24

25

26

27

28

E-Filed 6/24/11 1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., No. C 09-1964 RS Plaintiffs, **ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S** MOTION TO STAY, MODIFYING SCHEDULE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Defendant.

The parties have filed competing motions. Plaintiffs request a stay of all litigation (save defendant's deadline to exchange its rebuttal expert reports) pending resolution of a regulatory complaint recently filed before the Postal Regulatory Commission ("PRC"). Defendants oppose a stay, and argue that fairness and efficiency require that the case continue to summary judgment and, if need be, trial. They do, however, request a modification of the dispositive motion hearing date so that the *filing* date will fall after defendants receive certain discovery materials. Although plaintiffs request to stay the entire matter, they nonetheless oppose moving out the dispositive motion deadline.

A court may in its discretion stay proceedings in appropriate circumstances. Generally, a court looks to three factors: (1) whether a stay would unduly prejudice or present a clear tactical disadvantage to the nonmoving party; (2) whether a stay will simplify the issues in question and trial No. C 09-1964 RS

ORDER

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the case; and (3) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set. See, e.g., In re Cygnus Telecom. Tech., LLC Patent Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (W.D. N.Y. 1999); ASCII Corp. v. STD Entm't USA, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1378, 1380 (N.D. Cal. 1994)).

A stay is not warranted here. The Postal Service argues, as an initial matter, that it will be unduly prejudiced by waiting for a resolution of the PRC complaint. The Postal Service complains that after two years of expensive discovery (and vigorous discovery battles), it is ready to challenge plaintiff's constitutional claims, to test plaintiff's evidentiary presentation, and to resolve the case at either summary judgment or trial. Defendants argue, in other words, that they also have a right to their respective "day in court" to defend against plaintiff's (apparently widely publicized) allegations.

Moreover, even plaintiffs agree that their regulatory claims filed before the PRC are separate and distinct from those constitutional claims that make up this litigation. Indeed, in the summer of 2009, defendants moved to dismiss the instant complaint and argued that, even if plaintiffs had stated viable constitutional claims, it would make sense to defer resolution until plaintiffs first sought relief through the PRC's administrative channels. Plaintiffs successfully defended against that motion by disavowing that theirs were regulatory claims, or claims that depended on resolution of hypothetical regulatory claims. As a matter of fairness, it is difficult to ignore plaintiffs' complete reversal of position. Two years ago, they insisted that deferral or delay of this litigation pending a regulatory proceeding in the PRC would add little but in turn prejudice the individuals plaintiffs represent by delaying relief. They now essentially argue the opposite: that a regulatory proceeding will at least "help" matters in this litigation enough to warrant interruption roughly three months prior to their scheduled trial date. More importantly, the plaintiffs do not actually argue that resolution of the regulatory complaint will "simplify" the substantive issues in question. Plaintiffs contend the matter would be simplified not because the constitutional claims depend or are informed by the regulatory ones, but because plaintiffs promise they will be so "satisfied" with a favorable PRC decision that they will voluntarily drop their constitutional claims. Given the major reversal No. C 09-1964 RS

ORDER

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

behind plaintiffs' stay request, plaintiffs should not be surprised if the Court receives this new promise with some skepticism.

Finally, discovery is nearly complete and a trial date was long ago set. In other words, the competing considerations with which this Court is tasked do not warrant the stay requested. That said, a compromise of sorts regarding scheduling is perhaps in order. This Court granted, over defendants' opposition, plaintiffs a slight extension of discovery deadlines. As the Postal Service points out, the new deadlines operate such that defendant's deadline to file a motion for summary judgment falls at a point in time prior to the date on which they will receive certain documents and discovery. Accordingly, the slight extension of the dispositive motion hearing deadline defendants request is warranted. As the parties are still in the midst of varied discovery battles, and have filed myriad discovery motions, it makes sense to push the dispositive motion deadline out slightly further than requested to allow the referral judge an opportunity to address the parties' numerous filings. All dispositive motions shall be heard no later than October 13, 2011. The trial date shall be continued to January 9, 2012. The continuance of the trial date is convenient for the Court's schedule and the slight delay does indeed allow plaintiffs to pursue their regulatory complaint. Should plaintiffs prevail there, they of course remain free to voluntarily to dismiss this matter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 6/24/11

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

No. C 09-1964 RS ORDER