EXHIBIT F

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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
4	
5	
6	ORACLE AMERICA, INC.,)
7	Plaintiff,)
8	vs.) No. CV 10-03561 WHA
9	GOOGLE, INC.,)
10	Defendant.)
11)
12	
13	
14	
15	CONFIDENTIAL TESTIMONY - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY
16	VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JAMES KEARL
17	MONDAY, MARCH 26, 2012
18	
19	
20	
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22	
23	
24	
25	PAGES 1 - 226

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Videotaped Deposition of JAMES KEARL, taken on behalf of Plaintiff, at Keker & Van Nest, 633 Battery Street, San Francisco, California, commencing at 9:37 a.m., Monday, March 26, 2012 before Kelli Combs, CSR 7705.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	<text><text><text></text></text></text>
1 2 3	APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL: FOR PLAINTIFF ORACLE AMERICA, INC.:	1 2 3	JAMES KEARL, after having been duly sworn, testified as follows: 00o
4	BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP	4	
5	BY: FRED NORTON, ESQ.	5	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Good morning, Counsel. 09:03:25
6	STEVEN C. HOLTZMAN, ESQ.	6	My name is Philip Knowles, of Veritext National
7	1999 Harrison Street, Suite 900	7	Deposition and Litigation Services. The date today
8	Oakland, California 94612	8	is March 26th, 2012, and the time is approximately 9:03 a.m.
9 10	(510) 874-1000 fnorton@bsfllp.com	10	This deposition is being held in the 09:03:39
11	monone osmp.com	11	office of Keker and Van Nest, located at 633 Battery
12	FOR DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.:	12	Street, on the fourth floor, in the City of
13	KEKER & VAN NEST, LLP	13	San Francisco, California 94111.
14	BY: DANIEL PURCELL, ESQ.	14	The caption of this case is Oracle America
15	633 Battery Street	15 16	versus Google, Inc., in the United States District 09:03:54 Court for the Northern District of California,
16 17	San Francisco, California 94111-1809 (415) 733-6697	17	San Francisco Division. The name of the witness is
18	dpurcell@kkvn.com	18	James Kearl.
19	apurcon e acontoni	19	At this time, the attorneys will identify
20		20	themselves and the parties they represent. 09:04:07
21		21	MR. NORTON: Fred Norton, on behalf of
22		22	Oracle America.
23		23	MR. HOLTZMAN: Steve Holtzman, for Oracle
		23 24 25	MR. HOLTZMAN: Steve Holtzman, for Oracle America. MR. COOPER: John Cooper, Farella, Braun & 09:04:20

Pages 2 to 5

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1	Martel. I represent Dr. Kearl. 09:04:21	1	MR. NORTON: Then 578. 09:06:52			
2	MR. TENKIN: Andrew Tenkin, Oracle	2	(Deposition Exhibit 578 marked			
3	America.	3	for identification.)			
4	MR. PURCELL: Dan Purcell, Keker & Van	4	BY MR. NORTON:			
5	Nest. I represent Google. 09:04:29	5	Q And the way I organized these may be a 09:07:4			
6	MR. ADAMS: Gregory Adams, with CRA	6	little differently from how you had them, but			
7	International.	7				
8	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Our court reporter,	8	should be the tables to your the appendices to			
9	Kelli Combs of Veritext, will swear in the witness.		9 your report. And 578 should be the tables; is that			
10	(Deponent sworn.) 09:04:41	10				
11	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: You may proceed.	11				
12	MR. COOPER: Counsel, at the outset, as I	12	Q Okay.			
13	indicated prior to the beginning of the deposition,	13	Now, other than the change that you			
14	Dr. Kearl has a correction he would like to make to	14	described to Paragraph 86 of your report, do you			
15	Paragraph 86 of 09:05:00	15	have any other changes to the report that you want 09:08:15			
16	He'd like to make a correction to	16	to make?			
17	Paragraph 86 of his report.	17	A No.			
18	MR. NORTON: Please, go ahead.	18	Q Can you just describe for me your			
19	THE WITNESS: In Paragraph 86, in order to	19	background in calculating patent damages?			
20	get the total value of the deal, I added the value 09:05:17	20	A I've been retained in a number of cases 09:08:27			
21	of Sun to the value to Google. That's the	21	either to do reasonable royalty or lost profits			
22	denominator. And then divide that into the value of	22	and have filed reports on those matters.			
23	the Sun to get an estimate of the portfolio royalty.	23	Q And how many cases have you calculated a			
24	I should have netted out, of the part that	24	reasonable royalty for patents?			
25	goes into the denominator, the transfer between 09:05:33	25	A Probably seven or eight. You need to 09:08:53			
	6		8			
1	Google and Oracle for the \$20 million payments, 09:05:35	1	clarify what you mean "cases." Would this be 09:08:56			
2	upfront payments, and the \$25 million capped	2	formal testimony? It would be less than that, but			
3	royalty. The present value of those two numbers is	3	I've worked on matters in which there has been			
4	a little less than \$100 million. So the denominator	4	preliminary work done, often settled, in			
5	would be slightly smaller and, therefore, the 09:05:51	5	probably I don't know maybe ten, eight to 09:09:08			
6	estimated royalty slightly larger.	6	ten.			
7	EXAMINATION	7	Q Then of that eight to ten, how many cases			
8	BY MR. NORTON:	8	did you give testimony concerning a reasonable			
9	Q All right. Thank you.	9	royalty in a patent case?			
			A I think only two. 09:09:20			
10 11	We'll probably come back to that a little 09:06:08	10	•			
	bit later in the morning.		Q And those two, did you testify on behalf			
12	Why don't we start with the easiest	12	of the plaintiff or the defendant or one of each?			
13	question of the day. Would you rather I call you	13	A Both cases was on behalf of the			
14	Professor or Dr. Kearl?	14	defendant.			
15	A Whatever works for you. 09:06:19	15	Q And have you 09:09:34			
16	Q I probably will switch back and forth	16	Prior to this case, have you ever been			
17	because I won't remember.	17	engaged to calculate a reasonable royalty copyright			
18	Why don't we start by marking your report,	18	case?			
19	and I'll ask the court reporter, first, to mark	19	A Well, yes. Damages in a very large			
20	Exhibit 570 I'm sorry 576. 09:06:28	20	copyright case, in a couple of cases, yes. 09:09:46			
21	(Deposition Exhibit 576 marked	21	Q And did you give testimony concerning the			
22	for identification.)	22	value of a license in a copyright case?			
23	MR. NORTON: Then 577.	23	A I was deposed in at least one of those			
24	(Deposition Exhibit 577 marked	24	cases. It's since disappeared into practice, as			
25	for identification.) 09:06:52	25	the lawyers say. I don't recall. I don't think I 09:10:06			
	7		9			

1			
1	gave testimony in the other case. 09:10:10	1	for the copyrights in suit? 09:12:54
2	Q And in the copyright case in which you	2	A Correct.
3	gave testimony, did you testify on behalf of the	3	Q And to calculate infringer's profits for
4	plaintiff or on behalf of the defendant?	4	copyrights in suit?
5	A The defendant. 09:10:18	5	A Correct. 09:12:59
6	Q What was the nature of the product in the	6	Q And lost profits for those copyrights?
7	copyright case in which you gave testimony on a	7	A Correct.
8	reasonable royalty?	8	Q And for each of those measures of damage,
9	A Software.	9	have you reached an independent opinion as to what
10	Q And the two patent cases in which you gave 09:10:30	10	the damages are in this case? 09:13:07
11	testimony on behalf of the defendants concerning a	11	A Within the confines of Judge Alsup's
12	reasonable royalty, what was the nature of the	12	orders, yes.
13	products in those cases?	13	Q In order to reach your opinions, did you
14	A They were both medical devices.	14	limit yourself to the documents
15	Q In the copyright case that involved 09:10:47	15	With respect to documents, did you limit 09:13:27
16	software, what kind of software was that?	16	yourself to the documents that were cited by the
17	A UNIX software.	17	parties' experts in their reports?
18	Q Do you recall the name of that case?	18	A Mostly, but as you'll note in the
19	A Yes, it's IBM versus SCO or SCO versus	19	footnotes, there are some documents that we went
20	IBM. 09:11:02	20	out and got that we judged to be relevant to this 09:13:43
21	Q If you could just describe for me what you	21	case.
22	understand your task in this particular case to be?	22	Q When you mention documents that you went
23	A I was retained by the Court, as I	23	out and got, are you referring to literature and
24	understand the matter, to originally critique the	24	things in the public record?
25	experts of each side. And then when the trial was 09:11:20	25	A Yes. 09:13:58
	10		12
1	delayed, Judge Alsup asked if I could come up with 09:11:24	1	Q So to the extent you rely on documents 09:13:59
2	an independent damages estimate. My response was	2	produced by the parties, did you limit yourself to
3	I could within the confines of the record. That	3	documents that were cited in one of the expert's
4	is, I couldn't go out and do independent research	4	reports?
5	beyond literature research. So I think it's fair 09:11:41	5	A Yes. 09:14:09
6	to say that it's morphed over time from at least	6	Q Did you review deposition testimony of
7	what it appeared to be last fall, as the trial has	7	witnesses in this case?
8	been delayed.	8	A I have.
9	Q But is it fair to say that, ultimately,	9	Q Did you limit yourself to deposition
10	your task included the job of coming up with an 09:11:55	10	testimony that was cited by one of the experts in 09:14:19
11	independent opinion as to the reasonable royalty of	11	the case?
12	the patents-in-suit in this case?	12	A No.
13	A Right, but within some fairly tight	13	Q So you reviewed deposition testimony that
	constraints. It's my understanding that Judge	14	had not necessarily been cited by any expert?
14	eonourunnos neo nej unuerounnenneg unueroudege		
14 15	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine 09:12:09	15	A That's correct. 09:14:30
		15 16	A That's correct. 09:14:30Q And did you have access to all of the
15	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine 09:12:09		
15 16	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine 09:12:09 on matters that he had precluded experts on either	16	Q And did you have access to all of the
15 16 17	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine 09:12:09 on matters that he had precluded experts on either side from testifying about, so it's not a sort of	16 17	Q And did you have access to all of the deposition transcripts in the case?
15 16 17 18	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine 09:12:09 on matters that he had precluded experts on either side from testifying about, so it's not a sort of go anywhere effort. It's within the confines of	16 17 18	Q And did you have access to all of the deposition transcripts in the case? MR. COOPER: Objection; calls for
15 16 17 18 19	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine 09:12:09 on matters that he had precluded experts on either side from testifying about, so it's not a sort of go anywhere effort. It's within the confines of his orders over the last three months.	16 17 18 19	Q And did you have access to all of the deposition transcripts in the case? MR. COOPER: Objection; calls for speculation.
15 16 17 18 19 20	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine on matters that he had precluded experts on either side from testifying about, so it's not a sort of go anywhere effort. It's within the confines of his orders over the last three months.09:12:09QBut with that understanding, it would be 09:12:3909:12:39	16 17 18 19 20	Q And did you have access to all of the deposition transcripts in the case? MR. COOPER: Objection; calls for speculation. THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think so, but I'm 09:14:43
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine on matters that he had precluded experts on either side from testifying about, so it's not a sort of go anywhere effort. It's within the confines of his orders over the last three months. Q But with that understanding, it would be fair to say that your task included the job of09:12:09	16 17 18 19 20 21	Q And did you have access to all of the deposition transcripts in the case? MR. COOPER: Objection; calls for speculation. THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think so, but I'm 09:14:43 not sure because we don't have a listing of all of
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine 09:12:09 on matters that he had precluded experts on either side from testifying about, so it's not a sort of go anywhere effort. It's within the confines of his orders over the last three months. Q But with that understanding, it would be 09:12:39 fair to say that your task included the job of calculating a reasonable royalty for the	16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q And did you have access to all of the deposition transcripts in the case? MR. COOPER: Objection; calls for speculation. THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think so, but I'm 09:14:43 not sure because we don't have a listing of all of the depositions that were taken.
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine on matters that he had precluded experts on either side from testifying about, so it's not a sort of go anywhere effort. It's within the confines of his orders over the last three months. Q But with that understanding, it would be fair to say that your task included the job of calculating a reasonable royalty for the patents-in-suit in this case?	16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Q And did you have access to all of the deposition transcripts in the case? MR. COOPER: Objection; calls for speculation. THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think so, but I'm 09:14:43 not sure because we don't have a listing of all of the depositions that were taken. BY MR. NORTON:

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
, 1		
1	did not receive a transcript? 09:14:56	1 Now, did you understand in the course of 09:17:31
2	A No.	2 your task, that you were permitted to come up with
3	Q Now, have you conducted any interviews	3 any methodology you chose to best calculate a
4	with any employees of any party?	4 reasonable royalty for the patents-in-suit?
5	A Let me clarify. I assume that retained 09:15:17	5 A I interpreted Judge Alsup's instruction 09:17:48
6	experts are not defined as employees of the	6 to me that I was to derive an independent estimate
7	parties.	7 as allowing for that, yes, subject, as I said now
8	Q I meant to carve those out. Let me ask it	8 a couple of times, to his subsequent orders
9	a little bit differently.	9 limiting the other experts on the case.
10	You have spoken with each of the parties' 09:15:26	10QAnd so with respect to the reasonable09:18:09
11	retained damages experts, correct?	11 royalty methodology reasonable royalty
12	A I have.	12 methodology in this case, have you reached an
13	Q Some of the parties' retained technical	13 opinion as to what the best way is to calculate a
14	experts?	14 reasonable royalty for the patents and copyrights in
15	A I have. 09:15:33	15 suit? 09:18:22
16	Q Other than the parties' retained technical	16 A I have.
17	experts and retained damages experts, have you	17 Q Okay.
18	spoken to any employee of any party?	18 And
19	A No.	19 A Let me back up. I've come up with a
20	Q To the extent that either Professor 09:15:44	20 methodology for estimate for the best way to 09:18:30
21	Cockburn or Dr. Leonard or Dr. Cox relies on	21 estimate the reasonable royalty on the portfolio
22	interviews with employees of a party, have you	that the parties were discussing in 2006. The
23	considered those interviews?	23 allocation of that portfolio royalty to the
24	A To the degree that they're reflected in	24 patents and copyrights in suit is constrained by
25	the reports, and then there were subsequent 09:16:06	25 Judge Alsup's orders. 09:18:50
	14	16
1	depositions of the people that they may have 09:16:09	1 Q Let me break that down a little bit. 09:18:54
2	interviewed, yes.	2 So with respect to calculating a royalty
3	Q To the extent that the expert	³ on the portfolio that the parties were discussing in
4	To the extent that Dr. Cox relied on	4 2006, you have come up with what you believe is the
5	interviews of people, or a person who was not 09:16:19	5 best way to calculate that royalty; is that correct? 09:19:06
6	subsequently interviewed, at some point deposed, did	6 A Correct.
7	you rely on those interviews?	7 Q Sorry. I didn't mean to speak over you.
8	A Again, only to the degree that he	8 And I know it's in the report, but in
9	reflects those interviews in his own reports.	⁹ brief form, what is the best way to calculate that
10	Q Is there anything that you did to assess 09:16:38	10 royalty? 09:19:20
11	the accuracy of the statements that were relayed to	11 A Has really three parts: One is to begin
12	Dr. Cox by the people he interviewed?	12 with the assumption that the parties would have
13	A No.	13 negotiated either a percentage of revenue or a per
14	Q In the course of reaching your opinions,	14 handset royalty in 2006; that that would then be
15	did you make any assumptions? 09:16:58	15 applied to actual Google revenues going forward; 09:19:46
16	A Yes.	16 and then to focus on the estimation of that per
	Q Is it possible for you to tell me what	17 unit or percentage royalty by looking at the
17	- IN IN PODDANIA INI TOU TO TOUT THE WHAT	
17 18		1 1 8 expectations of both parties in 2006 and now they
18	your primary assumptions are?	18 expectations of both parties in 2006 and how they 19 valued the 2006 deal backing out from the deal
18 19	your primary assumptions are? A I think a fair answer to that is that	19 valued the 2006 deal, backing out from the deal
18 19 20	your primary assumptions are? A I think a fair answer to that is that they are reflected in the report. We've been 09:17:13	19valued the 2006 deal, backing out from the deal20the things that were not associated with the09:20:14
18 19 20 21	your primary assumptions are? A I think a fair answer to that is that they are reflected in the report. We've been 09:17:13 tried to be very clear about when I've made an	19valued the 2006 deal, backing out from the deal20the things that were not associated with the09:20:1421intellectual property.
18 19 20 21 22	your primary assumptions are? A I think a fair answer to that is that they are reflected in the report. We've been 09:17:13 tried to be very clear about when I've made an assumption. And without walking through the	 valued the 2006 deal, backing out from the deal the things that were not associated with the 09:20:14 intellectual property. Q That allows you to calculate a per handset
18 19 20 21 22 23	your primary assumptions are? A I think a fair answer to that is that they are reflected in the report. We've been 09:17:13 tried to be very clear about when I've made an assumption. And without walking through the report, I'm not sure I can give a fair answer to	 valued the 2006 deal, backing out from the deal the things that were not associated with the 09:20:14 intellectual property. Q That allows you to calculate a per handset or per revenue dollar royalty rate?
18 19 20 21 22 23 24	your primary assumptions are? A I think a fair answer to that is that they are reflected in the report. We've been 09:17:13 tried to be very clear about when I've made an assumption. And without walking through the report, I'm not sure I can give a fair answer to that question.	 valued the 2006 deal, backing out from the deal the things that were not associated with the 09:20:14 intellectual property. Q That allows you to calculate a per handset or per revenue dollar royalty rate? A Correct.
18 19 20 21 22 23	your primary assumptions are? A I think a fair answer to that is that they are reflected in the report. We've been 09:17:13 tried to be very clear about when I've made an assumption. And without walking through the report, I'm not sure I can give a fair answer to	 19 valued the 2006 deal, backing out from the deal 20 the things that were not associated with the 09:20:14 21 intellectual property. 22 Q That allows you to calculate a per handset 23 or per revenue dollar royalty rate? 24 A Correct. 25 Q You said that 09:20:31

1	Well, with respect to apportioning that 09:20:33	1	BY MR. NORTON:		
2	2006 royalty rate, have you come up with what you	2			
3	believe is the best methodology for apportioning to		3 market share of Android as a result of the		
4	the intellectual property in suit?	4	infringement?		
5	A I don't think that's what I testified 09:20:56	5	A Yes. 09:23:52		
6	to. What I said was after after the	6	Q And uses that to apportion?		
7	determining the reasonable royalty on the	7	A Yes.		
8	portfolio, then the apportionment is really	8	Q Did you reach an opinion as to whether		
9	constrained by Judge Alsup's orders. And I	9	that approach was, as a matter of economics, was		
10	adopted the group and value methodology of 09:21:10	10	better or worse than the group and value approach? 09:24:03		
11	Professor Cockburn, but I'm not opining on whether	11	A Both approaches have some problems, and		
12	that's the best methodology for doing this.	12	I think both approaches have some strengths, so		
13	Q When you say, "whether that's the best	13	there is not it's not an easy call, which is		
14	methodology for doing this," what is "this"?	14	which one dominates the other.		
15	A Apportioning. 09:21:27	15	Q Did you conduct an analysis, an 09:24:21		
16		16	apportionment analysis, using the changes in market		
17	Q Did you consider other ways of	17	share?		
1 /	A Over the course of the last six months,	18	A Yes.		
		19			
19	yes, a number of different ways.		Q Is that analysis in your report?		
20	Q Did you identify any means of apportioning 09:21:39	20	A No. 09:24:35		
21	that is better than Professor Cockburn's group and	21	Q Is it excluded from your report because of		
22	value approach, as permitted by Judge Alsup's	22	your understanding of Judge Alsup's orders?		
23	orders?	23	A That's correct.		
24	A No.	24	Q When you conducted an analysis using the		
25	Q When I ask you "better," I mean, better in 09:21:57	25	changes in market shares, did you get to the point 09:24:46		
	18		20		
1	your estimation as an economist. 09:21:59	1	where you actually calculated a per unit royalty? 09:24:48		
2	A No.	2	A We may have.		
3	Q Are there other methods that you	3	Q Did you get to the point where you		
4	considered to be reasonable methods of apportioning,	4	calculated a royalty as a percentage of Google		
5	although perhaps not as good as the group and value 09:22:25	5	advertising revenues? 09:25:07		
6	approach permitted by Judge Alsup?	6	A Yes.		
7	MR. COOPER: Objection as to form.	7	Q Under that analysis using the change in		
8	THE WITNESS: Let me ask a clarifying	8	market shares, what royalty rate did you calculate		
9	question	9	as a percentage of Google advertising revenues?		
10	BY MR. NORTON:	10	A I don't recall at this point. 09:25:23		
11	Q Of course.	11	Q Was it greater than or less than the		
12	A of both attorneys.	12	royalty rate that you calculated using the group and		
13	Am I permitted to talk about things that	13	value approach?		
14	Judge Alsup has excluded in answer to that	14	A Greater, but not a lot.		
15	question? 09:23:15	15	Q Can you put any order of magnitude on "not 09:25:36		
16	MR. PURCELL: I think so.	16	a lot"?		
17	MR. NORTON: I agree with Mr. Purcell.	17	A Well, I need to preface this by saying		
18	MR. PURCELL: This is just a deposition.	18	that we did some preliminary work. It did not go		
19	Your testimony at trial might be limited, but I	19	through the kind of vetting that the final report		
20	think you can answer. 09:23:28	20	has, so as long as it's understood that this is 09:26:11		
21	THE WITNESS: Fair enough. Then I think	21	that we didn't complete the work because we were		
22	the approach that looks at the change in market	22	instructed not to complete the work, it probably		
23	share, predicted change in market share, was a good	23	would have been I don't know maybe twice as		
24	approach, an interesting approach.	24	high, in the 2 or 3 percent range, as opposed to		
25		25	the under-2 percent range. It may have been as 09:26:25		
	19		21		
	19	1	21		

~					
1	much as 50 to 80 percent higher than the fairly 09:26:32	1	their phones. 09:29:39		
2	low royalties.	2	For example, you could imagine that the		
3	Q Were there any other apportionment	3	way that Google could have offset the market share		
4	analyses that you began to use, but stopped because	4	effect would be to provide a subsidy to the phones		
5	of orders by Judge Alsup? 09:26:49	5	equal to the sort of the amount that they would 09:29:		
6	A We worked at estimating this the same	6	have lost because of the reduced functionality.		
7	way we've sort of tracked the experts here,	7	It's just unclear because if you think of these as		
8	which is my job. And so in Professor Cockburn's	8	independent OEMs, and you think kind of a		
9	first report or second report, sorry, not his	9	competitive market here in which the handsets		
10	first report, but his second report. 09:27:11	10	themselves are priced at roughly equal to the cost 09:30:0		
11	Q So you used the method	11	of the equipment and stuff in the handsets, then it		
12	You performed an analysis using the method	12	doesn't make a lot of sense to argue the adjudgment		
13	that Professor Cockburn used to apportion in his	13	would have been in the price.		
14	September 2011 report?	14	Q Okay.		
15	A Yeah, we explored that method, parts of 09:27:23	15	So did you reach a conclusion as an 09:30:24		
16	that method, sure.	16	economist as to whether an approach using the change		
17	Q In exploring that method, did you reach a	17	in market shares would have been economically sound?		
18	conclusion as to what you believe the royalty rate	18	A With the caveats I've just given, yes,		
19	would be if that were a permissible method?	19	but it would have required a careful analysis		
20	A It would have been what I just told you 09:27:38	20	of of what would have happened as the 09:30:46		
21	a few minutes ago. It would have been roughly	21	functionality of the phones decreased and what		
22	twice the current I need to be very cautious	22	part of that would have been reflected in market		
23	here because I don't have the numbers in front of	23	share and what part of it would have been		
24	me, and I didn't write the numbers down, but my	24	reflected in perhaps the direct subsidy to Google.		
25	vague recollection is they would be roughly twice 09:27:48	25	I mean, Google presumably cares about 09:31:03		
	22		24		
1	the size of the current royalties, maybe not quite 09:27:49	1	market share, but it also cares about its 09:31:05		
2	that large.	2	advertising revenues on these phones. So if you		
3	Q Now, with respect to the the change in	3	netted out a subsidy they had to pay, that would		
4	market share approach that you considered that you	4	have reduced their their their net revenues,		
5	did not include in your final report, did you reach 09:28:14	5	which would have mattered to them as well. 09:31:15		
6	an opinion as an economist as to whether that	6	Let me put it a slightly different way.		
7	approach would be sound as a matter of economics?	7	Even if you don't have the same market share		
8	A It requires some additional work that I	8	even if the market share doesn't change by the full		
9	think Professor Cockburn didn't do. The as I	9	amount predicted by Professor Cockburn, it's		
10	understand, that approach was excluded by Judge 09:28:41	10	partially offset, but it's offset by subsidies to 09:31:31		
11	Alsup on an argument that when the predicted	11	Google. Then Google's revenues from the handsets		
12	willingness to pay was compared to the price, the	12	goes down, in part, because of the market share		
13	price of the phone was not allowed to move, that	13	and, in part, because it has to offset the problems		
14	this was Dr. Leonard's principal criticism. It's	14	that the OEMs have in selling their phones. That		
15	my understanding that was at the heart of why 09:29:01	15	was not explored carefully by Professor Cockburn. 09:31:49		
16	Judge Alsup excluded that.	16	I did not explore it. So short of exploring that,		
17	It's hard to believe these phones' prices	17	you know, there is not much that can be said there,		
18	would have gone down. Google didn't control the	18	except that it was an appropriate methodology if		
19	price. So it is a reasonable assumption that the	19	that hole could have been filled.		
20	price of the Android phones would not have changed, 09:29:18	20	Q All right. Thank you. 09:32:06		
21	and this would have been mostly a market share, a	21	Now, with respect to the copyright		
22	functionality would have affected market share, but	22	reasonable royalty, is there any difference in your		
23	that required some additional stable work by	23	approach to calculating a reasonable royalty for		
24	Professor Cockburn, having to do with the Google's	24	copyright and a reasonable royalty for patents?		
25	relationships with the OEMs and how the OEMs price 09:29:35	25	A No. And here I need to be very 09:32:24		
	23		25		
1		1			


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1 2 3 4	cautious. I'm not a lawyer, obviously. It's my 09:32:26 understanding that there is not really a	1	factors to calculate a reasonable royalty in a 09:34:58			
3	understanding that there is not really a					
		2	patent case, does that make good economic sense?			
4	reasonable royalty on a on copyrights. A	3	A You're asking me to opine on the Georgia			
-1	different term is used, but all of the experts in	4	Pacific factors?			
5	this case have used a reasonable royalty approach 09:32:39	5	Q A good an economically sensible way to 09:35:10			
6	to deriving the the what would have been the	6	calculate a royalty in a patent case?			
7	foregone revenues on the on the copyrights, and	7				
8	I have adopted that approach.	8				
9	Q To the extent that	9	answer is in some cases yes, in some cases no.			
10	To the extent that damages in a copyright 09:32:56	10	I've opined in my report this makes sense 09:35:24			
11	case can be measured by a hypothetical license that	11	for a portfolio, doesn't really make sense for the			
12	would have been negotiated between the parties at	12	individual patents. But I think the Georgia			
13	the time that infringement began, and to the extent	13	Pacific factors are don't have a lot of weight			
14	that in a patent case, damages could be calculated	14	among economists. I don't think this is this is			
15	by calculating a hypothetical license that would 09:33:14	15	not the approach that an economist would take to 09:35:47			
16	have been negotiated by the parties at the time the	16	thinking about these matters. And you know, sort			
17	infringement began, is there any economic reason to	17	of there is a constraint here that economists have			
18	approach those two measurements any differently?	18	to pour themselves into. And so if you read these			
19	A Yes. The patents have a known life.	19	reports, including the experts in this case, the			
20	And it's my understanding that the copyrights have 09:33:31	20	Georgia Pacific factors are a set of, we've got to 09:36:00			
21	a known life, but it's much longer. I don't know	21	do this; let's just check off the list. They don't			
22	what the life is, but it's a much longer period of	22	seriously inform the analysis.			
23	time. So presumably, if you were able to think	23	In defense of my report, I took them			
24	about these negotiations as separate on the two	24	seriously because they provided, as you know since			
25	different forms of intellectual property, they 09:33:49	25	you have read it, a place to critique the experts, 09:36:21			
	26		28			
1	might take a slightly different character because 09:33:52	1	which was part of my assignment. And so they 09:36:25			
2	of the because of the lifetime, expected life	2	allowed me an opportunity to address specifically a			
3	of that.	3	number of topics the experts brought on. In this			
4	And, you know, you have invited me to	4	case they happened to be useful, but in lots of			
5	speculate a little bit here, so I will. It's 09:34:04	5	cases they are not terribly useful. 09:36:38			
6	conceivable that the kind of noninfringing	6	Q So is the approach that you used to			
7	substitutes could be different for patents than for	7	calculate a reasonable royalty for patents, is it			
8	copyrights.	8	just as good a method for calculating the			
9	Q Okay.	9	hypothetical license for the copyrights in this			
10	You're familiar with the Georgia Pacific 09:34:16	10	case? 09:36:49			
11	factors?	11	MR. COOPER: From an economic point of			
12	A I am.	12	view?			
13	Q All right.	13	MR. NORTON: From an economic point of			
14	In the two observations that you just made	14	view, yes.			
15	that might be different between copyrights and 09:34:22	15	THE WITNESS: I think I've answered that 09:36:59			
16	patents, would those potential differences be	16	question. You know, if you had separate licenses			
17	addressed by application of the Georgia Pacific	17	for patents and for copyrights, as opposed to a			
18	factors?	18	portfolio of intellectual property, and had			
10 19	A I'm not quite sure how to answer. It's	19	negotiations that would inform you about how the			
20	my understanding the Georgia Pacific factors apply 09:34:39	20	parties thought about those two separate things, 09:37:20			
21	to the reasonable royalty for patents and not for	21	then I think in principle, given my earlier answer,			
22	copyrights, but I'm happy to be informed if I've	22	one could think about the negotiations as being			
22		22	somewhat different between the two. But in this			
23 24	got that wrong. Q Well, is there	23				
24 25		24 25	case, we have a single negotiation over an aggregate			
2 J	Is application of the Georgia Pacific 09:34:57	20	that includes both the patents and the copyrights, 09:37:34			



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in 2006 reflect a discount because of the 09:48:31	1 litigation premium. 09:51:28
	2 BY MR. NORTON:
	3 Q I'm sorry.
-	4 When you say, "there is empirical evidence
	5 that there is a positive litigation premium," are 09:51:34
	6 you talking about this case?
	7 A No, not this case. I'm just talking
	8 about the economists who studied this matter have
	9 found that there is a positive litigation premium.
	10 Q And so in general, one expects there to be 09:51:47
	 a litigation premium? A Yes, based on that empirical work.
	C
	14issue of uncertainty with respect to validity and15infringement: is that right?09:52:01
	8
	17 look at the study. I just know there is this18 premium that we're talking about.
-	19 Q I'm sorry. 20 Now, you have used the term ''conservative'' 09:52:10
-	21 in a number of places in your report to describe
	 21 In a number of places in your report to describe 22 your methods and conclusions; is that right?
	23 A Yes.
	24 Q When you use the term "conservative" in
	25 your report, by that, you mean that you have 09:52:19
that true? 09:49:54	1 calculated damages that are lower than what might 09:52:22
A Well, maybe. It's not altogether clear	2 be lower than what would be the case if you had
which way this goes. I mean, Sun has uncertainty	3 perfect information?
about which of its patents and copyrights are	4 A For the most part, yes.
valid and enforceable, right? And Google has 09:50:07	5 Q Is there any example where you have used 09:52:34
uncertainty about sort of the cost of figuring	6 the term "conservative" to describe a methodology or
that out and discovering it. So it's unclear	7 conclusion you have reached that might be too high?
which way that goes, frankly.	8 A Not that comes readily to mind, but
Q But it is possible, if the parties were to	9 there may be. I don't recall. I think, in
renegotiate a license after determination of 09:50:32	10 general, the estimates I have, you would expect 09:52:51
	10 general, the estimates I have, you would expect 09:52:51
infringement and validity in this case with respect	10 general, the estimates make, you would expect 09.52.51 11 the adjustments to go the other go up.
infringement and validity in this case with respect to the patents and copyrights in suit, that they	
	11 the adjustments to go the other go up.
to the patents and copyrights in suit, that they	 the adjustments to go the other go up. Q And so given that, wouldn't it be the case
to the patents and copyrights in suit, that they would negotiate for a higher royalty rate than the	 the adjustments to go the other go up. Q And so given that, wouldn't it be the case that if the parties were to renegotiate the license
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to the patents and copyrights in suit, that they would negotiate for a higher royalty rate than the one you have calculated? MR. COOPER: Objection; form. 09:50:45 THE WITNESS: That's possible, but I want to emphasize again the point I just made, which is Google may have been willing to pay a small premium in order to for the for the portfolio, in order to avoid the litigation that could come if it 09:51:07 subsequently infringed. So there is the uncertainty here cuts a	11the adjustments to go the other go up.12QAnd so given that, wouldn't it be the case13that if the parties were to renegotiate the license14after a finding of infringement and validity, that15the royalty that they would negotiate would be09:53:1416higher than the one you have calculated?17AWell, that goes to an issue that really18starts with Professor Cockburn a long time ago19about whether or not the Sun Armstrong project20expected revenues are a way of thinking about09:53:4021about that issue. And if they are, the answer is22the royalty that I estimated, for the most part,
to the patents and copyrights in suit, that they would negotiate for a higher royalty rate than the one you have calculated? MR. COOPER: Objection; form. 09:50:45 THE WITNESS: That's possible, but I want to emphasize again the point I just made, which is Google may have been willing to pay a small premium in order to for the for the portfolio, in order to avoid the litigation that could come if it 09:51:07 subsequently infringed. So there is the uncertainty here cuts a couple of different ways. I don't think it cuts	 the adjustments to go the other go up. Q And so given that, wouldn't it be the case that if the parties were to renegotiate the license after a finding of infringement and validity, that the royalty that they would negotiate would be 09:53:14 higher than the one you have calculated? A Well, that goes to an issue that really starts with Professor Cockburn a long time ago about whether or not the Sun Armstrong project expected revenues are a way of thinking about 09:53:40 about that issue. And if they are, the answer is the royalty that I estimated, for the most part, incorporates that.
to the patents and copyrights in suit, that they would negotiate for a higher royalty rate than the one you have calculated? MR. COOPER: Objection; form. 09:50:45 THE WITNESS: That's possible, but I want to emphasize again the point I just made, which is Google may have been willing to pay a small premium in order to for the for the portfolio, in order to avoid the litigation that could come if it 09:51:07 subsequently infringed. So there is the uncertainty here cuts a	 the adjustments to go the other go up. Q And so given that, wouldn't it be the case that if the parties were to renegotiate the license after a finding of infringement and validity, that the royalty that they would negotiate would be 09:53:14 higher than the one you have calculated? A Well, that goes to an issue that really starts with Professor Cockburn a long time ago about whether or not the Sun Armstrong project expected revenues are a way of thinking about 09:53:40 about that issue. And if they are, the answer is the royalty that I estimated, for the most part,
	 A Well, maybe. It's not altogether clear which way this goes. I mean, Sun has uncertainty about which of its patents and copyrights are valid and enforceable, right? And Google has uncertainty about sort of the cost of figuring that out and discovering it. So it's unclear which way that goes, frankly. Q But it is possible, if the parties were to


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1	used that you believe are conservative in the sense 09:54:32	1	Q Right. 09:57:24			
2	that they tend to understate damages?	2	So in Footnote 27 to your report, you			
3	A Again, I hesitate to without going	3	explain that that substitution results in a			
4	through the report looking item by item, so I	4	conservative estimate of the reasonable royalty?			
5	my answer is not going to be exclude those 09:54:56	5	A Correct. 09:57:34			
6	things I may have mentioned in the report.	6	Q So that's a step that you took that will			
7	But I'll give you an example. Two	7	tend to understate the royalty that Sun would			
8	examples. One is there is this let me back up.	8	otherwise be entitled to, in this case Oracle,			
9	Ask a question. Are you talking about the	9	right?			
10	apportioned royalties or the portfolio? 09:55:26	10	A It might. But the the you 09:57:43			
11	Q Let's do it this way I don't mean for	11	· ·			
12	this to be a memory test, so my question was not	12				
13	intended to list all the ways in which your report	13	they're valuing the same economic activity. So in			
14	may be conservative.	14	some sense, you have to argue have to sort of			
15	Let me do it this way: Turning back to 09:55:42	15	come to a meeting of the minds about the prospects 09:58:03			
16	your methodology for calculating the royalty for the	16	of this activity. And in that sense, I used			
17	entire portfolio.	17	Google's more conservative estimates.			
18	A Yes.	18	Q Now, to the extent that Sun expected to			
19	Q So on one side, you need to calculate the	19	earn additional revenues that are not accounted for			
20	anticipated benefit to Sun as a result of that 09:55:55	20	in the project Armstrong document that you relied 09:58:24			
21	transaction?	21	upon, will your royalty calculation tend to be too			
22	A Correct.	22	low?			
23	Q And so you need to analyze what value Sun	23	MR. COOPER: Objection; form.			
24	expected to receive in 2006?	24	BY MR. NORTON:			
25	A Correct. 09:56:06	25	Q Let me ask the question a little 09:58:46			
2.5	42	25	Q Let me ask the question a nutle 09.50.40			
			1100 J. 00 70 47			
		1	differently. 09:58:47			
		2	If it were the case that in addition to			
		3	the revenues identified in the project Armstrong			
		4	document, Sun expected to earn further revenues from			
		5	provisioning that would be equal to or greater than 09:58:58			
		6	the projected Armstrong revenues, will the inclusion			
	—	7	of those additional expected benefits increase the			
		8	amount of the revenue of the royalty?			
		9	A Yes. Let me answer more fully in the			
		10	following way: I described in my report what I 09:59:18			
		11	call complex negotiations, as opposed to simple			
		12	negotiations, in which there are various terms the			
		13	parties are dumping money into. And if you're now			
		14	telling me that in addition to the upfront, the			
		15	capped share and project Armstrong, there is a 09:59:33			
		16	fourth category that money would have been dumped			
		17	into, then it's possible, sure.			
		18	Q Well, not just possible. If there were			
		19	additional revenues that Sun expected to earn that			
		20	were equal in size to the project Android revenues 09:59:50			
		21	that you have factored in, that would necessarily			
		22	increase the amount of the benefit to Sun in your			
		23	calculation, correct?			
		24	A It would, but you would have assumed			
	09:57:22	25	that those would have been reflected at some point 10:00:06			
1	43	1	45			

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
1	in the negotiation documents. And at least so far 10:00:07	1	point is that this is the net revenue, and you 10:02:25
2	as I know, there is nothing like that reflected.	2	would have to net out whatever costs. So it's
3	There is certainly no hard numbers here.	3	conceivable you could have a high revenue
4	Q Okay.	4	activity, but not much contribution to the value
5	But to the extent 10:00:16	5	of the intellectual property they thought they 10:02:38
6	I didn't mean to cut you off. Were you	6	were negotiating over.
7	finished with your answer?	7	Q Sure, because what you're actually
8	A Yeah.	8	calculating is the net present value of 2006 of the
9	Q But to the extent that there is evidence	9	expected profits, not revenues?
10	that Sun did have such expectations and that they 10:00:25	10	A Correct. 10:02:49
11	were quantified in some sense, to accurately	11	Q Okay.
12	calculate the royalty using your method, you should	12	And so the salient question would be, were
13	include the net present value of 2006 of those	13	there additional profits that Sun expected to earn
14	additional benefits; is that right?	14	directly from its monetization of Android?
15	A Yes, if there is clear evidence that 10:00:40	15	A Yes. And that envisioned, as part of 10:03:04
16	these were part of the way Sun viewed the value of	16	the compensation, for the bundle of intellectual
17	its intellectual property. And the way I've	17	property in 2006.
18	characterized the complex contract is that Sun had	18	Q Now, you also make adjustments to the
19	in mind a value for which it was willing to	19	value to Sun by looking at some of the other terms
20	license open source open source license of its 10:00:57	20	that the parties discussed in 2006; is that right? 10:03:34
21	intellectual property and that it intended to	21	A You need to be more precise.
22	monetize that in three different ways. So if	22	Q Sure. Okay.
23	you're telling me there is other things out here,	23	So one of the things that you look at
24	well, Sun had other business activities. It was	24	is
25	doing lots of things. You can't throw that in 10:01:12	25	And just so we're in the same place, if 10:03:43
	46		48
1	here. So you'd have to tie this to Sun's ex ante 10:01:14	1	you'd turn to Paragraph 73. 10:03:48
2	evaluation of the intellectual property that was	2	
3	at the heart of this negotiation.		
4	If your question is, there is a tie that		
5	shows there is a fourth bundle here, and it was 10:01:28		
6	part of what Sun thought of as the value of its		
7	intellectual property, then yes.		
8	Q Okay.		
9	Let me ask a somewhat more precise		
10	question.		
	The 10:02:22		
	The 10:02:22		10:05:20 49

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
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1	have Google promoting the Java brand in the mobile 10:14:46	1	a discount rate?	10:17:2	L
2	space?	2	A I do.		
3	A Probably.	3	Q And the discount rate	that you used was	
4	Q In connection with Android?	4	15 percent?		
5	A Probably. 10:14:51	5	A Yes.	10:17:25	
6	Q Is there any way in which it would not be	6			
7	to the benefit of Sun to have Google promoting Java				
8	in the mobile space?				
9	MR. COOPER: Objection; form.				
10	BY MR. NORTON:			10:17:33	
11	Q You said "probably," and I'm trying to	11	Q All right.		
12	figure out what makes it something less than	12	What is the reason to us	se a discount rate	
13	certain.	13	in the first place?		
14	A Do you want me to speculate? Is this an	14	A Because the future is un	certain.	
15	invitation to speculate? 10:15:22	15	Q All right.	10:17:41	
16	Q No. Is there a specific reason, that you	16	A And money is costly.		
17	can think of, as to why it would not be valuable to	17			
18	Sun to have Google promoting Android as Java?				
19	MR. COOPER: Same objection; form.				
20	THE WITNESS: This is really speculation, 10:16:02				
21	but to the degree that project Armstrong was not				
22	successful and that Sun did not gain or it's	22	Q The fixed fee payment	s come over a	
23	getting most of its monetization of this	23	three-year period?		
24	intellectual property so suppose going forward	24	A Correct.		
25	it's not successful, then Sun may very well have 10:16:18	25	Q You characterize those	e as low risk; is	10:18:06
	58				60
1	been interested in an alternative or competitive 10:16:25	1	that right?	10:18:07	
2	product, in which case, it's not of interest to have	2	A Correct.		
3	your competitors saying, "I'm just like the product	3	Q Are they lower risk the	an the future	
4	that just came on the market."	4	revenues?		
5	BY MR. NORTON:	5	A Yes.	10:18:15	
6	Q And all the evidence that you have seen	6	Q Is it appropriate to app	ply the same	
7	suggests that Sun expected Project Armstrong to be	7	discount rate for the relatively	y low-risk fixed	
8	successful?	8	payments as it is for the futur		
9	A Yes.	9	A I think so. I think you w	vant to use a	
10	Q Okay. 10:16:42	10	project-specific discount rate.	You're arguing	10:18:25
11	So at the time of the 2006 negotiation,	11	for a subproject-specific discou		
12	Sun would have expected that Google's promotion of	12	could do that, but I think typica		
13	Java in the mobile space in connection with Android	13	venture capitalist or whomever	is doing this	
14	would be valuable to Sun?	14	doesn't split the project into par	~	
15	A I think so, yes. 10:16:52	15	They just use a discount rate. A	and the discount	10:18:42
16	Q And would you agree that Sun would have	16	rate, overall, reflects the relative	e risks in	
17	expected that Google's promotion of Java in the	17	this, so you could argue to the d	legree that the	
18	mobile space in connection with Android would be	18	15 percent well, you could ar		
19	very valuable?	19	15 percent, in some sense, aggre	egates these risks	
20	MR. COOPER: Objection; form. 10:17:04	20	and reflects those.	10:18:56	
21	MR. PURCELL: Join.	21	Let me put it slightly diff	erently.	
22	THE WITNESS: I don't know.				
23	BY MR. NORTON:	23	at, let's say, the money market r	ate or something	
24	Q So when you have to bring the future	24	like this because they're certain,	, then I think,	
25	revenues back to net present value of 2006, you use 10:17:18	25	you know, one might argue that	the Project	10:19:09
	59			-	6

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
1	Armstrong monies have to be discounted at a 10:19:10	1	Q And your use of 15 percent instead of 10:21:39
2	substantially higher interest rate because they are	2	11.77 percent is conservative, correct?
3	more far more speculative and 15 percent is too	3	A Correct.
4	low.	4	Q And conservative, again, in the sense that
5	Q So in a sense, the 15 percent discount 10:19:21	5	had you used 11.77 percent, the royalty damages 10:21:46
6	rate is a is right for the whole project?	6	would be great?
7	A It is. That's how we've treated it.	7	A Agreed.
8	Q Now, the 15 percent discount rate itself	8	Q To the extent that well, let me strike
9	is another number that you characterize as	9	that.
10	conservative; is that right? 10:19:33	10	So one part of the equation is to figure 10:22:17
11	A Correct.	11	out what Sun's expected benefits are, expected
12	Q And again, it's conservative in the sense	12	profits are, and discount them back to net present
13	that it is a larger discount factor, discount rate,	13	value, correct?
14	than might reasonably apply?	14	A Correct.
15	A Well, this goes to an issue about 10:19:46	15	Q And then the second part of the equation 10:22:27
16	that economists struggle with some on damages.	16	is to determine what Google's expected profits are
17	You can get the rate of return, the cost of	17	and discount those back to net present value?
18	capital, essentially, for firms that look like Sun	18	A Correct.
19	and Google. And I think, actually, Professor	19	
		20	Q Now, in calculating Google's anticipated benefits, what benefits did you consider? 10:22:39
20	or Dr. Cox does that, and it's 11-point something 10:20:05		•
21	percent.	21	(Whereupon, Allyson Franco with
22	And then the question is, is a specific	22	Farella Braun & Martel, just
23	project more or less risky than the average risk of	23	entered the conference room.)
24	the firm's because that's the way the market values	24	THE WITNESS: I make the argument early in
25	the firm as a whole. What you'd like to have, and 10:20:19	25	the report that the parties would have agreed to a 10:22:52
	62		64
1	the theoretically approximate thing is to have 10:20:22	1	lieuros en Casalela Ardurid reurona en the 10.22.54
1	the theoretically appropriate thing, is to have 10:20:22 the the interest rate that reflects the risk of	1 2	license on Google's Android revenues on the 10:22:54
2		3	argument, a monitoring argument, that you don't want
3	the project, not the risk of the firm. We don't		to have things that are difficult to measure, so we
4	have that, and typically you don't have that. So	4	just look at Google's Android revenues. MR. COOPER: Let the record show that 10:23:07
5	it's conservative in the sense that it's above the 10:20:37	5	
6	average user cost of capital for firms that look	6	Allyson Franco from our firm has joined the
7	like Sun, but it may not be conservative relative	7	deposition.
8	to the risks of specific projects. I just don't	8	MR. NORTON: Thank you.
9	have information on that.	9	BY MR. NORTON:
10	Q All right. 10:20:54	10	Q Does it make any difference in your 10:23:15
11	But in Footnote 28 to your report, you	11	calculation whether Google expected other
12	state that:	12	substantial benefits from watching Android?
13	"I conclude use of the	13	A I'm not certain I know what you have in
14	15 percent discount rate is	14	mind, so you need to be more specific about that.
15	conservative in this instance''? 10:21:02	15	Q Okay. 10:23:55
16	A That's correct, because typically damage	16	In your review of the evidence, have you
17	experts are left to use the average, not the	17	seen any evidence that Google expected Android to
18	project specific. And we know the average for the	18	provide benefits to its Desktop search business?
19	group of firms in that industrial classification	19	A Not really. There are vague allusions
20	is, what, 11 something, 11.8 percent. So in that 10:21:19	20	to this, but I haven't seen, quote, evidence. 10:24:28
21	sense, it's conservative. That's all I meant.	21	Q To the extent that Google expected that
22	Q So in your report, you note that the	22	Android would provide benefits to its Desktop search
23	discount rate for 6 code 737, which includes both	23	business, are those benefits factored into your
24	Sun and Google, was 11.77 percent?	24	royalty analysis?
25	A Yes. 10:21:38	25	A Yes, in a sense they are. One of the 10:24:56
	63		65




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1	compatible implementation. 10:30:33	1	made in 2006. 10:33:35
2	Q So when we look at the hypothetical	2	Q Okay.
3		3	And so to the extent that there were
4	negotiation, imagine the parties negotiating for the infringement that Google actually did, do you agree	4	alternatives available to Google in 2006, the
5		5	
	r		
6 7	compensation to account for the risk of increased	6	baked into the bargain the parties would have struck
8	fragmentation from an incompatible implementation?	8	at that time? A Yes.
9	A Yes.		
	Q And that additional compensation that Sun	9	Q And if that's correct, then there should
10	would have expected is not included in your royalty 10:31:09	10	be no need to make any adjustment to the portfolio 10:33:55
11	calculations; is that right?	11	royalty based on arguments that there are
12	A Correct.	12	alternatives; is that right?
13	Q Now, in addition to the issue of	13	A That's my opinion.
14	fragmentation, by using the 2006 starting point, is	14	Q So if we could turn to Paragraph 86.
15	it correct to say that the strike that. I'm 10:31:28	15	Now, in paragraph 86 here in your report, 10:35:06
16	sorry.	16	you describe, if I understand correctly, the step
17	Is it fair to say that by using the 2006	17	where you convert the expected value to Google and
18	starting point, the consideration of alternatives is	18	expected value to Sun into an effective report for
19	already baked into the numbers?	19	the entire portfolio; is that right?
20	A Yes, I say that explicitly in my report. 10:31:48	20	A Correct. 10:35:24
21	Q When you say "explicitly," is that	21	Q Now, at the beginning of the deposition
22	Paragraphs 177 to 179 of your report?	22	you explained that there is a change that you would
23	A Yes. But in addition, there are a	23	make to the calculation here that would slightly
24	couple of footnotes.	24	decrease the denominator of the equation.
25	Q I hate to do this to you, but can you 10:32:12	25	A Yes. 10:35:41
	70	ļ	72
1	direct me to those? 10:32:14	1	Q All right. 10:35:41
2	A Sure. One in verse paragraph	2	And do you have a calculation as to what
3	Q Some of us write in poetry. Some of us	3	the percentage royalty would be after you make that
4	write in prose.	4	correction?
5	A Yes. Paragraph 76, Footnote 38, this is 10:32:29	5	A This affects it as second decimal place 10:35:50
6	talking about Sun, but it's equally true about		
7	taiking about Sun, but it's equally true about	6	or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
'		6	or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8	Google.		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8	Google.		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9	Google.QSo in Footnote 38 let me catch up toyou.In Footnote 38, you're referring to10:32:58		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say:		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09 with regard to the effects of an		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09 with regard to the effects of an agreement with Google for an open-source Java-VM Android on its		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09 with regard to the effects of an agreement with Google for an open-source Java-VM Android on its Java ME business would be fully		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09 with regard to the effects of an agreement with Google for an open-source Java-VM Android on its Java ME business would be fully reflected in its 2006 offer.'' 10:33:21		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09 with regard to the effects of an agreement with Google for an open-source Java-VM Android on its Java ME business would be fully reflected in its 2006 offer.'' 10:33:21 And you say that's equally true of Google.		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09 with regard to the effects of an agreement with Google for an open-source Java-VM Android on its Java ME business would be fully reflected in its 2006 offer.'' 10:33:21 And you say that's equally true of Google. Can you explain what you mean?		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: "This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09 with regard to the effects of an agreement with Google for an open-source Java-VM Android on its Java ME business would be fully reflected in its 2006 offer." 10:33:21 And you say that's equally true of Google. Can you explain what you mean? A The expectations that the parties held		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Google. Q So in Footnote 38 let me catch up to you. In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58 Paragraph 76. You say: ''This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations 10:33:09 with regard to the effects of an agreement with Google for an open-source Java-VM Android on its Java ME business would be fully reflected in its 2006 offer.'' 10:33:21 And you say that's equally true of Google. Can you explain what you mean?		or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.

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
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
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
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Í		1	agreement for that bundle of intellectual 11:26:37
		2	property.
		3	If you assume that Google did not know in
		4	2006 what it needed, then you can think about this
		5	in a couple of different ways. One, you can think 11:26:50
		6	of it as as an option to use some, all or none
		7	of the intellectual property, and what's the option
		8	value for being able to choose both what you want
		9	to use and the timing in which you use it. And the
		10	option value, I think, would be the portfolio 11:27:10
		11	value. That's what portfolio licenses are,
		12	essentially, in this setting.
		13	A third way to think about it is, suppose
		14	that Google didn't really want to use Java ME
		15	directly, but wanted to use a Java Virtual Machine 11:27:26
		16	and write in Java so that applications and OEMs
		17	would be attracted to the platform because they
18	Q That is your best economic advice?	18	thought Java was necessary. So they are going to
19	A Yes.	19	go out and write their own thing. But they
20	Q It would be fair to say that's your best 11:25:09	20	understood, or would understand, I think 11:27:43
21	economic judgment?	21	reasonably, that Sun, that had done this for many,
22	A Yes.	22	many years, had bumped into the problems that it
23	Q So is it correct to say that your best	23	would encounter as it as it went out and did its
24	economic judgment is that the value of the in-suit	24	own Java Virtual Machine. And as it solved those
25	IP in this case is the value of the Java ME 11:25:19	25	problems, it was likely to solve them in the same 11:28:02
	102		104
1	portfolio from 2006? 11:25:25	1	way that Sun had solved them and, hence, crossed 11:28:04
2	A Yes. I'm quibbling about this only	2	the boundaries of a Sun patent. So in that sense,
3	because, as I suggest in the previous paragraphs,	3	you can think of the portfolio license as an
4	paragraphs running up to this paragraph, there are	4	insurance against subsequent litigation if you
5	several ways to think about this. And in my 11:25:40	5	happened to have crossed a boundary when you, in 11:28:20
6	economic opinion, there would have been a	6	fact, were doing your own thing here.
7	portfolio negotiation. All right? And therefore,	7	Q So in each of those three scenarios,
8	if some subset of the portfolio is infringed, the	8	Google knows exactly what it wants. Google doesn't
9	value is the portfolio value.	9	know what it wants. Google is looking for insurance
10	Q Okay. 11:25:57	10	as it goes down the Java path. In each of those 11:28:41
11	A But I don't mean the way you frame it	11	three scenarios, the value of the IP-in-suit would
12	suggests that I've apportioned this to those, and	12	be the value of the 2006 portfolio; is that correct?
13	that's not quite what I've done.	13	A Yes, although I think you misstated
14	Q Okay.	14	that. In the first one, I assume that Java
15	I know this isn't in the report, but why 11:26:09	15	that Google knows what it needs. Okay? In the 11:28:56
16	don't you explain what it is that you have done in	16	second two, Google doesn't know what it needs. It
17	reaching the conclusions that you express in Section	17	just believes it might need some part of this.
18	K?	18	Q Okay.
19	A Three different things, three or four	19	A Okay? But again, we need to be careful
20	different things. First, if you think of the 11:26:21	20	about pushing this in a certain way to suggest 11:29:12
21	hypothetical negotiation as the parties knowing in	21	that this is a I mean, it would be this if it
22	2006 what intellectual property they needed,	22	had gone a different route and infringed a
23	Google knew what it needed, it needed these two	23	different set of patents. It would have been this
24	patents and it needed the 37 copyrights, then	24	if they had infringed 80 percent of the patents,
25	whatever the agreement was in 2006 was the 11:26:35	25	because it's the portfolio that they were buying 11:29:27
	103		105

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Pages 106 to 109

		1	0.01
		1	Q Okay. 11:38:21
		2	Is it appropriate to include damages for
		3	phones that have been activated as of the date of
		4	trial?
		5	A That have not? 11:38:39
		6	Q That have, all phones that have been
		7	activated as of the date of trial.
		8	A That's a legal issue.
		9	Q As an economic matter, do you have an
		10	opinion? 11:38:47
		11	A Well, to the degree that Google gets, or
		12	Oracle gets, a going-forward royalty, then it gets
		13	a royalty on the revenues those phones will
		14	generate going forward. So in that sense, it's
		15	not disadvantaged by not getting the damages at 11:39:01
		16	trial.
17	that.	17	So suppose I have a ramp-up in which I
18	If the jury were to apply a per-unit	18	have almost no revenue now, but a lot of revenue a
	royalty, as opposed to a percentage of revenue	19	year from now on phones that were activated before
	royalty, using activations as of April 16, 2012, do 11:36:11	20	trial. Then presumably, Oracle would get the 11:39:17
	you believe there is any adjustment that should be	21	return on those phones when those revenues are
	made in order to have that royalty be as of present	22	reported in the and the royalty rate was applied
23	value as of the date of trial?	23	to the royalty I mean, to the to the
24	A Perhaps, but this is really complex and	24	revenues.
25	goes to some legal issues I don't understand, but 11:37:04	25	Q To the extent that the outcome of the case 11:39:39
	110		112
1	let me sort of put out what I mean, the parties 11:37:08	1	is that there is an award of historical damages and 11:39:40
2	shouldn't be able to choose, ex post, the most	2	an injunction going forward that prevents Google
3	advantageous to them. All right? These are ex	3	from using from infringing the patents and
4	ante numbers, and you shouldn't be able to say,	4	copyrights, do you have an opinion as to whether
5	well, this one works better for me than this one, 11:37:21	5	it's appropriate to calculate a per-unit royalty 11:39:54
6	because the actual path over that period is	6	based on the activations prior to the entry of the
7	different than we anticipated. All right? That's	7	
0	· ·	1 '	injunction?
8	the first point.	8	injunction? A I'm not sure that matters because if
8	the first point. The second point is that, clearly, an		A I'm not sure that matters because if
9	The second point is that, clearly, an	8	-
9 10	The second point is that, clearly, an assumption in this, an implicit assumption as I 11:37:35	8 9	A I'm not sure that matters because if you if you to some degree, the per-unit royalty, as I said, is a steady-state royalty, so 11:40:15
9	The second point is that, clearly, an	8 9 10	A I'm not sure that matters because if you if you to some degree, the per-unit
9 10 11	The second point is that, clearly, an assumption in this, an implicit assumption as I 11:37:35 think about it, is we're sort of talking about	8 9 10 11	A I'm not sure that matters because if you if you to some degree, the per-unit royalty, as I said, is a steady-state royalty, so 11:40:15 you've sort of taken the forward revenues and
9 10 11 12	The second point is that, clearly, an assumption in this, an implicit assumption as I 11:37:35 think about it, is we're sort of talking about steady-state income on these phones. And to the	8 9 10 11 12	A I'm not sure that matters because if you if you to some degree, the per-unit royalty, as I said, is a steady-state royalty, so 11:40:15 you've sort of taken the forward revenues and awarded them to Oracle as damages as of the date
9 10 11 12 13	The second point is that, clearly, an assumption in this, an implicit assumption as I 11:37:35 think about it, is we're sort of talking about steady-state income on these phones. And to the degree there is a ramp-up, then these two numbers	8 9 10 11 12 13	A I'm not sure that matters because if you if you to some degree, the per-unit royalty, as I said, is a steady-state royalty, so 11:40:15 you've sort of taken the forward revenues and awarded them to Oracle as damages as of the date of trial. That would reduce Oracle's negotiating
9 10 11 12 13 14	The second point is that, clearly, an assumption in this, an implicit assumption as I 11:37:35 think about it, is we're sort of talking about steady-state income on these phones. And to the degree there is a ramp-up, then these two numbers give you slightly different numbers. But I don't	8 9 10 11 12 13 14	A I'm not sure that matters because if you if you to some degree, the per-unit royalty, as I said, is a steady-state royalty, so 11:40:15 you've sort of taken the forward revenues and awarded them to Oracle as damages as of the date of trial. That would reduce Oracle's negotiating position in the with the with the
9 10 11 12 13 14 15	The second point is that, clearly, an assumption in this, an implicit assumption as I 11:37:35 think about it, is we're sort of talking about steady-state income on these phones. And to the degree there is a ramp-up, then these two numbers give you slightly different numbers. But I don't know the evidence on that, and I don't think 11:37:48	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	A I'm not sure that matters because if you if you to some degree, the per-unit royalty, as I said, is a steady-state royalty, so 11:40:15 you've sort of taken the forward revenues and awarded them to Oracle as damages as of the date of trial. That would reduce Oracle's negotiating position in the with the with the injunction. 11:40:32
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	The second point is that, clearly, an assumption in this, an implicit assumption as I 11:37:35 think about it, is we're sort of talking about steady-state income on these phones. And to the degree there is a ramp-up, then these two numbers give you slightly different numbers. But I don't know the evidence on that, and I don't think 11:37:48 anybody has addressed it, so I have no way of	8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	A I'm not sure that matters because if you if you to some degree, the per-unit royalty, as I said, is a steady-state royalty, so 11:40:15 you've sort of taken the forward revenues and awarded them to Oracle as damages as of the date of trial. That would reduce Oracle's negotiating position in the with the with the injunction. 11:40:32 To the degree that you haven't done that
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1	Q Can you tell me how you define 11:41:27	1	incompatibility with respect to the copyrights, is 11:44:44
2	"incompatibility" in the way that you have attempted	2	that considered in your report?
3	to compensate for it in your report?	3	A I don't want to use weasel words here,
4	A "Incompatibility," as I understand it,	4	but it may or may not be. And it depends upon
5	is a Dalvik VM versus a Java VM in Android. 11:41:46	5	something I don't have expertise in, and that's 11:45:18
6	Q In considering compatibility, do you	6	how to construct and read the contracts, the
7	consider the use of the 37 copyrighted APIs in a way	7	formal not the formalized contracts, but the
8	that is incompatible with the Java specification?	8	deals that were put onto paper in March of 2006.
9	A I'm not quite sure what that means. You	9	And I don't know enough about how to construct or
10	need to help me on that. 11:42:24	10	think about those to know whether or not the grant 11:45:37
11	Q Do you understand that Oracle contends in	11	of intellectual property in the one paragraph that
12	this case that not only is the Dalvik VM not	12 13	grants it envisions that Android was free to then
13	compatible, but that the way in which Google has	14	use this that Google was then free to use it in
14 15	used the Java APIs is incompatible with the Java specification? 11:42:39	15	the way that it has used the APIs let me back up. 11:45:56
16	A I understand what you just described,	16	up. 11:45:56 If I took the 37 APIs and I licensed them
		17	and Android then then Google then put together
17 18	but I frankly don't understand the legal issue here. I mean, let me tell you what I mean, if	18	with them other APIs, which it then sort of used to
19	there is copyright infringement, presumably the	19	propagate applications that ran on a Java VM
20	infringement occurred because Google made the 37 11:43:02	20	Android, if that's what's envisioned in the 11:46:15
21	APIs close enough to Java APIs that Java writers	21	license, then yes, I've incorporated it. All
22	could, with minimal effort, write programs for	22	right? Okay?
23	Android in Java that would run on Android, but not	23	Q Okay.
24	run on other things. So they're not so	24	You understand that the 2006 negotiations
25	incompatible, or else they wouldn't be useful. 11:43:24	25	contemplated an Android that would be compatible, 11:46:30
20	114		1140.50 116
1	Q All right. 11:43:28	1	correct? 11:46:33
1 2	Q All right. 11:43:28 Let me try to	1 2	correct? 11:46:33 A Right.
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1	itself. 11:47:50	1	which you have addressed incompatibility is by 11:50:36
2	Q Subject to the fact that the number of	2	considering the benefits that Sun expected to get
3	your calculations are conservative?	3	from Armstrong; and, two, to the extent that your
4	A Correct.	4	net present value calculation of the benefits to Sun
5	Q And so to the extent that any of your 11:47:59	5	from Armstrong are conservative, it is necessarily 11:50:52
6	Armstrong calculations are conservative, you would	6	the case that your adjustment to compensate for
7	have undercompensated for the harm of	7	incompatibility must also be conservative?
8	incompatibility, correct?	8	A Agree.
9	A I don't know. It depends upon whether	9	Q All right.
10	or not you think the Armstrong expectations are a 11:48:27	10	Is there any other calculation in your 11:51:06
11	reasonable way of thinking about what they lost	11	approach, other than the Armstrong benefits, that
12	when you've got an incompatible deal.	12	would address the issue of incompatibility?
13	Q To the extent	13	A That I can imagine or that I considered?
14	A If they are, then you fully incorporated	14	Q That you have
15	them. 11:48:41	15	Numbers that you have actually calculated 11:51:26
16	Q To the extent that the Armstrong	16	and incorporated into your analysis.
17	calculations are an appropriate way to address the	17	A No.
18	issue of incompatibility, your royalty addresses	18	Q All right.
19	incompatibility because it takes into consideration	19	Now, another term that appears in your
20	the Armstrong projections? 11:49:00	20	report is "fragmentation." Do you understand 11:51:33
21	A Correct.	21	"fragmentation" to mean something different from
22	Q Nonetheless, to the extent that your net	22	"incompatibility"?
23	present value of the Armstrong benefit is	23	A Yes, with the caveat I'm not a technical
24	conservative, it necessarily does not capture all of	24	expert here.
25	the harm of incompatibility, correct? 11:49:14	25	Q Okay. 11:51:44
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	dimensions that may or may not have anything to do with compatibility. So I agree that my estimate is conservative, for example, the discount rate 11:49:28 issue that we discussed earlier. So it's conservative for a number of different points that I've made. All right? But that's that means that it underestimates the true value for those reasons, not necessarily for incompatibility. 11:49:45 Q But if the only way in which you have addressed the harm of incompatibility is by factoring the Armstrong projections, then it is necessarily the case that if your Armstrong projections are conservative, then your adjustment 11:49:59 for incompatibility is conservative? MR. COOPER: Objection; form. MR. PURCELL: Join.	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	report, as to the term "fragmentation."AWell, I have fudged the issue, as haseverybody else, about what the open-source license11:51:57is, whether it's the Apache license or the GPL.11:51:57It's my understanding and again, it's atechnical issue, so I'm not I may be wrong inmy understanding that the GPL would have led toless fragmentation than the Apache license. Andless fragmentation than the Apache license. And11:52:16to the degree that Android was built anddistributed with the Apache license, then that'smy understanding of incremental fragmentation,okay, beyond what we talked about earlier today,which was the fragmentation that was going on11:52:30anyway and would have occurred with open sourcingunder whatever license you would have used.QDo you agree that the hypothetical license
19	THE WITNESS: Sure. I mean I'll agree to	19	should ideally account for the incremental
20	that. I don't know what you mean by the, "Armstrong 11:50:22	20	fragmentation that would be expected to occur as a 11:53:02
21	projections are conservative." Again, that could go	21	result of Google's infringing use?
22	to the discount. I've discounted them at too high a	22	A The hypothetical license, yes, I agree.
23	discount rate.	23	Q All right.
24	BY MR. NORTON:	24	And one question that you have is, in
25	Q To the extent that, one, the only way in 11:50:33	25	determining the incremental fragmentation, are we 11:53:23
1	119		121

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
1	comparing Google's infringement to a 2006 11:53:26	1	fragmentation as a result of open sourcing would be 11:56:27
2		2	
	negotiation that would open source under the GPL or		exactly the same, regardless of whether Sun remained
3	under Apache?	3	in control or Google remained in control, if the
4	That was a terrible question. Let me try	4	parties had agreed in 2006 on an Apache license?
5	that again. 11:53:38	5	A No. That's an interesting question in 11:56:53
6	You want to measure the anticipated	6	that I don't think the issue of Sun's subsequent
7	incremental fragmentation, right?	7	control has been factored into anybody's analysis,
8	A Yes. Based on some questions you asked	8	including mine, except to the degree the control
9	this morning, or earlier today, there are two	9	was embedded in the license itself, the type of
10	potential incremental fragmentations. To the 11:53:52	10	license. So to the degree that Sun and Google are 11:57:11
11	degree that Java ME was fragmented before, and	11	no longer partners in the hypothetical world, and
12	became fragmented in the normal course of	12	because Sun's not weighing into the development
13	business, I don't know whether it was or it	13	here, that that I just don't know whether that
14	wasn't, but your question implied that it may have	14	would have led to more fragmentation or not. I
15	been there may have been some baseline 11:54:08	15	really don't know. 11:57:28
16	fragmentation. Then going forward, you would have	16	Q Well, do you understand that one of the
17	expected that fragmentation to continue.	17	sources of fragmentation is the fact that Android is
18	And we had a discussion earlier about	18	incompatible, not just that it's open source, but
19	whether an open-source license would have enhanced	19	that it's incompatible?
20	that, that baseline fragmentation of Java ME. That 11:54:18	20	A Yes. 11:57:49
21	would have been baked into the negotiation because	21	Q All right.
22	the parties knew that Sun knew that it was going	22	And if in the 2006 negotiation the parties
23	to have a open-source license on this matter.	23	expected that let's just assume the parties
24	Okay?	24	expected they would use an Apache license for Java
25	Then to the degree that Sun would never 11:54:36	25	and Android in the 2006 negotiation, but that Sun 11:58:13
	122		124
1	have accepted an open-source license that was 11:54:39	1	
			would remain in a position where it could ensure 11:58:16
1		1	would remain in a position where it could ensure 11:58:16 that Android remained compatible with the existing
2	potentially more fragmenting than a different	2	that Android remained compatible with the existing
2 3	potentially more fragmenting than a different open-source license, then that would not have been	2 3	that Android remained compatible with the existing Java specifications.
2 3 4	potentially more fragmenting than a different open-source license, then that would not have been built in, although it may have been if they had	2 3 4	that Android remained compatible with the existing Java specifications. In that scenario, the anticipated
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	potentially more fragmenting than a different open-source license, then that would not have been built in, although it may have been if they had agreed on that license. It's really unclear on 11:54:56 which license they were going to agree on, and it's my understanding that's, in part, why the negotiations fell apart, was over that license. Q All right. So if I understand you correctly, part of 11:55:07 what you're wrestling with is if Android is released under the Apache license, and it was anticipated by the parties in 2006 that Android would be released under the Apache license, then you wonder whether there is any incremental fragmentation as a result 11:55:32 of open source A No. In that case, I don't wonder. In that case, I assume there is not. Q As the result of open sourcing? A No, as a sole source yeah, that's 11:55:40 right, of the the license would have that fragmentation, anticipated fragmentation, built into it, the 2006, not the hypothetical, the 2006 license.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	that Android remained compatible with the existing Java specifications. In that scenario, the anticipated fragmentation as of 2006 would be less than the 11:58:28 anticipated fragmentation as a result of the hypothetical license, correct? A Possibly. Q Can you give me probably? Let me ask you this way: Who has a 11:58:45 greater interest in ensuring that Android remained compatible with existing Java? Google or Sun? A Sun did, but it's not clear that Google had an interest in sort of going out and specifically fragmenting. I mean, Google had an 11:59:00 interest in creating its own platform. And to the degree that that's incompatible, that is, itself, a fragmentation, I agree. That a fragment, however you want to think about this, fork off of this. Okay? But the reason I gave the answer I 11:59:14 did is my reading of the record is that Google was, itself, very concerned about fragmenting the Android platform. So to the degree that it didn't allow for further fragmentation, one. Second step
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	potentially more fragmenting than a different open-source license, then that would not have been built in, although it may have been if they had agreed on that license. It's really unclear on 11:54:56 which license they were going to agree on, and it's my understanding that's, in part, why the negotiations fell apart, was over that license. Q All right. So if I understand you correctly, part of 11:55:07 what you're wrestling with is if Android is released under the Apache license, and it was anticipated by the parties in 2006 that Android would be released under the Apache license, then you wonder whether there is any incremental fragmentation as a result 11:55:32 of open source A No. In that case, I don't wonder. In that case, I assume there is not. Q As the result of open sourcing? A No, as a sole source yeah, that's 11:55:40 right, of the the license would have that fragmentation, anticipated fragmentation, built into it, the 2006, not the hypothetical, the 2006	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	that Android remained compatible with the existing Java specifications. In that scenario, the anticipated fragmentation as of 2006 would be less than the 11:58:28 anticipated fragmentation as a result of the hypothetical license, correct? A Possibly. Q Can you give me probably? Let me ask you this way: Who has a 11:58:45 greater interest in ensuring that Android remained compatible with existing Java? Google or Sun? A Sun did, but it's not clear that Google had an interest in sort of going out and specifically fragmenting. I mean, Google had an 11:59:00 interest in creating its own platform. And to the degree that that's incompatible, that is, itself, a fragmentation, I agree. That a fragment, however you want to think about this, fork off of this. Okay? But the reason I gave the answer I 11:59:14 did is my reading of the record is that Google was, itself, very concerned about fragmenting the Android platform. So to the degree that it didn't


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
names wrong here the TCK and the Android 11:59:36	1	Q Is that a economically important 12:02:05
equivalent of the TCK were more or less testing	2	difference?
the same thing, then there is no reason to believe	3	A Maybe.
that you've got fragmentation beyond sort of	4	Q What consideration have you given to
what the initial step. 11:59:47	5	whether it's economically important? 12:02:10
Q Right.	6	A Well, we're cursed with hindsight,
The initial step, which is, in fact,	7	right? I mean, the the smartphones have sort
fragmentation?	8	of taken the market, although not worldwide, but
A It is fragmentation.	9	in the U.S., and feature phones have become less
Q All right. 11:59:55	10	important. It's unclear whether this was clear in 12:02:35
Now, with respect to the fragmentation	11	2005, 2006. When Sun or when Apple announced
that is the result of the initial step, is there	12	its new iPhone, it was unclear whether this was
anyplace in your report where you have attempted to	13	going to be a successful product or not. So at
calculate the value of or the harm of that	14	the time, I don't know that the expectations of
fragmentation? 12:00:08	15	these two different phones were all that 12:02:55
A No.	16	different.
Q So that's unquantified throughout your	17	Q Based on the Google projections you have
report?	18	seen, did Google expect smartphones to be more
A Correct.	19	valuable to its business than feature phones?
Q And are you aware of any way of 12:00:13	20	A Yes. 12:03:11
calculating that fragmentation from the infringing	21	Q Based on the Armstrong projections, did
use?	22	Sun expect smartphones to be more valuable to its
A No.	23	business than feature phones on a per-unit basis?
	24	A I don't know because I don't know the
Q Hold on one second.	24	
Q Hold on one second. I want to talk for a minute about the 12:00:37	25	universal business with smartphones. I know it 12:03:32
I want to talk for a minute about the12:00:37126Danger license. You examined the Danger license in12:00:39your report at Paragraphs 87 through 96; is that	25 1 2	128 had lots of these royalty arrangements with 12:03:35 smartphone manufacturers, the OEMs. I just don't
I want to talk for a minute about the 12:00:37 126 Danger license. You examined the Danger license in 12:00:39	25	had lots of these royalty arrangements with 12:03:35 smartphone manufacturers, the OEMs. I just don't know the universe of that.
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




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


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


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		1	in 2006 Google knows knew or expected what we 01:10:09
		2	now know to be the case in 2012. The negotiation
		3	in 2006 was over the stuff we're talking about in
		4	2012. That was all I was saying is "if."
		5	If they didn't know, then one really does 01:10:26
		6	have to think about sort of an option value or an
		7	insurance value. It's a little bit like I tried
		8	to think about how to sort of get my head around
		9	this.
		10	Suppose I don't pay a subscription. I 01:10:43
		11	subscribe to a magazine, I don't pay a
		12	subscription. I get sued for failure to pay my
		13	subscription, and I say, "Well, I only read one
		14	page out of each hundred," okay? I mean, the ex
		15	ante negotiations for the subscription is for the 01:10:57
		16	full 100-page magazine. I don't get to say, after
		17	the fact, "Gee, I only read one page." At least
		18	that seems wrong from an economics perspective.
19	BY MR. PURCELL:	19	Q And why is that analogy opposite? Why is
20	Q And you're thinking of it as an ex ante 01:08:32	20	this situation where one is negotiating over a 01:11:15
21	negotiation for an entire portfolio, not an ex ante	21	magazine subscription rather than negotiating over
22	negotiation for two patents and 37 API packages?	22	two patents and 37 API packages?
23	A The way I start is to say, let's think	23	A Because not knowing what Google needed,
24	about what the portfolio was worth, okay, and then	24	in 2006 not knowing sort of the course of its
25	ask, you know, does apportionment make sense? And 01:08:47	25	technological development, so it doesn't know 01:11:31
	154		156
1	the answer is no. But if apportionment is 01:08:52	1	which of these it needs, all right? Think of 01:11:34
2	required by the law, then here's an apportionment.	2	this my analogy here, inept may it be, I don't
3	Q And why doesn't apportionment make sense?	3	know which of the 100 pages I want to read; I just
4	A Well, for the three reasons that are	4	know I want to read one. Then I'd be willing to
5	here that I've already discussed, which is, if 01:09:04	5	pay the subscription price for the right to read 01:11:47
6	they knew that they wanted this intellectual	6	whatever page I wanted to read.
7	property, then that would have been the value of	7	Q Doesn't the hypothetical negotiation in
8	the deal.	8	this case presuppose a negotiation over just the
9	Q How do you know that?	9	intellectual property in-suit?
10	A Because if I'm only negotiating over, 01:09:13	10	A I understand that is what the law 01:12:01
11	really, 37 APIs, plus two patents, and I've got	11	requires. This opinion simply says that doesn't
12	all this other stuff here, then the value that I'm	12	make a lot of sense to an economist, but and
13	putting forward, the numbers I'm putting forward	13	Judge Alsup asked for my best economic view, so
14	are the value of those 39 things.	14	here it is.
15	Q But when Google was negotiating the 01:09:33	15	Q So I know the answer to this question 01:12:16
16	license in 2006, it wasn't negotiating for a license	16	already, but you've reviewed Judge Alsup's orders in
17	for two patents and 37 API packages, correct?	17	this case?
18	A That's correct, sure.	18	A I have.
19	Q So how can you conclude that Google's	19	Q And I'm sure you've read them carefully.
20	behavior in that real world negotiation over a 01:09:50	20	A I've read them carefully. 01:12:25
21	different set of objects necessarily is the same as	21	Q And you've reviewed the transcript of the
22	what Google would have been willing to pay for a	22	various hearings on challenges the damage experts
23	much smaller set of objects in the hypothetical	23	report in this case?
24	negotiation?	24	A I have.
25	A I think you misunderstood me. I said if 01:10:03	25	Q Do you perceive any tension between your 01:12:32
1	155		157

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1	opinion in Section K of your report and any of 01:12:33	1	Q Is there any way you can narrow that range 01:14:37
2	Judge Alsup's orders or statements	2	based on the information that you have?
3	MR. COOPER: Objection as to form.	3	A Not really. Again, it's unclear who had
4	MR. NORTON: Join.	4	the obligation to put forward the argument here,
5	THE WITNESS: I can imagine there will be 01:12:42	5	but since I have to rely on the record, that's 01:15:07
6	some tension, yes.	6	sort of what the experts have done, as opposed to
7	BY MR. PURCELL:	7	going out and doing this independently, there's
8	Q Do you intend to tell the jury that, in	8	nothing in this record that I could use to make
9	your opinion, no apportionment of the 2006 IP bundle	9	that apportionment or that division.
10	is appropriate as a matter of economics? 01:12:50	10	Q If you were starting from scratch and one 01:15:21
11	A I expect I'll be permitted to tell the	11	of the parties retained you to address this
12	jury what Judge Alsup tells me I can tell the	12	question, is there some set of information that you
13	jury, so	13	would want them to provide to you so you could
14	Q That's a very diplomatic way of putting	14	apportion the percentage of Android profits
15	it. 01:13:05	15	attributable to the alleged copyright infringement? 01:15:32
16	So moving forward just a little bit to	16	A As I indicated this morning, I think the
17	paragraph 118 of your report, there's a section on	17	shift in market share is potentially useful but
18	"Other Copyright Damages," and it starts with a	18	has been excluded, so
19	section on "Disgorgement of Infringer's Profits."	19	But if I were to do it, I would probably
20	A Yes. 01:13:27	20	look at the shift in the market share. What 01:15:55
21	Q Do you see that?	21	fraction of the incremental revenues was due to the
		22	incremental market share due to the APIs.
		23	Q So would that be along the lines of
		24	looking at the benefits provided to Android by the
		25	copyrighted APIs and then the incremental increase 01:16:14
	158		160
1	Q And then in Paragraph 122, the next 01:13:45	1	in market share as a result of those benefits being 01:16:18
2	paragraph, you state that neither party has offered	2	in the software?
3	a viable methodology for separating out Android	3	A Correct.
4	profits attributable to the infringement versus	4	Q And what's your understanding regarding
5	Android profits not attributable to the 01:13:58	5	what benefits the copyrighted APIs provide to the 01:16:26
6	infringement?	6	Android platform, if any?
7	A Correct.	7	A That's a technical issue. I'll tell you
8	Q And then paragraph 124 on the next page	8	my understanding of it but not it's not an
9	starts with:	9	opinion in that sense.
10	"Based on the admissible 01:14:10	10	That it provided a couple of benefits 01:16:40
11	evidence in this matter, I am not	11	sort of going forward, that is, in 2006. I think
12	aware of a quantitative method to	12	the record suggests, or at least there's argument
13	estimate the percent of Android	13	in the record that Google believed that it needed a
14	revenue or profit that is due to	14	Java-based platform. It needed to appeal to Java
15	the alleged copyright 01:14:18	15	application writers or people who would write in 01:17:01
16	infringement."	16	Java.
17	Do you see that?	17	The OEMs were accustomed to using Java,
18	A Yes.	18	in fact, were taking Java ME licenses, many of
19	Q And as a result of that, you conclude that	19	them. And, therefore, having APIs that said, if
20	the percentage of Android profit attributable to the 01:14:24	20	you write in your accustomed fashion, an 01:17:16
21	alleged copyright infringement is not zero but less	21	application, it's going to work on this new machine
22	than 100 percent, correct?	22	or this new virtual machine and/or the
23	A Yes.	23	modifications you have to make aren't very large;
24	Q That's a pretty broad range.	24	that is, it's kind of within the genre of of
25	A It is. 01:14:36	25	that was one benefit to them. 01:17:43
1	159	1	161

Pages 158 to 161

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6	that getting to the market quickly was really the 01:18:00 principal way to do that was through Java, then it	6	the conjoint from actual market behavior, so
7	had that benefit, as well.	7	Q If we could turn to Paragraph 203, and
8	Q You looked at Dr. Shugan's conjoint	8	this actually, I think, is in the following exhibit.
9	analysis as part of your work in this case, correct?	9	In the last sentence of Paragraph 203, you write:
10	A I did. 01:18:15	10	"However, the direction of 01:21:11
11	Q And Dr. Shugan, his conjoint analysis	11	bias on Professor Shugan's results
12	included some testing and evaluation of the relative	12	caused by these omitted features is
13	importance of certain features of a smartphone	13	ambiguous and can only be fully
14	platform to consumers?	14	assessed if a new survey were
15	A Correct. 01:18:29	15	conducted that included the omitted 01:21:20
16	Q And I believe Dr. Shugan tested seven	16	features."
17	features of smartphone platforms in his conjoint	17	Do you see that?
18	analysis; is that correct?	18	A Correct.
19	A Correct.	19	Q That's what we've just been discussing?
20	Q And I think that you write in your report 01:18:47	20	A Yes, with regard to the market share 01:21:25
21	that Dr. Shugan's omission of other potentially	21	estimates. Well, the potential bias in these
22	relevant features of a smartphone platform might	22	coefficients which might cancel out when you're
23	have balanced his relative importance results,	23	doing a ratio.
24	correct?	24	Q Let's leave the market share calculations
25	MR. NORTON: Objection; form. 01:18:59	25	aside and just talk about the relative importance 01:21:35
	162		164
1		1	6 . t
1	THE WITNESS: No. 01:19:00 BY MR. PURCELL:	1 2	features. 01:21:37
2 3		3	With the relative importance features, do
4	Q Did I say "balanced"?A Yes, you did.	4	you have any particular opinion about the degree of bias in Dr. Shugan's relative importance features?
5	Q I meant to say "biased," excuse me. Let 01:19:02	5	A The paragraph says it's ambiguous. It's 01:21:51
6	me say that again.	6	difficult to know which way the bias goes.
0	In your report, you concluded that	7	Q But are you reasonably confident that the
7		1 '	Q Dut are you reasonably comment that the
7 8	Dr. Shugan's omission of other potentially relevant	8	bias isn't particularly significant in either
8	Dr. Shugan's omission of other potentially relevant smartphone platform features might have biased his	8	bias isn't particularly significant in either direction?
8 9	smartphone platform features might have biased his	9	direction?
8 9 10	smartphone platform features might have biased his relative importance results, correct? 01:19:17		direction? A No, I'm not, but again, loosely, this is 01:22:01
8 9	smartphone platform features might have biased his	9 10	direction? A No, I'm not, but again, loosely, this is 01:22:01 the difference between using a coefficient to
8 9 10 11	smartphone platform features might have biased hisrelative importance results, correct?01:19:17AWell, no, that's not quite correct.	9 10 11	direction? A No, I'm not, but again, loosely, this is 01:22:01 the difference between using a coefficient to forecasting and looking at the ratio of the
8 9 10 11 12	smartphone platform features might have biased hisrelative importance results, correct?01:19:17AWell, no, that's not quite correct.There are two different kinds of biases here. Ithink the my pretty extensive analysis of	9 10 11 12	direction? A No, I'm not, but again, loosely, this is 01:22:01 the difference between using a coefficient to forecasting and looking at the ratio of the coefficients. And if you look at the ratio of the
8 9 10 11 12 13	smartphone platform features might have biased hisrelative importance results, correct?01:19:17AWell, no, that's not quite correct.There are two different kinds of biases here. Ithink the my pretty extensive analysis ofconjoint suggests that it's likely to be biased;	9 10 11 12 13	direction? A No, I'm not, but again, loosely, this is 01:22:01 the difference between using a coefficient to forecasting and looking at the ratio of the coefficients. And if you look at the ratio of the coefficients, you could have substantial bias in
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1	A I wasn't trying to validate his 01:22:51	1	.5 as the ratio of these. We cannot find that 01:26:02
2	conclusions. I was simply looking at an	2	number in the conjoint analysis; it's nowhere to be
3	independent way of trying to assess the importance	3	found. The number that comes out of the conjoint
4	of speed versus applications.	4	analysis is .7, so and Dr. Cockburn just has a
5	Q And what work did you do to try to assess 01:23:00	5	single sentence in his report that says: "From the 01:26:19
6	the importance of speed versus applications?	6	conjoint analysis, I have learned" or something
7	A This is a long answer.	7	to the effect "that it's .5."
8	Q That's fine.	8	No reference, no footnote, no cite to the
9	A Dr. Cockburn uses first, uses eBay	9	table or anything. So that's where we are in that.
10	data and I use the eBay data. I use the same data 01:23:19	10	You can think about the econometrics as validation, 01:26:36
11	he does. He then uses an approach in which he	11	if you want, of the conjoint or an independent way
12	writes his own maximum likelihood function and	12	of looking at the relative value.
13	runs an algorithm to maximize that. He does	13	In my analysis in the back in the
14	what's known in economics as a bootstrap, which is	14	Reasonable Royalty section, I used .8. I just take
15	a way of getting at the standard errors of the 01:23:39	15	the simple mean between .7 and .9 of the two 01:26:55
16	coefficient, yes, the standard errors of the	16	different kinds of estimates.
17	coefficient.	17	And were The Court to find that the
18	When we implemented his we just took	18	conjoint or the jury to find the conjoint wasn't
19	his stuff and implemented. It takes, literally,	19	reliable for a whole set of reasons, I have an
20	240 computer hours to run, so it's 10 days from 01:24:00	20	independent estimate of the value of the an 01:27:10
21	when you push the button until something pops out	21	independent way of apportioning the copyrights that
22	the other end.	22	I don't think anybody else has at this point.
23	Dr. Leonard's criticism of Dr. Cockburn	23	Q All right.
24	was that he could write a likelihood function that	24	And what's your independent way of
25	could be estimated much simpler that was the 01:24:15	25	apportioning the copyrights? 01:27:23
	166		168
1	equivalent of Dr. Leonard's Dr. Cockburn. In 01:24:20	1	A It would be the econometric. 01:27:24
2	fact, he didn't need to write it; he could simply	2	Q That you just described?
3	use a canned program to do this. And if you use	3	A Yes.
4	his program, it takes a tenth of the time; it takes	4	Q Okay.
5	12 hours or 10 hours. 01:24:34	5	Just wanted to be sure you weren't leading 01:27:31
6	So in all of the econometrics I did, I	6	into something else that you had done.
7	did the Dr. Leonard implementation. I did not do	7	A No.
8	the Dr. Cockburn.	8	Q So we've gone through the universe of
9	Now, we tested the difference, and the	9	everything you've done with respect to your
10	coefficients are more or less the same in the two 01:24:50	10	econometric analysis on copyright apportionment? 01:27:38
11	to sort of the second decimal place; sometimes	11	A Yes. I mean, there are lots of details
12	they're a little bit higher, sometimes a little bit	12	in the econometrics themselves, but that's the big
13	lower. So it appears that using the more	13	picture.
14	simplified approach of Dr. Leonard gets you into	14	Q Dr. Shugan and Dr. Cockburn use strike
15	the same gets you roughly the same. So that's 01:25:08	15	that. 01:27:55
16	the long lead into this.	16	In Dr. Shugan's and Dr. Cockburn's view,
17	Using that approach, then we went out and	17	the primary benefit provided to Android by the
18	retrieved information on applications and on the	18	copyrighted APIs was an increased number of
19	various phones, brought that applications data in	19	applications, correct?
20	and meshed it with the data that Dr. Cockburn had 01:25:29	20	MR. NORTON: Objection. 01:28:07
21	used and estimated a version of the Cockburn model	21	THE WITNESS: Correct.
22	using the Leonard technique with applications and	22	BY MR. PURCELL:
23	find that the ratio of speed to applications is	23	Q And they use
24	about .9 so applications to speed is about .9.	24	Dr. Cockburn uses, essentially, an
25		25	increased number of employeding as a meany for the 01.29.12
23	One other observation: Dr. Cockburn uses 01:25:58	25	increased number of applications as a proxy for the 01:28:13 169

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1	benefits provided by the copyrighted APIs, correct? 01:28:16	1	Cockburn, which is, what's the change in the market 01:30:34
2	A That's correct.	2	share attributable to that, and then sort of back
3	Q Can you take a look at Paragraph 303 of	3	out sort of what the revenue effects of that change
4	your report?	4	in market share are. You've got to go from this
5	Paragraph 303, you write:01:28:33	5	utility measure to some measure of sort of how that 01:30:46
6	"Professor Shugan reports	6	affects the prospects in the market, and there's no
7	relative importance estimates of	7	way to go from 7.85 percent utility effect to a
8	7.85 percent and 11.17 percent for	8	revenue effect just by making by applying it
9	availability of applications and	9	directly to util to revenue.
10	applications startup time, 01:28:43	10	BY MR. PURCELL: 01:31:02
11	respectively."	11	Q And do you have any methodology in mind
12	Do you see that?	12	for translating the 7.85 percent utility effect into
13	A Yes.	13	a market share effect?
14	Q So he uses a relative importance figure of	14	A Well, that's been excluded by by
15	7.85 percent for availability of applications, 01:28:50	15	Judge Alsup. Apparently, the Sawtooth software 01:31:18
16	Professor Shugan?	16	has a button you push, and it tells you what
17	A Yes.	17	happens to the market share. That's the button
18	Q Would he be reasonable to use that	18	that Dr. Shugan pushed. So it translates it by
19	7.85 percent figure as an estimate of the percentage	19	sort of looking at all of the other sort of
20	of Android revenue attributable to the copyrighted 01:29:05	20	relative utility effects, utility from the 01:31:37
21	APIs as opposed to other features of the Android	21	different kinds of things.
22	software?	22	But that's been excluded because, as I
23	MR. NORTON: Object.	23	understand the argument that Dr. Leonard made and
24	THE WITNESS: In what setting? I'm not	24	Judge Alsup and the part in Google is that because
25	sure 01:29:18	25	of the bias, the potential bias in that number, you 01:31:52
	170		172
1	BY MR. PURCELL: 01:29:19	1	can't get a reliable estimate of the market share 01:31:56
		2	change.
2 3	Q Well, in the sense of disaggregating the inputs to Android revenues that are not due to the	3	Q Other than the Sawtooth method that
4	-	4	Judge Alsup excluded, can you think of any other way
5	copyrighted APIs? A I don't think so, no. 01:29:28	5	to go from the 7.85 percent relative consumer 01:32:08
6	Q Why not?	6	preference figure to a market share figure?
7		7	A No.
	A Well, the conjoint analysis doesn't	8	
8	really get to revenues. It gets purportedly,	9	Q If you were asked to estimate the likely
9	it's an estimate of the utility that people place		change in market share if the copyrighted APIs were
10	on things, but there's no way to go at least, I 01:29:39	10	removed from the Android software, what what 01:32:33
11 12	don't see an easy path from there to revenues.	11 12	would you do?
	Q If 7.85 percent of consumers are most		MR. NORTON: Object.
13	influenced by the availability of applications, it	13	THE WITNESS: I would use the
14	wouldn't be reasonable to assume that roughly	14	econometrics.
15	7.85 percent of the benefit provided by the software 01:29:57	15	BY MR. PURCELL: 01:32:46
16	is due to the availability of applications?	16	Q How would you go about using the
17	A I don't think so.	17	econometrics to translate the consumer preference
18	Q How would you go about translating, if you	18	share into a market share number?
19	could, that 7.85 percent figure into an	19	A Well, you can use the econometrics to
20	apportionment of the value of the software 01:30:12	20	predict the reduction in willingness to pay, and 01:32:58
21	attributable to the APIs that enable the	21	then, you know, there's dispute on all of these
22	availability of applications?	22	matters, and I understand that; I'm not here to
23	MR. NORTON: Objection.	23	resolve that dispute.
24	THE WITNESS: I think you have to do it	24	But then you could then use parties I
25	the way that Professor Shugan does and Professor 01:30:28	25	think Dr. Cockburn did something that was 01:33:10 173
25	the way that Professor Shugan does and Professor 01:30:28 171	25	think Dr. Cockburn did something that was 01:33

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1 reasonably innovative and creative here, which is 0133:11 1	×			
3 who were bidding on two different phones, two 3 or - it's got some problems that keep is from 4 different operating systems, whilm a reasonable 5 had to move some other phote. 01:35:58 6 fell below a certain level, would they swritch the 6 Q Prior to Judge Alsay's excluding the 7 another non-Android phone. 0 13 or - it's got some other phones. 01:35:58 8 another non-Android phone. 0 13 onclasses about the drop in market share that 10 and divide by the number of people in the 01:33:37 10 available to Google? 01:36:10 11 A No, we never finished that analysis. 13 that same stare of the market share that 13 that effect. You could do exactly the same thing 13 that would shed any light on that? 14 with - with applications ab tid with specificant. 01:36:20 for uproposes of the relative speed versus 01:36:20 15 but to get there, as 1 indicated earler this 01:34:34 16 in application, but was net ower finished that analysis. 16 relative - when the willingress to pay for that. 16 napplication, but was net ower finished that	1	reasonably innovative and creative here, which is 01:33:11		look at applications in this case. The conjoint 01:35:38
4 different operating systems, within a reasonable 4 being very useful in that regard, so think you 5 prefield of the subling systems, within a reasonable 6 Control 133:52 6 fell below a certain level, would they switch the 6 Q Prior to Judge Alsup's excluding the 7 phones - switch from one - from an Android to 7 concentoric analysis, have you reached any tentative 9 and divide by the number of people in the 01:35:53 01:35:52 10 and divide by the number of people in the 01:35:53 11 population, or the sample youre looking at, and 11 A No, we never finished that analysis. 12 that's amesure of the market share shift to to 11:35:10 A We have any preliminary results 14 with - with aptications as he did with speed. 14 A We have the collicient. We could back 14 with - with aptications is a be did with speed. 14 a did vec at localization, to the neure with analysis. 12 problem have to deal with - with the 16 or pretty gairkly but - we used a coefficient. 14 relative - when the willingness to pay for that, 16 or pretty gairkly but - we used a coefficient. 12 </td <td></td> <td>· ·</td> <th></th> <td></td>		· ·		
5period of time and asking if the willingness to pay01:33:221had to move some other place.01:35:387phones - switch from one - from an Android to6QPrior to Judge Alsay's excluding the8another non-Android phone.7comometric analysis, have you reached any tentative9And fitby did, you just count that up9wuld be likely if the copyrighted APIs weren't10and divide by the number of people in the01:33:371011A no. we never finished that analysis.11A No. we never finished that analysis.12that sa measure of the marker share shift due to12QYou didn't have any preliminary results13that effect. You you the have to deal with - with the1314A No we never finished that analysis.15but to get there, as 1 indicated earlier this01:33:371516for purposes of the relative speed versus16morning, you then have to deal with - with the17applications. It analysis - consumer surplus - consumer surplus falls.18relative	3		3	
6 Control Judge Alsap's excluding the econometric analysis, have your reached any tentative another non-Android phone. 9 And if they did, you just count that up 9 9 And if they did, you just count that up 9 9 and dirived by the number of people in the 01:33:37 10 11 population, or the sample youre looking at, and 11 A No, we never finished that analysis. 12 that's a measure of the market share shift due to 12 Q You didn't have any preliminary results 14 with - with applications as he did with speed. 14 A We have the coefficient. We could back 16 morning, you then have to deal with - with the 16 for purposes of the relative speed versus 17 problem on that as samplus - consumer surplus fails. 19 and the question is, what would that do to 01:33:43 18 relative - when the willingness to pay for that, 19 applications, is than the report or appendices 19 so the consumer surplus fails, 19 calculation. 19 20 Q Could you actually direct me to it? 20 Q Could you actually direct me to it? 21 not done further work on that because of the 23 A It is, it is.				
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8 another non-Android phone. 8 conclusions about the drop in market share that 9 And if they did, you just count that up 9 vold be likely if the copyrighted APIs weren't 11 population, or the sample you're looking at, and 11 A No, we never finished that analysis. 12 that's a measure of the market share shift due to 11 A No, we never finished that analysis. 13 that effect. You could do exactly the same thing 13 that would shed any light on that? 14 with - with applications as he did with speed. 14 A We have the coefficient. We could back 16 morning, you then have to deal with - with the 16 for purposes of the relaive speed versus 01:36:20 18 relative - when the willingness to pay for that. 18 my knowledge. I don't recall having done the 12 19 so the consumer surpuls - consumer surpuls falls. 01:34:10 20 Q Is the coefficient for the speed versus 01:36:34 21 price? 11 relative - when the willingness to pay for that. 18 my knowledge. I don't recall having done the 12 22 12 got excluded on that basis, and I have 01:34:10 21 got stat coefficient for		-		
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10 and divide by the number of people in the 01:33:37 10 available to Google? 01:36:10 11 population, or the sample you're looking at, and 11 A No, we never finished that analysis. 11 13 that's measure of the market share shift due to 12 Q You didn't have any preliminary results 13 that effect. You could do exactly the same thing 13 that would shed any light on that? 14 with with applications sub edid with speed. 14 A We have the coefficient. We could back 15 it out pretry quickly but we used a coefficient 01:36:20 for purposes of the relative speed versus 01:36:24 16 morting you then have to deal with with the 16 for purposes of the relative speed versus 01:36:34 17 prolection, but that, at least, is a sensible place 24 Q So the consumer surplus - consumer surplus fills. 17 18 relative when the willingness to pay for that. 18 relative when the willingness to pay for that. 18 relative when the surple would that do the 01:34:20 21 prolection, but that, at least, is a sensible place 24 Q Could you actually direct me to it? 25 os tart. And as I sai		-		-
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19 quit working on it. 20 Q So had Judge Alsup not excluded that piece 01:35:20 21 of the econometric analysis, do you think you could 22 have used that econometric analysis to estimate 23 change in market share? 24 A Yes, we were prepared to with what we 25 call the enhanced econometric model to actually 01:35:35 25 profits to the iPhone is 01:38:49	17	change doesn't get you in about the right place.		
20 Q So had Judge Alsup not excluded that piece 01:35:20 21 of the econometric analysis, do you think you could 21 Q And in Paragraph 139, that paragraph 22 have used that econometric analysis to estimate 22 starts off with the statement: 23 change in market share? 23 ''However, while I agree some 24 A Yes, we were prepared to with what we 24 apportionment of Java ME lost 25 call the enhanced econometric model to actually 01:35:35 25 profits to the iPhone is 01:38:49	18	But once Judge Alsup cut that off, we		
21 of the econometric analysis, do you think you could 21 Q And in Paragraph 139, that paragraph 22 have used that econometric analysis to estimate 22 starts off with the statement: 23 change in market share? 23 "However, while I agree some 24 A Yes, we were prepared to with what we 24 apportionment of Java ME lost 25 call the enhanced econometric model to actually 01:35:35 25 profits to the iPhone is 01:38:49	19	quit working on it.		
22have used that econometric analysis to estimate22starts off with the statement:23change in market share?23''However, while I agree some24AYes, we were prepared to with what we24apportionment of Java ME lost25call the enhanced econometric model to actually01:35:3525profits to the iPhone is01:38:49	20			01:38:29
23 change in market share? 23 ''However, while I agree some 24 A Yes, we were prepared to with what we 24 apportionment of Java ME lost 25 call the enhanced econometric model to actually 01:35:35 25 profits to the iPhone is 01:38:49	21	of the econometric analysis, do you think you could	21	Q And in Paragraph 139, that paragraph
24AYes, we were prepared to with what we24apportionment of Java ME lost25call the enhanced econometric model to actually01:35:3525profits to the iPhone is01:38:49	22	have used that econometric analysis to estimate	22	starts off with the statement:
25call the enhanced econometric model to actually01:35:3525profits to the iPhone is01:38:49	23	change in market share?	23	"However, while I agree some
	24		24	apportionment of Java ME lost
175 177	25	call the enhanced econometric model to actually 01:35:35	25	profits to the iPhone is 01:38:49
	L	175		177


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1	appropriate, I do not agree with 01:38:51	1 is a	dispute between these two experts about a 01:42:02
2	Dr. Cox's formula for doing so."	2 fact	ual matter, and the trier of fact will have to
3	In apportioning Java ME lost profits due	3 deci	ide on that, not an expert. There's no economics
4	to Android versus due to other causes, what other	4 invo	olved in deciding that.
5	causes did you look at? 01:39:04	5	Q Sorry to interrupt, but I think you said 01:42:14
6	A The context here is, as I recall is	6 Dr.	Cockburn had taken issue with the strategic
7	that Dr. Cox says the iPhone came along, all of	7 fore	ecast.
8	this is attributable or, at least, a large	8	Did you mean Dr. Leonard?
9	fraction of this is attributable to the iPhone.	9 /	A Dr. Leonard.
10	Dr. Cockburn response Professor Cockburn 01:39:21	10	Q Dr. Cockburn used the strategic forecast, 01:42:21
11	responds, "No, it's not the iPhone. It wasn't the	11 and	l Dr. Leonard said that was not the appropriate
12	effect."	12 fore	ecast?
13	The question really is, when you look at	13 /	A Yes. Sorry. I got that backwards.
14	the expected sales or expected placements going	14	So there's a factual dispute there that I
15	forward, did they have included in them some 01:39:41	15 don	't weigh in on. There is then there's a 01:42:32
16	expectation about the iPhone? If they did, then	16 cou	ple of issues associated with Java ME being used
17	it's only the unexpected success of the iPhone that	17 for	non-handset devices, Blu-ray devices, soda pop
18	would not would have sort of creates an	18 mac	chines, a variety of things where Java ME is in,
19	apportionment problem because, otherwise, they're	19 and	Dr. Cox argues they should be.
20	already there. They've already been taken out and 01:39:59	20	
21	no apportionment is necessary.		
22	So you've got to argue this is the		
23	unexpected part of this. And it's hard to know		
24	what the expectations with regard to the iPhone.		
25	Our reading of this in 2006 is that people were 01:40:11		01:43:10
	178		180
1	mildly surprised that the iPhone did as well as it 01:40:16		
2	did, so it appears that there were unexpected		
3	results here that would not have been included in		
4	the forecast.		
5	Dr. Cox has a reasonably complex way of 01:40:28		
6	doing this, and we just take the proportional		
7	market shares, just as the paragraph says.		
8	Q But other than the iPhone, were there any		
9	other factors that you looked at and considered that		Q Focusing on the issue of whether the
10	might have caused Sun's projected forecast to fall 01:40:43		tegic forecast or some other forecast is 01:43:46
11	short in the real world?		ropriate, if you were to adopt Dr. Leonard's
12	A I don't think so.		hodology rather than Dr. Cockburn's, do you have
13	Q Now, the	·	sense of how your bottom line number of about
14	A I need to remind myself of what this		million would be affected?
15	section says. 01:40:56		A Do you mean Dr. Cox's methodology or 01:44:02
16	Q Okay.		Leonard's? Dr. Cox is takes on the
17	A Well, the answer is, yes, we did. In	17 (Q Correct.
18	some cases, yes; in some cases, no.	18	If you were not to use the strategic
19	Dr. Cockburn comes back and says:		ecast but you were to use the forecast that
20	"The strategic forecast is not 01:41:47		Cox prefers, have you done any calculation as to 01:44:18
21	the right one to use because of a	21 how	v that would affect your bottom line?
22	variety of reasons."		A I have not.
23	The reasons may or may not hold water, but		Q Do you have any sense of how using
24	I don't have any expertise to evaluate sort of those		Cox's preferred forecast would affect the bottom
25	reasons, so I simply say in Paragraph 131 that this 01:41:58	25 line	number? Would it cut it in half? Would it 01:44:29
	179		181






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
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1	measure. 02:03:45	1	And I assume that Dr. Leonard must not have seen it 02:06:05
2	Q Do you know whether Professor Cockburn's	2	because he doesn't criticize it, but you can put in
3	analysis of eBay data included new phones?	3	an alternative auxiliary regression that does make
4	A I don't. I mean, they're stripped	4	sense in which the coefficients have the right
5	phones, so I don't know I'd have to go back and 02:03:56	5	signs, for example, and get results similar to 02:06:23
6	look at the data. I don't recall.	6	Professor Cockburn's.
7	Q So you're not aware of whether Professor	7	Again, let me make sure that the answer
8	Cockburn has actually analyzed whether the effect on	8	here is understood in the same context as my
9	its econometrics analysis if you look exclusively at	9	earlier answers with Mr. Purcell, which is, I'm
10	the new phones 02:04:07	10	using the Leonard implementation of the Cockburn 02:06:43
11	A No, as I recall, he did that and gets	11	model; I'm not estimating the 240-hour estimation
12	about the same results.	12	every time.
13	Q And do you disagree with his conclusion	13	Q Right. Okay.
14	that when he focuses exclusively on new phones, he	14	And the fix that you described of
15	gets the same results? 02:04:18	15	Professor Cockburn's econometric analysis, that had 02:06:59
16	A No, I don't. As I indicated in both the	16	to do with patents that are no longer in this
17	conjoint analysis and the econometric analysis,	17	lawsuit?
18	the first thing we did, as I think in response to	18	A Yes.
19	Judge Alsup's charge, was to simply ask whether it	19	Q Now, the you have an enhanced model for
20	was implemented as represented it was implemented, 02:04:35	20	willingness to pay, correct? 02:07:14
21	and we were able to replicate Professor Cockburn's	21	A Correct.
22	work, all of his work, and Professor Shugan's	22	Q And you calculated a willingness to pay
23	work, all of their work.	23	value for the incremental speed benefits associated
24	Q But it's your opinion that use of eBay	24	with the '104 patent, right?
25	data in Professor Cockburn's econometric study is a 02:04:49	25	A Well, I estimated, to be technical 02:07:32
	194		196
1	reasonable proxy? 02:04:53	1	I'm careful here. I estimated the speed benefits 02:07:34
2	A Yes.	2	associated with the Linpack score, and as I made
3	Q And then you're aware of the critiques	3	clear in my report, I'm not opining on the
4	that Dr. Leonard has made of the econometrics	4	technical effect of the patents. That's a
5	analysis; is that right? 02:05:00	5	different issue, but I've assumed that technical 02:07:46
6	A I am.	6	effect of the patent is what the Oracle engineers
7	Q And you considered those in your report?	7	have said it is and then gone forward with that
8	A I have.	8	assumption.
9	Q And you, nonetheless, conclude that the	9	Q Oracle engineers conducted tests that
10	econometrics analysis is useful and reliable 02:05:07	10	would indicate the according to them, the effect 02:08:01
11	A Yes.	11	of removing the '104 patent and the '205 patent from
12	Q as performed by Professor Cockburn?	12	an Android phone, correct?
13	A Yes, with one exception. There is	13	A That's correct.
14	and it has to do with the memory patents that are	14	Q And you rely on their tests?
15	excluded. Professor Cockburn did a fix for that 02:05:25	15	A Yes. 02:08:12
16	that I think is problematic. Until that part of	16	Q And there are no Google tests, correct?
17	the until those patents were dropped, I did a	17	A That's correct.
18	fix that I think is better, but it was a fix, and	18	Q And the Linpack score, you agree, is a
19	my fix gets tighter results but roughly the same	19	useful proxy for the speed that consumers care
20		20	about? 02:08:23
21	results as his fix did but is easier to interpret 02:05:47	20	
22	and easier to implement.	21	A Yes, in the sense that it's a useful
22	and easier to implement. This is an auxiliary regression. It	21 22	A Yes, in the sense that it's a useful proxy in that it bridges from the patent to
23	and easier to implement. This is an auxiliary regression. It turns out it's embedded in the code so you actually	21	A Yes, in the sense that it's a useful proxy in that it bridges from the patent to something that you can measure. It's useful in
	and easier to implement. This is an auxiliary regression. It turns out it's embedded in the code so you actually don't see the regression output, but if you see the	21 22	A Yes, in the sense that it's a useful proxy in that it bridges from the patent to
23	and easier to implement. This is an auxiliary regression. It turns out it's embedded in the code so you actually	21 22 23	A Yes, in the sense that it's a useful proxy in that it bridges from the patent to something that you can measure. It's useful in

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		- 1	
1	score in which the patents' effect on speed was 02:08:53		report let me know if you're there. 02:11:59 A I'm there.
2 3	measured. So in that sense, it's useful and it	2	
3 4	has has regression validity in the sense that it has coefficients that have, you know, standard	4	Q You state: ''The marginal value
4 5	errors that make it reliable estimates of the 02:09:08	5	contribution of the patents and 02:12:14
6	coefficients for that, but we use it because of	6	copyrights in suit is substantial."
7	the fact that it's tied to the patents.	7	A I'm sorry, 41?
8	Q And then when you did your willingness to	8	Q Paragraph 41.
9	pay analysis, you assumed that the there would be	9	MR. COOPER: Oh, Paragraph 41.
10	an 80 percent reduction in the Linpack score if the 02:09:34	10	MR. COOFER: On, Falagraph 41. MR. NORTON: Did I say "Page"? 02:12:22
11	'104 patent were not included in the Android phone,	11	MR. COOPER: I thought you said "Page 41."
12	correct?	12	Sorry.
13	A Approximately 80 percent, yes.	13	THE WITNESS: Yes.
14	Q And you described that 80 percent estimate	14	BY MR. NORTON:
15	as conservative, correct? 02:09:46	15	Q So you state there: 02:12:28
16	A Yes.	16	"The marginal value
17	Q And by "conservative," that means that	17	contribution of the patents and
18	your use of it would tend to understate willingness	18	copyrights in suit is substantial."
19	to pay?	19	A Yes.
20	A Could, yes. 02:09:56	20	Q And there, are you referring to what's 02:12:34
21	Q Now, the you conclude that consumers	21	indicated by the engineering assessments and the
22	would pay an additional \$21 more for an average	22	willingness to pay?
23	priced Android phone if it had the incremental speed	23	A Yes. I put it slightly differently,
24	benefits of the '104 patent indicated by the Linpack	24	which is, I'm looking at the econometric
25	test; is that right? 02:10:17	25	evaluation of the willingness of the technical 02:12:51
	198		200
1	A Do you want to refer me to the 02:10:19	1	assessments. 02:12:55
2	Q Sure, I'm sorry. I think you can look at	2	Q Okay.
3	paragraph 400 and Table F9.	3	And you say:
4 5	A Yes.	5	"Google would presumably have been willing to pay up to this 02:12:59
6	Q So do I understand correctly that based on 02:10:43 your econometric study, consumers would pay \$21 more	6	
7	for a phone that had the speed benefits indicated by	7	amount for the in-suit patents and copyrights.''
8	the Linpack test by the engineers than they would	8	A Yes.
9	for a noninfringing Android phone?	9	Q When you say, "Google presumably would
10	A Yes. 02:10:59	10	have been willing to pay up to this amount," does 02:13:07
11	Q And you also used your enhanced model to	11	"this amount" refer to the per-unit willingness to
12	calculate willingness to pay for applications; is	12	pay?
13	that right?	13	A No.
14	A That's correct.	14	O What does that refer
15	Q And if we look at paragraph 401, you found 02:11:07	15	A This is a general comment that I use 02:13:14
16	that limiting the number of applications available	16	the econometrics since it's been excluded from
17	on the phone between 6,000 and 40,000 results in a	17	market share for the simple proposition that the
18	reduction in willingness to pay between, on average,	18	consumers valued this. There's a lot of talk in
19	12 and \$22; is that right?	19	the record about they value speed, they value
20	A That's correct. 02:11:28	20	applications, and so on, and what the econometrics 02:13:31
21	Q So the willingness to pay for the assumed	21	shows is they do.
22	incremental increase in applications is between 12	22	And, therefore, that Google, if it had
23	and \$22 per average-priced Android phone?	23	understood that in 2006, would have put a high
24	A Correct.	24	value, relatively high value on the intellectual
25	Q Now, if you go to Page 41 of your 02:11:42	25	property associated with achieving those gains. 02:13:48
	199		201
L	199	l	201

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		1	to Android are, in fact, correctly allocated to 02:22:20 Android?
		2	
		3	A Yes and no. I mean, we took the
		4	expenses for what they were, and we talked about
		5	the way or tried to analyze how Dr. Cox then 02:22:34
		6	uses those how he accounts for those expenses,
		7	whether he amortizes them, over what period of
9		8	time he amortizes them, and so forth. And I made
-	Q Now, if you were to assume that Google did	9	some criticisms about that, but we've not gotten
10	not have good noninfringing alternatives to the APIs 02:19:59	10	involved in sort of whether these numbers in the 02:22:51
11	or the '104 patent, and you also assume that the	11	Google reports are accurate. I mean, I have no
12	willingness to pay calculations are accurate, would	12	way of knowing.
13	that suggest to you that the reasonable royalty for	13	Q So you have no way of determining whether
14	the '104 patent and for the copyrights would both be	14	or not the actual expense items that show up on the
15	substantially in excess of what you calculated on 02:20:19	15	P&L really are properly allocated to Android as 02:23:02
16	Table 8?	16	opposed to some other Google business operation?
17	MR. PURCELL: Object to the form.	17	A I do not.
18	THE WITNESS: I really don't think you can	18	Q So you just take that one on faith?
19	go there, Mr. Norton. The the what the	19	A Well, I don't take it on faith. I
20	reasonable I mean, the noninfringing substitutes 02:20:34	20	assume that, following Dr. Cox, these numbers are 02:23:14
21	available to Google in 2006, as I've argued in	21	right, and if at trial I've been careful here;
22	dismissing Dr. Leonard's arguments about this, are	22	it's an important point, which is what I've
23	embedded in the offer, so if I believe they agreed	23	tried to do is set forth methodologies for doing
24	to the February 2006 offer, that embeds and reflects	24	these things with an understanding that those
25	whatever noninfringing substitutes there are, and so 02:20:51	25	methodologies are implemented with a set of 02:23:29
	206		208
1	way each then make a side encourter the set that 02,20,55	1	commentions come of which are consistent 02.22.21
1	you can't, then, make a side argument about that. 02:20:55	1	assumptions, some of which are empirical 02:23:31
2	That's in the number that you're going to allocate	2	assumptions, in which The Court will have better
3	in this, okay?	3	evidence at the date of trial than any of the
4	Then, this goes to the issue about what is	4	experts had at the point at which they were
5	an accurate way of apportioning that to these 02:21:06	5	implemented. But that the methodology will work, 02:23:42 whatever whatever the evidence is at trial.
6	particular patents and, you know, the difference	6	
7	between the willingness to pay may sort of cause you	7	So if the evidence is these costs are
8	to think hard about whether or not the group and	8	less, or they should have been amortized
9	value method got it right or was in the ballpark.		differently, then the methodology would have you
10	But beyond that, I don't think it helps. There's no 02:21:25	10	know, I would tell the jury, if asked, that the 02:23:57
11	way for me to go from the willingness to pay to an	11	jury needs to make those adjustments, or I would
12	adjustment that I ought to make to the group and	12	make the adjustments for the jury and present the
13	value apportionment.	13	numbers to them.
14	BY MR. NORTON:	14	Q Now, on the topic of infringer's profits,
15	Q So I want to talk for a moment on 02:21:46	15	Mr. Purcell asked you some questions about double 02:24:13
16	infringer's profits.	16	recovery, and I want to approach it a little bit
17	Now, for infringer's profits, you have	17	differently.
18	deducted from Android U.S. revenues its expenses	18	When you cal well, when you calculated
19	through September 2011, correct?	19	the reasonable royalty for copyright, that is based
20	A Yes. 02:22:04	20	on the 2000 net present value of Sun's anticipated 02:24:31
21	Q And the evidence you have for those	21	profits from the 2006 transaction, correct?
22	expenses is Dr. Cox's report; is that correct?	22	A Using Google's estimates of Sun's
23	A That's correct.	23	success, yes.
24	Q And have you done anything to ascertain	24	Q Google's estimates of the number of units,
25	whether or not the expenses that Dr. Cox allocated 02:22:15	25	correct? 02:24:49
	207		209

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
1	A Yes. That was poorly put. It's not 02:24:49	1	Is that much clearer? 02:29:54
2	Google's estimates of Sun's success; it's Google's	2	A Yes.
3	estimates of Android's success.	3	MR. COOPER: And you're asking him to
4	Q But the number that you are using is based	4	assume that's the statement of the law?
5	on Sun's anticipated profits? 02:24:58	5	MR. NORTON: I am. 02:29:59
6	A Yes.	6	MR. COOPER: Okay.
7	Q So to the extent that the copyright	7	BY MR. NORTON:
8	statute says that a Plaintiff is entitled to actual	8	Q And then am I correct in understanding
9	damages	9	that the copyright royalty that you have calculated
10	I'll ask you to assume that the copyright 02:25:16	10	is based on anticipated profits that Sun would have 02:30:08
11	statute provides that a Plaintiff is entitled to	11	received from a hypothetical license?
12	actual damages which can be measured as a lost	12	A Correct.
13	license or as a lost profit, and in addition to	13	Q Okay.
14	actual damages, the Plaintiff is entitled to	14	In that case, and assuming that my
15	infringer's profits to the extent not already 02:25:31	15	statement of the law is correct, is there any 02:30:21
16	counted in the actual damages.	16	overlap between your measure of the copyright,
17	A Okay.	17	reasonable royalty and your measure of the copyright
18	Q So with that understanding of actual	18	infringer's profits?
19	damages, is there any overlap between the	19	A May I ask you a clarifying question?
20	infringer's profits and the copyright royalty? 02:25:46	20	Q Okay. 02:30:40
21	A I don't know.	21	A I mean, is what you're getting at here
22	MR. COOPER: I'm going to retrospectively	22	that there could have been a difference between
23	object to the question as to form.	23	the expected profits to which was used in
24	MR. NORTON: I understand. I'll stick	24	calculation of the reasonable royalty and the
24 25		25	actual profits that history produced? Is it a 02:30:49
20	with that, though. 02:26:48 210	23	21 actual profits that history produced: 15 ft a
1	THE WITNESS: Just a second. Can I talk 02:27:01	1	distinction between the forecast and actual? 02:30:56
2	to my attorney off the record?	2	Q Well, I guess my point is just
3	MR. NORTON: Let's go off the record.	3	I don't believe my question depends on
4	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 2:27 p.m.	4	that distinction, so obviously, my question is still
5	and we'll go off the record. 02:27:07	5	not clear. 02:31:07
6	(Discussion held off record.)	6	If actual damages can be measured
7	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now	7	Is there anything in your
8	2:29 p.m. and we're back on the record.	8	Let me ask it this way: Is there anything
9	MR. COOPER: Counsel, I've had an	9	in your measure of the copyright reasonable royalty
10	opportunity to confer with Dr. Kearl while we were 02:29:08	10	that factors in Google's infringer's profits? 02:31:20
11	off the record, and it's apparent that Dr. Kearl	11	A I don't think so.
12	didn't understand your question.	12	Q Okay.
13	Can I ask you to rephrase it, please?	13	A Because the reasonable royalty is based
14	MR. NORTON: Of course. I'm sorry, that	14	on the it starts, as we've discussed a number
15	was confusing. 02:29:17	15	of times, on the 2006 license and the implied 02:32:50
16	BY MR. NORTON:	16	royalty that comes out of that, that included, not
17	Q So assume that the copyright statute	17	infringement, but compliant Android.
18	identifies actual damages and infringer's profits,	18	So the projected profits don't include
19	and actual damages can be measured one of two ways:	19	whatever incremental profits, if any, whichever
20	Either lost profits or a lost license fee, a 02:29:32	20	they go, negative or positive, that might have 02:33:11
21	hypothetical license. And the copyright statute	21	occurred because you have a an Android machine
22	further provides that the Plaintiff is entitled to	22	that is not or an Android product that is not
22 23	actual damages, plus infringer's profits to the	23	compliant.
23 24	extent the infringer's profits are not taken into	23	*
Z. H		24	Q Okay.
25	consideration in the actual damages. 02:29:50		Now, you talked a little bit about 02:33:29

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
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1 2	Professor Cockburn's group and value approach? 02:33:30 A Yes.	1	you sort of pick a bunch of independent things, or 02:36:07
3		2	think of it as a conglomerate, a firm that has a
	Q And when you were referring to Professor	3	roll-up of a bunch of independent firms, or you can
4	Cockburn's group and value approach, you'rereferring to the version of the group and value02:33:36	4	think about a portfolio as a set of things that are
5 6		5	designed to do one or two, to move forward the 02:36:15
7	approach that was permitted by Judge Alsup which	6	technology, and you might think of that in terms of
	uses, in part, Professor Cockburn's lower bound,		a vertically integrated firm that has divisions that
8 9	correct? A That's correct.	8	are productive because they're integrated as opposed
9 10		9	to a conglomerate that has divisions that are 022622
	Q Have you looked at Professor Cockburn's 02:33:47	10 11	independent of one another. 02:36:32
11 12	group and value upper bound approach? A No.	12	Portfolios are used loosely to describe
13		13	both of those, right, and typically, it's used to describe the latter, that is, a group of unrelated
14	Q Have you made Did you ever reach any opinions as to the	14	
15		15	patents that happen to be assembled by somebody who then is cort of licensing the neteric for whetever 02/26/41
16		16	then is sort of licensing the patents for whatever 02:36:41
17	A No. We simply waited for The Court to decide on this matter.	17	use in the portfolio.
18	Q Do you have an opinion as to whether the	18	If you think that the Java ME portfolio is not that, but it's a portfolio of patents that are
19	upper bound approach is a reasonable version of	19	designed to advance a particular technology, they
20	group and value? 02:34:10	20	have a particular technology, then it is a bit 02:36:58
21	A There are things that go different	21	unlike the portfolio studies that Professor Cockburn
22	directions here. One is as indicated in my	22	and Dr. Leonard appeal to in that they they're
23	report. Professor Cockburn uses three studies,	23	unlikely to be those kind of portfolios, right?
24	picks one that seemed to be out of the norm for	24	And the difference here is that you could
25	the academic studies in this area, and I provide 02:34:31	25	imagine that there are alternative paths through 02:37:16
	214		216
1	some evidence from a paper by John Putnam that 02:34:35	1	this portfolio that are substitutes for one another. 02:37:20
2	surveys the license renewal literature and the	2	So, for example, suppose to make this simple,
3	estimates of the value function for the for	3	suppose there are 500 patents in the Java ME
4	the for the annual literature that suggest that	4	portfolio, each of which is and there are five
5	the top 5 percent gets a lower fraction than does 02:34:54	5	paths, so you only need 100 patents to implement the 02:37:34
6	Professor Cockburn. So this is the difference	6	technology. You just need one of them. Then, in
7	between 77-point something and my 53.3 percent.	7	fact, one you don't take one five-hundredths to
8	Okay?	8	value this; you take one one-hundredth to value
9	So in that sense, I think he's not my	9	this, and the mean value is higher, as well, because
10	criticism here is that he could have used the 02:35:15	10	it's the mean of 100. It's the portfolio divided by 02:37:52
11	universe of studies in this area, and for whatever	11	100; not the portfolio divided by 500.
12	reason, picked a subset, and the better thing would	12	So there is this problem with the group
13	be to use the universal studies in the area, in	13	and value approach that I have, and I allude to it
14	which case, you come to a smaller, smaller	14	in several different places about this portfolio
15	fraction. 02:35:30	15	likely being composed of substitutes and 02:38:05
16	But there is a bit of a problem in all of	16	complements. There's no evidence in this matter. I
17	this, and here I think Dr. Leonard gets this quite	17	mean, people talk loosely about their substitutes
18	wrong, and we have these synthetic portfolios	18	here, but I've seen nothing in the record that
19	let me back up. This is a long answer. Witnesses	19	allows me or Professor Cockburn or Dr. Leonard, or
20	are not supposed to give long answers, but my 02:35:49	20	anybody else, to tease out that, but it is a 02:38:22
21	lawyer is a nice guy.	21	potential problem, because it treats these 500
22	MR. COOPER: We're in a special situation.	22	patents as if they were 500 independent patents, and
23	THE WITNESS: Let me be clear about how	23	there are unlikely to have been 500 independent
24 25	I'm thinking about portfolio. You can think about a	24 25	patents. And to the degree there are substitutes in there, this many that the group and value method 02:28:25
20	portfolio as sort of like a stock portfolio, which 02:36:03 215	23	there, this means that the group and value method 02:38:35 217
1	215	1	

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EXHIBIT H

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User 6			User 14		
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User 8					
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2nd Title	Lead VM Architect		Referred By		
2nd Phone		Ext.	Web Site		
Status		23	2002532300 (A_112-0		
Last Reach			1D/Status		
Last Meeting			Last Results		
Last Attempt			Public/Private	Public	
Notes/History	Date Range:	All Dates			
Note	11/12/07	5:44 PM	Google today released the Androi	d S/W SDK	
Note	5/26/06	7:53 PM	After many meetings incl. Alan Br	enner, it was agreed that the	wo companies cannot come to
			a meeting of minds on how to wor	k together re CDC-HI and op	en source.
Note	8/19/05	7:52 PM	Andy is interested in CDC-HI for v	vireless devices.	
Note	8/5/05	10:45 PM	Andy informed me today that the	co. by which Android Researc	h was acquired was Coogle.
			Vineet and I w/meet w/Andy and T	Tim Lindholm at on Fri. 8/19 a	t Google.

Created 2/26/2011 at 11:34 AM

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Contact Report

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