think with -the downloads is one set, but the object RFAs is the other
category within this burden, the ones that they haven't
answered based on burden; and those are actually the ones where
they said even more directly in the first answer they lack
sufficient information to respond to these requests because the

information wasn't maintained in a readily obtainable manner. 1 Then we said, "Admit that you don't have access to readily 2 obtainable information." And then they said, "We deny that." 3 THE COURT: Well, that may be the one I'm thinking 4 of. 5 MR. HOWARD: That, I think, is the one where the 6 7 language is more directly lined up. It's true --THE COURT: Yeah, as long as the language -- I mean, 8 if it's not perfectly lined up, it needs to be perfectly lined 9 up; but if it's perfectly lined up, then I think you have to 10 11 admit it. MR. HOWARD: And I think, Your Honor, just, if I 12 13 could, to cut through it, if you are not going to order them to 14 go do all of the RFAs, it would be, I think, acceptable to us 15 to carve out a subset and allow us to extrapolate from that. 16 So, for example, although there are a lot of 17 objects, they are grouped. They're grouped according to fix. 18 They're grouped according to update. There are 179 fixes and there are 65 updates. And, so, if they were to -- if we were 19 20 to take a slice of that and then we were allowed to extrapolate from that, that would at least give us the ability to apply the 21 22 evidence that is there to be applied. 23 THE COURT: Yeah. But what do you mean by, "We were

MR. HOWARD: Well, in other words, that whatever the

allowed to extrapolate by that"?

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answers were for the subset that we picked out of these, you know, the objects, fixes, updates, they were all within -they're all within, you know, Tupperware containers that fit inside of each other. Whatever the answers are, then we get to extrapolate that statistically to the universe that is implicated.

THE COURT: Well, your expert could. But the question is: Are you asking for that as an irrebuttable presumption or are you asking that as just an evidentiary foundation?

MR. HOWARD: What I'm asking is that we be allowed to statistically extrapolate without a challenge to the way that that subset was --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HOWARD: -- generated, otherwise they should answer all of them, but just to make it easier on them to answer.

THE COURT: This is the same place we were before; right?

MR. COWAN: Yeah. Because it's the same issue we were on rog 14, Your Honor. And all they're asking on this issue, the 33,000 files, the objects they want us to specifically admit for each request, 37 separate requests 33,000 times, is exactly what this Court ordered we shouldn't have to do in answering rog 14; and you picked and, I thought

at the time, the Court believed it was being -- you know, we first started with five. They then asked for five more. We did 10 which resulted in the 772 objects that -- 1772 objects we looked at that took 500 attorney hours to do.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor --

MR. COWAN: And, so --

THE COURT: Okay. I am going to take a recess. I just I can't remember the substance of this well enough and I'm not sure. I mean, I am concerned about the burden, I am very concerned, and I don't have indelibly etched on my memory all of the twists and turns this has taken and the Oracle-like pronouncements that, I've not meant to favor one party or the other, but Oracler-like pronouncements I may or may not have made. So I'm going to take a recess, ten minutes.

MR. HOWARD: Thank you.

THE CLERK: The court's in recess.

(Recess taken at 3:22 p.m.)

(Proceedings resumed at 3:29 p.m.)

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I looked a little more closely at the response, the plaintiffs' followup RFA for each item 1 to 33, 1 to 86, "Admit that defendants do not have reasonable access."

I think that probably to track exactly what they said better it would be more like something like, "Admit the defendants do not have reasonable access to sufficient, readily

obtainable information to indicate whether or not the copy of the listed fixed object was created using a local environment."

I think that -- you know, that may not be the exact magic language, but I think that's -- I think you would have to admit something like that.

MR. COWAN: Yeah. And I wasn't following where you were reading from, but I assume you were reading right out of our objection.

THE COURT: Well, I was just reading your -- yes, I was reading your objection and then amending the plaintiffs'

RFA to track the objection. I mean, the wording is very close.

It's not exact, but I think that -- but as I say, I think that you did -- I mean, you have to do one or the other, I think.

MR. COWAN: Right. When it comes to the specific request for each one of these 33,000, because the real issue, Your Honor, on the burden -- and, by the way, one of the things I thought up during the break, you asked about is there a specific case about whether the readily obtainable language in Rule 36 is the equivalent of a burden issue, and the answer is we haven't found anything on that specific language from the rule but Rule 26 certainly applies to all discovery.

THE COURT: Yes. No, it does. I mean, there's a burden-shift objection but I don't think it's the same as what you used in your --

MR. COWAN: Okay.

THE COURT: -- objection here. I don't know. I'm not sure that was what's meant by the rule.

But -- and I think the approach, something like vast majority, would also be one way to deal with it. But I think the problem is -- I mean, I think you should be willing to stipulate but along the lines it's been said. I've tried to get you to do it, but I'm not sure that I can.

I mean, the idea of ordering a stipulation is somewhat oxymoronic. So I think the law probably hasn't developed to that point; but I can't let you have it both ways, where you basically say -- I mean, everybody knows that most of this is true, but you give evasive answers, that's my concern.

MR. COWAN: And, Your Honor, I think it depends on how you phrase -- how they phrase the request as to what is true or what is not.

THE COURT: Well, and that's where I'm just -- you know, I don't know that I can give you more guidance --

MR. COWAN: Okay.

THE COURT: -- but I think that you ought to try to meet and confer and come up with something that follows as much guidance as I've been able to give you.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, we accept Your Honor's proposal, and we're happy to leave it at that right now and take the order that tracks that language.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. COWAN: Again, I need clarification in terms
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     of -- I understand the guidance the Court has given us relevant
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      to the meet and confer; but absent reaching some agreement, is
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      the Court ordering us to answer for each of these requests
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      33,000 times?
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                 THE COURT: No, but I've given you ways to avoid
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      doing that --
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                 MR. COWAN: Okay.
                 THE COURT: -- such as, vast majority. Okay.
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                                                                So
      I'm giving you alternatives to doing that, but --
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11
                 Okay. Let's go to the interrogatories, because
     that's different from the RFAs.
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                 MR. COWAN: I don't think there's any
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      interrogatories on this issue.
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                 MR. HOWARD: Our motion was confined to RFAs,
     Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I quess there
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      was the issue -- well, you've done the interrogatories 11 and
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      14.
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                 MR. COWAN: Well, that's the burden issue.
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      Your Honor, it goes back to the same 33,000 issue, and
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     that's --
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                 THE COURT: Okay. Right, and they were a burden.
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      mean, I am concerned about the burden, but I've given you
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      some --
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1 MR. COWAN: Okay. -- approaches to deal with the burden, 2 THE COURT: 3 and the approach you did take is unacceptable. It's not sufficient. 4 5 MR. COWAN: So we're back -- to summarize, we're back to the --6 7 THE COURT: I can't do the summarizing anymore. 8 MR. COWAN: Okay. THE COURT: You'll just have to order the 9 transcript. 10 11 MR. COWAN: Okay. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Let's go on. 13 MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, are you going to issue an 14 order? If not and you're waiting for the meet and confer, may 15 we have it happen in five days? We have experts that are 16 waiting on answers to these and for supplemental reports, and I 17 would request that Your Honor issue an order based on what 18 you've said. It can say that we have to meet and confer on some things and allow us to come back if we have to and 19 20 hopefully we don't, but that would be our request. 21 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to promise you I can 22 get an order out immediately. So I will separately order you 23 to meet -- orally now order you to meet and confer on these

issues. I would say, today is Tuesday, by the end of the week.

MR. COWAN: We can do that.

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1 MR. HOWARD: Yes. Yeah. And then inform the Court of the 2 THE COURT: results --3 4 MR. HOWARD: Okay. 5 THE COURT: -- because I'm not sure when I'll get an order out; but I think you should in the meantime, my order may 6 7 be just very summary, you should rely on the transcript. 8 MR. HOWARD: Okay. MR. COWAN: 9 Okay. 10 THE COURT: Okay. I think we're on to the motion to 11 I mean, I am concerned about the procedural issue and compel. I also -- just I found this was -- I did agree with Oracle, to 12 13 some extent, that some of these topics seem like multiple 14 topics kind of shoehorned in. 15 At the same time, I'm -- and certainly something 16 like, I think, interrogatory 7 wasn't -- was never, ever 17 disclosed in advance. I may be inclined to let defendants 18 substitute, although it certainly would have been better to ask 19 permission. 20 I guess the main, on the mapping, the main reason the defendant gives for bringing this is something supposedly 21 22 new at the deposition of Jason Rice and you're saying it's not 23 new, I guess.

MR. HOWARD: It's absolutely not new, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right. Well, let's take these

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issues one by one.

MR. COWAN: Since it's our motion --

THE COURT: Okay. Yes, go ahead. You're right.

MR. COWAN: -- Your Honor, do you want me to address the procedural issue first given that's what you commented on first?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COWAN: The Court, as you know, permitted three issues. We readily admit that we substituted one of the issues and included in our motion that request that we be permitted to do so, and it was simply a hangover issue from the discovery conference where we discussed these issues.

The folder 11 issue was discussed, we thought ruled on and resolved, and then when Oracle refused to give us the documents that we asked for is one we included that issue in the motion. So that's just -- we readily admit it's not anything that was identified to the Court. It's one of our two identified motions.

The other one, Your Honor, relates broadly to the expanded claims in the First-Amended Complaint. You will recall, or maybe you don't, probably don't, quite frankly, while we were attempting to describe these topics, there were a number of open meet-and-confer issues out there and I did my best to describe kind of categorically where those issues may fall; and you instructed me, "It better be specific when you

actually file the motion or I'm not going to hear it." And that issue is the six-custodian issue related to the expanded discovery timeline agreement. So we think that's sufficiently narrow.

The download issue was something that was identified. I'll concede that interrogatory 7 was not identified to them a week in advance of the motion, but it was identified to them the following Tuesday when they asked for further clarification. So it's not -- it's a matter of days of not being addressed.

But be that as it may, the request for production numbers 44, 45, 47, and 51 were certainly timely designated to Oracle on December 4th when they were supposed to be identified.

The issue is real simple, Your Honor, on that first issue and it is back to the old product-to-download-mapping issue that we've quoted extensively in our brief and in our reply brief.

THE COURT: Well, I'm left with this big uncertainty about whether there was -- whether it was clear or not clear, this distinction that the plaintiffs are arguing between download to product versus download to, what was it, customer?

MR. COWAN: Contract.

THE COURT: Contract.

MR. COWAN: It is clear, in our view, as a bell

because there is no way that you can automatically in an automated way map downloads to contracts. You have to physically look at the contracts; that nobody's ever in this case ever contended that there's an automated way to do that mapping. There's a lot of manual work that has to be done to map downloads to contracts.

We've focused all along, and we quoted extensively from the record, both the pleading record and the transcript records, both in front of Your Honor and in front of Judge Legge, that substantiates what we're talking about is mapping these downloaded items to specific products that Oracle sold.

THE COURT: Let me skip to a different issue. I think the real rub of this whole motion, assuming if I was going to allow it procedurally, is the issue of work product. And, I mean, I think it took a long time and there was a huge amount of underbroach to get to that, but he says he created this document at the direction of counsel. So it is work product.

And now they've given it to you and I don't think that there was necessarily an error in waiting given that I think it is work product, as far as I know, and I don't think you really say why it isn't. Then the question would be -- but you have it now. So the question is: What relief if any? And I don't really see where all the relief you put out there is --

MR. COWAN: All we want to do --

THE COURT: -- justified no matter what. And it just seems like sort of a grab bag of things that don't follow logically to me.

MR. COWAN: We simply want an order compelling them to fully respond to those requests for any information they have in their possession, custody, control. It may be nothing else. Their response may be nothing else. But they have admitted in their opposition that they do have some download-to-contract-mapping information that they've now done manually and they say, "We're not giving that to you," and we certainly don't have it.

So the real issue is timely disclosure of this information certainly before trial, but we didn't have it over the past two years when we were questioning their witnesses.

On the work-product issue, we dealt with that extensively in our reply brief; and we think, first of all, Mr. Howard's statements to the Court, to this Court and to Judge Legge, he said repeatedly, "If we have the information, we'll give it to them." He never indicated that they did have some information related to that that was work product. We've been pushing for this information since the very first motion to compel.

THE COURT: Well, I don't really think that they waived work product. I mean, it's, you know, it's arguable but

I don't find that.

So -- but is there anything you have that your withholding now?

MR. HOWARD: Yes, work product, Your Honor. We do have work product that was not relied on by our experts.

And I would like to bring Your Honor back to some important facts that were not disclosed in the moving papers or addressed in the reply but that we put before the Court in our opposition.

Pertinent to this discussion, in particular, we asked to give them our work product. We offered it. In January of 2008 we said, "We can go create spreadsheets if you agree not to depose the attorneys who are creating them," and a couple other things that are the same thing that they had put to us and we had accepted.

So the notion that there was work product, it's no secret. It was on our privilege log that was submitted to them in May of 2008 next to Jason Rice's name. Jason Rice submitted a declaration in March of 2008.

This work product issue has been out there all along and we tried to get around it with them cooperatively. In lieu of that, since they wouldn't accept that, we gave them the underlying data and, again, something they don't address in the form of the customer connection databases from which Mr. Rice created the very spreadsheet that they now have.

THE COURT: Well, they say they don't know how to do that.

MR. HOWARD: Well, two things, Your Honor. They do because we've put before Your Honor very similar spreadsheets drawn from the same set of information created by their litigation consultants from the same source data on customer connection.

And, number two, Judge Legge gave them the opportunity to have an Oracle engineer come help them do all of this mapping, and they didn't ever pursue that; and we made it clear repeatedly to the Court, to them, that we were prepared to do that.

So we've done everything we possibly can. We've given them all of the underlying data. We've given them all of the spreadsheets that preexisted that were not work product.

We've told them we have work product, we've tried to give it to them, and they haven't accepted any of that.

And, so, what's left, Your Honor is quite right, is that there is the formerly work product spreadsheet that was given to our experts, was timely disclosed pursuant to <code>Wixon</code>, which they don't address, in accordance with the timing set forth by the rules; and then there are, as there has been since <code>May of 2008</code>, some additional work product spreadsheets that are work product created for litigation not relied on by the experts, but they've had the underlying data to use themselves

for the entire time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. COWAN: Several issues, Your Honor. The offer to give us what they had in their possession in exchange for this agreement not to depose even their experts on how it was created, et cetera, he's trying to parallel that with something that was a separate agreement that we had with -- that a hired expert did that we produced to them in exchange for a similar agreement, not something that an employee in a matter of hours extracted data out of a database that Oracle had in its possession.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to deny this one. I'm going to deny that motion. I think I've just -- I know you disagree with me, but I'm denying it.

On the Folger Levin (phonetic) subpoena, again there was procedural argument, but I'm going to reach it; and I guess the question is -- I do think that the list that defendants have come up with, although it's down to 64 pleadings, still has a number of irrelevant ones on it; but then there are some, too, that I don't know how they can tell whether they're relevant or not, like interrogatories or depositions, without seeing them, and there's no burdensomeness involved in this.

MR. HOWARD: No. We're not -- at this point, I think we're standing on relevance, Your Honor, and it's a fishing expedition. The relevant -- from the very beginning of

this discussion --1 THE COURT: Well, I don't think it's a total fishing 2 3 expedition. I mean, you know, the lawsuit did put these damage-related issues in play. 4 I need that Exhibit I that has what's still at issue 5 on that that you're still looking for. 6 7 So I'm going to grant this one in part, but I think 8 I'm just not sure exactly where I draw the line, certainly at least the six items that you're own person said relate to those 9 10 customers but I think there may be others, too. 11 Okay. So Exhibit I has what you're looking for now; right? 12 13 MR. McDONELL: It does, Your Honor, and I would just 14 offer to the Court that this is just a stack of documents 15 sitting in a conference room a matter of blocks from here --16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. McDONELL: -- that have been reviewed --THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. McDONELL: -- and could be turned over to us so 19 20 we can assess based, instead of on this cryptic --21 THE COURT: Right. I mean, I have no reason to 22 think she's not telling the truth, but different eyes knows 23 different things, see different significances. MR. McDONELL: So our request remains that it be 24

turned over or if we can go look at them.

THE COURT: Well, but some of them, I think, I don't see -- for example, Larry Olsen's (phonetic) character and reputation motion in limine, I mean, I would agree that that's not relevant.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I looked --

THE COURT: Postmerger layoffs, I don't see how that could be relevant. I mean, those things -- it has to be -- so I just would narrow this down some more.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I looked at the documents that have been identified, the six. Those are ones that identify customers that are in play in this litigation.

Sometimes they're just included in a long list of these customers wouldn't buy software. Unless there is a relevance argument made before anything beyond the references to those customers, which is the set that we have been limited to --

THE COURT: Well, I just don't see -- I mean, frankly, I'm not sure why you're resisting this so hard which -- because, I mean, there's no burden. They can look at them. These are court-filed documents. Some have portions sealed but you all have protective orders. And I just think this is making a mountain out of a molehill, basically, at this point.

So I'm going to -- I think you specifically called out as examples of ones you thought weren't relevant. The ones related to the motion in limine of Mr. Olsen (phonetic), I

agree with that is irrelevant; and I'm not sure -- was there other specific ones you mentioned?

MR. HOWARD: We were just going by way of example, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I thought -- well, but still, I don't -- you know, post -- how would postacquisition layoffs be relevant?

MR. McDONELL: Your Honor, for example, if they're laying off the PeopleSoft employees because they intend to de-emphasize the PeopleSoft product line or do away with it altogether and that message gets to a customer or gets into the marketplace, then it decreases the chance that those customers want to stay with the Oracle slash PeopleSoft organization.

But, again, we are limited because we know the general issues in the case --

THE COURT: All right. Well, other than the Larry Olsen (phonetic) ones, I'm ordering those produced.

MR. McDONELL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now custodian production. It seems as if there wasn't really a meeting of the minds. There was a miscommunication involved as to whether these were going to be updated or not updated; and I think that although the stipulation didn't -- it didn't specifically specify that there was a right to this, I think it put it in the category there was a right to ask for it.

MR. HOWARD: You're talking about the expanded timeline discussion, Your Honor?

Right.

THE COURT:

MR. McDONELL: The only way in which the timeline is even debatable is: What's a key custodian? There's no question that it allows for production of documents from that later time frame from key custodians on the topics. And by narrowing our request from 131 overall custodians down to 6, I think presumptively we've been focused and have narrowed it to key custodians.

We've also offered instead of the 900 search terms, they could use a reduced number of 71 search terms. These are all likely to be trial witnesses that we're talking about, their key documents for a period after the lawsuit was filed up until the time TomorrowNow went out of business, but a time frame in which there will be undoubtedly a great amount of evidence from other sources, but these key custodians should turn over their documents as well.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, you said there's no meeting of the minds.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HOWARD: They do not dispute --

THE COURT: I mean, on whether Oracle was pursuing this issue or not pursuing -- I mean, whether --

MR. HOWARD: SAP was.

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THE COURT: -- whether SAP was pursuing it. I think they thought that you had refused but were looking into it, you know, that sort of thing.

MR. HOWARD: They do not dispute our account, which is that we had objected to it. There was a meet and confer, and the ball was in their court to come back with an explanation. They don't dispute that. They say their notes are unclear.

And their subsequent actions corroborate our account. They never raised it with you, with us, with anybody even when the specific topic of late custodian productions was before the Court. And there is substantial prejudice to us now to be addressing that. We've shut down, in large part, the review apparatus. I think we were entitled to take the view that it was abandoned.

THE COURT: Well, I guess one thought I have is whether -- because it is, arguably, somewhat late to bring this up but I also think it's relevant and I don't think it was abandoned, although I think that I don't -- I'm not certain it was abandoned. I can understand how you perceived it that way.

So I think it's caused a bigger burden on the plaintiffs than it otherwise would because, as I say, they thought they were through that phase, is whether some of the expense of this should be shifted. That's one thought I had.

MR. McDONELL: We're openminded to your guidance on

that, Your Honor. We do want the documents. And if it's a matter of offering to pay a portion of it, we can certainly confer with our clients and I imagine they would be quite openminded to that.

THE COURT: All right. Because I think that would assuage some of the burden. But I think it is relevant and I don't buy that they're absolutely foreclosed from it, but I realize that it probably is more burdensome than it otherwise would have been because it's at a late stage.

MR. HOWARD: Right. Well, the money is one thing and the distraction while we're trying to do experts and summary judgment, and all of the rest, is not something they can compensate for, but we'll accept the Court's ruling on it or whatever you decide.

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, I think I'm inclined to something like a 50/50 split on the expense and a reasonable time frame, I mean, recognizing you have those other things to do, but I don't have a set idea in mind.

MR. McDONELL: So we'll confer. I imagine we'll be able to resolve that issue.

Your Honor, we gave notice to counsel that there's one bit of guidance for the future that we want to just give you a heads up about. We are currently about the business of scheduling expert depositions, and we have a disagreement on how many days of testimony will be permitted for certain

experts. Maybe we'll work it out, maybe we won't. 1 Is this -- did Judge Hamilton -- are 2 THE COURT: there any orders that govern this at all? 3 4 ALL: No. 5 THE COURT: Because hers was on fact witnesses when we set deposition limits? 6 7 MR. HOWARD: The deposition limits are presumptively 8 governed by the seven-hour rule. 9 THE COURT: Okay. MR. HOWARD: And, so, I don't think she certainly 10 11 didn't speak beyond that --12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. HOWARD: -- and Your Honor hasn't either. 14 THE COURT: Right. 15 MR. COWAN: Your Honor, there is a statement in the 16 order that says that the parties should meet and confer about 17 the length of expert depositions. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. McDONELL: But there's not a ripe dispute for 20 you now. We're just thinking ahead. Should we not be able to reach an agreement, is there a preferred way to bring it to 21 22 your attention? Perhaps letter briefs would be appropriate. 23 don't know that it would really require an in-person argument. THE COURT: Right. Well, maybe a joint letter brief 24 25 with a point counterpoint.

MR. HOWARD: That would be fine with us, Your Honor. 1 I mean, I hope -- is this ever going to 2 THE COURT: wind down, my fabulous role in all of this? 3 MR. HOWARD: I think you may be nearing the end of 4 5 your intense involvement. THE COURT: I seem to have lost all my braincells. 6 7 I'm a little concerned about that. 8 (Laughter) THE COURT: This will be a warning to you, I 9 think --10 11 MR. HOWARD: I'm not going to tell you --THE COURT: -- of not coming back. 12 13 MR. HOWARD: I'm not going to make any promises, 14 Your Honor, because we are on the record, but we'll do our 15 best. 16 THE COURT: So, you know, I think --17 MR. McDONELL: Well, Your Honor, there are issues 18 that came up between the last time we saw Your Honor in a joint 19 discovery conference statement and the close of discovery that 20 we don't believe could have been raised in any of these 21 motions. We're still evaluating those. We hope we won't need 22 to bring them to Your Honor. We'll try again to resolve them 23 with counsel, but it's within the norm of possibility. THE COURT: Well, I hope so. I know Judge Hamilton 24 25 is fond of explaining it. The judicial well is not bottomless.

I seem to be --1 MR. HOWARD: Well, we have our own issues, 2 Your Honor. I've identified one of them. Your Honor didn't 3 indicate a lot of enthusiasm for a brief from us on the issue 4 of changing the -- what they've said about fixes. 5 For the record, though, I think I just need to 6 7 confirm it's a similar list of issues that we have. Your Honor is not inclined to entertain that. If we want to raise that, 8 that would be something we raise with Judge Hamilton it sounds 9 10 to me. 11 THE COURT: I don't remember what you're talking 12 about. 13 MR. HOWARD: I was just trying to put our 14 counterpoint on the record. I know it's been a long day. We have issues as well. Maybe that's all I need to say. I had 15 identified one earlier. 16 THE COURT: I think it's more than enough. 17 18 MR. HOWARD: Submitted, Your Honor. 19 MR. McDONELL: I think that concludes it from the 20 defendants' point of view, Your Honor. Thank you, Your Honor. 21 ALL: 22 (Proceedings adjourned at 3:56 p.m.) 23 24

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, KELLY BRYCE, Court Reporter for the United States

Court, Northern District of California, hereby certify that the

foregoing proceedings in C 07-1658 PJH (EDL), Oracle USA, Inc.;

et al. versus SAP AG, et al., were reported by me, a shorthand

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Kelly Bryce

Thursday, January 28, 2010