

exclude Roto-Rooter's experts is granted in part and denied in part. Roto-Rooter's expert Kathryn L. Locatell is excluded as an expert witness. Roto-Rooter's experts Stephen M. Werner, Mark C. Hunter, and Michael Brones are not excluded as expert witnesses.

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### I. BACKGROUND

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2 On December 1, 2009, this Court issued a Case Management and Pretrial Order for Jury 3 Trial requiring all parties to serve initial expert disclosures by August 2, 2010, and rebuttal expert 4 disclosures, if any, by August 16, 2010. It is undisputed that Roto-Rooter served their initial expert 5 disclosures to Plaintiff one day late, "after the close of business on August 3, 2010." Pl.'s Mot. at 1. 6 In this August 3rd disclosure, Roto-Rooter named four experts they intended to use at trial: Stephen 7 M. Werner, Mark C. Hunter, Michael Brones and Kathryn L. Locatell. Id. It is also undisputed that 8 Roto-Rooter did not include expert reports in their August 3rd disclosure, but included deposition 9 transcripts for Werner, Hunter, and Brones. Id. at 2, 4.

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On August 16, 2010, the deadline for disclosing rebuttal experts, Roto-Rooter disclosed
Werner, Hunter, and Brones as rebuttal witnesses, and included expert reports from all three. Pl.'s
Mot. at 2. Locatell was not disclosed as a rebuttal expert, and no report from her has ever been
served. Id. at 4.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires parties to disclose the identity of their expert 16 witnesses and to include a written report. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A)-(B). The expert witnesses 17 must be disclosed in accordance with the deadlines ordered by the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18 26(a)(2)(C). The written report must include: 19 (i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them: 20 (ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; (iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; (iv) the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored 21 in the previous 10 years; 22 (v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony 23 in the case. 24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)-(vi). Rebuttal experts are those "intended solely to 25 contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party under 26 Rule 26(a)(2)(B) .... "Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C)(ii). 27 Failure to disclose an expert witness or provide the required information results in 28 exclusion of the expert witness "unless the failure was substantially justified or is

harmless." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). The burden of proving an excuse is on the party
facing sanctions. <u>See Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp.</u>, 259 F.3d 1101, 1107
(9th Cir. 2001) ("Implicit in Rule 37(c)(1) is that the burden is on the party facing
sanctions to prove harmlessness"). The Court has discretion in issuing such sanctions. <u>Id.</u>
at 1106 ("Furthermore, although we review every discovery sanction for an abuse of
discretion, we give particularly wide latitude to the district court's discretion to issue
sanctions under Rule 37(c)(1).").

#### III. DISCUSSION

9 The Court-ordered deadline for disclosing expert witnesses was August 2, 2010. 10 Roto-Rooter concedes that they failed to timely disclose, as a "result of a calendaring 11 mistake." Defs.' Opp. at 3-4. Roto-Rooter also concedes that their August 3, 2010 12 disclosure did not include expert reports, although they did include signed expert 13 deposition transcripts from 2007. Id. at 4. On August 16, the rebuttal disclosure deadline, Roto-Rooter served three of the four required expert reports. Since it is uncontested that 14 15 Roto-Rooter failed to timely satisfy the requirements of Rule 26, the question is whether 16 Roto-Rooter can show substantial justification or harmlessness for their error. Fed. R. Civ. 17 P. 37(c)(1).

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#### A. Roto-Rooter has failed to demonstrate substantial justification

19 Confusion over deadlines or a timing mistake do not qualify as a substantial 20 justification. See North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1145 21 (D. Minn. 2003) ("[W]e find that North Star's failure to disclose Rongstad's opinion was 22 not substantially justified, as the only cause offered by North Star is its assertion that it 23 confused the pretrial deadlines in this case . . . "); Engleson v. Little Falls Area Chamber of 24 Commerce, 210 F.R.D. 667, 679-70, 672 (D. Minn. 2002) (holding there was no 25 substantial justification for the late disclosure of plaintiff's expert and later noting that the 26 plaintiff "offered no reason, apart from her own dereliction, for the delay in disclosing ... 27 [her] expert"). In their opposition, Roto-Rooter does not address substantial justification. 28 The cases cited above do not provide any basis for Roto-Rooter to claim substantial

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justification on the basis of their calendaring mistake. Since the burden is on Roto-Rooter
 to prove substantial justification, and they have not done so here, the Court finds that Roto Rooter's failure to timely disclose was not substantially justified.

В.

#### Roto-Rooter's failure to timely disclose was harmless as to experts Werner, Hunter, and Brones

In determining whether a discovery violation was "harmless," the court looks to whether the non-violating party would be prejudiced by allowing the discovery into the case, despite the violation. <u>Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG</u>, 264 F.R.D. 541, 557 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("Moreover, Plaintiffs' failure was not harmless because Defendants would suffer prejudice if Plaintiffs were allowed to proceed on their new damages claims . . . and the cost of the additional analysis would be exorbitant"); <u>Fitz, Inc. v. Ralph Wilson Plastics</u> <u>Co.</u>, 184 F.R.D. 532, 536 (D.N.J. 1999) ("Failure to comply with Rule 26 regarding expert witnesses is only harmless when there is no prejudice to the party entitled to disclosure") (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit held that district courts have discretion "to allow expert testimony in appropriate circumstances," even when Rule 26 is violated. The four factors for courts to consider in evaluating harmlessness and justification are: "(1) prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the ability of that party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likelihood of disruption of the trial; and (4) bad faith or willfulness involved in not timely disclosing the evidence." Lanard Toys, Ltd. v. Novelty, Inc., 375 Fed. Appx. 705, 713 (9th Cir. Cal. Apr. 13, 2010) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiff's expert to testify, even though plaintiff did not serve a timely, complete expert report, since the violation was non-prejudicial).

## **1.** Factor one: prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the evidence is offered

Plaintiff argues that Roto-Rooter's failure to comply with discovery rules has
harmed Plaintiff, focusing on the harm from the lack of written reports in the August 3rd
disclosure. Pl.'s Mot. at 4. Plaintiff asserts that Roto-Rooter's August 3rd disclosure
included only "dated curricula vitae, copies of some documents allegedly reviewed, and

deposition transcripts for three of the four named experts," with "no information
whatsoever" regarding Locatell. <u>Id.</u> Plaintiff argues that the lack of written reports is
prejudicial since such reports help the opposing party in preparing for depositions and trial
examinations, as well as preparing for the disclosure of their own rebuttal experts. <u>Id.</u>
Therefore, Plaintiff argues it has been "unable to properly prepare its case" or "adequately
prepar[e] to rebut or examine those experts' unknown opinions." <u>Id.; Finwall v. City of</u>
<u>Chicago</u>, 239 F.R.D. 494, 497, 501 (N.D. Ill. 2006).

Roto-Rooter argues that the intent behind the disclosure rule "is to provide all
parties with information regarding the experts and the opinions those experts will be
testifying to at trial in order for the parties to determine whether the depositions of those
experts will be taken or whether additional experts should be retained," citing <u>Reese v.</u>
<u>Herbert</u>, 527 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008). Defs.' Opp. at 2. Roto-Rooter asserts that this
intent has been satisfied since Plaintiff has already deposed Roto-Rooter's experts. Defs.'
Opp. at 2.

While Roto-Rooter failed to timely disclose their experts, a one-day delay in
disclosure did not cause unfair surprise or prejudice to Plaintiff. Roto-Rooter disclosed the
same experts that were used in the underlying action, along with three deposition
transcripts. Although as a general matter, disclosure of deposition transcripts is not a
substitute for disclosure of expert reports, this case presents a somewhat unusual situation
in which three of the four proposed experts have already been deposed in the underlying
action, so their opinions were not unknown to Plaintiff.

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# 2. Factor two: the ability of the party offering the evidence to cure the prejudice

Plaintiff argues that Roto-Rooter's provision of the 2007 deposition transcripts on August 3rd was inadequate. <u>Ward v. City of S. Lake Tahoe</u>, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60000 \*4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007) ("Further, deposition testimony is not a substitute for the provision of expert reports under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) . . ."). The court in <u>Ward</u> noted that reviewing depositions in the place of expert reports was "time consuming" and "cumbersome." <u>Id.</u> at \*5. The present case is distinguishable from <u>Ward</u>. In <u>Ward</u>, expert

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reports were apparently never provided, forcing the defendant to rely on depositions alone. Id. at \*3. Here, Roto-Rooter has cured their lack of expert reports for three of their four experts by serving three expert reports on August, 16, 2010. Therefore, Plaintiff will not be forced to rely on the 2007 depositions for Werner, Hunter, and Brones in the place of reports, but rather can use the expert reports provided by Roto-Rooter on August 16, 2010 to prepare for depositions and trial. However, Roto-Rooter has made no attempt to cure the lack of an expert report for Locatell.

8 Plaintiff, however, asserts that the three expert reports delivered August 16th are deficient for the following reasons: (1) the reports by Werner and Hunter "lack a statement 9 of compensation;" (2) the report by Brones includes "some of his opinions," but does not "contain any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support Dr. Brones' opinions, a list of publications authored in the last 10 years, a list of all other case [sic] in which Dr. Brones has testified as an expert in the previous 4 years, or a statement of compensation;" and (3) Brones "states that he 'intend[s] to conduct additional work' and apparently form more opinions, demonstrating that the declaration does not contain a 'complete statement of all opinions' he will express." Pl.'s Mot. at 5; see R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. CU Interface, 17 LLC, 657 F. Supp. 2d 905, 909-10 (N.D. Ohio 2008) ("Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(i) does not allow 18 an expert to list only some of his reasons for a conclusion and then incorporate the 19 remainder through an unrevealing catchall phrase-the report must contain a 'complete 20 statement' of those bases and reasons").

21 Although the omission of compensation statements for Werner, Hunter and Brones 22 and omission of some lists and exhibits in the Brones report are minor, the failure of 23 Brones to disclose all of his opinions in his late-filed expert report is prejudicial to 24 Plaintiff. Accordingly, Roto-Rooter shall supplement the Werner and Hunter reports with 25 compensation statements and the Brones report with exhibits supporting Brones' opinions, 26 a list of publications authored within the last ten years, a list of all other cases in which 27 Brones had testified as an expert within the previous four years, and a statement of 28 compensation no later than October 29, 2010. Although the Court declines to strike the

Brones report for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C)(i),
 Brones is precluded from adding any further opinions or relying on any additional work for
 his opinions at trial.

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#### Factor three: the likelihood of disruption of the trial

Roto-Rooter's delay in disclosure and in serving timely reports poses little, if any, disruption to the trial date of November 29, 2010. The original deadline for expert discovery was September 30, 2010. The Court has already ordered the expert discovery deadline extended to October 15, 2010 for the purpose of deposing Roto-Rooter's experts, due to Plaintiff's motion to exclude.

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#### 4. Factor four: bad faith or willfulness involved

11 Roto-Rooter argues that their failure to disclose experts on the August 2, 2010 deadline "was not a result of bad faith or willfulness," and they did not miss the deadline in 12 13 order to "avoid disclosing [their] experts of the opinions their experts intend to testify too," as evidenced by their immediate service of disclosure after realizing their mistake. Defs.' 14 15 Opp. at 7. Plaintiff suggests that a lack of bad faith is not apparent here, noting that while 16 Roto-Rooter served their disclosure immediately upon learning of their mistake on August 17 3rd, the expert reports were not served until August 16th as part of the rebuttal, and they 18 included three of the original four experts. Pl.'s Rep. at 8. However, the Court is not 19 persuaded that the two-week delay in providing expert reports shows bad faith, especially 20 in light of Roto-Rooter's calendaring mistake that led them to believe that expert reports 21 were not due until August 31, 2010. Ompoc Decl. ¶ 7.

On balance, the factors weigh in favor of a finding that Roto-Rooter's delay in
disclosure and in providing expert reports was harmless as to experts Werner, Hunter, and
Brones. Roto-Rooter has not cured the defect in disclosure as to Locatell, and therefore the
delay in disclosing her was not harmless. In addition, Roto-Rooter's delay caused at least
some prejudice to Plaintiff because Plaintiff must conduct expert depositions at a later
stage in this case. Thus, Plaintiff's motion to exclude experts is granted with respect to
Locatell and denied with respect to Werner, Hunter, and Brones. Further, to the extent that

Plaintiff has been unable to complete Roto-Rooter's experts' depositions by the previously extended deadline, the Court extends the deadline for taking Roto-Rooter's experts' depositions to October 29, 2010. Roto-Rooter shall pay Plaintiff's costs for deposing these three experts, including Plaintiff's attorney's fees. **IT IS SO ORDERED.** Elizabeth D. Laporte Dated: October 18, 2010 United States Magistrate Judge 

United States District Court For the Northern District of California