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21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 22 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
 23 OAKLAND DIVISION

23 ORACLE USA, INC., *et al.*,
 24 Plaintiffs,
 25 v.
 26 SAP AG, *et al.*,
 27 Defendants.

No. 07-CV-01658 PJH (EDL)

**NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION
 NO. 4: TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY
 OF DEFENDANTS' EXPERT
 DONALD REIFER**

Date: September 30, 2010
 Time: 9 a.m.
 Place: Courtroom 3
 Judge: Hon. Phyllis J. Hamilton

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1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on September 30, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., in the courtroom of
2 the Honorable Phyllis J. Hamilton, of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiffs Oracle USA, Inc.,
3 Oracle International Corporation, Oracle EMEA Limited, and Siebel Systems, Inc. (collectively,
4 “Oracle”) shall and hereby do move for an order excluding opinions and testimony of Donald
5 Reifer, (“Reifer”) designated by Defendants SAP AG, SAP America, Inc., and TomorrowNow,
6 Inc. (“SAP TN”) (collectively “Defendants”) as an expert witness in this matter, on the grounds
7 that Reifer’s proposed expert opinion testimony is inadmissible on the basis of the authorities
8 and evidence set forth herein and in the accompanying declarations.

9 **I. INTRODUCTION AND RELIEF REQUESTED**

10 Oracle’s expert, Paul C. Pinto, has estimated the amount that SAP would have spent to
11 develop software of similar functionality to what it infringed here. Pinto’s estimation of what
12 SAP would have spent to avoid infringement, along with his opinions (based on his real world
13 experience) about the considerations of avoided time delay and avoided risk, are part of the
14 “build” analysis portion of the classic “buy vs. build” decision that companies consider every
15 day to determine whether to license software or whether to develop a non-infringing solution
16 themselves. As the evidence will show, any reasonable party in a license negotiation,
17 hypothetical or not, would consider this trade-off.

18 To estimate what SAP would have spent, Pinto uses principles and methodologies from
19 two different cost estimation fields – function point and Constructive Cost Modeling
20 (“COCOMO”) – but tempers both with his own real-world experience. In an effort to rebut
21 Pinto’s analyses applying the COCOMO model, Defendants offer the opinions and testimony of
22 Donald Reifer. Like most of Defendants’ experts, Reifer conducted no independent analysis and
23 offers no affirmative, standalone opinions of his own. Instead, he limits himself to a critique of
24 aspects of Pinto’s application of the COCOMO methodology. Even in this unambitious effort,
25 Reifer fails to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as well as *Daubert*
26 *v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and its progeny. Accordingly,
27 specific opinions by Reifer, summarized below, should be excluded.

28 Pinto’s COCOMO analysis properly begins by figuring out how large the development

1 project is, by counting the total number of Source Lines of Code (“SLOC”) in the software at
2 issue. Given that the software programs at issue contain millions of lines of code, developers use
3 automated tools called code counters to count the SLOC. Pinto developed code counters that he
4 used to count the lines of code in software at issue in this case, disclosed the results of those
5 counts, and produced the counters themselves so that Defendants could repeat and confirm his
6 results.

7 Reifer opines that Pinto’s code counters are defective and count too many lines of code,
8 and as a result overestimate development costs. But he reaches that conclusion without (a)
9 having ever used Pinto’s code counters, or (b) having ever tried to count all the lines of code in
10 the software products at issue. In short, Reifer could not figure out how to use Pinto’s code
11 counters. Instead of asking for help, at the last minute he asked a graduate student, Tom Tan, to
12 create “replicas” of Pinto’s code counters. Reifer then applied the replicas to non-representative
13 sample of JD Edwards software and concluded that the “*replicas*” over-counted the lines of Java
14 software code by about 9.5%, and the C software code by 14.5%. On that basis alone, Reifer
15 then decided that Tan’s “replicas” were defective as code counters, and further assumed that
16 Pinto’s code counters – which Reifer and Tan never actually used to count even a single line of
17 code – suffered from the same defects. From these conjectures – they cannot be called premises
18 – Reifer concludes that all of Pinto’s Java SLOC counts are overstated by 9.5% and all of his C
19 SLOC counts are overstated by 14.5%.

20 Reifer’s errors are fundamental, elementary, and place his proffered testimony well
21 outside the range of permissible expert opinion. Neither Reifer, nor any witness relying on
22 Reifer, should be permitted to offer any testimony or evidence that Pinto’s estimates of SLOC
23 counts are incorrect.

24 **II. LEGAL STANDARD**

25 The party proffering an expert opinion has to demonstrate it meets the Rule 702
26 admissibility standards by a “preponderance of proof.” *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc.*,
27 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); *Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir.
28 1996). Fed. R. Evid. 702 provides:

1 If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist
2 the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
3 issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
4 experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of
5 an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
6 sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
7 principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
8 principles and method reliably to the facts of the case.

9 Fed. R. Evid. 702. Reifer's opinions fail to meet these three requirements.

10 Further, "[w]hen an expert opinion is not supported by sufficient facts to validate it in the
11 eyes of the law, or when indisputable record facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion
12 unreasonable, it cannot support a jury's verdict." *In re Citric Acid Litigation*, 191 F.3d 1090,
13 1102 (9th Cir. 1999), citing *Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 509 U.S.
14 209, 242 (1993). In such a case, the Court must exclude the testimony of the expert that failed to
15 meet the standard for admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence and Supreme Court
16 precedent. *See also DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., Ltd.*, 296 F.Supp.2d 1140, 1157-58 (N.D.
17 Cal. 2003) (excluding damages expert testimony in part because expert failed to consider
18 relevant facts), *aff'd on other grounds*, 471 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006); *QR Spex, Inc. v.*
19 *Motorola*, 2004 WL 5642907, at *9 (C.D. Cal.) (excluding expert report and opinion where
20 expert did not review relevant underlying evidence).

21 **III. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

22 **A. Paul C. Pinto's Expert Opinion on the Amounts SAP Would 23 Have Spent to Develop Similar Software**

24 On November 16, 2009, Oracle expert Paul C. Pinto served his expert report in this
25 matter, which contained his affirmative expert opinions and analysis, including estimates of the
26 amounts that it would have cost Defendants to independently develop software similar to the
27 Oracle software that they instead accessed, took, and used. *See Alinder Decl., Ex. C (Pinto
28 Report)* at 1. Pinto has worked in the field of software development for 24 years. *Id.* at 3 &
Attachment A. He has been a senior software executive at software companies that compete
directly with Oracle and SAP. *Id.* He has also worked at software firms to develop software
development cost estimates, bid on those projects, and then deliver on those bids by building the

1 actual software. *See id.*, Ex. D (Pinto Depo.) at 112:24-113:16.

2 Over the course of his career, Pinto has personally been involved with conducting at least
3 100 software estimating efforts, applying a variety of estimating models and techniques,
4 including at least 50 software development estimating projects using COCOMO analysis. *Id.* at
5 109:14-110:20; 226:3-25. COCOMO is a software cost estimation model that uses regression
6 formulas, coupled with parameters that were derived from historical project characteristics.
7 Alinder Decl., Ex. C (Pinto Report) at 34-35. The model was originally published in 1981 as a
8 method for estimating the level of effort, project duration, and costs associated with developing
9 software. *Id.* COCOMO estimates the software development effort as a function of a limited set
10 of “scaling drivers” that describe the development process, and a set of “cost drivers” that
11 include subjective assessments about the product, platform, personnel, and project attributes. *Id.*
12 at 35. For this case, Pinto used a particular version of COCOMO, called COCOMO II 1997, that
13 he has used frequently in his professional work and which he has found to be the most accurate
14 version of the model for calculating software development costs in circumstances such as those
15 present in this case. Alinder Decl., Ex. D (Pinto Depo.) at 112:8-114:6.

16 One input into the COCOMO model is the number of SLOC. Accordingly, as an initial
17 step in the COCOMO analysis, Pinto counted the source lines of code for two of the software
18 products at issue, JD Edwards Enterprise One, Version 8.12, and PeopleSoft, Version 8.X.
19 Alinder Decl., Ex. C (Pinto Report) at 16-17. Given that the software programs at issue contain
20 millions of lines of code, software developers use automated tools called code counters to count
21 the SLOC. The process of counting source lines of code is simple in some respects, but still
22 requires a certain amount of nuance and familiarity with the underlying software development
23 language. *See id.* at 15-16. Each such language has rules for constructing its source code, in the
24 same way that the English language has rules for constructing statements and sentences. *Id.*
25 These software coding rules, or standards, enable software utilities to be built that can distinguish
26 the different rules, and thus, count the lines of code. *Id.*

27 Pinto constructed software utilities (“code counters”) that counted the logical Source
28 Lines of Code in particular enterprise application products. Pinto specifically designed and

1 tailored each line counting utility to address the specific needs of each type of source code that
2 he analyzed (*e.g.*, COBOL, C, SQL, SQR, etc.). *Id.* at 16. These code counting utilities were
3 produced to Defendants so that they could replicate and confirm Pinto’s analyses. *See* Alinder
4 Decl., Ex. B (Reifer Depo.) at 125:14-127:1.

5 Pinto then applied his code counters to JD Edwards Enterprise One, Version 8.12, and
6 PeopleSoft, Version 8.X, in order to count the SLOC as the foundation for estimating software
7 size. These analyses yielded 7,774,791 SLOC for JD Edwards Enterprise One, and 7,650,493
8 SLOC for PeopleSoft. *See* Alinder Decl., Ex. C (Pinto Report) at 17. Pinto then applied
9 COCOMO’s scaling and cost factors to derive an estimated cost of development. *See id.* at 34-
10 39.

11 **B. Donald Reifer’s Rebuttal Expert Report to Pinto**

12 Defendants chose not to offer affirmative expert reports on these topics, but on March 26,
13 2010, served the expert report of Donald Reifer in rebuttal to Pinto. *See* Alinder Decl., Ex. A
14 (Reifer Report) at 1. Reifer purports to be a COCOMO expert, and criticizes parts of Pinto’s
15 COCOMO analysis with which he disagrees. *See id.* at 3-6.

16 Of particular relevance here, Reifer criticizes Pinto’s SLOC counts, arguing that they are
17 overstated. *See id.* at 18-22. Reifer has no factual basis for this opinion. Reifer did not perform
18 his own code counts on the Oracle software that Pinto analyzed, nor did he analyze the actual
19 code counters that Pinto developed and disclosed. Instead, Reifer testified that he received
20 Pinto’s code counters in the form of .exe files and text files, but that he was unable to get those
21 utilities to run. Alinder Decl., Ex. B (Reifer Depo.) at 127:9-128:15; 129:12:-130:12). Reifer
22 never asked defense counsel for technical assistance with the counters, and neither Reifer nor
23 defense counsel ever contacted Oracle or Pinto to seek assistance with the code counters, or to
24 try to understand whether Reifer was making mistakes that prevented him from running those
25 counters. *Id.* at 143:23-144:15.

26 Instead of analyzing and testing Pinto’s code counters, some time after mid-February,
27 2010, Reifer asked a graduate student, named Tom Tan, to create “replicas” of Pinto’s counters,
28 relying on descriptions of the parameters that Pinto had also produced in discovery. *Id.* at 127:9-

1 128:15; 129:12:-130:12; 137:6-22; 138:11-139:4 & 143:12-144:1). Reifer did not develop the
2 “replica” code counters himself and in fact has *never* developed a code counter from scratch. *Id.*
3 at 130:18-24. Reifer also did not perform the software runs with the “replica” utility – Tan did
4 that, too. *Id.* at 137:18-22.

5 Reifer then purported to “test” the accuracy of the “replica” code counter built by his
6 graduate student assistant Tan.¹ He did so by selecting just five² routines from the JD Edwards
7 Enterprise One application, two using Java code and three using C code. Alinder Decl., Ex. A
8 (Reifer Report) at 19-20. For each, Reifer counted the lines of code with Tan’s “replicas,”
9 counted the lines of code with a free code counter developed by the University of Southern
10 California and modified by Tan for use in this case, and then compared the results. *Id.* at 18-22,
11 33, 62. According to Reifer, when he performed this perfunctory analysis, Tan’s “replicas”
12 yielded 95 Java source lines of code and the USC counter yielded 86 Java source lines of code, a
13 difference of 9.5%. *Id.* at 19-22. Reifer then presumed that this disparity between Tan’s *replica*
14 and the USC code counter – *nine lines of code* in a non-random sample that represented one
15 one-hundredth of one percent (0.01%) of the 868,623 lines of Java code in JD Edwards
16 Enterprise One – established that *Pinto’s code counters* systematically overstated Java lines of
17 code by 9.5%. Alinder Decl., Ex. C (Pinto Report) at 17; *id.* Ex. A (Reifer Report) at 33, 57, 62.
18 Again, Reifer reached this expert opinion without ever loading, much less running, much less

19
20 ¹ Reifer’s first “test” was to apply the so-called “replica” code counters to a public domain, open
21 source flight simulator program called FlightGear. Alinder Decl., Ex. A (Reifer Report) at 18-
22 19. He then applied a free code counter developed by the University of Southern California to
23 the same flight simulator program, and compared the results. *Id.* At his deposition, Reifer was
24 unable to explain why he used FlightGear, which is not an enterprise software application, other
25 than the fact that he was familiar with it. *See* Alinder Decl. Ex. B (Reifer Depo.) at 154:7-155:9.
26 In addition, Reifer admitted that Pinto’s counters were never intended to count lines of code in
27 the C++ programming language, which is one of the languages used by FlightGear, but not JD
28 Edwards. Alinder Decl., Ex. B (Reifer Depo.) at 154:7-156:13. When questioned about his
analyses using FlightGear, Reifer admitted that those analyses and experiments were not relevant
to his opinions in this case. *Id.* at 150:13-24 (“So the experiment was not germane to anything in
my report.”).

² Pinto had determined that the JD Edwards Enterprise One application consisted of 38.634
separate programs (10.163 of which were in Java, with the remainder in C code). Alinder Decl.,
Ex. C (Pinto Report) at 15.

1 using, Pinto’s counters, and without even trying to count 99.99% of the lines of Java code in JD
2 Edwards Enterprise One.

3 Reifer and Tan repeated this exercise with the C code in JD Edwards Enterprise One, this
4 time applying the counters to a larger (though not random) sample of code and concluding that
5 Tan’s “replicas” over-counted the C code by 14.5%. Alinder Decl., Ex. A (Reifer Report) at 22,
6 33. Although Reifer and Tan still did not use Pinto’s actual code counters, or even try to count
7 more than 86% of the C code in JD Edwards Enterprise One, Reifer once again concludes that
8 Pinto’s counters systematically over-counted the number of lines of C code by 14.5%. *Id.*

9 Having conveniently attributed the defects in Tan’s “replica” code counters to Pinto,
10 Reifer then purports to correct the supposed error by reducing the size of the development
11 project, and by extension its cost. *See id.* at 86-87.

12 C. Pinto’s Analysis of Reifer’s Errors

13 After receiving Reifer’s report, Pinto compared the output of Reifer’s graduate assistant’s
14 “replicas” with the output of the actual code counters that Pinto had used. That comparison
15 demonstrates that the “replicas” were not replicas at all, but rather distorted and inaccurate
16 substitutes for what Pinto did. *See Alinder Decl., Ex. E (Pinto Rebuttal Notes) at 1-3.* The
17 “replicas” systematically produce SLOC counts that are considerably higher than Pinto’s actual
18 results. *See id.; see also Alinder Decl., Ex. D (Pinto Depo.) at 306:24-311:10.* Indeed, Pinto’s
19 real counters yield counts that are lower than the benchmark USC counters preferred by Reifer.
20 *See Alinder Decl., Ex. E (Pinto Rebuttal Notes) at 1-3.* Only by replacing Pinto’s code counting
21 utility with his own inaccurate version was Reifer able to create the illusion of an error by Pinto.

22 IV. ARGUMENT

23 A. Reifer’s Opinions and Testimony Regarding the Accuracy of 24 Pinto’s Source Lines of Code Counts Must Be Excluded

25 Defendants cannot carry their burden under the *Daubert* standard because Reifer’s
26 critique of Pinto’s code counts fails almost every element of Rule 702.

27 First, Reifer is not “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
28 education,” *see Fed. R. Evid. 702*, in the development of code counters. Prior to this case, he

1 had never built a code counter from scratch, and at the conclusion of this case, he still will never
2 have done so. *See* Alinder Decl., Ex. B (Reifer Depo.) at 130:18-24: Reifer simply has no
3 expert qualifications that would permit him to opine on the accuracy of Pinto’s code counters by
4 relying on a so-called replica that he also neither created nor has the expertise to create. *See*,
5 *e.g.*, *United States v. Chang*, 207 F.3d 1169, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2000) (expert “qualified” in one
6 topic excluded from testifying on topic where didn’t have expertise); *United States v. Cook*, 261
7 Fed. Appx. 52, 54 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); *Salinas v. Amteck of Kentucky, Inc.*, 682 F.Supp.2d
8 1022, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (rejecting opinions on warnings by proffered expert who had no
9 “professional training or expert qualifications to opine on the formulation or design of warning
10 or safety labels” and had never “investigated a case with similar facts” and never “testified as a
11 warnings expert”); *Redfoot v. B. F. Ascher & Company*, 2007 WL 1593239, at *10-11 (N.D.
12 Cal.) (Hamilton, J.) (rejecting testimony on medical subjects and conclusions of what caused
13 victim’s autism for which expert had neither training nor qualifications to opine).

14 Second, Reifer’s opinions will not assist the jury as the trier of fact. “The ‘will assist’
15 requirement, under *Daubert*, ‘goes primarily to relevance.’” *Primiano v. Cook*, 2010 WL
16 1660303, at *6 (9th Cir.) (quoting *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 591). Reifer simply did not analyze
17 what Pinto actually did. He analyzed what his own graduate student assistant, Tan, did. As a
18 result, Reifer may have damning testimony to offer against Tan’s SLOC counts, but he has
19 nothing useful to say about Pinto’s.

20 Third, Reifer’s opinion has no basis in fact, *see* Fed. R. Evid 702, because – again –
21 Reifer simply did not analyze what Pinto actually did. There is no more fundamental error than
22 an expert analysis of the wrong thing. *See, e.g.*, *Andrews v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co.*,
23 447 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 2006) (expert testimony excluded under *Daubert* because expert
24 based his calculations on data from the wrong highway ramp). Reifer’s attacks on Pinto have no
25 factual basis, and must be excluded. *See Guidroz-Brault v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co.*, 254 F.3d 825,
26 830-31 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming exclusion of multiple experts because conclusions based on
27 factually unsupported assumptions); *Nuveen Quality Income Mun. Fund Inc. v. Prudential Equity*
28 *Group, LLC*, 262 Fed. Appx. 822, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2008) (“An expert opinion is properly

