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4	UNITED STATES DI	STRICT COURT
5	NORTHERN DISTRICT	OF CALIFORNIA
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7	THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,	) Case No. 0
8	Plaintiff,	Related ca: 07-5800 SC
9	V.	07-6045 SC 08-2268 SC
10	JOHN JOSEPH COTA; REGAL STONE	08-5096 SC 08-5098 SC
11	LIMITED, FLEET MANAGEMENT, LTD.; and the M/V COSCO BUSAN, LR/IMO	09-1469 SC
12	Ship No. 9231743, her engines, apparel, electronics, tackle,	ORDER REQUI Supplement
13	boats, appurtenances, etc., <u>in</u> <u>rem</u> ,	)
14	Defendants.	) )
15 16	REGAL STONE LIMITED and FLEET MANAGEMENT, LTD.,	) ) )
17	Counterclaimants,	)
18	V.	) )
19	THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY,	) )
20	Counterdefendant.	) )
21		) )
22	REGAL STONE LIMITED and FLEET MANAGEMENT, LTD.,	) )
23	Cross-Complainants,	) )
24	v.	) )
25	JOHN JOSEPH COTA,	) )
26	Cross-Defendant.	) )
27		
28	1	

ase No. 08-2052 SC elated cases:

7-5800 SC 7-6045 SC 8-2268 SC 8-5096 SC 8-5098 SC 9-1469 SC

RDER REQUIRING UPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

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1
     REGAL STONE LIMITED and FLEET
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     MANAGEMENT, LTD.,
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                Third-Party Plaintiffs,
 4
          v.
 5
     THE SAN FRANCISCO BAR PILOTS and
     THE SAN FRANCISCO BAR PILOTS
 6
     BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE
     ASSOCIATION,
 7
                Third-Party Defendants.
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This matter comes before the Court on the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff and Counterdefendant Continental Insurance Company ("Continental") and Cross-Defendant John Joseph Cota ("Cota"). Docket Nos. 90 ("Continental's MPSJ"), 93 ("Cota's MPSJ"). Defendants, Counterclaimants, and Cross-Defendants Regal Stone Limited ("Regal Stone") and Fleet Management, Ltd., ("Fleet") filed an Opposition. Docket No. 97. Continental and Cota submitted replies. Docket Nos. 102 ("Continental's Reply"), 104 ("Cota's Reply").

Continental and Cota moved for partial summary judgment on the question of whether California Harbors and Navigation Code section 1198 ("section 1198") is preempted by federal maritime law. Continental's MPSJ at 1; Cota's MPSJ at 1. If section 1198

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> California Harbors and Navigation Code section 1198(c) states, in part:

Every vessel, owner, operator, or demise or bareboat charterer hiring a pilot with a state license for the Bays of San Francisco, San Pablo, and Suisun shall either defend, indemnify, and hold harmless pilots pursuant to paragraph (1), or alternatively, notify pilots of an

is not preempted, then the Court can strike the Second Affirmative Defense in the Answer filed by Regal Stone and Fleet, <u>see</u> Docket No. 26 ("Answer") ¶ 64, and the Court can enter judgment against Regal Stone and Fleet on their first claim for relief in their Counterclaim, Cross-Claim and Third-Party Complaint, <u>see</u> Docket No. 27 ("Countercl.") ¶¶ 25-29.

In response, Regal Stone and Fleet Management contend that section 1198 does not apply to them. Opp'n at 9-15. Some of the arguments in support of this contention are without merit. Regal Stone and Fleet argue that section 1198 does not apply to them if Cota and/or the San Francisco Bar Pilots Association ("Bar Pilots") engaged in willful misconduct. Id. at 9-10. This argument makes no sense. Section 1198(c)(1)(C) provides that "the obligation to defend, indemnify and hold harmless the pilot . . . shall not apply in cases of willful misconduct." Cal. Harbors & Navigation Code § 1198(c)(1)(C). Hence, if there was willful misconduct, Regal Stone and Fleet would be relying on the statute to avoid the obligation to defend or indemnify Cota.

Regal Stone and Fleet argue that section 1198 does not apply because the Bar Pilots passed on to their customers the cost of

intent to pay for trip insurance pursuant to paragraph (2). If a vessel or its owner, operator, or demise or bareboat charterer does not provide written notice pursuant to paragraph (2) of an intent to exercise the trip insurance option, then the vessel and its owner, operator, and demise or bareboat charterer will be deemed to have elected the obligation to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless pilots pursuant to paragraph (1).

liability insurance in their pilotage rates. Opp'n at 13. Here, again, Regal Stone and Fleet are relying on the provisions of section 1198. They are arguing that the Bar Pilots violated section 1198, not that section 1198 does not apply.

Regal Stone and Fleet make one other argument in support of their contention that section 1198 does not apply, and this argument has more merit. Regal Stone and Fleet allege that Hanjin Shipping Company ("Hanjin"), the time charterer, hired Cota to pilot the COSCO BUSAN. Opp'n at 11. Section 1198(c) states that "[e]very vessel, owner, operator, or demise or bareboat charterer hiring a pilot with a state license for the Bay[] of San Francisco . . . shall . . . defend, indemnify, or hold harmless pilots." Cal. Harbors & Navigation Code § 1198(c).

Here, at the time of the allision, Regal Stone was the owner of the COSCO BUSAN. Kennedy Decl. ¶ 2.2 Fleet provided the crew and technical management of the vessel. Id. ¶ 6. Hanjin was the time charterer. Rajvanshy Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.3 Regal Stone and Fleet allege that they did not hire Cota, and that Hanjin was responsible for proving and paying for pilotage of the COSCO BUSAN. Opp'n at 10-11. Regal Stone and Fleet allege Hanjin was not their agent, and that they did not give Hanjin authority to waive the purchase of trip insurance, or to agree on their behalf

<sup>24 2</sup> Kevin Kennedy, a Director of Regal Stone, filed a declaration in support of Regal Stone and Fleet's Opposition to the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Docket No. 99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Kishore Rajvanshy, the Managing Director for Fleet, filed a declaration in support of Regal Stone and Fleet's Opposition to the Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. Docket No. 98.

to defend and indemnify Cota and/or the Bar Pilots. Opp'n at 11; Kennedy Decl. ¶ 11; Rajvanshy Decl. ¶ 6. Case law suggests time charterers are not the agents of vessel owners when contracting for the services of a pilot. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. The Sea Scout, 164 F. Supp. 701, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1958) aff'd sub. nom. States Marine Corp. of Del. v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 272 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1959).

The Court acknowledges that there are countervailing considerations. Even though the time charter states Hanjin will provide and pay for pilots, Kennedy Decl. ¶ 9, it also states "[t]he owners to remain responsible for . . . acts of pilots," id. ¶ 10. Also, even if the time charterer hired the pilot, this might still count as a situation where the "vessel" hired a pilot.

Nevertheless, the Court needs more information before it can determine if section 1198 applies to Regal Stone and Fleet.

Continental points out that Regal Stone and Fleet's argument creates "a scheme by which a foreign vessel owner can escape responsibility for complying with section 1198 - simply by never actually permitting the owner to hire the pilot." Continental's Reply at 4-5. This point is a good one, but it does not address the fact that the plain language of section 1198(c) does not include a situation where the time charterer hires the pilot.

Continental dismisses Regal Stone and Fleet's argument as simply not relevant to whether section 1198 is preempted. Id. at 5.

Similarly, Cota contends that "[a]s a matter of logic and law, the first and primary issue is the one of preemption." Cota's Reply at 3. However, if section 1198(c) does not apply to Regal Stone

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and Fleet, then the Court does not need to reach the preemption issue.<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the Court requires the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing Regal Stone and Fleet's argument that section 1198(c) does not apply to them because Hanjin hired Cota.

Based on the above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

- 1. The stay on discovery is lifted for the limited purpose of determining whether section 1198(c) applies to Regal Stone and Fleet. The parties to this action shall have forty-five (45) days from the date of this Order to conduct such discovery.
- 2. The Court requires the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether section 1198(c) applies to Regal Stone and Fleet. Continental and Cota may file separate briefs not to exceed ten (10) pages each.

  Regal Stone and Fleet may file a joint opposition to the briefs not to exceed twenty (20) pages. Continental and Cota may file separate replies not to exceed five (5) pages. The Court will hold a hearing on the question on December 18, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 1, on the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Court also takes note of the "fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requir[ing] that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them." Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988). While the Ninth Circuit does not view preemption questions as raising constitutional issues of substance, Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Comm'n, 676 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1982), the doctrine of constitutional avoidance supports the Court's desire not to reach the preemption question until it is satisfied section 1198(c) applies to Regal Stone and Fleet.

1		17th floor, U.S. Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San
2		Francisco, CA 94102. The briefs, opposition, and
3		replies must be filed in accordance with Civil Local
4		Rules 7-2 and 7-3.
5	3.	If the Court determines that section 1198(c) does apply
6		to Regal Stone and Fleet, then it will set a new hearing
7		date for Continental's and Cota's Motions for Partial
8		Summary Judgment. There will be no further briefing on
9		the question of whether section 1198 is preempted by
10		federal maritime law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 21, 2009

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE