



1 Respondent's answer, which was filed on September 14, 2011. See Doc. #29.

2 In the interest of providing Petitioner clarity and direction and preventing this  
3 action from further stalling, the Court now orders as follows:

4 1. Petitioner is hereby directed to file a traverse **by no later than**  
5 **December 30, 2011.**

6 2. Petitioner's requests for discovery (Doc. ## 33 & 35) are **DENIED** for  
7 lack of good cause. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 908-09, quoting Harris v.  
8 Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969) (good cause for discovery under Rule 6(a) of the  
9 Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases is shown "where specific allegations  
10 before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully  
11 developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief . . ."); Pham v.  
12 Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 2005).

13 3. Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. #31) also is  
14 **DENIED** without prejudice as premature. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective  
15 Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, express  
16 limitations are imposed on the power of a federal court to grant an evidentiary  
17 hearing. Under AEDPA, a district court may not hold an evidentiary hearing on a  
18 claim for which the petitioner failed to develop a factual basis in state court unless  
19 the petitioner shows that: (1) the claim relies either on (a) a new rule of  
20 constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral  
21 review, or (b) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered  
22 through the exercise of due diligence; and (2) the facts underlying the claim would  
23 be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional  
24 error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of the  
25 underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

26 Even if a prisoner is able to clear the hurdle posed by § 2254(e)(2), "the fact  
27 that a hearing would be permitted does not mean that it is required." Downs v.


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Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, the district court retains discretion whether to hold an evidentiary hearing or to expand the record with discovery and documentary evidence. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 590 (9th Cir. 2004). This permissible intermediate step may avoid the necessity of an expensive and time consuming hearing in every habeas corpus case. Id. at 590-91.

Here, as a threshold matter, Petitioner has not alleged why he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2). He does not assert that his claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactive to cases on collateral review, nor does he allege that the factual predicate of his claim could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Petitioner is advised that the Court will order an evidentiary hearing on its own motion if, upon consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s claims, one is required.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 8, 2011

  
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JAMES WARE  
United States District Chief Judge