

whether defense counsel read portions or merely "pretended to read" (Br. 2). What is clear is that the personnel record was not admitted into evidence, marked as an exhibit, or shown to the jury. It is tenuous to claim that the personnel record has entered the public record.

As the previous order denying plaintiffs' motion to seal indicated (*see* Dkt. No. 238), plaintiffs must present "compelling reasons" to justify sealing court records. *Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu*, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs contend that Expert Clark has an overriding privacy interest in his personnel record and that defense counsel's purpose in questioning Clark — to preclude him from again testifying effectively as a police practices expert — was improper. Even assuming *arguendo* that some contents of the personnel record have bled into the public record, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing how these interests outweigh the public interest in access.

Holding himself out as an expert witness, Expert Clark has no privacy right not to be asked pointed questions during cross examination. Yes, it is possible that in the future Expert Clark will be impeached in some other litigation with the answers given in our trial. This, however, goes with the territory of being an expert witness for hire. The particular answers given here were not so far afield to warrant the extreme relief sought by this motion. In future trials, the trial judge therein can rule on motions in limine to restrict any counsel from referencing the testimony given in our trial. That judge will be in a much better position to see the potential role of the testimony.

The hearing set for October 7, 2010, at 8:00 a.m. is hereby VACATED. Two
motions now having been made, plaintiffs may make no further motions to seal this
testimony.

Dated: September 14, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE