EXHIBIT F
ORACLE AMERICA, INC., )
Plaintiff, )
vs.
GOOGLE, INC.,
Defendant.
$\qquad$ _)
CONFIDENTIAL TESTIMONY - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY
VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF JAMES KEARL
MONDAY, MARCH 26, 2012

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| 3 |  | 3 | FOR THE WITNESS: |
| 4 |  | 4 | FARELLA BRAUN \& MARTEL |
| 5 |  | 5 | BY: JOHN L. COOPER, ESQ. |
| 6 |  | 6 | ALYSON FRANCO |
| 7 | Videotaped Deposition of JAMES KEARL, taken on | 7 | 235 Montgomery Street |
| 8 | behalf of Plaintiff, at Keker \& Van Nest, 633 Battery | 8 | San Francisco, California 94104 |
| 9 | Street, San Francisco, California, commencing at | 9 | (415) 954-4400 |
| 10 | 9:37 a.m., Monday, March 26, 2012 before Kelli Combs, | 10 |  |
| 11 | CSR 7705. | 11 | Also Present: |
| 12 |  | 12 | Philip Knolls, Videographer |
| 13 |  | 13 | Andrew Tenkin, In-house counsel for Oracle |
| 14 |  | 14 | Greg Adams with Charles River Associates |
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| 1 | APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL: | 1 | JAMES KEARL, |
| 2 |  | 2 | after having been duly sworn, testified as follows: |
| 3 | FOR PLAINTIFF ORACLE AMERICA, INC.: | 3 | ----00o--- |
| 4 | BOIES, SCHILLER \& FLEXNER, LLP | 4 |  |
| 5 | BY: FRED NORTON, ESQ. | 5 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Good morning, Counsel. 09:03:25 |
| 6 | STEVEN C. HOLTZMAN, ESQ. | 6 | My name is Philip Knowles, of Veritext National |
| 7 | 1999 Harrison Street, Suite 900 | 7 | Deposition and Litigation Services. The date today |
| 8 | Oakland, California 94612 | 8 | is March 26th, 2012, and the time is approximately |
| 9 | (510) 874-1000 | 9 | 9:03 a.m. |
| 10 | fnorton@bsfllp.com | 10 | This deposition is being held in the 09:03:39 |
| 11 |  | 11 | office of Keker and Van Nest, located at 633 Battery |
| 12 | FOR DEFENDANT GOOGLE, INC.: | 12 | Street, on the fourth floor, in the City of |
| 13 | KEKER \& VAN NEST, LLP | 13 | San Francisco, California 94111. |
| 14 | BY: DANIEL PURCELL, ESQ. | 14 | The caption of this case is Oracle America |
| 15 | 633 Battery Street | 15 | versus Google, Inc., in the United States District 09:03:54 |
| 16 | San Francisco, California 94111-1809 | 16 | Court for the Northern District of California, |
| 17 | (415) 733-6697 | 17 | San Francisco Division. The name of the witness is |
| 18 | dpurcell@kkvn.com | 18 | James Kearl. |
| 19 |  | 19 | At this time, the attorneys will identify |
| 20 |  | 20 | themselves and the parties they represent. 09:04:07 |
| 21 |  | 21 | MR. NORTON: Fred Norton, on behalf of |
| 22 |  | 22 | Oracle America. |
| 23 |  | 23 | MR. HOLTZMAN: Steve Holtzman, for Oracle |
| 24 |  | 24 | America. |
| 25 |  | 25 | MR. COOPER: John Cooper, Farella, Braun \& 09:04:20 |
|  | 3 |  | 5 |

Martel. I represent Dr. Kearl.
MR. TENKIN: Andrew Tenkin, Oracle
America.
MR. PURCELL: Dan Purcell, Keker \& Van
Nest. I represent Google.
MR. ADAMS: Gregory Adams, with CRA
International.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Our court reporter,
Kelli Combs of Veritext, will swear in the witness.
(Deponent sworn.)
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: You may proceed.
MR. COOPER: Counsel, at the outset, as I
indicated prior to the beginning of the deposition,
Dr. Kearl has a correction he would like to make to
Paragraph 86 of --
He'd like to make a correction to
Paragraph 86 of his report.
MR. NORTON: Please, go ahead.
THE WITNESS: In Paragraph 86, in order to
get the total value of the deal, I added the value
of Sun to the value to Google. That's the
denominator. And then divide that into the value of
the Sun to get an estimate of the portfolio royalty.
I should have netted out, of the part that
goes into the denominator, the transfer between
Me9:05:33

Google and Oracle for the $\$ 20$ million payments, $\quad$ 09:05:35 upfront payments, and the $\$ 25$ million capped royalty. The present value of those two numbers is a little less than $\$ 100$ million. So the denominator would be slightly smaller and, therefore, the 09:05:51 estimated royalty slightly larger.

## EXAMINATION

BY MR. NORTON:
Q All right. Thank you.
We'll probably come back to that a little 09:06:08
bit later in the morning.
Why don't we start with the easiest
question of the day. Would you rather I call you
Professor or Dr. Kearl?
A Whatever works for you.
09:06:19
Q I probably will switch back and forth because I won't remember.

Why don't we start by marking your report, and I'll ask the court reporter, first, to mark Exhibit 570 -- I'm sorry -- $576.09: 06: 28$
(Deposition Exhibit 576 marked
for identification.)
MR. NORTON: Then 577.
(Deposition Exhibit 577 marked
for identification.) 09:06:52

> MR. NORTON: Then 578. (Deposition Exhibit 578 marked for identification.)

BY MR. NORTON:
Q And the way I organized these may be a 09:07:44 little differently from how you had them, but Exhibit 576 should be your report. Exhibit 577 should be the tables to your -- the appendices to your report. And 578 should be the tables; is that correct?

09:08:02
A That's correct.
Q Okay.
Now, other than the change that you
described to Paragraph 86 of your report, do you have any other changes to the report that you want 09:08:15 to make?

A No.
Q Can you just describe for me your background in calculating patent damages?

A I've been retained in a number of cases 09:08:27 either to do reasonable royalty or lost profits and have filed reports on those matters.

Q And how many cases have you calculated a reasonable royalty for patents?

A Probably seven or eight. You need to 09:08:53
clarify what you mean "cases." Would this be 09:08:56
formal testimony? It would be less than that, but I've worked on matters in which there has been preliminary work done, often settled, in probably -- I don't know -- maybe ten, eight to 09:09:08 ten.

Q Then of that eight to ten, how many cases did you give testimony concerning a reasonable royalty in a patent case?
A I think only two.
09:09:20

Q And those two, did you testify on behalf of the plaintiff or the defendant or one of each?

A Both cases was on behalf of the defendant.

## Q And have you -- <br> 09:09:34

Prior to this case, have you ever been engaged to calculate a reasonable royalty copyright case?

A Well, yes. Damages in a very large copyright case, in a couple of cases, yes. 09:09:46

Q And did you give testimony concerning the value of a license in a copyright case?

A I was deposed in at least one of those cases. It's since disappeared into practice, as the lawyers say. I don't recall. I don't think I 09:10:06
gave testimony in the other case. 09:10:10
Q And in the copyright case in which you gave testimony, did you testify on behalf of the plaintiff or on behalf of the defendant?

A The defendant. 09:10:18
Q What was the nature of the product in the copyright case in which you gave testimony on a reasonable royalty?

A Software.
Q And the two patent cases in which you gave 09:10:30
testimony on behalf of the defendants concerning a
reasonable royalty, what was the nature of the products in those cases?

A They were both medical devices.
Q In the copyright case that involved 09:10:47 software, what kind of software was that?

A UNIX software.
Q Do you recall the name of that case?
A Yes, it's IBM versus SCO or SCO versus
IBM.
09:11:02
Q If you could just describe for me what you understand your task in this particular case to be?

A I was retained by the Court, as I
understand the matter, to originally critique the
experts of each side. And then when the trial was 09:11:20
10
delayed, Judge Alsup asked if I could come up with
an independent damages estimate. My response was
I could within the confines of the record. That
is, I couldn't go out and do independent research
beyond literature research. So I think it's fair
to say that it's morphed over time from at least
what it appeared to be last fall, as the trial has
been delayed.
Q But is it fair to say that, ultimately,
your task included the job of coming up with an
independent opinion as to the reasonable royalty of
the patents-in-suit in this case?
A Right, but within some fairly tight
constraints. It's my understanding that Judge
Alsup ruled that I would not be allowed to opine
on matters that he had precluded experts on either
side from testifying about, so it's not a sort of
go anywhere effort. It's within the confines of
his orders over the last three months.
Q But with that understanding, it would be
(air to say that your task included the job of
calculating a reasonable royalty for the
patents-in-suit in this case?
A Yes.
for the copyrights in suit?
09:12:54
A Correct.
Q And to calculate infringer's profits for copyrights in suit?

A Correct.
09:12:59
Q And lost profits for those copyrights?
A Correct.
Q And for each of those measures of damage, have you reached an independent opinion as to what the damages are in this case?

09:13:07
A Within the confines of Judge Alsup's
orders, yes.
Q In order to reach your opinions, did you limit yourself to the documents -With respect to documents, did you limit 09:13:27 yourself to the documents that were cited by the parties' experts in their reports?

A Mostly, but as you'll note in the
footnotes, there are some documents that we went out and got that we judged to be relevant to this 09:13:43 case.

Q When you mention documents that you went out and got, are you referring to literature and things in the public record?
A Yes.
09:13:58

Q So to the extent you rely on documents 09:13:59
produced by the parties, did you limit yourself to documents that were cited in one of the expert's reports?

A Yes.
09:14:09
Q Did you review deposition testimony of witnesses in this case?

A I have.
Q Did you limit yourself to deposition testimony that was cited by one of the experts in $09: 14: 19$ the case?

A No.
Q So you reviewed deposition testimony that had not necessarily been cited by any expert?
A That's correct.
09:14:30

Q And did you have access to all of the deposition transcripts in the case?

MR. COOPER: Objection; calls for speculation.

THE WITNESS: Yeah, I think so, but I'm
09:14:43
not sure because we don't have a listing of all of
the depositions that were taken.
BY MR. NORTON:
Q Are you aware of any depositions for which you -- any depositions that were taken for which you 09:14:52
A No.
Q Now, have you conducted any interviews
with any employees of any party?
A Let me clarify. I assume that retained 09:15:17
experts are not defined as employees of the
parties.

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did not receive a transcript?
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did not receive a transcript?
09:14:56
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A No.
Q Now, have you conducted any interviews with any employees of any party?
A Let me clarify. I assume that retained 09:15:17 experts are not defined as employees of the parties.

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    Q I meant to carve those out. Let me ask it
a little bit differently.
            You have spoken with each of the parties' \(\quad 09: 15: 26\)
retained damages experts, correct?
    A I have.
    Q Some of the parties' retained technical
experts?
    A I have. 09:15:33
    Q Other than the parties' retained technical
    experts and retained damages experts, have you
    spoken to any employee of any party?
    A No.
    Q To the extent that either Professor 09:15:44
    Cockburn or Dr. Leonard or Dr. Cox relies on
    interviews with employees of a party, have you
    considered those interviews?
    A To the degree that they're reflected in
    the reports, and then there were subsequent
                            09:16:06
    depositions of the people that they may have 09:16:09
    interviewed, yes.
    Q To the extent that the expert --
        To the extent that Dr. Cox relied on
    interviews of people, or a person who was not 09:16:19
    subsequently interviewed, at some point deposed, did
    you rely on those interviews?
    A Again, only to the degree that he
    reflects those interviews in his own reports.
    Q Is there anything that you did to assess 09:16:38
    the accuracy of the statements that were relayed to
    Dr. Cox by the people he interviewed?
    A No.
    Q In the course of reaching your opinions,
    did you make any assumptions? 09:16:58
    A Yes.
    Q Is it possible for you to tell me what
    your primary assumptions are?
    A I think a fair answer to that is that
    they are reflected in the report. We've been -- 09:17:13
    tried to be very clear about when I've made an
    assumption. And without walking through the
    report, I'm not sure I can give a fair answer to
    that question.
        Q That's fair. Thank you.
                                09:17:22

Q I meant to carve those out. Let me ask it a little bit differently.

You have spoken with each of the parties' 09:15:26
retained damages experts, correct?
A I have.
Q Some of the parties' retained technical experts?

A I have. 09:15:33
Q Other than the parties' retained technical
experts and retained damages experts, have you
spoken to any employee of any party?
A No.
Q To the extent that either Professor 09:15:44
Cockburn or Dr. Leonard or Dr. Cox relies on
interviews with employees of a party, have you
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A To the degree that they're reflected in
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you rely on those interviews?
A Again, only to the degree that he
reflects those interviews in his own reports.
Q Is there anything that you did to assess 09:16:38
the accuracy of the statements that were relayed to
Dr. Cox by the people he interviewed?
A No.
Q In the course of reaching your opinions,
did you make any assumptions?
09:16:58
A Yes.
Q Is it possible for you to tell me what your primary assumptions are?

A I think a fair answer to that is that they are reflected in the report. We've been --
assumption. And without walking through the report, I'm not sure I can give a fair answer to that question.

Q That's fair. Thank you.
09:17:22

Now, did you understand in the course of \(09: 17: 31\) your task, that you were permitted to come up with any methodology you chose to best calculate a reasonable royalty for the patents-in-suit?

A I interpreted Judge Alsup's instruction 09:17:48
to me that I was to derive an independent estimate as allowing for that, yes, subject, as I said now a couple of times, to his subsequent orders limiting the other experts on the case.

Q And so with respect to the reasonable 09:18:09 royalty methodology -- reasonable royalty methodology in this case, have you reached an opinion as to what the best way is to calculate a reasonable royalty for the patents and copyrights in suit?

09:18:22
A I have.
Q Okay.
And --
A Let me back up. I've come up with a methodology for estimate -- for the best way to
estimate the reasonable royalty on the portfolio
that the parties were discussing in 2006. The
allocation of that portfolio royalty to the
patents and copyrights in suit is constrained by
Judge Alsup's orders. 09:18:50

Q Let me break that down a little bit. \(09: 18: 54\)
So with respect to calculating a royalty
on the portfolio that the parties were discussing in
2006, you have come up with what you believe is the
best way to calculate that royalty; is that correct? 09:19:06
A Correct.
Q Sorry. I didn't mean to speak over you.
And I know it's in the report, but in brief form, what is the best way to calculate that royalty? 09:19:20

A Has really three parts: One is to begin
with the assumption that the parties would have negotiated either a percentage of revenue or a per handset royalty in 2006; that that would then be applied to actual Google revenues going forward;

09:19:46 and then to focus on the estimation of that per unit or percentage royalty by looking at the expectations of both parties in 2006 and how they valued the 2006 deal, backing out from the deal the things that were not associated with the 09:20:14 intellectual property.

Q That allows you to calculate a per handset or per revenue dollar royalty rate?

A Correct.
Q You said that -- 09:20:31
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Well, with respect to apportioning that 09:20:33
2006 royalty rate, have you come up with what you believe is the best methodology for apportioning to the intellectual property in suit?
A I don't think that's what I testified 09:20:56 to. What I said was after -- after the -determining the reasonable royalty on the portfolio, then the apportionment is really constrained by Judge Alsup's orders. And I adopted the group and value methodology of 09:21:10 Professor Cockburn, but I'm not opining on whether that's the best methodology for doing this.
Q When you say, 'whether that's the best methodology for doing this," what is 'this'?
A Apportioning.
09:21:27
Q Did you consider other ways of apportioning?
A Over the course of the last six months, yes, a number of different ways.
Q Did you identify any means of apportioning 09:21:39 that is better than Professor Cockburn's group and value approach, as permitted by Judge Alsup's orders?
A No.
Q When I ask you 'better," I mean, better in 09:21:57
your estimation as an economist. 09:21:59
A No.
Q Are there other methods that you considered to be reasonable methods of apportioning, although perhaps not as good as the group and value 09:22:25 approach permitted by Judge Alsup?

MR. COOPER: Objection as to form.
THE WITNESS: Let me ask a clarifying
question --
BY MR. NORTON:
Q Of course.
A -- of both attorneys.
Am I permitted to talk about things that
Judge Alsup has excluded in answer to that
question? 09:23:15
MR. PURCELL: I think so.
MR. NORTON: I agree with Mr. Purcell.
MR. PURCELL: This is just a deposition.
Your testimony at trial might be limited, but I think you can answer.

09:23:28
THE WITNESS: Fair enough. Then I think the approach that looks at the change in market share, predicted change in market share, was a good approach, an interesting approach.

BY MR. NORTON:
Q So an approach that looks at the change in market share of Android as a result of the infringement?
A Yes.
09:23:52

Q And uses that to apportion?
A Yes.
Q Did you reach an opinion as to whether that approach was, as a matter of economics, was better or worse than the group and value approach? 09:24:03

A Both approaches have some problems, and
I think both approaches have some strengths, so there is not -- it's not an easy call, which is which one dominates the other.

Q Did you conduct an analysis, an 09:24:21
apportionment analysis, using the changes in market share?

A Yes.
Q Is that analysis in your report?
A No.
09:24:35
Q Is it excluded from your report because of your understanding of Judge Alsup's orders?

A That's correct.
Q When you conducted an analysis using the changes in market shares, did you get to the point 09:24:46 20
where you actually calculated a per unit royalty? 09:24:48
A We may have.
Q Did you get to the point where you
calculated a royalty as a percentage of Google advertising revenues? 09:25:07

A Yes.
Q Under that analysis using the change in market shares, what royalty rate did you calculate as a percentage of Google advertising revenues?

A I don't recall at this point.
09:25:23
Q Was it greater than or less than the
royalty rate that you calculated using the group and value approach?

A Greater, but not a lot.
Q Can you put any order of magnitude on 'not 09:25:36 a lot'?

A Well, I need to preface this by saying
that we did some preliminary work. It did not go through the kind of vetting that the final report has, so as long as it's understood that this is -- 09:26:11
that we didn't complete the work because we were instructed not to complete the work, it probably would have been -- I don't know -- maybe twice as high, in the 2 or 3 percent range, as opposed to the under-2 percent range. It may have been as 09:26:25

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much as 50 to }80\mathrm{ percent higher than the fairly
09:26:32
low royalties.
    Q Were there any other apportionment
analyses that you began to use, but stopped because
of orders by Judge Alsup?
09:26:49
A We worked at estimating this the same way -- we've sort of tracked the experts here, which is my job. And so in Professor Cockburn's first report -- or second report, sorry, not his first report, but his second report.
09:27:11
Q So you used the method --
You performed an analysis using the method that Professor Cockburn used to apportion in his September 2011 report?
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A Yeah, we explored that method, parts of 09:27:23 that method, sure.

Q In exploring that method, did you reach a conclusion as to what you believe the royalty rate would be if that were a permissible method?

A It would have been what I just told you
09:27:38
a few minutes ago. It would have been roughly twice the current -- I need to be very cautious here because I don't have the numbers in front of me, and I didn't write the numbers down, but my vague recollection is they would be roughly twice 09:27:48
22
the size of the current royalties, maybe not quite 09:27:49 that large.

Q Now, with respect to the -- the change in market share approach that you considered that you did not include in your final report, did you reach 09:28:14 an opinion as an economist as to whether that approach would be sound as a matter of economics?

A It requires some additional work that I think Professor Cockburn didn't do. The -- as I understand, that approach was excluded by Judge 09:28:41
Alsup on an argument that when the predicted willingness to pay was compared to the price, the price of the phone was not allowed to move, that this was Dr. Leonard's principal criticism. It's my understanding that was at the heart of why

09:29:01 Judge Alsup excluded that.

It's hard to believe these phones' prices would have gone down. Google didn't control the price. So it is a reasonable assumption that the price of the Android phones would not have changed, 09:29:18 and this would have been mostly a market share, a functionality would have affected market share, but that required some additional stable work by Professor Cockburn, having to do with the Google's relationships with the OEMs and how the OEMs price 09:29:35
their phones.
09:29:39
For example, you could imagine that the way that Google could have offset the market share effect would be to provide a subsidy to the phones equal to the -- sort of the amount that they would have lost because of the reduced functionality. It's just unclear because if you think of these as independent OEMs, and you think kind of a competitive market here in which the handsets themselves are priced at roughly equal to the cost 09:30:07 of the equipment and stuff in the handsets, then it doesn't make a lot of sense to argue the adjudgment would have been in the price.

## Q Okay.

So did you reach a conclusion as an 09:30:24
economist as to whether an approach using the change
in market shares would have been economically sound?
A With the caveats I've just given, yes,
but it would have required a careful analysis of -- of what would have happened as the 09:30:46 functionality of the phones decreased and what part of that would have been reflected in market share and what part of it would have been reflected in perhaps the direct subsidy to Google. I mean, Google presumably cares about

09:31:03 24
market share, but it also cares about its 09:31:05
advertising revenues on these phones. So if you netted out a subsidy they had to pay, that would have reduced their -- their -- their net revenues, which would have mattered to them as well.

09:31:15
Let me put it a slightly different way.
Even if you don't have the same market share -even if the market share doesn't change by the full amount predicted by Professor Cockburn, it's partially offset, but it's offset by subsidies to 09:31:31 Google. Then Google's revenues from the handsets goes down, in part, because of the market share and, in part, because it has to offset the problems that the OEMs have in selling their phones. That was not explored carefully by Professor Cockburn. 09:31:49 I did not explore it. So short of exploring that, you know, there is not much that can be said there, except that it was an appropriate methodology if that hole could have been filled.

Q All right. Thank you. 09:32:06 Now, with respect to the copyright reasonable royalty, is there any difference in your approach to calculating a reasonable royalty for copyright and a reasonable royalty for patents?

A No. And here I need to be very 09:32:24
cautious. I'm not a lawyer, obviously. It's my 09:32:26
understanding that there is not really a
reasonable royalty on a -- on copyrights. A
different term is used, but all of the experts in
this case have used a reasonable royalty approach $09: 32: 39$
to deriving the -- the -- what would have been the
foregone revenues on the -- on the copyrights, and
I have adopted that approach.
Q To the extent that --
To the extent that damages in a copyright $\quad \mathbf{0 9 : 3 2 : 5 6}$
case can be measured by a hypothetical license that
would have been negotiated between the parties at
the time that infringement began, and to the extent
that in a patent case, damages could be calculated
by calculating a hypothetical license that would $\quad \mathbf{0 9 : 3 3 : 1 4 ~}$
have been negotiated by the parties at the time the
infringement began, is there any economic reason to
approach those two measurements any differently?
A Yes. The patents have a known life.
And it's my understanding that the copyrights have
a known life, but it's much longer. I don't know
what the life is, but it's a much longer period of
time. So presumably, if you were able to think
about these negotiations as separate on the two
different forms of intellectual property, they
26
might take a slightly different character because 09:33:52
of the -- because of the lifetime, expected life
of that.
And, you know, you have invited me to
speculate a little bit here, so I will. It's 09:34:04
conceivable that the kind of noninfringing
substitutes could be different for patents than for
copyrights.
Q Okay.
You're familiar with the Georgia Pacific 09:34:16
factors?
A Iam.
Q All right.
In the two observations that you just made
that might be different between copyrights and
09:34:22
patents, would those potential differences be
addressed by application of the Georgia Pacific factors?

A I'm not quite sure how to answer. It's my understanding the Georgia Pacific factors apply 09:34:39 to the reasonable royalty for patents and not for copyrights, but I'm happy to be informed if I've got that wrong.

Q Well, is there --
Is application of the Georgia Pacific 09:34:57
factors to calculate a reasonable royalty in a 09:34:58
patent case, does that make good economic sense?
A You're asking me to opine on the Georgia
Pacific factors?
Q A good -- an economically sensible way to 09:35:10 calculate a royalty in a patent case?

A Well, if you mean a -- a -- a
negotiation, a hypothetical negotiation, the answer is in some cases yes, in some cases no.

I've opined in my report this makes sense 09:35:24 for a portfolio, doesn't really make sense for the individual patents. But I think the Georgia
Pacific factors are -- don't have a lot of weight among economists. I don't think this is -- this is not the approach that an economist would take to thinking about these matters. And you know, sort of there is a constraint here that economists have to pour themselves into. And so if you read these reports, including the experts in this case, the Georgia Pacific factors are a set of, we've got to 09:36:00 do this; let's just check off the list. They don't seriously inform the analysis.

In defense of my report, I took them seriously because they provided, as you know since you have read it, a place to critique the experts, $\quad$ 09:36:21
which was part of my assignment. And so they
09:36:25
allowed me an opportunity to address specifically a number of topics the experts brought on. In this case they happened to be useful, but in lots of cases they are not terribly useful.

09:36:38
Q So is the approach that you used to calculate a reasonable royalty for patents, is it just as good a method for calculating the hypothetical license for the copyrights in this case?

09:36:49
MR. COOPER: From an economic point of view?

MR. NORTON: From an economic point of view, yes.

THE WITNESS: I think I've answered that
09:36:59 question. You know, if you had separate licenses for patents and for copyrights, as opposed to a portfolio of intellectual property, and had negotiations that would inform you about how the parties thought about those two separate things,
then I think in principle, given my earlier answer, one could think about the negotiations as being somewhat different between the two. But in this case, we have a single negotiation over an aggregate that includes both the patents and the copyrights, $\quad 09: 37: 34$


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 34


Q To the extent that there is a legal 09:44:42 requirement to calculate damages through the day of trial, does that have any effect on your approach to the structure of this license?

MR. COOPER: Objection; form.
THE WITNESS: No. My approach is to
09:45:00
estimate the royalty rate. That is the rate that
they would have agreed to in 2006, and so to the
date of trial it's applied to actual Google
revenues. And if asked about going forward by the court, I would simply say you apply the same royalty $09: 45: 16$ rate either as a running royalty, or if it's a lump sum, that you have to get reasonable testimony about the expectations of the parties going forward. BY MR. NORTON:

Q Now, in the 2006 negotiation, would the 09:45:32 parties have necessarily concluded that the intellectual property in that bundle was both valid and to be infringed by Google?

A The actual or hypothetical?
Q In the actual 2006 negotiations between 09:45:55

Google and Sun.
09:45:57
A They would have individually had their expectations about the validity and enforceability of the intellectual property. And presumably, that affects the license in that the party
licensing, Sun in this case, probably doesn't want those challenged and would rather get the money. And Google doesn't want to spend the time and money to challenge. I assume that's why licenses are taken. So -- so they would have -- they may 09:46:28 have had differing expectations, for all I know, but they would not have assumed in those negotiations that the intellectual property was not valid or not enforceable.

Q Are you familiar with the term 'litigation 09:46:43 premium'?

## A I am.

Q What is a litigation premium?
A It's -- the litigation creates an
uncertain environment -- takes an uncertain
09:46:53
environment and creates certainty about certain aspects of that environment, and that movement from uncertainty to certainty has a dollar value. That's the litigation premium.

Q So prior to the litigation being brought 09:47:06 36
and resolved, there is some uncertainty?
09:47:09
A There is.
Q And uncertainty about what?
A Lots of things. That's a pretty broad question.

09:47:23
Q That's fair.
Uncertainty with respect to what that bears on the litigation premium?

A Well, that's also a broad question, and I address this in the report. There is 09:47:34 uncertainty about which of the patents might be needed. If you don't believe there is any uncertainty about that, then the 2006 negotiation was over these patents and the value of it is the value of these patents. 09:47:52

So you've got sort of which -- which course through this technology Google is actually going to take. And then if it takes the course through this technology, which patents end up being and copyrights end up being infringed, and then 09:48:10 sort of the issue of the validity and the enforceability of those patents and copyrights that happened to have been infringed, all of that is not known in 2006.

Q So would the royalty that was negotiated 09:48:27
in 2006 reflect a discount because of the 09:48:31
uncertainty that existed at that time, in comparison
to the state of knowledge after the litigation?
A It may have.
Q And --
A And as I've indicated in a number of
points in my report -- let me back up.
It's unclear what "conservative" means
into my role, so I'm not -- when I say
"conservative," I don't know who I'm supposed to be $\quad 09: 48: 58$
conservative for, and I've tried not -- but the
approach in the end I took -- I took was to say,
this is a lower bound, and there are a number of
reasons why the actual royalty would be above the
number I put forward. It's not an upper bound.
So -- and I didn't necessarily try to bias it that
way, but it just turns out the way things fall, it
appears to be a lower bound, and it would be a
lower bound on this argument as well.
Q So to the extent that there was
uncertainty with respect to validity and
infringement with respect to the IP in suit in 2006,
one would expect that after the litigation, if the
parties had a new negotiation, the royalty rate
would be higher than what you have calculated; is
$\mathbf{0 9 : 4 9 : 5 2}$
in 2006 reflect a discount because of the 09:48:31 uncertainty that existed at that time, in comparison to the state of knowledge after the litigation?

A It may have.
Q And --
09:48:44
A And as I've indicated in a number of points in my report -- let me back up.

It's unclear what "conservative" means
into my role, so I'm not -- when I say
"conservative," I don't know who I'm supposed to be 09:48:58
conservative for, and I've tried not -- but the approach in the end I took -- I took was to say, this is a lower bound, and there are a number of reasons why the actual royalty would be above the number I put forward. It's not an upper bound. 09:49:16
So -- and I didn't necessarily try to bias it that way, but it just turns out the way things fall, it appears to be a lower bound, and it would be a Q So to uncertainty with respect to validity and infringement with respect to the IP in suit in 2006, one would expect that after the litigation, if the parties had a new negotiation, the royalty rate would be higher than what you have calculated; is 09:49:52

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that true?
                09:49:54
```

A Well, maybe. It's not altogether clear which way this goes. I mean, Sun has uncertainty about which of its patents and copyrights are valid and enforceable, right? And Google has
uncertainty about sort of the cost of figuring that out and discovering it. So it's unclear which way that goes, frankly.

Q But it is possible, if the parties were to renegotiate a license after determination of 09:50:32 infringement and validity in this case with respect to the patents and copyrights in suit, that they would negotiate for a higher royalty rate than the one you have calculated?

MR. COOPER: Objection; form.
09:50:45
THE WITNESS: That's possible, but I want to emphasize again the point I just made, which is Google may have been willing to pay a small premium in order to -- for the -- for the portfolio, in order to avoid the litigation that could come if it 09:51:07 subsequently infringed.

So there is -- the uncertainty here cuts a couple of different ways. I don't think it cuts uniformly one way. I am aware, however, I think there is empirical evidence that there is a positive 09:51:23
litigation premium.
09:51:28
BY MR. NORTON:
Q I'm sorry.
When you say, 'there is empirical evidence that there is a positive litigation premium," are 09:51:34 you talking about this case?

A No, not this case. I'm just talking about the economists who studied this matter have found that there is a positive litigation premium.

Q And so in general, one expects there to be 09:51:47 a litigation premium?

A Yes, based on that empirical work.
Q And that empirical work is focused on the issue of uncertainty with respect to validity and infringement; is that right?

09:52:01
A I think so. I'd have to go back and look at the study. I just know there is this premium that we're talking about.

## Q I'm sorry.

Now, you have used the term "conservative" 09:52:10 in a number of places in your report to describe your methods and conclusions; is that right?

A Yes.
Q When you use the term "conservative" in
your report, by that, you mean that you have 09:52:19
40
calculated damages that are lower than what might 09:52:22
be -- lower than what would be the case if you had perfect information?

A For the most part, yes.
Q Is there any example where you have used 09:52:34
the term "conservative" to describe a methodology or conclusion you have reached that might be too high?

A Not that comes readily to mind, but there may be. I don't recall. I think, in general, the estimates I have, you would expect 09:52:51 the adjustments to go the other -- go up.

Q And so given that, wouldn't it be the case that if the parties were to renegotiate the license after a finding of infringement and validity, that the royalty that they would negotiate would be 09:53:14 higher than the one you have calculated?

A Well, that goes to an issue that really starts with Professor Cockburn a long time ago about whether or not the Sun Armstrong project expected revenues are a way of thinking about --
about that issue. And if they are, the answer is
the royalty that I estimated, for the most part, incorporates that.

Q Other than the measure of the anticipated Armstrong revenues, are there approaches you have 09:54:23
used that you believe are conservative in the sense 09:54:32 that they tend to understate damages?

A Again, I hesitate to -- without going through the report looking item by item, so I -my answer is not going to be -- exclude those

09:54:56 things I may have mentioned in the report.

But I'll give you an example. Two examples. One is there is this -- let me back up. Ask a question. Are you talking about the apportioned royalties or the portfolio? 09:55:26

Q Let's do it this way -- I don't mean for this to be a memory test, so my question was not intended to list all the ways in which your report may be conservative.

Let me do it this way: Turning back to 09:55:42 your methodology for calculating the royalty for the entire portfolio.

A Yes.
Q So on one side, you need to calculate the anticipated benefit to Sun as a result of that 09:55:55 transaction?

A Correct.
Q And so you need to analyze what value Sun expected to receive in 2006?

A Correct.
09:56:06


## Q Right.

09:57:24
So in Footnote 27 to your report, you explain that that substitution results in a conservative estimate of the reasonable royalty?
A Correct.
09:57:34

Q So that's a step that you took that will tend to understate the royalty that Sun would otherwise be entitled to, in this case Oracle, right?

$$
\text { A It might. But the -- the -- you } 09: 57: 43
$$

can't -- I suppose you can have the parties with two widely differing expectations here, but they're valuing the same economic activity. So in some sense, you have to argue -- have to sort of come to a meeting of the minds about the prospects $\quad 09: 58: 03$ of this activity. And in that sense, I used Google's more conservative estimates.

Q Now, to the extent that Sun expected to earn additional revenues that are not accounted for in the project Armstrong document that you relied 09:58:24 upon, will your royalty calculation tend to be too low?

MR. COOPER: Objection; form. BY MR. NORTON:

Q Let me ask the question a little 09:58:46

## differently. <br> 09:58:47

If it were the case that in addition to the revenues identified in the project Armstrong document, Sun expected to earn further revenues from provisioning that would be equal to or greater than 09:58:58 the projected Armstrong revenues, will the inclusion of those additional expected benefits increase the amount of the revenue -- of the royalty?

A Yes. Let me answer more fully in the following way: I described in my report what I call complex negotiations, as opposed to simple negotiations, in which there are various terms the parties are dumping money into. And if you're now telling me that in addition to the upfront, the capped share and project Armstrong, there is a 09:59:33 fourth category that money would have been dumped into, then it's possible, sure.

Q Well, not just possible. If there were additional revenues that Sun expected to earn that were equal in size to the project Android revenues 09:59:50 that you have factored in, that would necessarily increase the amount of the benefit to Sun in your calculation, correct?

A It would, but you would have assumed
that those would have been reflected at some point $\quad$ 10:00:06


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have Google promoting the Java brand in the mobile $\quad$ 10:14:46 space?

A Probably.
Q In connection with Android?
A Probably.
10:14:51
Q Is there any way in which it would not be
to the benefit of Sun to have Google promoting Java in the mobile space?

MR. COOPER: Objection; form.

## BY MR. NORTON:

Q You said "probably," and I'm trying to
figure out what makes it something less than certain.

A Do you want me to speculate? Is this an invitation to speculate? 10:15:22

Q No. Is there a specific reason, that you can think of, as to why it would not be valuable to Sun to have Google promoting Android as Java?

MR. COOPER: Same objection; form.
THE WITNESS: This is really speculation,
10:16:02
but to the degree that project Armstrong was not
successful and that Sun did not gain -- or it's
getting most of its monetization of this
intellectual property -- so suppose going forward it's not successful, then Sun may very well have

10:16:18
58
been interested in an alternative or competitive $\quad$ 10:16:25
product, in which case, it's not of interest to have
your competitors saying, "I'm just like the product
that just came on the market."
BY MR. NORTON:
Q And all the evidence that you have seen suggests that Sun expected Project Armstrong to be successful?

A Yes.
Q Okay.
10:16:42
So at the time of the 2006 negotiation,
Sun would have expected that Google's promotion of Java in the mobile space in connection with Android would be valuable to Sun?
A I think so, yes.
10:16:52

Q And would you agree that Sun would have expected that Google's promotion of Java in the mobile space in connection with Android would be very valuable?

MR. COOPER: Objection; form.
10:17:04
MR. PURCELL: Join.
THE WITNESS: I don't know.

## BY MR. NORTON:

$Q$ So when you have to bring the future revenues back to net present value of 2006, you use $\mathbf{1 0 : 1 7 : 1 8}$
a discount rate?
10:17:21
A I do.
Q And the discount rate that you used was 15 percent?

A Yes.
$10: 17: 25$

10:17:33
Q All right.
What is the reason to use a discount rate in the first place?

A Because the future is uncertain.
Q All right.
10:17:41
A And money is costly.


Q The fixed fee payments come over a three-year period?

A Correct.
Q You characterize those as low risk; is 10:18:06
that right?
10:18:07
A Correct.
Q Are they lower risk than the future revenues?

A Yes.
10:18:15
Q Is it appropriate to apply the same discount rate for the relatively low-risk fixed payments as it is for the future revenues?

A I think so. I think you want to use a project-specific discount rate. You're arguing
for a subproject-specific discount rate. One could do that, but I think typically a firm or a venture capitalist or whomever is doing this doesn't split the project into particular parts. They just use a discount rate. And the discount rate, overall, reflects the relative risks in this, so you could argue to the degree that the 15 percent -- well, you could argue that the 15 percent, in some sense, aggregates these risks and reflects those.

10:18:56
Let me put it slightly differently.
at, let's say, the money market rate or something like this because they're certain, then I think, you know, one might argue that the Project

10:19:09



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compatible implementation. 10:30:33
Q So when we look at the hypothetical
negotiation, imagine the parties negotiating for the
infringement that Google actually did, do you agree
that Sun would have expected some additional 10:30:49
compensation to account for the risk of increased
fragmentation from an incompatible implementation?
A Yes.
Q And that additional compensation that Sun
would have expected is not included in your royalty $\quad$ 10:31:09
calculations; is that right?
A Correct.
Q Now, in addition to the issue of fragmentation, by using the 2006 starting point, is it correct to say that the -- strike that. I'm 10:31:28 sorry.

Is it fair to say that by using the 2006
starting point, the consideration of alternatives is already baked into the numbers?

A Yes, I say that explicitly in my report. 10:31:48
Q When you say "explicitly," is that
Paragraphs 177 to 179 of your report?
A Yes. But in addition, there are a
couple of footnotes.
Q I hate to do this to you, but can you $10: 32: 12$
direct me to those? $\quad 10: 32: 14$
A Sure. One in verse -- paragraph --
Q Some of us write in poetry. Some of us write in prose.

A Yes. Paragraph 76, Footnote 38, this is
talking about Sun, but it's equally true about Google.

Q So in Footnote 38 -- let me catch up to you.

In Footnote 38, you're referring to 10:32:58
Paragraph 76. You say:
"This is another example of a point I made earlier: What Sun knew in 2006 about its Java ME business and Sun's expectations with regard to the effects of an agreement with Google for an open-source Java-VM Android on its Java ME business would be fully reflected in its 2006 offer." 10:33:21
And you say that's equally true of Google.
Can you explain what you mean?
A The expectations that the parties held about what would happen going forward are reflected in the agreements that they would have
made in 2006.
10:33:35
Q Okay.
And so to the extent that there were alternatives available to Google in 2006, the economic effect of those alternatives is already $\quad$ 10:33:45 baked into the bargain the parties would have struck at that time?

A Yes.
Q And if that's correct, then there should be no need to make any adjustment to the portfolio $10: 33: 55$ royalty based on arguments that there are alternatives; is that right?

A That's my opinion.
Q So if we could turn to Paragraph 86.
Now, in paragraph 86 here in your report, 10:35:06 you describe, if I understand correctly, the step where you convert the expected value to Google and expected value to Sun into an effective report for the entire portfolio; is that right?
A Correct.
10:35:24

Q Now, at the beginning of the deposition you explained that there is a change that you would make to the calculation here that would slightly decrease the denominator of the equation.

A Yes.
10:35:41

Q All right. 10:35:41
And do you have a calculation as to what the percentage royalty would be after you make that correction?

A This affects it as second decimal place 10:35:50
or the first decimal place. It's a teeny effect.


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    A It may very well be, sure. 11:14:14
    Q For purposes of your calculations in your
    report, you have used the numbers from Dr. Cox's
    report?
    A Correct.
    11:14:19
    Q And to the extent that revenues as of the
    date of trial are greater than they were calculated
    by Dr. Cox back in September, that would increase
    the royalty -- well, increased the damages number?
    A Sure. I think I've been clear, but if I 11:14:35
    haven't been clear, what I'm putting forth is a
    methodology that if asked to testify, I would
    instruct the jury about -- or not instruct, but
    testify to, and the jury would then multiply this
    number, times the actual revenues that had come
    11:14:49
    into evidence in some other way. So the numbers
    here for damages, the dollar numbers are
    illustrative. They are not my opinion of what
    damages actually are.
        Q And when you calculate --
        11:15:04
        The revenues that you consider for
        purposes of your royalty calculation are limited to
        the United States; is that correct?
            A Yes.
            Q You only use advertising revenue and not 11:15:17
    Android market revenue or direct sales of handsets? 11:15:20
    A I think it's just advertising revenue.
    Q Is there a reason why you did not consider
    Android market revenue in your calculation of
    damages on the royalty?
                                11:15:31
    A There is interesting literature in
    economics about monitoring, and the argument
    essentially is that parties will agree in
    contracts typically to things that are easy to
    monitor; that is, that have -- where they can have 11:15:51
    external verification. And so I make the argument
    that the parties would have agreed to a royalty on
    revenues, on Android's advertising revenues, okay,
    because they are a direct measure of the benefit
    of having the Android operating system on the 11:16:13
    phones. To the degree there are convoyed sales or
    other kinds of things that are difficult to
    monitor, I don't believe they would be in the
    royalty base.
        Q So you characterize --
                            11:16:29
            For this purpose, are you characterizing
    revenues from the Android market as convoyed sales?
            A Yeah. If you mean by the Android
    market, the sales of apps?
    Q I do.
                                11:16:41
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11:14:14
Q For purposes of your calculations in your report, you have used the numbers from Dr. Cox's report?

A Correct.
11:14:19
Q And to the extent that revenues as of the date of trial are greater than they were calculated by Dr. Cox back in September, that would increase the royalty -- well, increased the damages number?

A Sure. I think I've been clear, but if I 11:14:35 haven't been clear, what I'm putting forth is a methodology that if asked to testify, I would instruct the jury about -- or not instruct, but testify to, and the jury would then multiply this number, times the actual revenues that had come

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11:15:31
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economics about monitoring, and the argument essentially is that parties will agree in contracts typically to things that are easy to monitor; that is, that have -- where they can have 11:15:51 external verification. And so I make the argument that the parties would have agreed to a royalty on revenues, on Android's advertising revenues, okay, because they are a direct measure of the benefit of having the Android operating system on the

11:16:13 other kinds of things that are difficult to monitor, I don't believe they would be in the royalty base.

## Q So you characterize --

11:16:29 evenues from the Android market as convoyed sales?
A Yeah. If you mean by the Android market, the sales of apps?

Q Ido.

- $11: 1$

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\(\begin{array}{ll}\text { A } & \text { Yes. } \\ \text { Q } & \text { 11:16:43 } \\ & \text { And same for direct sales of the Nexus }\end{array}\) handset?
A Yes. Although it's unclear how to treat that to the degree that's not a particularly large 11:16:53 part of this business, as I understand, so it's not going to matter very much.
Q Actually, would you look at your Table 9?
A Sure.
Q On Table 9, you're using Dr. Cox's
11:17:18 numbers; is that right?
A Yes.
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let me sort of put out what -- I mean, the parties 11:37:08 shouldn't be able to choose, ex post, the most advantageous to them. All right? These are ex ante numbers, and you shouldn't be able to say, well, this one works better for me than this one,
11:37:21
because the actual path over that period is
different than we anticipated. All right? That's the first point.
The second point is that, clearly, an assumption in this, an implicit assumption as I
11:37:35
think about it, is we're sort of talking about steady-state income on these phones. And to the degree there is a ramp-up, then these two numbers give you slightly different numbers. But I don't know the evidence on that, and I don't think 11:37:48 16 anybody has addressed it, so I have no way of 17 making an adjustment for that. But I would agree 18 that the fact that you're talking about April 2012, 19 and that you have had a lot of phones that have 20 sort of -- what's the word I want -- been -- 11:38:04
$21 \quad$ Q Activated?
22 A -- activated, but don't have much
23 royalty on them yet, that's a bit of a problem.
24 So there is a steady-state assumption in
25 here. 11:38:20
 phones that have been activated as of the date of trial?

A That have not?
11:38:39
Q That have, all phones that have been activated as of the date of trial.

A That's a legal issue.
Q As an economic matter, do you have an opinion?

11:38:47
A Well, to the degree that Google gets, or Oracle gets, a going-forward royalty, then it gets a royalty on the revenues those phones will generate going forward. So in that sense, it's not disadvantaged by not getting the damages at trial.

So suppose I have a ramp-up in which I
have almost no revenue now, but a lot of revenue a year from now on phones that were activated before trial. Then presumably, Oracle would get the 11:39:17 return on those phones when those revenues are reported in the -- and the royalty rate was applied to the royalty -- I mean, to the -- to the revenues.

Q To the extent that the outcome of the case 11:39:39

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is that there is an award of historical damages and 11:39:40
an injunction going forward that prevents Google from using -- from infringing the patents and copyrights, do you have an opinion as to whether it's appropriate to calculate a per-unit royalty 11:39:54 based on the activations prior to the entry of the injunction?
```

A I'm not sure that matters because if you -- if you -- to some degree, the per-unit royalty, as I said, is a steady-state royalty, so 11:40:15 you've sort of taken the forward revenues and awarded them to Oracle as damages as of the date of trial. That would reduce Oracle's negotiating position in the -- with the -- with the injunction. 11:40:32

To the degree that you haven't done that and those royalties are forward, that would enhance Oracle, so it just changes sort of slightly the value of the injunctive remedy, depending upon whether or not more of it was loaded before the 11:40:45 injunction or more of it came afterwards.

Q Now, in various points in your report, you address the issue of incompatibility, and you also talk about fragmentation; is that correct?

$$
\text { A Correct. } \quad 11: 41: 23
$$

Q Can you tell me how you define 11:41:27
'incompatibility" in the way that you have attempted to compensate for it in your report?

A "Incompatibility," as I understand it, is a Dalvik VM versus a Java VM in Android. 11:41:46

Q In considering compatibility, do you consider the use of the 37 copyrighted APIs in a way that is incompatible with the Java specification?

A I'm not quite sure what that means. You need to help me on that. 11:42:24

Q Do you understand that Oracle contends in this case that not only is the Dalvik VM not compatible, but that the way in which Google has used the Java APIs is incompatible with the Java specification?

11:42:39
A I understand what you just described,
but I frankly don't understand the legal issue here. I mean, let me tell you what -- I mean, if there is copyright infringement, presumably the infringement occurred because Google made the 37 11:43:02
APIs close enough to Java APIs that Java writers
could, with minimal effort, write programs for
Android in Java that would run on Android, but not
run on other things. So they're not so
incompatible, or else they wouldn't be useful. 11:43:24
114

Q All right. 11:43:28
Let me try to --
Do you understand that Oracle contends
that Sun would not license the 37 APIs on terms that would allow those APIs to be supersetted or 11:43:44 subsetted in comparison to the specification?

A I've seen that discussion. And frankly,
that's technical stuff, and I have no opinion about it.

> Q Okay.

11:44:00
Do you have an understanding as to whether -- well, assume with me that the problem is not that Google used the 37 APIs in a way that is different from the way that Sun used them, the specific APIs, but rather that Google used them with $\quad$ 11:44:16 other APIs that make it impossible for a program written to the Android specification using the 37 Java APIs and the remaining Android APIs to run on a Java platform?
A Okay.
11:44:33

Q Further assume that Sun would not have agreed to that without substantial compensation.

A Okay.
Q All right.
So if that is the meaning of $\quad 11: 44: 40$
incompatibility with respect to the copyrights, is $\quad$ 11:44:44 that considered in your report?

A I don't want to use weasel words here, but it may or may not be. And it depends upon something I don't have expertise in, and that's $\quad$ 11:45:18 how to construct and read the contracts, the formal -- not the formalized contracts, but the deals that were put onto paper in March of 2006.
And I don't know enough about how to construct or think about those to know whether or not the grant $\quad$ 11:45:37 of intellectual property in the one paragraph that grants it envisions that Android was free to then use this -- that Google was then free to use it in the way that it has used the APIs -- let me back up. 11:45:56

If I took the 37 APIs and I licensed them and Android then -- then Google then put together with them other APIs, which it then sort of used to propagate applications that ran on a Java VM Android, if that's what's envisioned in the 11:46:15 license, then yes, I've incorporated it. All right? Okay?

Q Okay.
You understand that the 2006 negotiations contemplated an Android that would be compatible, $\quad$ 11:46:30 116

## correct? <br> 11:46:33

A Right.
Q Do you also assume that Sun's ability to obtain the benefits of the Armstrong project depended upon Android being compatible?

11:46:46
MR. PURCELL: Object to the form.
THE WITNESS: I don't know. You're
venturing into technical areas that I can't opine on.
BY MR. NORTON:
11:46:59
Q Is the reason why the Android revenues -I'm sorry.

Is the reason why the Armstrong revenues are included in the royalty calculation because that is value that Sun expected to get in the $2006 \quad$ 11:47:18 negotiation, but did not receive in the hypothetical world?

A Yes.
Q Okay. All right.
And so to the extent that Google's 11:47:30 infringement prevented Sun and Oracle from obtaining the benefits of the Armstrong project, have you fully accounted for that in your royalty calculations?

A I believe so, the Armstrong project 11:47:48
itself.
Q Subject to the fact that the number of
your calculations are conservative?
A Correct.
Q And so to the extent that any of your $\quad \mathbf{1 1 : 4 7 : 5 9 ~}$
Armstrong calculations are conservative, you would
have undercompensated for the harm of
incompatibility, correct?
A I don't know. It depends upon whether
or not you think the Armstrong expectations are a
reasonable way of thinking about what they lost
when you've got an incompatible deal.
Q To the extent --
A If they are, then you fully incorporated
them.
Q To the extent that the Armstrong
calculations are an appropriate way to address the
issue of incompatibility, your royalty addresses
incompatibility because it takes into consideration
the Armstrong projections?
A Correct.
Q Nonetheless, to the extent that your net
present value of the Armstrong benefit is
conservative, it necessarily does not capture all of
the harm of incompatibility, correct?
11:49:00

A Well, I wouldn't put it that way. It's 11:49:17
conservative along a number of different
dimensions that may or may not have anything to do
with compatibility. So I agree that my estimate
is conservative, for example, the discount rate 11:49:28
issue that we discussed earlier. So it's
conservative for a number of different points that
I've made. All right? But that's -- that means
that it underestimates the true value for those reasons, not necessarily for incompatibility.

11:49:45
Q But if the only way in which you have addressed the harm of incompatibility is by factoring the Armstrong projections, then it is necessarily the case that if your Armstrong projections are conservative, then your adjustment $\quad$ 11:49:59 for incompatibility is conservative?

MR. COOPER: Objection; form.
MR. PURCELL: Join.
THE WITNESS: Sure. I mean I'll agree to
that. I don't know what you mean by the, "Armstrong 11:50:22
projections are conservative." Again, that could go
to the discount. I've discounted them at too high a
discount rate.
BY MR. NORTON:
Q To the extent that, one, the only way in 11:50:33

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which you have addressed incompatibility is by
considering the benefits that Sun expected to get
from Armstrong; and, two, to the extent that your
net present value calculation of the benefits to Sun
from Armstrong are conservative, it is necessarily
11:50:52
the case that your adjustment to compensate for
incompatibility must also be conservative?
    A Agree.
    Q All right.
        Is there any other calculation in your 11:51:06
approach, other than the Armstrong benefits, that
would address the issue of incompatibility?
    A That I can imagine or that I considered?
    Q That you have --
        Numbers that you have actually calculated 11:51:26
and incorporated into your analysis.
    A No.
    Q All right.
    Now, another term that appears in your
report is "fragmentation." Do you understand 11:51:33
"fragmentation" to mean something different from
''incompatibility"?
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    A Yes, with the caveat I'm not a technical
    expert here.
Q Okay.
11:51:44
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Why don't you just give me the 11:51:44
understanding that you have employed, regarding the
report, as to the term "fragmentation."
A Well, I have fudged the issue, as has
everybody else, about what the open-source license 11:51:57
is, whether it's the Apache license or the GPL.
It's my understanding -- and again, it's a
technical issue, so I'm not -- I may be wrong in
my understanding -- that the GPL would have led to
less fragmentation than the Apache license. And 11:52:16
to the degree that Android was built and
distributed with the Apache license, then that's
my understanding of incremental fragmentation,
okay, beyond what we talked about earlier today,
which was the fragmentation that was going on 11:52:30
anyway and would have occurred with open sourcing
under whatever license you would have used.
Q Do you agree that the hypothetical license
should ideally account for the incremental
fragmentation that would be expected to occur as a 11:53:02
result of Google's infringing use?
A The hypothetical license, yes, I agree.
Q All right.
And one question that you have is, in
determining the incremental fragmentation, are we 11:53:23
121

| comparing Google's infringement to a 2006 |
| :--- |
| negotiation that would open source under the GPL or |
| under Apache? |
| That was a terrible question. Let me try |
| 11:53:38 |

that again.
You want to measure the anticipated
incremental fragmentation, right?
A Yes. Based on some questions you asked
this morning, or earlier today, there are two
potential incremental fragmentations. To the
degree that Java ME was fragmented before, and
became fragmented in the normal course of
business, I don't know whether it was or it
wasn't, but your question implied that it may have
been -- there may have been some baseline
fragmentation. Then going forward, you would have
expected that fragmentation to continue.
$\quad$ And we had a discussion earlier about
whether an open-source license would have enhanced
that, that baseline fragmentation of Java ME. That
would have been baked into the negotiation because
have accepted an open-source license that was 11:54:39 potentially more fragmenting than a different open-source license, then that would not have been built in, although it may have been if they had agreed on that license. It's really unclear on 11:54:56
which license they were going to agree on, and it's
my understanding that's, in part, why the
negotiations fell apart, was over that license.
Q All right.
So if I understand you correctly, part of 11:55:07
what you're wrestling with is if Android is released under the Apache license, and it was anticipated by the parties in 2006 that Android would be released under the Apache license, then you wonder whether there is any incremental fragmentation as a result 11:55:32 of open source --

A No. In that case, I don't wonder. In that case, I assume there is not.

Q As the result of open sourcing?
A No, as a sole source -- yeah, that's 11:55:40
right, of the -- the license would have that fragmentation, anticipated fragmentation, built into it, the 2006, not the hypothetical, the 2006 license.

Q Is it your opinion that the extent of 11:56:24
fragmentation as a result of open sourcing would be 11:56:27 exactly the same, regardless of whether Sun remained in control or Google remained in control, if the parties had agreed in 2006 on an Apache license?

A No. That's an interesting question in 11:56:53
that I don't think the issue of Sun's subsequent control has been factored into anybody's analysis, including mine, except to the degree the control was embedded in the license itself, the type of license. So to the degree that Sun and Google are 11:57:11 no longer partners in the hypothetical world, and because Sun's not weighing into the development here, that that -- I just don't know whether that would have led to more fragmentation or not. I really don't know. 11:57:28

Q Well, do you understand that one of the sources of fragmentation is the fact that Android is incompatible, not just that it's open source, but that it's incompatible?

A Yes.
11:57:49
Q All right.
And if in the 2006 negotiation the parties expected that -- let's just assume the parties expected they would use an Apache license for Java and Android in the 2006 negotiation, but that Sun 11:58:13 124

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would remain in a position where it could ensure 11:58:16
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that Android remained compatible with the existing
Java specifications.
In that scenario, the anticipated
fragmentation as of 2006 would be less than the $\quad$ 11:58:28
anticipated fragmentation as a result of the
hypothetical license, correct?
A Possibly.
Q Can you give me probably?
Let me ask you this way: Who has a 11:58:45
greater interest in ensuring that Android remained
compatible with existing Java? Google or Sun?
A Sun did, but it's not clear that Google
had an interest in sort of going out and
specifically fragmenting. I mean, Google had an 11:59:00
interest in creating its own platform. And to the
degree that that's incompatible, that is, itself,
a fragmentation, I agree. That a fragment,
however you want to think about this, fork off of
this. Okay? But the reason I gave the answer I 11:59:14
did is my reading of the record is that Google
was, itself, very concerned about fragmenting the
Android platform. So to the degree that it didn't
allow for further fragmentation, one. Second step
is, to the degree -- and I'm going to get the 11:59:34


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part of a pure intellectual property license that 12:54:05 did not also involve distribution of Google content?

MR. NORTON: Objection; form.
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure what the last
clause in that question means, but it's my 12:54:19
understanding that Google, for placing the Google
widget on the boot-up screen or, at least, on the
screen that came up, shared revenues with OEMs.
BY MR. PURCELL:
Q Right.
12:54:37
Are you aware of any other case in which Google wasn't placing the Google widget on startup screens where it agreed to a revenue share deal in exchange just for a license of intellectual property?

12:54:49
A Not beyond the -- not beyond the two I mentioned, no.

Q Not beyond the license with Java or Java ME?

A Right.
12:54:58
Q And what was the second one?
A And the widget deals.
Q Leaving aside the widget, which is what I'm defining as distribution of Google content --

A Okay.
12:55:07

Q -- just talking about a pure intellectual 12:55:07 property license, a license for a patent or a copyright, are you aware of any instance other than, I suppose, the Java ME deal where Google agreed to a revenue share?

12:55:18
A No.


Let's assume that in real world negotiations, Sun's initial position was that it wanted $\$ 100$ million, plus a revenue share.

> Are you with me so far?

12:55:49
A Uh-huh.
Q Okay.
And then by the time negotiations broke off, Sun had agreed to drop its demand to
\$28 million without a revenue share. Again, this is 12:55:56
just an assumption; I'm not representing that as fact.

But assuming those facts to be true, wouldn't that suggest to you that Sun would have been willing to accept less money in the

12:56:08
hypothetical negotiation?
12:56:10
MR. NORTON: Objection; form.
THE WITNESS: Less money than what? It
suggests that they were willing to accept less money
in the actual negotiations, so to the degree that 12:56:20
the actual negotiations are a model for the
hypothetical, the answer is yes. But if you mean
less than that, because it is a hypothetical, then I
don't know.
BY MR. PURCELL:
12:56:34
Q I actually meant the former.
So do you take account for the fact that, in the real world, the last offer on the table before negotiations broke down did not involve a revenue share component in hypothesizing the 12:56:55 negotiation in your report?

A The only answer I can give you,
Mr. Purcell, is the one I just gave a few minutes ago, which is I don't know what the clause means, "other terms to be determined." To the degree 12:57:08 that was included in the revenue share on the part of Sun, I just don't think we know.

Q If Sun had -- strike that.
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So if you look at the numerator of the reasonable royalty fraction that I estimate, a large -- the largest fraction of that, I mean, the 12:57:58 predominant number there is due to the monetization. That's where Sun expected to get most of this. So if you peel off these other numbers, they don't change that ratio very much.
5 BY MR. PURCELL:
12:58:11


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the answer is no. But if apportionment is 01:08:52
required by the law, then here's an apportionment.
Q And why doesn't apportionment make sense?
A Well, for the three reasons that are
here that I've already discussed, which is, if
01:09:04
they knew that they wanted this intellectual property, then that would have been the value of the deal.
Q How do you know that?
A Because if I'm only negotiating over,
01:09:13
really, 37 APIs, plus two patents, and I've got
all this other stuff here, then the value that I'm putting forward, the numbers I'm putting forward are the value of those 39 things.
Q But when Google was negotiating the 01:09:33 license in 2006, it wasn't negotiating for a license for two patents and 37 API packages, correct?
A That's correct, sure.
Q So how can you conclude that Google's behavior in that real world negotiation over a 01:09:50
21 different set of objects necessarily is the same as
22 what Google would have been willing to pay for a 23 much smaller set of objects in the hypothetical 24 negotiation?
A I think you misunderstood me. I said if 01:10:03

1
2
> in 2006 Google knows -- knew or expected what we 01:10:09 now know to be the case in 2012. The negotiation in 2006 was over the stuff we're talking about in 2012. That was all I was saying is "if."

> If they didn't know, then one really does 01:10:26 have to think about sort of an option value or an insurance value. It's a little bit like -- I tried to think about how to sort of get my head around this.

> Suppose I don't pay a subscription. I
> 01:10:43

subscribe to a magazine, I don't pay a subscription. I get sued for failure to pay my subscription, and I say, "Well, I only read one page out of each hundred," okay? I mean, the ex ante negotiations for the subscription is for the 01:10:57 full 100-page magazine. I don't get to say, after the fact, "Gee, I only read one page." At least that seems wrong from an economics perspective.

Q And why is that analogy opposite? Why is this situation where one is negotiating over a 01:11:15 magazine subscription rather than negotiating over two patents and 37 API packages?

A Because not knowing what Google needed,
in 2006 not knowing sort of the course of its technological development, so it doesn't know 01:11:31 156
which of these it needs, all right? Think of 01:11:34
this -- my analogy here, inept may it be, I don't
know which of the 100 pages I want to read; I just
know I want to read one. Then I'd be willing to
pay the subscription price for the right to read 01:11:47
whatever page I wanted to read.
Q Doesn't the hypothetical negotiation in this case presuppose a negotiation over just the intellectual property in-suit?

A I understand that is what the law
01:12:01
requires. This opinion simply says that doesn't
make a lot of sense to an economist, but -- and
Judge Alsup asked for my best economic view, so here it is.

Q So I know the answer to this question 01:12:16 already, but you've reviewed Judge Alsup's orders in this case?

A I have.
Q And I'm sure you've read them carefully.
A I've read them carefully.
01:12:25
Q And you've reviewed the transcript of the various hearings on challenges the damage experts report in this case?

A I have.
Q Do you perceive any tension between your 01:12:32

| 1 | opinion in Section $K$ of your report and any of 01:12:33 | 1 | Q Is there any way you can narrow that range 01:14:37 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Judge Alsup's orders or statements -- | 2 | based on the information that you have? |
| 3 | MR. COOPER: Objection as to form. | 3 | A Not really. Again, it's unclear who had |
| 4 | MR. NORTON: Join. | 4 | the obligation to put forward the argument here, |
| 5 | THE WITNESS: I can imagine there will be 01:12:42 | 5 | but since I have to rely on the record, that's 01:15:07 |
| 6 | some tension, yes. | 6 | sort of what the experts have done, as opposed to |
| 7 | BY MR. PURCELL: | 7 | going out and doing this independently, there's |
| 8 | Q Do you intend to tell the jury that, in | 8 | nothing in this record that I could use to make |
| 9 | your opinion, no apportionment of the 2006 IP bundle | 9 | that apportionment or that division. |
| 10 | is appropriate as a matter of economics? 01:12:50 | 10 | Q If you were starting from scratch and one 01:15:21 |
| 11 | A I expect I'll be permitted to tell the | 11 | of the parties retained you to address this |
| 12 | jury what Judge Alsup tells me I can tell the | 12 | question, is there some set of information that you |
| 13 | jury, so.... | 13 | would want them to provide to you so you could |
| 14 | Q That's a very diplomatic way of putting | 14 | apportion the percentage of Android profits |
| 15 | it. 01:13:05 | 15 | attributable to the alleged copyright infringement? 01:15:32 |
| 16 | So moving forward just a little bit to | 16 | A As I indicated this morning, I think the |
| 17 | paragraph 118 of your report, there's a section on | 17 | shift in market share is potentially useful but |
| 18 | "Other Copyright Damages,' and it starts with a | 18 | has been excluded, so.... |
| 19 | section on 'Disgorgement of Infringer's Profits." | 19 | But if I were to do it, I would probably |
| 20 | A Yes. 01:13:27 | 20 | look at the shift in the market share. What 01:15:55 |
| 21 | Q Do you see that? | 21 | fraction of the incremental revenues was due to the |
|  |  | 22 | incremental market share due to the APIs. |
|  |  | 23 | Q So would that be along the lines of |
|  |  | 24 | looking at the benefits provided to Android by the |
|  |  | 25 | copyrighted APIs and then the incremental increase 01:16:14 |
|  | 158 |  | 160 |
| 1 | $Q$ And then in Paragraph 122, the next 01:13:45 | 1 | in market share as a result of those benefits being 01:16:18 |
| 2 | paragraph, you state that neither party has offered | 2 | in the software? |
| 3 | a viable methodology for separating out Android | 3 | A Correct. |
| 4 | profits attributable to the infringement versus | 4 | $Q$ And what's your understanding regarding |
| 5 | Android profits not attributable to the 01:13:58 | 5 | what benefits the copyrighted APIs provide to the 01:16:26 |
| 6 | infringement? | 6 | Android platform, if any? |
| 7 | A Correct. | 7 | A That's a technical issue. I'll tell you |
| 8 | Q And then paragraph 124 on the next page | 8 | my understanding of it but not -- it's not an |
| 9 | starts with: | 9 | opinion in that sense. |
| 10 | 'Based on the admissible 01:14:10 | 10 | That it provided a couple of benefits 01:16:40 |
| 11 | evidence in this matter, I am not | 11 | sort of going forward, that is, in 2006. I think |
| 12 | aware of a quantitative method to | 12 | the record suggests, or at least there's argument |
| 13 | estimate the percent of Android | 13 | in the record that Google believed that it needed a |
| 14 | revenue or profit that is due to | 14 | Java-based platform. It needed to appeal to Java |
| 15 | the alleged copyright 01:14:18 | 15 | application writers or people who would write in 01:17:01 |
| 16 | infringement." | 16 | Java. |
| 17 | Do you see that? | 17 | The OEMs were accustomed to using Java, |
| 18 | A Yes. | 18 | in fact, were taking Java ME licenses, many of |
| 19 | Q And as a result of that, you conclude that | 19 | them. And, therefore, having APIs that said, if |
| 20 | the percentage of Android profit attributable to the 01:14:24 | 20 | you write in your accustomed fashion, an 01:17:16 |
| 21 | alleged copyright infringement is not zero but less | 21 | application, it's going to work on this new machine |
| 22 | than 100 percent, correct? | 22 | or this new virtual machine and/or the |
| 23 | A Yes. | 23 | modifications you have to make aren't very large; |
| 24 | Q That's a pretty broad range. | 24 | that is, it's kind of within the genre of -- of -- |
| 25 | A It is. 01:14:36 | 25 | that was one benefit to them. 01:17:43 |
|  | 159 |  | 161 |

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> A I wasn't trying to validate his conclusions. I was simply looking at an independent way of trying to assess the importance of speed versus applications. Q And what work did you do to try to assess 01:23:00 the importance of speed versus applications? A This is a long answer. Q That's fine. A Dr. Cockburn uses -- first, uses eBay data and I use the eBay data. I use the same data he does. He then uses an approach in which he writes his own maximum likelihood function and runs an algorithm to maximize that. He does what's known in economics as a bootstrap, which is a way of getting at the standard errors of the coefficient, yes, the standard errors of the coefficient. When we implemented his -- we just took his stuff and implemented. It takes, literally, 240 computer hours to run, so it's 10 days from when you push the button until something pops out the other end. Dr. Leonard's criticism of Dr. Cockburn was that he could write a likelihood function that could be estimated much simpler that was the $01: 24: 15$
equivalent of Dr. Leonard's -- Dr. Cockburn. In $01: 24: 20$
fact, he didn't need to write it; he could simply
use a canned program to do this. And if you use
his program, it takes a tenth of the time; it takes
12 hours or 10 hours.
So in all of the econometrics I did, I
did the Dr. Leonard implementation. I did not do
the Dr. Cockburn.
$\quad$ Now, we tested the difference, and the
coefficients are more or less the same in the two
to sort of the second decimal place; sometimes
they're a little bit higher, sometimes a little bit
lower. So it appears that using the more
simplified approach of Dr. Leonard gets you into
the same -- gets you roughly the same. So that's
the long lead into this.
Using that approach, then we went out and
retrieved information on applications and on the
various phones, brought that applications data in
and meshed it with the data that Dr. Cockburn had
used and estimated a version of the Cockburn model
using the Leonard technique with applications and
find that the ratio of speed to applications is
about .9 -- so applications to speed is about .9.
One other observation: Dr. Cockburn uses
$01: 25: 58$
are
.5 as the ratio of these. We cannot find that 01:26:02
number in the conjoint analysis; it's nowhere to be found. The number that comes out of the conjoint analysis is .7 , so -- and Dr. Cockburn just has a single sentence in his report that says: "From the 01:26:19 conjoint analysis, I have learned --" or something to the effect -- "that it's .5."

No reference, no footnote, no cite to the table or anything. So that's where we are in that. You can think about the econometrics as validation, 01:26:36
if you want, of the conjoint or an independent way of looking at the relative value.

In my analysis in the -- back in the Reasonable Royalty section, I used .8. I just take the simple mean between .7 and .9 of the two 01:26:55 different kinds of estimates.

And were The Court to find that the conjoint -- or the jury to find the conjoint wasn't reliable for a whole set of reasons, I have an independent estimate of the value of the -- an 01:27:10 independent way of apportioning the copyrights that I don't think anybody else has at this point.

## Q All right.

And what's your independent way of apportioning the copyrights?

01:27:23 168

A It would be the econometric.
01:27:24
Q That you just described?
A Yes.
Q Okay.
Just wanted to be sure you weren't leading 01:27:31
into something else that you had done.
A No.
Q So we've gone through the universe of everything you've done with respect to your econometric analysis on copyright apportionment? 01:27:38

A Yes. I mean, there are lots of details in the econometrics themselves, but that's the big picture.

Q Dr. Shugan and Dr. Cockburn use -- strike that. 01:27:55

In Dr. Shugan's and Dr. Cockburn's view, the primary benefit provided to Android by the copyrighted APIs was an increased number of applications, correct?

MR. NORTON: Objection.
01:28:07
THE WITNESS: Correct.
BY MR. PURCELL:
Q And they use --
Dr. Cockburn uses, essentially, an increased number of applications as a proxy for the $01: 28: 13$
benefits provided by the copyrighted APIs, correct? 01:28:16
A That's correct.
Q Can you take a look at Paragraph 303 of your report?

Paragraph 303, you write:
01:28:33
'Professor Shugan reports relative importance estimates of 7.85 percent and 11.17 percent for availability of applications and applications startup time,

01:28:43
respectively."
Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q So he uses a relative importance figure of 7.85 percent for availability of applications, 01:28:50 Professor Shugan?

A Yes.
Q Would he be reasonable to use that
7.85 percent figure as an estimate of the percentage
of Android revenue attributable to the copyrighted 01:29:05
APIs as opposed to other features of the Android
software?
MR. NORTON: Object.
THE WITNESS: In what setting? I'm not
sure --
01:29:18

## BY MR. PURCELL: <br> 01:29:19

Q Well, in the sense of disaggregating the inputs to Android revenues that are not due to the copyrighted APIs?

A I don't think so, no.
01:29:28
Q Why not?
A Well, the conjoint analysis doesn't
really get to revenues. It gets -- purportedly,
it's an estimate of the utility that people place
on things, but there's no way to go -- at least, I 01:29:39
don't see an easy path from there to revenues.
Q If 7.85 percent of consumers are most
influenced by the availability of applications, it
wouldn't be reasonable to assume that roughly
7.85 percent of the benefit provided by the software 01:29:57
is due to the availability of applications?
A I don't think so.
Q How would you go about translating, if you could, that 7.85 percent figure into an apportionment of the value of the software 01:30:12 attributable to the APIs that enable the availability of applications?

MR. NORTON: Objection.
THE WITNESS: I think you have to do it
the way that Professor Shugan does and Professor 01:30:28

Cockburn, which is, what's the change in the market 01:30:34 share attributable to that, and then sort of back out sort of what the revenue effects of that change in market share are. You've got to go from this utility measure to some measure of sort of how that 01:30:46 affects the prospects in the market, and there's no way to go from 7.85 percent utility effect to a revenue effect just by making -- by applying it directly to util- -- to revenue.
BY MR. PURCELL:
01:31:02
$Q$ And do you have any methodology in mind for translating the 7.85 percent utility effect into a market share effect?

A Well, that's been excluded by -- by
Judge Alsup. Apparently, the Sawtooth software 01:31:18
has a button you push, and it tells you what happens to the market share. That's the button that Dr. Shugan pushed. So it translates it by sort of looking at all of the other sort of relative utility effects, utility from the 01:31:37 different kinds of things.

But that's been excluded because, as I
understand the argument that Dr. Leonard made and
Judge Alsup and the part in Google is that because
of the bias, the potential bias in that number, you 01:31:52

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can't get a reliable estimate of the market share 01:31:56
change.
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    Q Other than the Sawtooth method that
    Judge Alsup excluded, can you think of any other way
to go from the 7.85 percent relative consumer 01:32:08
preference figure to a market share figure?
A No.
Q If you were asked to estimate the likely
change in market share if the copyrighted APIs were
removed from the Android software, what -- what 01:32:33
would you do?
MR. NORTON: Object.
THE WITNESS: I would use the
econometrics.
BY MR. PURCELL:
01:32:46

Q How would you go about using the econometrics to translate the consumer preference share into a market share number?

A Well, you can use the econometrics to predict the reduction in willingness to pay, and 01:32:58 then, you know, there's dispute on all of these matters, and I understand that; I'm not here to resolve that dispute.

But then you could then use parties -- I
think Dr. Cockburn did something that was 01:33:10


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| 1 | appropriate, I do not agree with 01:38:51 | 1 | is a dispute between these two experts about a 01:42:02 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Dr. Cox's formula for doing so." | 2 | factual matter, and the trier of fact will have to |
| 3 | In apportioning Java ME lost profits due | 3 | decide on that, not an expert. There's no economics |
| 4 | to Android versus due to other causes, what other | 4 | involved in deciding that. |
| 5 | causes did you look at? 01:39:04 | 5 | Q Sorry to interrupt, but I think you said 01:42:14 |
| 6 | A The context here is, as I recall -- is | 6 | Dr. Cockburn had taken issue with the strategic |
| 7 | that Dr. Cox says the iPhone came along, all of | 7 | forecast. |
| 8 | this is attributable or, at least, a large | 8 | Did you mean Dr. Leonard? |
| 9 | fraction of this is attributable to the iPhone. | 9 | A Dr. Leonard. |
| 10 | Dr. Cockburn response -- Professor Cockburn 01:39:21 | 10 | Q Dr. Cockburn used the strategic forecast, 01:42:21 |
| 11 | responds, "No, it's not the iPhone. It wasn't the | 11 | and Dr. Leonard said that was not the appropriate |
| 12 | effect." | 12 | forecast? |
| 13 | The question really is, when you look at | 13 | A Yes. Sorry. I got that backwards. |
| 14 | the expected sales or expected placements going | 14 | So there's a factual dispute there that I |
| 15 | forward, did they have included in them some 01:39:41 | 15 | don't weigh in on. There is -- then there's a 01:42:32 |
| 16 | expectation about the iPhone? If they did, then | 16 | couple of issues associated with Java ME being used |
| 17 | it's only the unexpected success of the iPhone that | 17 | for non-handset devices, Blu-ray devices, soda pop |
| 18 | would not -- would have -- sort of creates an | 18 | machines, a variety of things where Java ME is in, |
| 19 | apportionment problem because, otherwise, they're | 19 | and Dr. Cox argues they should be. |
| 20 | already there. They've already been taken out and 01:39:59 | 20 |  |
| 21 | no apportionment is necessary. |  |  |
| 22 | So you've got to argue this is the |  |  |
| 23 | unexpected part of this. And it's hard to know |  |  |
| 24 | what the expectations with regard to the iPhone. |  |  |
| 25 | Our reading of this in 2006 is that people were 01:40:11 |  | 01:43:10 |
|  | 178 |  | 180 |
|  | mildly surprised that the iPhone did as well as it 01:40:16 |  |  |
| 2 | did, so it appears that there were unexpected |  |  |
| 3 | results here that would not have been included in |  |  |
| 4 | the forecast. |  |  |
| 5 | Dr. Cox has a reasonably complex way of 01:40:28 | - |  |
| 6 | doing this, and we just take the proportional |  |  |
| 7 | market shares, just as the paragraph says. |  |  |
| 8 | Q But other than the iPhone, were there any |  |  |
| 9 | other factors that you looked at and considered that | 9 | Q Focusing on the issue of whether the |
| 10 | might have caused Sun's projected forecast to fall 01:40:43 | 10 | strategic forecast or some other forecast is 01:43:46 |
| 11 | short in the real world? | 11 | appropriate, if you were to adopt Dr. Leonard's |
| 12 | A I don't think so. | 12 | methodology rather than Dr. Cockburn's, do you have |
| 13 | Q Now, the -- | 13 | any sense of how your bottom line number of about |
| 14 | A I need to remind myself of what this | 14 | \$56 million would be affected? |
| 15 | section says. 01:40:56 | 15 | A Do you mean Dr. Cox's methodology or 01:44:02 |
| 16 | Q Okay. | 16 | Dr. Leonard's? Dr. Cox is -- takes on the -- |
| 17 | A Well, the answer is, yes, we did. In | 17 | Q Correct. |
| 18 | some cases, yes; in some cases, no. | 18 | If you were not to use the strategic |
| 19 | Dr. Cockburn comes back and says: | 19 | forecast but you were to use the forecast that |
| 20 | "The strategic forecast is not 01:41:47 | 20 | Dr. Cox prefers, have you done any calculation as to 01:44:18 |
| 21 | the right one to use because of a | 21 | how that would affect your bottom line? |
| 22 | variety of reasons." | 22 | A I have not. |
| 23 | The reasons may or may not hold water, but | 23 | Q Do you have any sense of how using |
| 24 | I don't have any expertise to evaluate sort of those | 24 | Dr. Cox's preferred forecast would affect the bottom |
| 25 | reasons, so I simply say in Paragraph 131 that this 01:41:58 | 25 | line number? Would it cut it in half? Would it -- 01:44:29 |
|  | 179 |  | 181 |

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    A I don't think so.
        01:59:07
        MR. PURCELL: All right. That's all I've
got. We can go off the record.
    THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
1:59 p.m. and we're going off the record. 01:59:29
            (Brief pause in proceedings.)
        THE VIDEOGRAPHER:The time is now
        2:01 p.m. and we're back on the record.
            FURTHER EXAMINATION
BY MR. NORTON: 02:01:46
    Q All right. I want to talk a little bit
about the econometrics.
    A Okay.
    Q Now, you conclude that the -- Professor
Cockburn's econometric analysis is generally useful 02:01:54
and reliable for estimating consumer willingness to
pay for both speed and applications?
    A Yes.
    Q And then you actually calculate
    willingness to pay for increased speed and for 02:02:10
applications; is that correct?
    A Correct.
    Q Now, I want to go through a few points on
    Professor Cockburn's analysis.
```

        He uses eBay data in his econometrics 02:02:22
        192
    analysis, correct?
02:02:25
A Correct.
Q And you agree that that's appropriate?
A I think I'm a bit more cautious about
that which is to say that, you know, in fairness, 02:02:33
we'd like to have information on new phone
purchases, but new phone purchases are embedded in
plans that are impossible -- so it's impossible to
disentangle the phone from the plan. And in those
cases, the economists look for reasonable proxies, $\quad$ 02:02:51
and the eBay data strikes me as a reasonable
proxy, but it has embedded in it an assumption
that I've not tested, and I don't think anybody
else can test, and that is that the -- and here
I'm using "relative" in a very loose way, but the 02:03:08
relative preferences for used phones are the same
as the relative preferences for new phones.
And all I mean by that is that since the
econometric estimates what economists term
"elasticities," that the elasticity response here 02:03:23
is the same for both used and new phone buyers to
the degree that eBay phones are used phones. I
don't think all of them are but to the degree they
are. So there is that assumption that lets you go
from the proxy to measuring what you really want to $02: 03: 40$
measure.
02:03:45
Q Do you know whether Professor Cockburn's analysis of eBay data included new phones?

A I don't. I mean, they're stripped
phones, so I don't know -- I'd have to go back and 02:03:56 look at the data. I don't recall.

Q So you're not aware of whether Professor Cockburn has actually analyzed whether the effect on its econometrics analysis if you look exclusively at the new phones --

02:04:07
A No, as I recall, he did that and gets about the same results.

Q And do you disagree with his conclusion that when he focuses exclusively on new phones, he gets the same results?

02:04:18
A No, I don't. As I indicated in both the conjoint analysis and the econometric analysis, the first thing we did, as I think in response to
Judge Alsup's charge, was to simply ask whether it
was implemented as represented it was implemented, 02:04:35
and we were able to replicate Professor Cockburn's
work, all of his work, and Professor Shugan's
work, all of their work.
Q But it's your opinion that use of eBay
data in Professor Cockburn's econometric study is a 02:04:49
reasonable proxy?
A Yes.
Q And then you're aware of the critiques
that Dr. Leonard has made of the econometrics
analysis; is that right?
A I am.
Q And you considered those in your report?
A I have.
Q And you, nonetheless, conclude that the
econometrics analysis is useful and reliable --
A Yes.
Q -- as performed by Professor Cockburn?
A Yes, with one exception. There is --
and it has to do with the memory patents that are
excluded. Professor Cockburn did a fix for that
that I think is problematic. Until that part of
the -- until those patents were dropped, I did a
fix that I think is better, but it was a fix, and
my fix gets tighter results but roughly the same
results as his fix did but is easier to interpret
and easier to implement.
This is an auxiliary regression. It
turns out it's embedded in the code so you actually
don't see the regression output, but if you see the
regression output, it doesn't make a lot of sense.
02:06:02

And I assume that Dr. Leonard must not have seen it 02:06:05
because he doesn't criticize it, but you can put in
an alternative auxiliary regression that does make
sense in which the coefficients have the right
signs, for example, and get results similar to
02:06:23
Professor Cockburn's.
Again, let me make sure that the answer
here is understood in the same context as my earlier answers with Mr. Purcell, which is, I'm using the Leonard implementation of the Cockburn 02:06:43 model; I'm not estimating the 240-hour estimation every time.

Q Right. Okay.
And the fix that you described of
Professor Cockburn's econometric analysis, that had 02:06:59
to do with patents that are no longer in this lawsuit?

A Yes.
Q Now, the -- you have an enhanced model for willingness to pay, correct?

02:07:14
A Correct.
Q And you calculated a willingness to pay value for the incremental speed benefits associated with the ' 104 patent, right?

A Well, I estimated, to be technical -- 02:07:32 196

I'm careful here. I estimated the speed benefits
02:07:34
associated with the Linpack score, and as I made clear in my report, I'm not opining on the technical effect of the patents. That's a
different issue, but I've assumed that technical 02:07:46 effect of the patent is what the Oracle engineers have said it is and then gone forward with that assumption.

Q Oracle engineers conducted tests that would indicate the - according to them, the effect 02:08:01 of removing the ' 104 patent and the ' 205 patent from an Android phone, correct?

A That's correct.
Q And you rely on their tests?
A Yes. 02:08:12
Q And there are no Google tests, correct?
A That's correct.
Q And the Linpack score, you agree, is a useful proxy for the speed that consumers care about? 02:08:23
A Yes, in the sense that -- it's a useful proxy in that it bridges from the patent to something that you can measure. It's useful in that sense. I mean, we're sort of stuck with the Linpack score, like it or not, because it's the 02:08:49
score in which the patents' effect on speed was
measured. So in that sense, it's useful and it
has -- has regression validity in the sense that
it has coefficients that have, you know, standard
errors that make it reliable estimates of the
coefficients for that, but we use it because of
the fact that it's tied to the patents.
Q And then when you did your willingness to
pay analysis, you assumed that the -- there would be
an 80 percent reduction in the Linpack score if the $\mathbf{0 2 : 0 9 : 3 4}$
'104 patent were not included in the Android phone,
correct?
A Approximately 80 percent, yes.
$Q$ And you described that 80 percent estimate
as conservative, correct?
A Yes.
$Q$ And by "conservative," that means that
your use of it would tend to understate willingness
to pay?
A Could, yes.
Q Now, the -- you conclude that consumers
would pay an additional \$21 more for an average
priced Android phone if it had the incremental speed
benefits of the '104 patent indicated by the Linpack
test; is that right?

A Do you want to refer me to the -- 02:10:19
Q Sure, I'm sorry. I think you can look at paragraph 400 and Table F9.

A Yes.
Q So do I understand correctly that based on 02:10:43 your econometric study, consumers would pay $\mathbf{\$ 2 1}$ more for a phone that had the speed benefits indicated by the Linpack test by the engineers than they would for a noninfringing Android phone?

A Yes.
02:10:59
Q And you also used your enhanced model to calculate willingness to pay for applications; is that right?

A That's correct.
Q And if we look at paragraph 401, you found 02:11:07 that limiting the number of applications available on the phone between 6,000 and 40,000 results in a reduction in willingness to pay between, on average, 12 and $\$ 22$; is that right?

A That's correct.
02:11:28
Q So the willingness to pay for the assumed incremental increase in applications is between 12 and $\$ 22$ per average-priced Android phone?

A Correct.
Q Now, if you go to Page 41 of your 02:11:42

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report -- let me know if you're there.
02:11:59
A I'm there.
Q You state:
"The marginal value
contribution of the patents and
02:12:14 copyrights in suit is substantial."
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A I'm sorry, 41?
Q Paragraph 41.
MR. COOPER: Oh, Paragraph 41.
MR. NORTON: Did I say "Page"?
02:12:22
MR. COOPER: I thought you said "Page 41."
Sorry.
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. NORTON:
Q So you state there: 02:12:28
'The marginal value
contribution of the patents and
copyrights in suit is substantial."
A Yes.
Q And there, are you referring to what's 02:12:34
indicated by the engineering assessments and the willingness to pay?

A Yes. I put it slightly differently,
which is, I'm looking at the econometric
evaluation of the willingness -- of the technical $\quad 02: 12: 51$
200

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assessments. 02:12:55
    Q Okay.
        And you say:
            ''Google would presumably have
        been willing to pay up to this 02:12:59
        amount for the in-suit patents and
        copyrights."
    A Yes.
    Q When you say, "Google presumably would
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have been willing to pay up to this amount," does
'this amount" refer to the per-unit willingness to
pay?
A No.
Q What does that refer --
A This is a general comment that -- I use
the econometrics since it's been excluded from
market share for the simple proposition that the
consumers valued this. There's a lot of talk in
the record about they value speed, they value
applications, and so on, and what the econometrics $\quad 02: 13: 31$
shows is they do.
And, therefore, that Google, if it had
understood that in 2006, would have put a high
value, relatively high value on the intellectual
property associated with achieving those gains. 02:13:48
02:13:07
02:13:14

Q Now, if you were to assume that Google did
not have good noninfringing alternatives to the APIs $\quad \mathbf{0 2 : 1 9 : 5 9}$
or the '104 patent, and you also assume that the
willingness to pay calculations are accurate, would
that suggest to you that the reasonable royalty for
the '104 patent and for the copyrights would both be
substantially in excess of what you calculated on $\quad \mathbf{0 2 : 2 0 : 1 9}$
Table 8?
$\quad$ MR. PURCELL: Object to the form.
$\quad$ THE WITNESS: I really don't think you can
go there, Mr. Norton. The -- the -- what -- the
reasonable -- I mean, the noninfringing substitutes $02: 20: 34$
available to Google in 2006, as I've argued in
dismissing Dr. Leonard's arguments about this, are
embedded in the offer, so if I believe they agreed
to the February 2006 offer, that embeds and reflects
whatever noninfringing substitutes there are, and so 02:20:51
me

[^0]to Android are, in fact, correctly allocated to Android?
A Yes and no. I mean, we took the expenses for what they were, and we talked about the way -- or tried to analyze how Dr. Cox then uses those -- how he accounts for those expenses, whether he amortizes them, over what period of time he amortizes them, and so forth. And I made some criticisms about that, but we've not gotten involved in sort of whether these numbers in the

02:22:20 02:22:34

Google reports are accurate. I mean, I have no way of knowing.

Q So you have no way of determining whether or not the actual expense items that show up on the $\mathbf{P \& L}$ really are properly allocated to Android as 02:23:02 opposed to some other Google business operation?

A I do not.
Q So you just take that one on faith?
A Well, I don't take it on faith. I
assume that, following Dr. Cox, these numbers are
02:23:14
right, and if at trial -- I've been careful here;
it's an important point, which is -- what I've tried to do is set forth methodologies for doing these things with an understanding that those methodologies are implemented with a set of 02:23:29 208

$$
\begin{align*}
& \text { assumptions, some of which are empirical } \\
& \text { assumptions, in which The Court will have better } \\
& \text { evidence at the date of trial than any of the } \\
& \text { experts had at the point at which they were } \\
& \text { implemented. But that the methodology will work, } \\
& \text { whatever -- whatever the evidence is at trial. } \\
& \text { So if the evidence is these costs are } \\
& \text { less, or they should have been amortized } \\
& \text { differently, then the methodology would have -- you } \\
& \text { know, I would tell the jury, if asked, that the } \\
& \text { jury needs to make those adjustments, or I would } \\
& \text { make the adjustments for the jury and present the } \\
& \text { numbers to them. } \\
& \text { Q Now, on the topic of infringer's profits, } \\
& \text { Mr. Purcell asked you some questions about double } \\
& \text { recovery, and I want to approach it a little bit } \\
& \text { differently. }
\end{align*}
$$

When you cal- -- well, when you calculated the reasonable royalty for copyright, that is based on the 2000 net present value of Sun's anticipated 02:24:31 profits from the 2006 transaction, correct?

A Using Google's estimates of Sun's success, yes.

Q Google's estimates of the number of units, correct?

02:24:49

| 1 | A Yes. That was poorly put. It's not 02:24:49 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 | Google's estimates of Sun's success; it's Google's |
| 3 | estimates of Android's success. |
| 4 | Q But the number that you are using is based |
| 5 | on Sun's anticipated profits? 02:24:58 |
| 6 | A Yes. |
| 7 | Q So to the extent that the copyright |
| 8 | statute says that a Plaintiff is entitled to actual |
| 9 | damages -- |
| 10 | I'll ask you to assume that the copyright 02:25:16 |
| 11 | statute provides that a Plaintiff is entitled to |
| 12 | actual damages which can be measured as a lost |
| 13 | license or as a lost profit, and in addition to |
| 14 | actual damages, the Plaintiff is entitled to |
| 15 | infringer's profits to the extent not already 02:25:31 |
| 16 | counted in the actual damages. |
| 17 | A Okay. |
| 18 | Q So with that understanding of actual |
| 19 | damages, is there any overlap between the |
| 20 | infringer's profits and the copyright royalty? 02:25:46 |
| 21 | A I don't know. |
| 22 | MR. COOPER: I'm going to retrospectively |
| 23 | object to the question as to form. |
| 24 | MR. NORTON: I understand. I'll stick |
| 25 | with that, though. 02:26:48 |
|  | 210 |
| 1 | THE WITNESS: Just a second. Can I talk 02:27:01 |
| 2 | to my attorney off the record? |
| 3 | MR. NORTON: Let's go off the record. |
| 4 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 2:27 p.m. |
| 5 | and we'll go off the record. 02:27:07 |
| 6 | (Discussion held off record.) |
| 7 | THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now |
| 8 | 2:29 p.m. and we're back on the record. |
| 9 | MR. COOPER: Counsel, I've had an |
| 10 | opportunity to confer with Dr. Kearl while we were 02:29:08 |
| 11 | off the record, and it's apparent that Dr. Kearl |
| 12 | didn't understand your question. |
| 13 | Can I ask you to rephrase it, please? |
| 14 | MR. NORTON: Of course. I'm sorry, that |
| 15 | was confusing. 02:29:17 |
| 16 | BY MR. NORTON: |
| 17 | Q So assume that the copyright statute |
| 18 | identifies actual damages and infringer's profits, |
| 19 | and actual damages can be measured one of two ways: |
| 20 | Either lost profits or a lost license fee, a 02:29:32 |
| 21 | hypothetical license. And the copyright statute |
| 22 | further provides that the Plaintiff is entitled to |
| 23 | actual damages, plus infringer's profits to the |
| 24 | extent the infringer's profits are not taken into |
| 25 | consideration in the actual damages. 02:29:50 |
|  | 211 |

Google's estimates of Sun's success; it's Google's estimates of Android's success.

Q But the number that you are using is based on Sun's anticipated profits? 02:24:58

A Yes.
Q So to the extent that the copyright
statute says that a Plaintiff is entitled to actual damages --

I'll ask you to assume that the copyright 02:25:16
statute provides that a Plaintiff is entitled to
actual damages which can be measured as a lost
license or as a lost profit, and in addition to
actual damages, the Plaintiff is entitled to
infringer's profits to the extent not already
02:25:31
A Okay.
Q So with that understanding of actual
damages, is there any overlap between the infringer's profits and the copyright royalty? 02:25:46

A I don't know.
MR. COOPER: I'm going to retrospectively
object to the question as to form.
MR. NORTON: I understand. I'll stick
with that, though. 02:26:48

THE WITNESS: Just a second. Can I talk 02:27:01 to my attorney off the record?

MR. NORTON: Let's go off the record.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 2:27 p.m.
and we'll go off the record. 02:27:07
(Discussion held off record.)
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now
2:29 p.m. and we're back on the record.
MR. COOPER: Counsel, I've had an opportunity to confer with Dr. Kearl while we were 02:29:08
off the record, and it's apparent that Dr. Kearl
didn't understand your question.
Can I ask you to rephrase it, please?
MR. NORTON: Of course. I'm sorry, that
was confusing.
02:29:17
Q So assume that the copyright statute identifies actual damages and infringer's profits, and actual damages can be measured one of two ways: Ether lost profits or a lost license fee, a 02:29:32
pethe hicense. And the copyright state
actual damages, plus infringer's profits to the extent the infringer's profits are not taken into consideration in the actual damages. 02:29:50

Is that much clearer?
02:29:54
A Yes.
MR. COOPER: And you're asking him to
assume that's the statement of the law?
MR. NORTON: I am.
02:29:59
MR. COOPER: Okay.

## BY MR. NORTON:

Q And then am I correct in understanding that the copyright royalty that you have calculated is based on anticipated profits that Sun would have 02:30:08 received from a hypothetical license?

A Correct.
Q Okay.
In that case, and assuming that my
statement of the law is correct, is there any 02:30:21
overlap between your measure of the copyright,
reasonable royalty and your measure of the copyright
infringer's profits?
A May I ask you a clarifying question?
Q Okay. 02:30:40
A I mean, is what you're getting at here
that there could have been a difference between
the expected profits to which was used in
calculation of the reasonable royalty and the
actual profits that history produced? Is it a 02:30:49
distinction between the forecast and actual? 02:30:56
Q Well, I guess my point is just --
I don't believe my question depends on that distinction, so obviously, my question is still not clear.

02:31:07
If actual damages can be measured -Is there anything in your --
Let me ask it this way: Is there anything in your measure of the copyright reasonable royalty that factors in Google's infringer's profits? 02:31:20

A I don't think so.
Q Okay.
A Because the reasonable royalty is based on the -- it starts, as we've discussed a number of times, on the 2006 license and the implied 02:32:50 royalty that comes out of that, that included, not infringement, but compliant Android.

So the projected profits don't include whatever incremental profits, if any, whichever they go, negative or positive, that might have 02:33:11
occurred because you have a -- an Android machine that is not -- or an Android product that is not compliant.

Q Okay.
Now, you talked a little bit about 02:33:29

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Professor Cockburn's group and value approach?
    A Yes.
    Q And when you were referring to Professor
Cockburn's group and value approach, you're
referring to the version of the group and value 02:33:36
approach that was permitted by Judge Alsup which
uses, in part, Professor Cockburn's lower bound,
correct?
    A That's correct.
    Q Have you looked at Professor Cockburn's 02:33:47
group and value upper bound approach?
    A No.
    Q Have you made --
        Did you ever reach any opinions as to the
reasonableness of the upper bound approach? 02:33:55
    A No. We simply waited for The Court to
decide on this matter.
    Q Do you have an opinion as to whether the
upper bound approach is a reasonable version of
group and value?
                                    02:34:10
    A There are things that go different
directions here. One is as indicated in my
report. Professor Cockburn uses three studies,
picks one that seemed to be out of the norm for
the academic studies in this area, and I provide 02:34:31
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                                    214
    some evidence from a paper by John Putnam that 02:34:35
surveys the license renewal literature and the
estimates of the value function for the -- for
the -- for the annual literature that suggest that
the top 5 percent gets a lower fraction than does 02:34:54
Professor Cockburn. So this is the difference
between 77-point something and my 53.3 percent.
Okay?

So in that sense, I think he's not -- my
criticism here is that he could have used the 02:35:15
universe of studies in this area, and for whatever
reason, picked a subset, and the better thing would
be to use the universal studies in the area, in
which case, you come to a smaller, smaller
fraction. 02:35:30

But there is a bit of a problem in all of this, and here I think Dr. Leonard gets this quite wrong, and we have these synthetic portfolios -let me back up. This is a long answer. Witnesses are not supposed to give long answers, but my 02:35:49 lawyer is a nice guy.

MR. COOPER: We're in a special situation.
THE WITNESS: Let me be clear about how
I'm thinking about portfolio. You can think about a portfolio as sort of like a stock portfolio, which 02:36:03
you sort of pick a bunch of independent things, or 02:36:07 think of it as a conglomerate, a firm that has a roll-up of a bunch of independent firms, or you can think about a portfolio as a set of things that are designed to do one or two, to move forward the 02:36:15 technology, and you might think of that in terms of a vertically integrated firm that has divisions that are productive because they're integrated as opposed to a conglomerate that has divisions that are independent of one another.

02:36:32
Portfolios are used loosely to describe both of those, right, and typically, it's used to describe the latter, that is, a group of unrelated patents that happen to be assembled by somebody who then is sort of licensing the patents for whatever $\quad 02: 36: 41$ use in the portfolio.

If you think that the Java ME portfolio is not that, but it's a portfolio of patents that are designed to advance a particular technology, they have a particular technology, then it is a bit 02:36:58 unlike the portfolio studies that Professor Cockburn and Dr. Leonard appeal to in that they -- they're unlikely to be those kind of portfolios, right?

And the difference here is that you could imagine that there are alternative paths through $\quad 02: 37: 16$ 216
this portfolio that are substitutes for one another. $02: 37: 20$
So, for example, suppose -- to make this simple, suppose there are 500 patents in the Java ME portfolio, each of which is -- and there are five paths, so you only need 100 patents to implement the $02: 37: 34$ technology. You just need one of them. Then, in fact, one -- you don't take one five-hundredths to value this; you take one one-hundredth to value this, and the mean value is higher, as well, because it's the mean of 100. It's the portfolio divided by $02: 37: 52$ 100 ; not the portfolio divided by 500 .

So there is this problem with the group and value approach that I have, and I allude to it in several different places about this portfolio likely being composed of substitutes and 02:38:05 complements. There's no evidence in this matter. I mean, people talk loosely about their substitutes here, but I've seen nothing in the record that allows me or Professor Cockburn or Dr. Leonard, or anybody else, to tease out that, but it is a $\quad 02: 38: 22$ potential problem, because it treats these 500 patents as if they were 500 independent patents, and there are unlikely to have been 500 independent patents. And to the degree there are substitutes in there, this means that the group and value method

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Q So that would -- 02:44:40
If you were to plug those numbers in to your Table 10, that would increase the total Java ME lost profits, assuming everything else stays the same?

02:44:50
A I think so. I think you're correct.
Q You could go back and rerun those numbers, right?

A Yes.
Q I'm not asking you to do that right now, 02:45:02
but you could make those adjustments and generate new Java ME lost profits and --

A Yeah, let me -- let me answer more cautiously, if you'll permit, which is, it appears I've made a mistake here, and to the degree I've 02:45:13 made a mistake, I will fix the mistake, but I'll need to go back and look and see whether or not the actual Excel sheets and the things we did this with, in fact, reflect the mistake and whether it was a mistake.

02:45:30
So if it's a mistake, I will notify both parties that I've made an error in this case, of course.




MR. NORTON: Thank you very much. I appreciate your time today. I have nothing further.

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of
Disk 3 of 3 and concludes the deposition of James
Kearl. The time is now 2:46 p.m. and we're going 02:46:28 off the record.

Thank you, Counsel.
(Time noted: 2:46 p.m.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
) :ss
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO )
I, KELLI COMBS, CSR NO. 7705, a Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of California, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at the time and place herein set forth; that any witnesses in the foregoing proceedings, prior to testifying, were placed under oath; that the verbatim record of the proceedings was made by me using machine shorthand which was thereafter transcribed under my direction; further, that the foregoing is an accurate transcription thereof.

I further certify that I am neither financially interested in the action nor a relative or employee of any attorney of any of the parties.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have this date subscribed my name.

Dated: March 27, 2012

KELLI COMBS, CSR NO. 7705 224

MARCH 26, 2012
JAMES KEARL
EXAMINATION
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(BY MR. PURCELL) 134

CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY

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EXHIBIT H


[^0]:    you can't, then, make a side argument about that.
    02:20:55
    That's in the number that you're going to allocate in this, okay?

    Then, this goes to the issue about what is an accurate way of apportioning that to these 02:21:06 particular patents and, you know, the difference between the willingness to pay may sort of cause you to think hard about whether or not the group and value method got it right or was in the ballpark. But beyond that, I don't think it helps. There's no 02:21:25 way for me to go from the willingness to pay to an adjustment that I ought to make to the group and value apportionment.
    BY MR. NORTON:
    Q So I want to talk for a moment on $\quad 02: 21: 46$ infringer's profits.

    Now, for infringer's profits, you have deducted from Android U.S. revenues its expenses through September 2011, correct?

    A Yes.
    02:22:04
    Q And the evidence you have for those expenses is Dr. Cox's report; is that correct?

    A That's correct.
    Q And have you done anything to ascertain whether or not the expenses that Dr. Cox allocated 02:22:15

