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6	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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, 8	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9	JERRY TRAHAN,
10	Plaintiff, No. C 09-03111 JSW
11	v. NOTICE OF QUESTIONS FOR
12	U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, HEARING
13	Defendant.
14	/
15	TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE
16	NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR THE HEARING SCHEDULED ON
17	DECEMBER 13, 2013, AT 9:00 A.M.:
18	The Court has reviewed the parties' papers and, thus, does not wish to hear the parties
19	reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to rely on authorities not
20	cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing counsel of these
21	authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at the hearing. If
22	the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the citations to the
23	authorities only, with reference to pin cites and without argument or additional briefing. Cf.
24	N.D. Civil Local Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to
25	explain their reliance on such authority. The Court suggests that associates or of counsel
26	attorneys who are
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United States District Court For the Northern District of California working on this case be permitted to address some or all of the Court's questions contained
herein.
Now that the class has been certified, is Mr. Trahan willing to enter into a binding
stipulation that the amount in controversy is less than \$5,000,000, either as to damages

or as to attorneys fees? *See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles*, – U.S. –, 133 S.Ct. 1345, at 1350 (2013) (declining to reach issue of whether a stipulation limiting attorneys' fees would be binding).

2. Does Mr. Trahan assert that the allegations in the First Amended Complaint regarding the amount in controversy, which was filed before the class was certified, are now binding? If so, on what authority does he rely to support that position?

3. Does U.S. Bank concede that a motion can put a defendant on notice that a case is or has become removable. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3); *see also Williams v. Ruan Transport Corp.*, 2013 WL 5492205 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013) (noting that motion for class certification and motion for default judgment would have put defendant on notice of class size for purposes of removal under CAFA).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 11, 2013

JEFFREY S. WHITE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE