

1 Defendants"). Docket No. 22 ("Smith MTD"). This motion is fully
2 briefed. Docket Nos. 26 ("Opp'n to Smith MTD"), 28 ("Smith
3 Reply"). Defendant Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company
4 ("Tesoro") has filed the third motion to dismiss, which has also
5 been fully briefed. Docket Nos. 23 ("Tesoro MTD"), 25 ("Opp'n to
6 Tesoro MTD"), 30 ("Tesoro Reply").¹

7 Having considered the papers submitted by these parties, the
8 Court concludes that this matter is suitable for determination
9 without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the motions
10 to dismiss submitted by Angel and the Individual Defendants are
11 GRANTED. Tesoro's motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
12 IN PART.

13
14 **II. BACKGROUND**

15 Plaintiff joined the U.S. Air Force in 1994, and transitioned
16 into the Air Force Reserve in 1999. First Amended Complaint
17 ("FAC"), Docket NO. 15, ¶ 20. Upon his transition, Plaintiff began
18 working as a refinery operator at the Golden Eagle Refinery, which
19 Tesoro purchased at some point prior to 2003. Id. ¶ 21. In
20 January of 2005, while Plaintiff was employed by Tesoro, Plaintiff
21 was recalled to active duty with the Air Force and deployed to
22 Iraq. Id. ¶ 22. While serving, Plaintiff was injured and
23 permanently disabled -- Plaintiff does not indicate the extent of
24 his injury, and only notes that it was "orthopedic" in nature. Id.
25 ¶ 23. He was medically retired from the Air Force in November of
26

27 ¹ Defendants United Steel Workers, International Union Local 5
28 ("USW"), Jeff Clark and Steve Rojek have not submitted any motions
to dismiss, and have instead chosen to answer the First Amended
Complaint. Docket No. 17.

1 2008. Id.

2 At the time that Plaintiff was recalled to the Air Force, he
3 informed Tesoro and was placed on active military leave. Id. ¶ 22.
4 Although Tesoro filled his position, Plaintiff was assured that he
5 would be "taken care of" when he returned from service. Id. ¶ 24.
6 However, when Plaintiff retired from the military, he was
7 ultimately denied reemployment from Tesoro.

8 When Plaintiff sought reemployment with Tesoro, he initially
9 met with Angel, a physician's assistant located at Tesoro's
10 refinery. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff claims that Angel did not give
11 Plaintiff any "formal evaluation of his physical capabilities," and
12 informed Plaintiff "that he did not think that Tesoro would
13 accommodate" him. Id. Plaintiff next met with Daniels, who was
14 employed in Tesoro's human resources department. Id. ¶ 27.
15 Plaintiff informed her of several open positions in the refinery
16 which he believed he could fill, and contacted her on several later
17 occasions. Id. However, on December 22, 2008, Daniels called
18 Plaintiff to tell him that "the company is unable to accommodate
19 you" and that he was being terminated from employment with Tesoro,
20 effective immediately. Id. ¶ 28. Plaintiff claims that Carlson
21 and Rios approved his termination. Id.

22 The next day, Plaintiff left a voicemail with Smith, the
23 President and Chairmen of Tesoro, and requested a chance to speak
24 with him about the termination. Id. ¶ 32. Although Smith did not
25 personally respond to Plaintiff's message, Porter, the Senior Vice
26 President of Refining Operations, returned Plaintiff's call the
27 following day. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Porter initially claimed that he
28 would contact Smith, as well as Rios and Bodnar at the refinery, to

1 "get to the bottom of the situation" -- however, Plaintiff never
2 heard from Porter again. Id. ¶ 33.²

3 Plaintiff alleges a total of seven causes of action against
4 Tesoro. He claims that Tesoro (1) violated the Uniformed Services
5 Employment and Reemployment Rights Act ("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C. § 4301
6 et seq.; (2) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; (3) violated California's Fair
8 Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12900 et
9 seq.; (4) wrongfully terminated him in violation of fundamental
10 public policy; (5) violated section 389 et seq. of the California
11 Military and Veterans Code ("section 389"); (6) breached the
12 collective bargaining agreement with USW; and (7) was negligent in
13 hiring, training, supervising, or retaining its employees. Id.
14 ¶¶ 40-73.

15 Plaintiff's causes of action against Angel and the Individual
16 Defendants are more limited. He only brings one cause of action
17 against Angel, for violation of section 389. Id. ¶¶ 63-66. He
18 brings two causes of action against the Individual Defendants,
19 including (1) violation of section 389; and (2) negligent hiring,
20 training, supervision and retention. Id. ¶¶ 71-73.

21
22 **III. LEGAL STANDARD**

23 Defendants Smith and Porter both claim that this Court lacks
24 personal jurisdiction over them, and move for dismissal under Rule
25

26 ² The FAC only mentions Defendant Reitzel as the employee who
27 informed Plaintiff that Tesoro had filled his position at the
28 refinery, although it also alleges that Reitzel "was responsible
for management decisions relating to the hiring, training,
supervision, retention and termination of those employees under his
supervision." FAC ¶¶ 7, 25.

1 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. Where a court
2 considers a 12(b)(2) motion without an evidentiary hearing, "the
3 plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional
4 facts to withstand the motion to dismiss. That is, the plaintiff
5 need only demonstrate facts that if true would support
6 jurisdiction over the defendant." Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d
7 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Jurisdiction must
8 comport with both the long-arm statute of the state in which the
9 district court sits, as well as the constitutional requirements of
10 due process. Mattel, Inc., v. Greiner & Hausser GmbH, 354 F.3d
11 857, 863 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that
12 the California long-arm statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10,
13 allows Courts to exercise jurisdiction to the limits of the Due
14 Process Clause of the Constitution, "so a federal court may
15 exercise personal jurisdiction if doing so comports with federal
16 constitutional due process." Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011,
17 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2009).

18 In addition, Individual Defendants, Angel, and Tesoro all
19 claim that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
20 can be granted against them, and have moved for dismissal on this
21 basis. A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
22 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v.
23 Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). It requires a court to
24 determine whether a Complaint comports with Federal Rule of Civil
25 Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires that a pleading contain a "short
26 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
27 entitled to relief." Dismissal can be based on the lack of a
28 cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged

1 under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
2 Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Allegations of material
3 fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable
4 to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80
5 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). With regard to well-pleaded
6 factual allegations, the court should assume their truth, but a
7 motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff fails to
8 proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is
9 plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
10 547 (2007). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions
11 couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
12 1937, 1949-50 (2009).

13
14 **IV. DISCUSSION**

15 **A. Personal Jurisdiction over Smith and Porter**

16 Plaintiff does not allege that Smith or Porter reside, work,
17 or possess property in California -- in fact, the FAC suggests
18 that they both work in Bexar County, Texas. FAC ¶¶ 3-4. "It is
19 the plaintiff's burden to establish the court's personal
20 jurisdiction over a defendant." Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d
21 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff must therefore allege some
22 other basis for asserting jurisdiction over these two defendants.

23 A defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction within a
24 particular judicial district pursuant to theories of either
25 general or specific jurisdiction. See Boschetto, 539 F.3d at
26 1015-16. In his Opposition, Plaintiff only suggests that Smith
27 and Porter may be subject to specific jurisdiction. Opp'n to
28 Smith MTD at 3-9. "[A] court may exercise specific jurisdiction

1 over a foreign defendant if his or her less substantial contacts
2 with the forum give rise to the cause of action before the court."
3 Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d at 923. Where the alleged contact with
4 the forum state is limited, as in this case, "the cause of action
5 must arise out of that particular purposeful contact"
6 Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth
7 Circuit has developed a three-pronged test to determine whether
8 specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is
9 appropriate:

- 10 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully
- 11 direct his activities or consummate some
- 12 transaction with the forum or resident thereof;
- 13 or perform some act by which he purposefully
- 14 avails himself of the privilege of conducting
- 15 activities in the forum, thereby invoking the
- 16 benefits and protections of its laws;
- 17 (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or
- 18 relates to the defendant's forum-related
- 19 activities; and
- 20 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport
- 21 with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it
- 22 must be reasonable.

23 Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at
24 801).

25 Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized
26 that "purposeful direction of some act having effect in the forum
27 constitutes sufficient contact to exert jurisdiction"
28 Unocal, 248 F.3d at 923-24; see also Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985). Purposeful availment may therefore
satisfy the first part of the Ninth Circuit's test. Unocal, 248
F.3d at 924. It "requires a finding that the defendant '[has]
performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or
promotes the transaction of business within the forum state,'" id.
(quoting Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990)), or

1 that the out-of-state defendant performed an injurious act,
2 knowing that "the brunt of that injury would be felt by" someone
3 in the forum state, Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984).

4 The alleged contact that Smith or Porter had with California
5 is extremely limited. Plaintiff left Smith a voice mail. FAC
6 ¶ 32. Smith then instructed Porter to call Plaintiff, and Porter
7 told Plaintiff that he would talk to employees at the Refinery to
8 investigate and "get to the bottom of the situation." Id. ¶ 33.
9 Porter told Plaintiff that he would get back to him, but he never
10 did; Plaintiff was eventually called by another Tesoro employee
11 and told that Porter would not be able to speak to Plaintiff about
12 his termination. Id. ¶¶ 33, 36. This contact was initiated by
13 Plaintiff, and neither Smith nor Porter is alleged to have
14 directed any injurious communications towards the forum state.
15 The quality of the only contact direct to Plaintiff -- a vague and
16 presumably false assurance from Porter -- does not rise to the
17 level of an "intentional and allegedly tortious act[]" expressly
18 aimed at the forum." C.f. Brainerd v. Governors of University of
19 Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding defendant
20 intentionally directed activities towards forum, where defendant
21 allegedly made tortious statements during phone call initiated by
22 plaintiff). The Court finds that Porter's innocuous reaction to
23 Plaintiff's phone call is insufficient to establish "purposeful
24 availment."

25 Plaintiff also suggests that "the factual allegations
26 presented by Plaintiff demonstrate that Defendants Smith and
27 Porter participated in the alleged wrongful conduct against
28 Plaintiff . . . at a minimum by personally ratifying and/or

1 acquiescing to the wrongful conduct by their employees"
2 Opp'n to Smith MTD at 8. The FAC demonstrates nothing of the
3 sort. There is no basis to conclude that Smith, the President and
4 Chairman of the Board, or Porter, the Senior Vice President of
5 Refining, personally ratified, or even knew about, the termination
6 before it occurred. Although Porter's comments to Plaintiff
7 suggest that Porter later learned of the termination and did
8 nothing to remedy it, the Court finds that this type of
9 acquiescence is not sufficient to establish that Porter "directed"
10 his activity towards this forum in a manner sufficient to give
11 rise to personal jurisdiction over him. Plaintiff has failed to
12 meet his burden of establishing a basis for jurisdiction over
13 Smith and Porter.

14 **B. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim Against Angel and**
15 **the Individual Defendants**

16 1. California Military & Veterans Code Section 389

17 The remaining Individual Defendants claim that Plaintiff's
18 sixth cause of action for violation of section 389 should be
19 dismissed with prejudice, because individual supervisors,
20 employees, and corporate agents should not be held personally
21 liable for employment discrimination claims where the claims arise
22 out of the performance of regular personnel management duties.
23 Smith MTD at 13-15.

24 Plaintiff's response is based on the plain language of section
25 394(a) of the California Military and Veterans Code, which reads
26 as follows:

27 No person shall discriminate against any officer,
28 warrant officer or enlisted member of the
military or naval forces of the state or of the

1 United States because of that membership. No
2 member of the military forces shall be prejudiced
3 or injured by any person, employer, or officer or
4 agent of any corporation, company, or firm with
5 respect to that member's employment, position or
6 status or be denied or disqualified for
7 employment by virtue of membership or service in
8 the military forces of this state or of the
9 United States.

6 Cal. Mil & Vet. Code § 394(a) ("subsection 394(a)").³ The statute
7 expressly applies to the actions of "any person," in addition to
8 any "employer, or officer or agent of any corporation, company, or
9 firm." Id. Plaintiff claims that this language was intended to
10 create liability not just as to employers, but also as to
11 individual employees who were somehow involved in the acts of
12 discrimination. Opp'n to Smith MTD at 10.

13 The Court is not aware of any authority specifically
14 interpreting the language of subsection 394(a). However, the
15 Court is persuaded that a California court would not interpret the
16 statute so as to reach "persons" who are being sued for claims
17 that "arise out of the performance of necessary personnel
18 management duties." Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal. App.
19 4th 55, 63-64 (Ct. App. 1996). In Janken, a California appellate
20 panel considered whether discrimination claims could be brought
21 against supervisors, in their personal capacity, under FEHA. FEHA
22 makes it illegal for "an employer" to discriminate "because of the
23 race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical
24

25 ³ Plaintiff also suggests that the Individual Defendants might be
26 liable under California Military and Veterans Code § 394(d), which
27 applies only to employment discrimination based on membership in
28 "the military or naval forces of this state," as opposed to "the
military forces of this state or of the United States." Compare
Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code § 394(a) and id. § 394(d). The Court need
not at this time reach the question of whether this difference
precludes Plaintiff from relying on subsection 394(d).

1 disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status,
2 sex, age, or sexual orientation." Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a).
3 "Employer" is defined under the statute to include "any person
4 regularly employing five or more persons, or any person acting as
5 an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly." Id. § 12926(d).
6 On its face, the statute could therefore be read to apply to
7 supervisors as persons acting as direct agents for an employer.
8 Nevertheless, the panel concluded that there was a strong
9 consensus against holding individual employees and supervisors
10 personally liable for discrimination claims based solely on
11 managerial acts, and further expressed concern that holding
12 managers liable may chill effective management while adding, at
13 best, meager additional protections or recompense to victims of
14 discrimination. Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 67-71, 72-76 ("Little
15 would be added to the protection of employees by the addition of
16 individual supervisory employees as defendants, and what little
17 would be added would be at potentially great cost."); see also
18 Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 645-654 (1998) (adopting reasoning
19 of Janken).

20 In the context of subsection 394(a), the inclusion of the
21 words "any person," in addition to "officer or agent of any
22 corporation," is as ambiguous as FEHA's use of the term "employer"
23 to include "any person acting as an agent of an employer." Both
24 statutes are broad enough to encompass discriminatory actions
25 taken by individual supervisors, but neither answers the question
26 of whether that individual supervisor may be personally liable in
27 his or her individual capacity. The unique language of subsection
28 394(a) clearly expands the application of the subsection beyond

1 the employment context, but it does not necessarily attach
2 personal liability to supervisors where the suit properly lies
3 against their employers. Plaintiff has provided no rationale for
4 distinguishing subsection 394(a) from FEHA in this regard. This
5 Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff may not assert his
6 section 389 claims against the Individual Defendants. Plaintiff's
7 sixth cause of action is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to
8 the Individual Defendants.⁴

9 2. Negligent Hiring, Training and Supervision

10 Plaintiff's claim against the Individual Defendants for
11 negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention also fails.
12 "In California, an employer can be held liable for negligent
13 hiring if he knows the employee is unfit, or has reason to believe
14 the employee is unfit or fails to use reasonable care to discover
15 the employee's unfitness before hiring him." Juarez v. Boy Scouts
16 of America, Inc., 81 Cal. App. 4th 377, 395 (Ct. App. 2000).

17 Liability for negligent hiring . . . is based
18 upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires
19 individuals with characteristics which might pose
20 a danger to customers or other employees, the
21 enterprise should bear the loss caused by the
22 wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees.
Negligence liability will be imposed on an
employer if it knew or should have known that
hiring the employee created a particular risk or
hazard and that particular harm materializes.

23 Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1139 (Ct.
24 App. 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

25 _____
26 ⁴ This rationale also applies to Angel, who was "a physician's
27 assistant" at Tesoro's refinery and was allegedly acting as
28 Tesoro's agent, although not as an "employee." See FAC ¶¶ 11, 26.
Plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish Angel from the other
Individual Defendants on the basis of his employment status. This
cause of action is therefore DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Angel.

1 Plaintiff is apparently alleging that all of the Individual
2 Defendants (except Daniels) are liable because they negligently
3 hired, supervised, trained, or retained the other employees who
4 mistreated Plaintiff. The FAC includes general allegations that
5 "Defendants" had a duty to hire, supervise, and train Tesoro's
6 employees, and also includes statements that specific Individual
7 Defendants had a general responsibility for the hiring or
8 "management of employees." FAC ¶¶ 5-9, 72. However, Plaintiff
9 does not specify which particular employee was "unfit," and in
10 what way, except to say that Tesoro's employees could not properly
11 abide by the various statutory requirements mentioned throughout
12 the FAC.⁵ Plaintiff does not identify any particular Individual
13 Employees who had a duty to train that person. Instead, Plaintiff
14 asserts this claim against all Individual Defendants except
15 Daniels. This cause of action appears to be a shotgun attempt by
16 Plaintiff to hold each Individual Defendant liable based on any
17 misconduct of any of the other Defendants. The Court is not
18 persuaded that this is an appropriate use of this cause of action,
19 or that the FAC presents facts that render this a plausible claim
20 against any particular Individual Defendant. This cause of action
21 is DISMISSED as to the Individual Defendants.

22 **C. Whether Plaintiff has Stated a Claim Against Tesoro**

23 1. Plaintiff's Discrimination Claims

24 Plaintiff pleads that Tesoro discriminated against him based
25 on both his military service and his disability, and that he was

26 _____
27 ⁵ The single concrete basis for unfitness that the FAC seems to
28 allege is against Daniels, who "had never heard of USERRA." FAC
¶ 37. This is simply not enough to create a plausible inference
that Daniels was unfit for her job or that any other defendant
should have been aware that Daniels was unfit for her job.

1 terminated as a result of this discrimination. "Even though
2 heightened pleading is not required in discrimination cases, the
3 complaint must still 'give the defendant fair notice of what the
4 plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008)
5 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512, (2002)).
6

7 To prevail under the ADA,⁶ Plaintiff ultimately "must show
8 that (1) [he] is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA;
9 (2) [he] is a qualified individual, meaning [he] can perform the
10 essential functions of [his] job; and (3) [Tesoro] terminated [him]
11 because of [his] disability." Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164
12 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999).⁷ The Court finds that, although
13 the FAC lacks certain details, it sufficiently notifies Tesoro of
14 the claims against it. Plaintiff does not provide any description
15 of his disability, except to say that it is the result of an
16 "orthopedic" injury. See FAC ¶ 23. However, he does claim that he
17 was declared permanently disabled and medically retired from the
18 military as a result of this injury. Id. ¶ 23. The FAC sets out,
19 in detail, the dates and the names of his contact with Tesoro, and
20 it includes facts that clearly suggest that Plaintiff was not
21 rehired on account of his disability. Plaintiff was told by Angel
22 that "he did not think Tesoro would accommodate" him, and Daniels
23 told him that "the company is unable to accommodate you" when she
24 informed him of his termination. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28. Plaintiff has

25 _____
26 ⁶ "[T]he FEHA provisions relating to disability discrimination are
27 based on the ADA," and courts typically examine claims under these
28 statutes in conjunction with one another. See Humphrey v. Mem'l
Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001).

⁷ Tesoro does not challenge Plaintiff's disabled status, or the
allegation that Plaintiff was terminated due to his disability.

1 received right-to-sue letters from both the California Department
2 of Fair Employment and Housing and the Equal Employment Opportunity
3 Commission. FAC ¶¶ 38-39. The FAC is therefore more than
4 sufficient to allow Tesoro to prepare its defense, and it is also
5 sufficient to raise his claims for discrimination based on his
6 disability, and for a failure to accommodate his disability, above
7 the speculative level.

8 Tesoro argues that Plaintiff should plead, with greater
9 specificity, precisely what his disabilities were, the essential
10 features of the position that he sought to fill, and how Tesoro was
11 supposed to accommodate him. Tesoro MTD at 4-8. However, Tesoro
12 fails to identify any legal authority that suggests that Plaintiff
13 must plead this level of particularity at this stage of the
14 litigation. To be sure, Plaintiff will later need to establish
15 that he is a "qualified individual," and this will require him to
16 show that he was "'an individual with a disability who, with or
17 without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
18 functions of the employment position" Rohr v. Salt River
19 Project Agric. Improvement and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 862 (9th
20 Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(a)). In later
21 stages of this suit, "part of the plaintiff's initial burden [will]
22 include[] 'showing the existence of a reasonable accommodation.'"
23 Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th
24 Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 749
25 (9th Cir. 1998)). However, were this Court to require the FAC to
26 spell out precisely how Tesoro should have accommodated him, this
27 would be tantamount to requiring Plaintiff to establish a prima
28 facie case at the dismissal stage. No such heightened pleading

1 standard is required. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511 (rejecting
2 requirement that plaintiff establish prima facie case of
3 discrimination to survive motion to dismiss in Title VII suit); see
4 also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-570 (reaffirming substance of
5 Swierkiewicz).

6 Whether Plaintiff pleads a plausible cause of action for
7 discrimination based on his military status is a closer question.
8 Plaintiff can point to nothing in the FAC that suggests that his
9 termination was in any way related to his military status --
10 instead, the allegations strongly indicate that he was terminated
11 because of his disability. Plaintiff's sole argument is as
12 follows:

13 [I]t is reasonable to infer that Defendants
14 discriminated against Plaintiff Kirbyson based on
15 Kirbyson's military service since other (non-
16 military) Tesoro employees were treating [sic]
17 more favorably than Plaintiff Kirbyson (i.e.,
18 non-military employees with disabilities were
provided with reasonable accommodations . . .)
and based on the temporal proximity of
Plaintiff's termination to his return from
military service.

19 Opp'n to Tesoro at 10-11. However, the FAC contains no fact that
20 suggests that other employees with disabilities were treated
21 differently than Plaintiff. Moreover, the FAC suggests that
22 Tesoro's initial response to Plaintiff's recall to the military was
23 appropriate -- he was placed on leave and told that he would be
24 "taken care of." FAC ¶¶ 22, 24. Plaintiff was not terminated
25 until after he was disabled. Id. 28. When Tesoro's reaction to
26 his service is coupled with the plausible explanation for his
27 termination that is articulated in the FAC, the FAC leaves no fact
28 that creates a plausible inference that Plaintiff's military

1 service was a motivating factor in his termination.⁸ Plaintiff's
2 claim that Tesoro discriminated against him on the basis of his
3 military status appears to be pure speculation.

4 Because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Tesoro
5 discriminated against him based on his military service,
6 Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for violation of section 389 is
7 DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Tesoro. However, this does not
8 preclude Plaintiff from stating a claim against Tesoro for
9 violation of USERRA, to the extent that Plaintiff is asserting that
10 Tesoro failed to reasonably accommodate him as a disabled service
11 member returning from duty. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4312, 4313(a)(3).
12 Tesoro's motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's
13 first cause of action for violation of USERRA, second cause of
14 action for violation of the ADA, third cause of action for
15 violation of FEHA, and fifth cause of action for wrongful
16 termination.

17 2. Breach of Contract Claim

18 Plaintiff alleges that he is a beneficiary of the collective
19 bargaining agreement between Tesoro and USW, and that Tesoro
20 breached this agreement when it terminated him without cause. FAC
21 ¶¶ 68-69. "A cause of action for breach of contract requires
22 pleading of a contract, plaintiff's performance or excuse for
23 failure to perform, defendant's breach and damage to plaintiff

24 ⁸ Plaintiff only cites the case of Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 196
25 F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 1998), for the claim that the "temporal
26 proximity" of his termination to his service might give rise to an
27 inference of discrimination. Opp'n to Tesoro MTD at 11. However,
28 Barnett was describing a retaliation claim, which was significantly
more conducive to an inference based on the timing of the parties'
activities. The Court finds that the inference in this case is far
weaker -- so weak, in light of the other allegations, as to be
implausible or merely speculative.

1 resulting therefrom." Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood
2 Apartments, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 1031 (Ct. App. 2009) (quotation
3 marks and citation omitted). Tesoro rests its arguments on one
4 basis for dismissal of this cause of action: that Plaintiff failed
5 to sufficiently identify the terms of the contract or his damages.
6 See Tesoro MTD at 14-15.

7 Plaintiff pleads the existence of a contract and explains how
8 Tesoro breached that contract: by terminating him without cause.
9 FAC ¶¶ 68-69. "The complaint must describe the alleged terms of
10 the contract in a sufficiently specific manner to give the
11 defendant notice of the nature of the claim. For example, a claim
12 on a written contract must either (1) quote relevant contractual
13 language; (2) include a copy of the contract as an attachment; or
14 (3) summarize the contract's purported legal effect." Am. Realty
15 Trust, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 362 F. Supp. 2d
16 744 (N.D. Tex. 2005). Although Plaintiff has not quoted directly
17 from the contract, he has identified the specific contract (of
18 which Tesoro has presumably kept a copy), and has sufficiently
19 summarized its legal effect (protection from termination without
20 cause) to allow Tesoro to prepare its response.

21 3. Negligence

22 For the reasons identified in Part IV.B.2, supra, this Court
23 is not persuaded that Plaintiff has plausibly pled a failure to use
24 reasonable care in the hiring, training, supervision or retention
25 of employees, based solely on an alleged failure to comport with
26 certain laws.

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28 ///

1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2 The Court hereby GRANTS the Individual Defendants' motion to
3 dismiss, as well as Larry Angel's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff's
4 sixth cause of action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all
5 defendants except Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company.
6 Plaintiff's eighth cause of action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
7 as to all defendants; however, Plaintiff is strongly discouraged
8 from attempting to bring this claim against any Individual
9 Defendant unless he can plead facts that indicate that an employee
10 of Tesoro was so unfit for his or her position as to give rise to a
11 plausible inference that a particular Individual Defendant was
12 negligent in hiring, training, or supervising that employee.

13 The Court hereby GRANTS Tesoro Refining and Marketing
14 Company's motion to dismiss WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Plaintiff's
15 sixth and eighth causes of action. Tesoro Refining and Marketing
16 Company's motion to dismiss is DENIED as to (1) Plaintiff's first
17 cause of action for violation of USERRA, (2) second cause of action
18 for violation of the ADA, (3) third cause of action for violation
19 of FEHA, (4) fifth cause of action for wrongful termination, and
20 (5) seventh cause of action for breach of contract; these causes of
21 action are undisturbed as to Defendant Tesoro Refining and
22 Marketing Company. Should Plaintiff choose to submit an amended
23 complaint, he must do so no later than thirty (30) days from the
24 date of this Order.

25 IT IS SO ORDERED.

26
27 Dated: March 2, 2010

28 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE