EXHIBIT 2

Pages 1 - 26 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOSEPH C. SPERO, MAGISTRATE SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT AMERICA LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, Plaintiff, NO. C 11-00167 SI (JCS) vs. GEORGE HOTZ; HECTOR MARTIN CANTERO; SVEN PETER; and DOES 1 through 100, San Francisco, California Thursday Defendants. March 10, 2011 11:00 a.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

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(Appearances continued on next page)

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Official Reporter - U.S. District Court

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THE CLERK: We are calling Case Number C. 11-00167, Sony Computer Entertainment versus George Hotz.

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And, counsel, please state your appearances.

MR. GILLILAND: Good morning, your Honor. For the plaintiff, this is Jim Gilliland, together with Mehrnaz Boroumand Smith, and Holly Gaudreau, for Plaintiff, Sony Computer Entertainment.

MR. KELLAR: And good morning, your Honor. For Defendant, George Hotz, this is Stewart Kellar, along with Jack Praetzellis.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you very much.

One is dated the 18th, having to do with discovery disputes; and one is the 28th of February, having to do with impoundment.

I did sign the order authorizing the issuance of the subpoenas that you both agreed that should be issued. And we'll deal with the rest of the discovery disputes today.

I did want to emphasize two things about the subpoenas that were issued; and also, to the extent I authorize a PayPal subpoena, what my intent is with respect to those. And my intent, number one, is that the information that's produced pursuant to those subpoenas will be attorneys' eyes only, under the protective order; and second, that it will be without prejudice, obviously, to the subpoenaed parties or anyone else who's got standings, prejudice -- without prejudice

to their right to file a motion to quash.

And what I would order you to do is make sure, when you serve those subpoenas or any other subpoenas I authorize, that you make sure you advise the subpoenaed parties that they have the right to file a motion to quash.

On the discovery disputes, I thought we'd just go down them, one by one.

The first is a PayPal subpoena. This is -- it seems to me the relevancy of the PayPal information is limited to whether or not the source of funds that are paid into the PayPal account associated with the "geohot" g-mail address -- the location from which those funds are paid may be of some relevance, but the documents, beyond that narrow scope, I don't see particularly interesting, because we want to find out whether or not it's being paid by California residents.

And so my thought was I would authorize a subpoena to the PayPal account only to the extent that you could obtain documents sufficient to identify the source of funds, including location of the source of those funds deposited into a PayPal account — any PayPal account associated with the geohot@gmail.com from January of 2009 to the present; but otherwise, narrow it to that, but no further. That would be my tentative ruling.

Anyone want to comment on that?

MR. KELLAR: Your Honor, this is Stewart Kellar, for

George Hotz.

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With regard to the PayPal subpoena, first, the subpoena does not limit discovery to locations within California, which would be the only relevant portion to find jurisdiction at this stage.

And, second, the legal -- George has subsequently set up a legal-defense fund, at which he received donations through PayPal after January 11th, after our February 10th meeting in your office. And so those donations would be implicated in the subpoena, and the privacy interests of those involved would be implicated, and has no bearing on jurisdiction.

THE COURT: When was that set up? When did you start receiving money?

MR. KELLAR: The exact date?

THE COURT: Approximately.

MR. KELLAR: Subsequent to our meeting February 10 or so. I believe it might have been that following week. Let me find out.

THE COURT: That doesn't matter.

What I would do -- the easy way around, to satisfy your concern on that, I'll just say January 1, '09, to 2/1/11. We'll cabin it. We'll put bookends on the dates. January 1, '09, through February 1, 2011. And that will do yours.

Okay. Anything else you wanted to say, Mr. Kellar, on that subject?

MR. KELLAR: Only that the subpoena seeks financial information from those people who have no connection to California. If we're looking for addresses of the subpoenaed parties, those outside of California have no relevance to jurisdictional discovery.

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THE COURT: Okay. Could I hear from the plaintiff on that subject?

MS. SMITH: This is Mehrnaz Boroumand Smith, on behalf of SCEA.

The only concern I have with the proposal that you're making is that PayPal may have difficulty providing us information limited to -- in other words, it may be easier for PayPal to give us all of the information, rather than the information limited to the California residents.

THE COURT: Yeah. Well, easier is one issue. Easier doesn't necessarily cut it. There are lots of things that are easier, and it may or may not be easier. It may or may not be impossible. It depends on — it's a matter of degree. So I don't know about easier; whether that would justify getting information; but you agree that the question that is relevant is — is to identify whether or not, and how much, and how many California residents paid into that account?

MS. SMITH: Yes, your Honor. We agree with that.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, then, I'll limit it, as requested. I will limit it to documents sufficient to

identify any source of funds in California that went into that PayPal account -- any PayPal account associated with geohot@g-mail.com for the period January 1, '09, to February 1, '11. And ask the plaintiff to redraft their subpoena accordingly. So that's the PayPal account.

Twitter -- is Twitter -- there's no issue with Twitter anymore?

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MS. SMITH: So the only outstanding issue with Twitter, your Honor, is that Twitter requires a consent from Mr. Hotz to release his Tweets. And we need to get that consent from Mr. Hotz. Our understanding is that he will provide it. And we're working on the paperwork that Twitter needs; but we just wanted to confirm that that consent is going to be provided to us.

THE COURT: Mr. Kellar.

MR. KELLAR: Your Honor, with regard to the consent, we agree at our meet-and-confer in person that we would not oppose that subpoena being sent, but as far as doing affirmative acts to enable the subpoena, we didn't agree to that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then, Mr. Hotz is ordered to sign a consent to obtain his Twitter posts from January 1, 2009, to the present; his Tweets. I think it's -- he's already not objected to the subpoena. I'll order him to provide that consent.

Third is Mr. Hotz' deposition. Mr. Hotz is Okay. 1 ordered to appear for a deposition relating solely to the 2 question of personal jurisdiction. 3 The plaintiff shall pay reasonable expenses of 4 Mr. Hotz to be deposed in California. 5 Parties shall work out a date. 6 7 MR. KELLAR: Your Honor, this is Stewart Kellar, for 8 George Hotz. With regard to a deposition, if George is ordered to 9 appear in California, he will be present in the forum, and 10 therefore, subject to being served with process while in the 11 12 forum. 13 THE COURT: Well, can we --We agree, your Honor, not to serve him --MS. SMITH: 14 All right. THE COURT: 15 -- when he appears for his deposition. 16 MS. SMITH: Well, so am I -- it is stipulated between 17 THE COURT: the parties that appearance here in -- that he cannot be served 18 with process by the parties to this action when he appears at 19 his deposition in California? Is that correct? 20 That's correct, your Honor. MS. SMITH: 2.1 Okay. THE COURT: 22 Your Honor, this is Stewart Kellar MR. KELLAR: 23 again. 24 Can it also be stipulated that none of the interested 25

parties in this action that have been listed by Sony Computer 1 Entertainment America will serve Mr. Hotz' process, either? 2 THE COURT: Well, by "interested parties," what do 3 4 you mean? MR. KELLAR: They were listed in -- along with the 5 initial complaint of -- I'm pulling it up right now, 6 7 your Honor. THE COURT: You're talking about the statement of 8 interested parties filed for conflict purposes, or refusal 9 10 purposes? MR. KELLAR: Correct. 11 THE COURT: Is there any objection to that addition? 12 MS. SMITH: No, your Honor. Good. Then that's the 13 stipulation. 14 Neither the plaintiff nor any interested THE COURT: 1.5 parties listed by plaintiff shall serve Mr. Hotz with process 16 when he comes to California. 17 I mean, I've got to tell you I don't think it makes 18 any difference, because they can serve him with process 19 wherever he is. Personal jurisdiction doesn't depend on where 20 he serves the process. 21 So -- but fine. Everyone's agreed to that. That's 22 23 great. The next two issues -- the impound demand and the 24 impound -- and the -- in terms of inspection for discovery 25

purposes, and the impound sort of work together. And here are my preliminary thoughts about that.

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Number one is I'd like to know from the plaintiffs:

If we go along with your proposal with respect to what is

impoundment, leaving aside the -- any searching the devices for

discovery, which may or may not be permitted, but just the

impoundment procedure you have envisioned, and which -- with

the procedures identified by the expert in the second

declaration, the second certification, and making a couple of

extra copies, what's that cost?

MS. SMITH: Well, I think it was about 1,500, your Honor, per image. And that — we would be required to do four images, under our proposal; plus the amount of time that it would take the experts to do the analysis that they need to do. And they did not give us an estimate, I don't think, on the amount of time it would take them to do their analysis.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, you know, it's always a balance. And so -- and right now, you're splitting the costs of this, right?

But the defendant has, you know, raised certain objections, which may or may not be well taken; but I think I have to balance in that the price that would be required for each of the steps that you want. So, you know, if the whole thing costs \$6,000, then I don't care very much. You can split that. And that is \$3,000 each. And that's not very much, in

the scheme of things; but the time is what is expensive with this expert.

MS. SMITH: Well, your Honor, this is Mehrnaz again.

We can put a cap on the amount that's divided between the two parties, and then anything additional, SCEA would pay for, if that helps.

THE COURT: Okay. What would you propose?

 ${\tt MS.~SMITH:}$ We could say 3,500 would be the cap, and then anything above that would be -- SCEA would pay for that.

THE COURT: So what you mean by that is the maximum share that the defendant would have to pay is \$3,500?

MS. SMITH: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Keller, leaving aside the question, for the moment, of whether it's appropriate for other reasons or inappropriate for other reasons to do the kinds of imagery and forensic analysis?

MR. KELLAR: This is Stewart Kellar again.

Putting aside the other issues at this point with regard to splitting the costs, it raises a few issues with regard to neutrality of the neutral. If they're getting paid by one party to perform certain tasks, we're concerned that the neutral may be inclined to perform tasks that are outside the scope of the impoundment order, because plaintiff is happy to pay for those extra tasks, which would then harm the neutrality of the neutral.

THE COURT: Well, we can fix that, right? We'll just 1 order that they -- that the neutral can only do things that are 2 authorized by the Court. Right? That will fix that problem. 3 All right. So --4 MR. KELLAR: This is Stewart Kellar again. 5 I agree with that. 6 THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. All right. So let's start 7 talking about impoundment. And the first order will be that 8 the neutral -- what's the name of the neutral, again? 9 MS. SMITH: "The Intelligence Group," or "TIG." 10 THE COURT: TIG shall only take steps with respect to 11 the items in their possession; items that have been impounded 12 that are authorized by Court order; that the first \$7,000 of 13 TIG costs will be split equally between plaintiff and 14 defendant, and any amount over \$7,000 would be paid for by the 15 plaintiff. 16 You see, I put off the hard question. 17 What do we do? 18 And so I guess, you know, my -- I guess the question 19 for you, Mr. Keller, is: I didn't really see how I could do 20 anything other than order the expert to do those things that it 21 thought were forensically necessary to examine, and comply with 22 the Court orders with respect to the files at issue.

You know, it has a protocol. The expert has a

And that is -- it's probably the first exhibit to

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the letter, is the relevant protocol. Is that the -- that's the one that has the -- isn't it the first certification, or second?

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MR. KELLAR: Yes, your Honor.

This is Stewart Kellar again.

With regard to the impoundment order, the original impoundment order and the temporary restraining order had ordered that the hard drive be impounded, irrespective of whether or not any circumvention devices are removed from the drives.

We saw that, initially, as overbroad.

However, when we came to an agreement during the temporary restraining order hearing on February 10th, regarding the scope of the impoundment order, neither party had any idea the method in which that extraction would take place.

And now, after speaking with the neutral, we realize that, in fact, the methods are more burdensome and invasive than just having the drives impounded with a third-party neutral.

THE COURT: No. I appreciate that; but the third-party neutral says that in order to accomplish the isolation of these particular files, it needs to do various things. And the certification by Mr. Grenier, which is dated February 27th, 2011, states various things he thinks he needs

to do. It's got, in paragraph five, the recommended procedures, and goes on to elaborate a little bit in the next paragraph. And that involves various technical procedures, including making a working copy, or whatever you would call it.

And you don't want him to do that?

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MR. KELLAR: No, your Honor, because, see, the procedures of making a backup copy then goes outside of the — the order of the Court or the — the notion of an impoundment order, which is to get the devices at issue out of the hands of the plaintiff, and out of the hands of the general public.

In fact, Judge Illston made such a comment during the hearing on February 10th, stating that the drives were to — the circumvention devices were to be taken from Mr. Hotz, so he did not have access to them, which is the sole reason for the impoundment order.

Then when the impoundment order came out, the language stated an overbroad term or a broad term; that the things that are to be isolated, segregated, and removed are information on those devices related to defendant's circumvention, rather than circumvention devices, themselves. Therefore, it has opened up a very problematic method of finding these drives — these circumvention devices — and information related thereto, which is a squishy term.

THE COURT: Well, I understand that, but here's my problem. That's the order of the Court. You've lost that

argument. Judge Illston has issued that order. As far as I'm concerned, that is the order of the court.

Now we have to figure out what to do with it. I'm not in a position to say, "Oh, well, Judge Illston got it wrong. let's not do that."

My task is to resolve disputes with regard to how her order will be implemented, right? That's my task.

MR. KELLAR: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Not whether.

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And she's ordered that.

I've got someone saying, "This is how you do it."

And your response is, "We don't want them to do what she asked."

I don't think I can go along with that.

I mean, I appreciate your concern.

You know, it should give you some comfort that nothing's going to leave the hands of the neutral, without Court order. I mean, she -- they're -- TIG, through the order that I just stated, will only be allowed to take any steps that are authorized by the Court -- by this court, with respect to these devices. And I can tell you that would include releasing anything to anyone that they have in their possession.

So your client can take some comfort in that, but I've got to come up with a forensically sound way of doing what the Court has ordered. And the only forensically sound way

that I've got in front of me is the one the neutral's proposed. 1 MR. KELLAR: Yes, your Honor. 2 This is Stewart Kellar again. 3 With regard to what the neutral has proposed, the 4 neutral has also noted in paragraph 8, page 4, of Mr. Grenier's 5 write-up, that the intelligence is only tasked with finding 6 specific data and copying that data, and then deleting it from 7 the original hard drive, and returning that drive to Mr. Hotz; 8 but Sony is seeking to create additional forensic images of 9 those drives for later, which is not a part of the impoundment 10 11 order. Well, okay. Let's take --12 THE COURT: This is Mehrnaz Boroumand Smith again. MS. SMITH: 13 No, no. I'm not ready to hear from you. THE COURT: 14 Sorry, your Honor. MS. SMITH: 15 I'm not ready to hear from you. 16 THE COURT: So I want to address the discovery question later, 17 second. 18 I want to do impoundment first. 19 As far as impoundment is concerned, my inclination is 20 to order that the TIG do what it says it needs to do in its 21 certification order that I previously cited with respect to its 22 functions. 23 And I haven't seen any objection that -- that 24

proposes a forensically sound way of doing what the Court has

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ordered as an alternative.

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Having no alternative, that would be the order of the court.

Then I'd go on, and I would be happy to talk about the question of whether or not there will be an extra copy; whether or not they're going to be allowed to have discovery of that extra copy, et cetera.

And my inclination on that is: Not just now; but we'd talk about that.

So does anyone else want to be heard on the impoundment; not on the discovery question? Anything further?

MR. KELLAR: Your Honor, this is Stewart Kellar again.

With regard to impoundment, both parties have had difficulty figuring out how to best articulate the finding of information related to those devices. Even with the neutral, it's been a difficult -- difficult to find out a protocol of information related to the devices. So I'd like to try to reach some sort of agreement on how we can determine what "information related to" means.

THE COURT: Well, let's do this a step at a time.

Number one, I'm going to order that TIG perform the tasks identified in its certification of -- they're different dates, right? February 27th, 2011.

Now, in terms of -- you know, they have the Judge's

order. They can -- they can come up with their own proposal, but I have no problem with you all trying to meet and confer and decide what is -- how one understands what exactly is information related to the circumvention devices. I don't have any problem with that.

My guess is that the best person that's in the best position to actually figure out what is a forensically sound way of dealing with that question is the neutral; but I have no problem with you also trying to reach an agreement. And if you reach an agreement, and all submit it to me as an order, I'll sign it. So why don't I order you to meet and confer on that question?

MR. KELLAR: Will do.

- THE COURT: Okay?

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Now, on the question of discovery, you know, you're going to get -- you're going to have a lot of discovery on -- we're talking about jurisdictional discovery. I -- I'm not convinced that you aren't going to have sufficient jurisdictional discovery without having to delve into these particular devices, so I'm -- you're -- you're -- you need to convince me. And I'm not convinced by your letter, that -- that there's something particular on there that you need to search for or have someone else search for like a neutral.

And because you're doing a bunch of jurisdictional discovery, I mean, you're going all over the place and

subpoenaing people, and, you know, from what I can tell, causing quite a hullabaloo in the blogosphere; but it's -- my question for you is: Well, what, in particular is on these devices that you think you need, in addition to all of this other stuff you're getting?

And the other question is: Why now?

So, for example, you could proceed with your jurisdictional discovery. If it turns out that, from this — this jurisdictional discovery, there is — you learn things that suggest, yes, we've got to get particular things off this drive or drives, and then come back to me.

MS. SMITH: So, your Honor, the reason for why we're seeking information off of these particular drives are twofold.

First, there's some information that may only be stored or contained on these devices.

For instance, if Mr. Hotz used this device to connect to the PlayStation network, the only place that we're going to know that from is by doing an assessment or an inspection of the device. We're not going to be able to get that from a third party or --

THE COURT: What's that got to do with jurisdiction?

MS. SMITH: So if he -- if he accessed the PlayStation network, he would have had to have had clicked through the PSN agreement, which has a jurisdictional provision in it.

1 THE COURT: Well, so, isn't -- won't there be other evidence of -- of how this person accessed your server, if at 2 all? 3 There may be, but the most direct MS. SMITH: 4 5 evidence would be from his computer. 6 MR. KELLAR: Your Honor, this is Stewart Kellar. 7 MS. SMITH: Also, can I put in one other item, which is: A lot of times people put in fake names to access the 8 PlayStation Network. So this -- being able to show that this 9 computer in one way, shape, or form accessed the -- the network 10 would show that Mr. Hotz did. And we wouldn't have to go 1.1 through the issues that come up with a fake names that people 12 13 put in. THE COURT: So, but that -- that -- so what you're 14 15 seeking, actually, is just any record in this computer of the computer being attached to a particular IP address? 16 17 That's right. We're just trying MS. SMITH: Sure. 1.8 to establish that that computer somehow hooked up to the PSN; 19 the PlayStation Network. 20 Additionally, we're looking for information, such as any of the Sony Developer Kit tools that might be contained on 21 that computer. That information would only be distributed by 22

THE COURT: Or between Mr. Hotz and somebody who had

Sony Computer Entertainment America, and would establish

contacts between SCEA and Mr. Hotz.

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them, and gave them to him? 1 MS. SMITH: That's correct; but at the end of the 2 day, he would have something belonging to SCEA that he should 3 have licensed. 4 THE COURT: Well, but you already say he's got 5 something belonging to you. This is not on the merits, right? 6 7 This is about general and specific jurisdiction. MS. SMITH: Right. And one of his contentions is 8 that he's not aware of Sony Computer Entertainment America 9 being in California. And we believe that the SDK -- the 10 developer's kit -- would contain information showing him that 11 12 SCEA is in California. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kellar, both of those things 13 seem relevant. 14 MR. KELLAR: Your Honor, this is Stewart Kellar 15 16 again. With regard to inspecting the computers to find 17 things that might be relevant to jurisdiction, that isn't 18 enough. And, in fact, Mr. Hotz has already responded to 19 interrogatories stating affirmatively and outright that he has 20 never accessed the PlayStation Network. 21 THE COURT: Well, but I understand; but that's not 22 enough. That's not the question. You know, the question is 23 not whether he says so. The question is whether it's true. 24

And just because someone --

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MR. KELLAR: With regard to accessing the PlayStation Network, the PlayStation Network is, in fact, accessed through PlayStation 3 system -- the console; the game console -- and not external hard drives, which again shows that there is -- would be a reason to access the impounded hard drives, for purposes of finding out if they connected to the PlayStation Network.

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THE COURT: Well, that's a technical matter I don't know about. And counsel can respond to that, but my -- but what about the second: Evidence to show that he knew that Sony Computers Entertainment America was in California?

MR. KELLAR: Ah. Your Honor, with regard to that, evidence to show that there are documents that say that Sony Computer Entertainment America is located in California does not evidence Mr. Hotz' knowledge that Sony is located in California.

THE COURT: Well, that's an argument looking for a little bit of a logical leap. I mean, I've got to tell you, it is. I'm sorry. It would be admissible in evidence to show if he, in fact, had a document on his computer showing that — where the company was, he would be able to — strong inference that since it's on his computer, he must have put it on there at some time. And the — and it a reasonable inference that he looks at documents that go on his computer. And so a jury would be permitted to reach that conclusion, or a judge. It

may be right and it may be wrong. He may never have read them. He may have downloaded a huge amount at the same time, et cetera, et cetera. He can refute that, but it's certainly one inference that's not unreasonable. So that doesn't -- that doesn't persuade me at all.

As to the first issue, for the plaintiff's side, what about this point that you don't connect; that you can't connect -- I guess, is Mr. Kellar's point of view -- that you can't connect a normal computer hard drive to the PlayStation network?

MS. SMITH: My understanding, your Honor, is that you can do that.

THE COURT: Excellent. And where do you get that understanding?

MS. SMITH: I was told by Sony.

THE COURT: Oh.

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MS. SMITH: I can go back and confirm, as well.

THE COURT: Well, Sony ought to know.

Well, here's my feeling on this. Both of those issues seem to me to be relevant to jurisdiction. I don't think that these things are immune from discovery, just because they're in -- in the possession of a neutral.

I do think that there's a risk that conducting discovery things on -- discovery searches on them will cause an injury to evidence in the case, or to the drives that belong to

the defendant. And I want to avoid all of those things. So what I will authorize for now is one thing. I'll authorize an order, a second.

The authority is that the TIG shall make an additional copy of both the encrypted and unencrypted versions of the drive, and keep them in their possession.

And I'll order the parties to meet and confer and come up with a proposed order authorizing TIG to search, consistent with its forensic procedures, for documents showing, one, whether the drive was connected to PSN; and, second, for any -- what are the name? The developer -- what?

MS. SMITH: SDK -- the Sony Developers Kits.

THE COURT: Sony Developers Kits?

MS. SMITH: Sorry. Software Development Kits.

THE COURT: Software Development Kits, for

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MS. SMITH: Correct.

THE COURT: So you meet and confer on that, and come up with a proposed order, because I'm going to authorize discovery of those things from the devices — copies of the devices; but I don't want to do it — but I want you all to come up with the exact language on how that's going to be done, but I just want you to know that that discovery will be authorized.

So I think that covers all of the issues, unless I

missed some. Have I missed any?

MS. SMITH: So there's one other issue, your Honor, with regard to the impoundment, and making sure that the encrypted computers or devices are decrypted. That's going to require that Mr. Hotz provide his decryption keys, or type them in for TIG. And I wanted to make sure that that was included, because he was refusing to do that, if any images were to be made.

THE COURT: Okay. And I guess -- I guess Mr. Keller, as consistent with my other rulings, I'd have to order that, right?

MR. KELLAR: This is Stewart Kellar.

With regard to that, Mr. Hotz has not stated outright that he will -- he will never enter the passwords.

And if, consistent with your rulings, you are saying the drives have to be made accessible, then you're correct.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, so, ask him to do it voluntarily. If he won't, I'll enter an order to that effect.

Now, so here's what I want to do. I've issued a bunch of orders on the record here. I'd like a proposed form of order reflecting all of those orders to be prepared by counsel for plaintiff, and agreed to as to form by counsel for defendant. And I guess we need to do that with some rapidity.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, we'll do that.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GILLILAND: We'll get a copy of the a transcript, 1 so that everyone's clear about what we have to say. 2 THE COURT: Okay. So that is going to be a rushed 3 transcript. That will make my court reporter really happy. 4 She's shaking her head. You're missing all of the 5 important -- see? You miss all of the nuances when you're on 6 7 the phone. MR. GILLILAND: Yeah. 8 THE COURT: All right. Well, so what I'd like you to 9 do is agree on a form of order, and submit it to me no later 10 than the close of business, Monday. So that will mean you'll 11 have to get to it and get going. Start drafting it even before 12 13 you get the transcript. When you get the transcript, you can check it. Okay? 14 MR. GILLILAND: Thank you very much, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 THE CLERK: Counsel, if you'll stay. 17 THE COURT: Everybody stay on the phone. 1.8 Stay on the phone. I'll give you Lydia's 19 THE CLERK: Otherwise, court stands in recess. 20 phone number. THE COURT: Yeah. Stay on the phone. 21 (At 11:44 a.m. the proceedings were adjourned) 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, LYDIA ZINN, Official Reporter for the United States Court, Northern District of California, hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings in C. 11-0167 SI (JCS), Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC v. George Hotz, et al., were reported by me, a certified shorthand reporter, and were thereafter transcribed under my direction into typewriting; that the foregoing is a full, complete and true record of said proceedings as bound by me at the time of filing.

The validity of the reporter's certification of said transcript may be void upon disassembly and/or removal from the court file.

/s/ Lydia Zinn, CSR 9223, RPR
Thursday, March 10, 2011