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statutes regulating commercial emails; in particular, the Court found plaintiffs failed to allege they had incurred an injury or injuries as a result of defendant's alleged false statements. Alternatively, the Court found that if, as plaintiffs had argued, § 7707(b)(1) does not itself preempt a claim under § 17529.5(a), plaintiffs nevertheless were required to allege they had incurred an injury caused by a violation of § 17529.5(a) in order to have standing to assert claims thereunder. Consequently, the Court dismissed the complaint, but afforded plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC").

In their supplemental brief in support of their motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs "agree that they must allege injury to have Article III standing" (see Pls.' Supp. Brief at 1:11), but argue that the filing of a SAC is unnecessary because the Court can infer from the FAC that each plaintiff was injured by the email(s) he or she allegedly received from defendant and that such injury was casually related to defendant's alleged violations of § 17529.5(a). Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, however, the Court finds such inferences cannot fairly be drawn from the FAC. The FAC includes no implicit allegation, for example, that any plaintiff expended any appreciable amount of time to read and then delete the email(s); indeed, the FAC is completely silent as to whether any plaintiff even opened the subject email(s). Moreover, with respect to plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, the FAC does not include sufficient factual allegations from which it can be reasonably inferred that any plaintiff is subject to a "real and immediate threat of repeated injury" by defendant. See, e.g., D'Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1036-39 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding, for purposes of standing in "context of a suit for injunctive relief," to satisfy Lujan's requirement of "actual or imminent" injury, plaintiff "must establish a real and immediate threat of repeated injury") (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.

As defendant has not shown further amendment would be futile, and as it appears plaintiffs may be able to amend to allege a cognizable injury or injuries, plaintiffs are hereby afforded leave to file a Second Amended Complaint no later than May 29, 2009.

Finally, because the pleadings remain unsettled, the Court hereby CONTINUES the

Case Management Conference from May 22, 2009 to July 10, 2009. A Joint Case Management Statement shall be filed no later than July 2, 2009.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 14, 2009

MAXINE M. CHESNEY United States District Judge