

Exhibit 3

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
52D FIGHTER WING (USAFE)

14 Jun 05

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJCOM SSO

FROM: 606 ACS/CC
52 OSS/SIO

SUBJECT: Discharge For Cause (Major Almy, Michael D., : REDACTED

1. PERSONAL DATA

- a. Name, Rank, SSAN: Almy, Michael D., Major, . REDACTED
- b. DOB: REDACTED
- c. Marital Status: Single
- d. Number of Dependents: 0
- e. TAFMSD: 20 Jun 1993
- f. Date of Separation: Indef

2. ACCESS DATA

- a. Date SCI Access Granted, Access Level/Categories: 17 Oct 01, SI/TK/G/
- b. Units Involved: 606 ACS, 52 FW
- c. Frequency of Handling SCI Material: Minimal
- d. Date Access Terminated and Date Member Debriefed: May 05

3. ACCESS HISTORY SUMMARIZED

- a. SCI Depth of Access, Systems and Dates, Projects and Dates, Programs and Dates, and Previous Access: n/a
- b. State if Access has been Barred, Suspended, or Terminated: Suspended
- c. Systems, Projects, Tasks, Plans, Programs, and Operations the Person was exposed to and the inclusive dates: None
- d. Evaluation of the individual's knowledge in each compartment in relation to the mission. Use the terms "thoroughly familiar" or "vaguely familiar" for each SCI entity listed: **Vaguely familiar with each -- normal duties did not require SCI access. He was familiarized with programs during required indoctrinations.**
(Note: for SCI access, include an evaluation of the sensitivity and perishability of each access.)

4. INCIDENT and BACKGROUND.

- a. Provide details of the incident. Indicate if publicity has, or is expected to occur and whether or not a security information file has been established. Report any previous offenses or incidents in security police reports; AF Form 110, individual incident reference record; OSI reports of investigation; and unit personnel information files. Report any previous

disciplinary or administrative actions including articles 15, letters of reprimand, letters of admonishment, and any other pertinent information:

Individual is being considered for administrative discharge for violation of Department of Defense policy against homosexual conduct. No Security Information File has been established. There are no previous incidents or any additional adverse information. No publicity has occurred, however publicity is possible if/when discharge proceedings become public.

5. PROPOSED DISCIPLINARY or ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

a. Include the reasons for discharge and the paragraph in AFI 36-3208, administrative separation of airmen, used for the discharge. Include the worst possible characterization of service (type of discharge), the commander's recommended characterization of service, and any civil court action pending as a result of the misconduct. The staff judge advocate will coordinate on the message to indicate if the proposed court martial, discharge, or removal action is legally sufficient.

Discharge from service for violation of the Department of Defense policy against homosexual conduct IAW AFI 36-3208, para 5.36.2. Worst characterization of service is general. Recommended characterization of service is honorable. No known civil actions pending.

6. SIO EVALUATION

a. Include sensitivity and perishability of the information, factors for special consideration, impact on national security, and any other information bearing on the proposed action.

The individual worked primarily with information protected at the SECRET collateral level. Information was normally related to daily intelligence briefings and operational capabilities of his squadron. The individual does have a basic understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the the AN/TPS-75 radar, Modular Control Equipment, CRC operations and associated self-protection systems.

7. COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT

a. Estimate the person's ability to comprehend and remember details, including his or her overall knowledge, attitude, and inquisitiveness. Assess his or her attitude about the air force and the pending discharge (i.e., hostile, ambivalent, etc.).

The individual has superior ability to comprehend and remember details. He has demonstrated above average inquisitiveness. He has demonstrated superior intelligence and ability to comprehend technical information. Although he is not pleased with being considered for discharge, he has not displayed any hostile attitudes toward the Air Force, his coworkers or superiors. He understands his behavior was wrong but took active steps to engage in the behavior regardless of current DoD policy. He has shown no hostile attitudes towards the United States.

b. Any attempts to expand his or her access to classified information, a repeated volunteer for special assignments which would require additional accesses or questions about classified information about which the individual has no need-to-know.

No

c. Missing documents that the individual had routine access to, as revealed by the annual inventory, or an inspection. No. Routine personal access was limited to SIPRNET email.

d. Repeated, or unusual overtime. No

e. Falsifying destruction records. No

f. Sudden, unexplained affluence. No

g. A pattern of recurring travel, either in the U.S. or abroad, without apparent recreation or business purposes. None

h. Falsification of any location visited on leave statements or travel vouchers. None

i. Travel to any country hostile to the U.S. None

j. Repeated association with non-U.S. citizens, regardless of nationality. None

k. Any known financial problems. None

l. Any known medical problems: None

m. Based on the information gathered above, is the person subject to blackmail, defections, or exploitation? Yes, individual is subject to blackmail or exploitation until such time as the current proceedings are made public.

n. Does the person harbor any bitterness or resentment as a result of the adverse action and will the person continue to protect special access information?—Based on observed behavior of the individual there is no indication they will fail to protect special access information.

o. Include an assessment of the potential damage to national security the individual could cause through an unauthorized disclosure of the sensitive information to which exposed.

Moderate—The individual worked mostly with SECRET classified information related to squadron operational capabilities and limitations, to include the Status of Resources and Training System, SORTS, the production of daily situation reports when the squadron is deployed and daily intelligence briefings. This information is constantly revised and reassessed based on new data. However, the individual does have sufficient understanding or knowledge of our operational capabilities and limitations to significantly affect national security.

p. Concurrence or non-concurrence with the commander's recommendations and any expansion of the above as appropriate. Use the terms "minimal" or "serious" when providing damage assessment.

Waide A. Mueller
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