

Plaintiff's description of the proposed additional claim in his request to amend does not 2 make sense and the proposed amended complaint adds little to clarify the nature of the claim. 3 The court thus must hypothesize what it is that plaintiff may be attempting to allege. There appear to be three possibilities: a claim for a violation of the state regulation, a claim that other 4 5 M.I.M. publications might be confiscated in the future, or a claim that M.I.M. Theory No. 8 6 cannot be confiscated on an individualized basis.

7 To the extent plaintiff means to contend that the confiscation of M.I.M. Theory No. 8 8 violates a particular state regulation, the confiscation of the publication did not violate the 9 regulations because the regulations do not purport to be an exhaustive list of contraband. See 15 10 Cal. Code Regs. § 3000 (defining "contraband" as anything not permitted), § 3006(d) (non-11 contraband may be confiscated under certain circumstances). Even assuming that the 12 confiscation did violate the regulations and that a cause of action exists for such a regulatory 13 violation, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such a claim. The court 14 has by separate order granted summary judgment in defendant's favor on the § 1983 claim that 15 gives this court federal question jurisdiction, and the court declines to exercise supplemental 16 jurisdiction over any state law claim that plaintiff might be able to allege if he further amended. 17 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (court may decline 18 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims under 1367(c)(3) once it has 19 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction). Plaintiff may pursue any state law 20 claim in state court.

21 To the extent that plaintiff is trying to assert a claim that other M.I.M. publications might 22 be confiscated in the future now that the complete ban on M.I.M. publications has been lifted, 23 such a claim is not ripe. Plaintiff has not alleged that any particular publication has been 24 disallowed since the policy was changed. And he has not alleged how defendant would have 25 liability for such an indvidualized determination that an unspecified publication should not be 26 delivered to plaintiff at some point in the future.

27 To the extent that plaintiff is trying to assert that M.I.M. Theory No. 8 may not be 28 confiscated on an individualized basis now that the complete ban on M.I.M. publications has

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been lifted, the court determined in the order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment
that the disallowance of M.I.M. Theory No. 8 passed muster under the test in <u>Turner v. Safley</u>,
482 U.S. 78 (1987).

Allowing the proposed amended complaint (or allowing plaintiff to further amend to explain which of these several alternatives he actually is trying to articulate) would be an exercise in futility for the reasons just described. Accordingly, the request to amend is DENIED. (Docket # 58.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9 Dated: June 29, 2009

SUSAN ILLSTON United States District Judge

For the Northern District of California **United States District Court**