EXHIBIT A

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13	NORTHERN DISTRI	EDI
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15	ANTHONY PETRU and MARCUS MATHIS, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,	SI1-03892 CLASS ACTION
16	Plaintiffs,	COMPLAINT
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19	APPLE INC.; HACHETTE BOOK GROUP, INC.; HARPERCOLLINS PUBLISHERS, INC.;	JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
20	MACMILLAN PUBLISHERS, INC; PENGUIN GROUP (USA) INC.; and SIMON &	
21	SCHUSTER, INC.,	
22	Defendants.	
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Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, based on their individual experiences, the investigation of counsel, and information and belief allege as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

 In November 2007, Amazon revolutionized the book publishing industry by releasing the Kindle, a handheld digital reader for electronic books or "eBooks." Using proprietary "electronic ink" technology, the Kindle replicated the appearance of ink on paper and introduced numerous efficiency-enhancing characteristics, including portability and other advantages of a digital format. A major economic advantage to eBook technology is its potential to massively reduce distribution costs historically associated with brick-and-mortar publishing. But publishers quickly realized that if market forces were allowed to prevail too quickly, these efficiency enhancing characteristics would rapidly lead to lower consumer prices, improved consumer welfare, and threaten the current business model and available surplus (profit margins). So, faced with disruptive eBook technology that threatened their inefficient and antiquated business model, several major book publishers, working with Apple Inc. ("Apple"), decided free market competition should not be allowed to work – together they coordinated their activities to fight back in an effort to restrain trade and retard innovation. The largest book publishers and Apple were successful.

The original Kindle sold out in less than six hours. To gain market share, take
 advantage of its first-mover advantage, and capitalize on the tremendous efficiencies associated with
 eBooks, Amazon set eBook pricing levels significantly below prices for physical books ("paper
 books" or "hardcover books"). Amazon set the prices of many of the popular new released eBook
 titles at \$9.99. Amazon instituted this pro-consumer, discounted pricing even though on many titles
 publishers charged Amazon a wholesale price at or above \$9.99.

3. Even though publishers were reaping the benefits of Amazon's successful efforts to
 vastly expand the consumer base and increase volume of units sold via Amazon's investment in
 eBook sales, publishers also feared Amazon's \$9.99 pricing. Amazon's discount pricing threatened
 to disrupt the publishers' long-established brick-and-mortar model faster than the publishers were
 willing to accept. Being hidebound and lacking innovation for decades, the publishers were
 particularly concerned that Amazon's pro-consumer pricing of eBooks would negatively impact their CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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moribund sales model, and in particular the sale of higher priced physical copies of books. And, longer term, publishers anticipated Amazon would eventually use its market power to reduce the publishers' share of the available surplus (profit margins) from each eBook sale.

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4. Given Amazon's first-mover advantage and ever growing installed user base, publishers knew that no single publisher could slow down Amazon and unilaterally force an increase in eBook retail prices. If one publisher acted alone to try and raise prices for its titles, that publisher would risk immediately losing a substantial (and growing) volume of sales. Not wanting to risk a significant loss of sales in the fastest growing market (eBook sales), the publishers named as defendants ("Publisher Defendants") solved this problem through coordinating between themselves (and Apple) to force Amazon to abandon its pro-consumer pricing. The Publisher Defendants worked together to force the eBook sales model to be entirely restructured. The purpose and effect of this restructuring was to halt the discounting of eBook prices and uniformly raise prices on all first release fiction and nonfiction published by these Publisher Defendants. Under the Publisher Defendants' new pricing model, known as the "Agency model", the Publisher Defendants have restrained trade by coordinating their pricing to directly set retail prices higher than had existed in the previously competitive market.

5. The Publisher Defendants' unlawful combination and pricing agreement would not have succeeded without the active participation of Apple. Apple facilitated changing the eBook pricing model and conspired with the Publisher Defendants to do so.

20 6. Apple had strong incentives to help the Publisher Defendants to restrain trade and 21 increase the price of eBooks. If Amazon continued to solidify its dominant position in the sale of 22 eBooks, strong network effects would make it difficult to dislodge Amazon. Moreover, Amazon's 23 pro-consumer pricing meant that to enter the eBooks market Apple would likely be forced to sell at 24 least some eBooks near or below its wholesale costs for an extended period of time. Apple did not 25 want to enter the eBooks market subject to this margin pressure caused by Amazon's pricing. But at 26 the same time, Apple believed that it had to enter the eBook market because the Kindle was (and is) 27 a competitive threat to Apple's business model. Apple is competing to be - and has become - a 28 dominant manufacturer of mobile devices, such as Apple's iPod, iPhone and iPad devices. These - 2 -CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

devices are designed to distribute, store, and access digital media through Apple's iOS platform, including Apple's App Store and iTunes Store.

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7. Apple knew that if Amazon could establish the Kindle as the dominant eBook reader by subsidizing the purchase of eBooks, Amazon could then use the Kindle platform (and its large installed user base) to distribute other digital media. Notably, Apple had successfully used a virtually identical strategy to gain a virtual monopoly on the distribution of digital music files through its iPod device and its associated iTunes store.

8. The Publisher Defendants and Apple implemented this unlawful agreement and combination on or before January 2010, when five of the six major book publishers of fiction and nonfiction works almost simultaneously announced that they were switching from a wholesale pricing model to an Agency model for eBook sales. This was an unprecedented industry shift in pricing (and sales model) in the book industry in the United States. The announcements to shift to the Agency model coincided with the release by Apple of the iPad tablet computer. In fact, when Apple announced the launch of the iPad on January 27, 2010, the Publisher Defendants agreed to allow Apple to use their trademarks in connection therewith.

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9. The same day Apple announced launching the iPad, it was also announced that Apple already struck deals with Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillian, Penguin, and Simon & Schuster to switch to the Agency model for Apple's iBookstore – the application on Apple's iPad that functions as an eBook reader (thus competing directly with the Amazon Kindle).

10. As part of the unlawful agreements, and seeking to leverage its installed user base and dominant position via the Apple iOS platform, Apple and the Publisher Defendants agreed that prices for Publisher Defendants' eBooks that were offered through the iBookstore would be calculated by a formula tied to physical books. This eBook formula would cause current prices for eBooks to increase and, at the same time, would guarantee Apple that the Publisher Defendants would not sell eBooks at lower prices elsewhere, such as through other eBook distributors, including Amazon. The intended effect of this agreement was to force Amazon to abandon its discount pricing of eBooks and allow the Publisher Defendants to establish uniformly higher prices for new release eBooks.

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11. The conspiracy and agreements worked as intended: (1) the Defendants increased and stabilized eBook pricing; and (2) forced Amazon to stop the discounting eBook prices on Publisher Defendants' titles.

12. As a direct result of this anticompetitive conduct as intended by the conspiracy, the price of eBooks has soared. The price of new bestselling eBooks increased to an average of \$12-\$15 – an increase of 33 to 50 percent. The price of an eBook in many cases now approaches – or even exceeds – the price of the same book in paper even though there are almost no incremental costs to produce each additional eBook unit. The price of the Publisher Defendants' eBooks sold on the iBookstore, facing no pricing competition from Amazon or other e-distributors for the exact same eBook titles, has remained at supra-competitive levels.

13. Plaintiffs bring claims under federal and state antitrust laws to enjoin the illegal conduct and to obtain damages.

II. PARTIES

14. Plaintiff Anthony Petru is a resident of Oakland, California. Plaintiff Petru purchased at least one eBook at a price above \$9.99 from a Publisher Defendant for use on his Amazon Kindle.

15. Plaintiff Marcus Mathis is a resident of Natchez, Mississippi. Since May 2010,
Plaintiff Mathis has purchased several eBooks from Publisher Defendants at a price above \$9.99 for use on his Sony Reader.

16. Plaintiffs paid higher prices for their eBooks as a direct and foreseeable result of the unlawful conduct set forth below.

17. Defendant Apple is a California corporation having its principal place of business at 1 Infinite Loop, Cupertino, CA 95014. Apple is a leading manufacturer of mobile devices designed to distribute, store, and display digital media. Examples of such devices include the Apple iPad device, a tablet computer which supports several eReader applications, including the Kindle App, and Apple's proprietary app, iBookstore.

18. Defendant Hachette Book Group, Inc. ("Hachette") is a leading U.S. trade publisher with its principal place of business at 237 Park Ave., New York, NY 10017. Its imprints include

Little, Brown & Co. and Grand Central Publishing. On information and belief, Hachette is owned by Hachette Livre, a French company.

19. Defendant HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. ("HarperCollins") is a leading U.S. trade
publisher with its principal place of business at 10 East 53rd St., New York, NY 10022. Its imprints
include Ecco, Harper, Harper Perennial and William Morrow. On information and belief,
HarperCollins is a subsidiary of News Corporation.

20. Defendant Macmillan Publishers, Inc. ("Macmillan") is a group of leading publishing companies with its principal place of business at 175 Fifth Ave., New York, NY 10010. Its U.S. publishers include Farrar Straus and Giroux, Henry Holt & Company, Picador, and St. Martin's Press. On information and belief, Macmillan is held by Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck, which is based in Stuttgart, Germany.

21. Defendant Penguin Group (USA) Inc. ("Penguin") is the U.S. affiliate of Penguin
Group, one of the largest English-language trade book publishers in the world. Penguin's principal
place of business is at 375 Hudson St., New York, NY 10014. Its imprints include Viking,
Riverhead Books, Dutton and Penguin Books.

22. Defendant Simon & Schuster, Inc. ("Simon & Schuster") is a leading U.S. trade publisher with its principal place of business at 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10019. Its imprints include Simon & Schuster, Scribner, Atria and Gallery Books. On information and belief, Simon & Schuster is part of CBS Corporation.

23. Defendants Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin and Simon & Schuster (collectively the "Publisher Defendants" or "Agency 5") comprise five of the country's six largest publishers.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

24. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 4 and 15; and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337, in that this action arises under the federal antitrust laws. The Court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction of the pendant state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court also has diversity jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1332(d) because the amount in controversy for the Class exceeds \$5,000,000, and there are members of the Class who are citizens of a different state than the Defendants.

25. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c) and Sections 4 and 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 22, because Defendants reside, transact business or are found within this District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims arose in this District.

26. Intradistrict Assignment: Assignment to the San Francisco or Oakland division of this Court is proper because a substantial portion of the events giving rise to the claims occurred therein.

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IV. MARKET POWER OVER EBOOK SALES

27. An eBook is an e-text that forms the digital media equivalent of a conventional print book, sometimes restricted with a digital rights management (DRM) system. eBooks represent a distinct antitrust market. The geographic market is the entire United States. No reasonable substitute exists for eBooks. Consumers who purchase eBooks value their flexibility and portability. Consumers of eBooks can carry thousands of publications with them on a single device and have the ability to immediately purchase books rather than having to go to a bookstore. In addition to saving time by not having to go to a bookstore, eBook readers need not pay shipping costs associated with online purchases of physical books. Moreover, eBooks have a highly unique distribution methodology and unique pricing. The industry also views eBooks as a separate economic segment of the more general book market.


28. A hypothetical monopolist that controlled the supply of eBooks would have the ability to raise the price of eBooks substantially for a significant period of time without consumers substituting another product.


29. In addition, the Publisher Defendants and Apple have exerted market power over eBook sales, as directly demonstrated by the anticompetitive effects of their conduct. Here, Defendants exercised market power as evidenced by their ability to raise prices above the competitive level – by increasing prices by at least *thirty* to *fifty* percent above similar books published under the wholesale model as demonstrated below:

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V. STRUCTURE OF THE INDUSTRY

30. eBooks are usually read on dedicated hardware devices known as eReaders. Personal computers, tablets and some cell phones can also be used to read eBooks. eBooks are sold directly through eReaders, as well as through the web.

31. Sony launched the first commercially successful eReader, the Sony Reader, in 2006. The following year, Amazon released the Kindle. The Kindle utilized "electronic ink" technology to replicate the look of a paper book while providing the portability associated with digital files. Amazon's Kindle quickly became the market leader by offering a much broader selections of books than Sony and offering them at a standard pro-consumer price of \$9.99.

32. Amazon instituted its discounted pricing model even though in many instances the wholesale price it paid equaled or even exceeded \$9.99. Amazon was willing to establish this price level in part to grow market share. Amazon also knew that with sufficient buying power and efficiencies it could eventually reduce the surplus publishers were paid for eBooks, thereby increasing Amazon's margins.

33. Amazon's disruptive technology forced traditional booksellers to respond by
introducing competing technology and pricing. In 2009, Barnes & Noble released its own eReader –
the Nook – and tried to match Amazon's pro-consumer pricing. Following Barnes & Noble's
announcement, Sony similarly announced that it would adopt the \$9.99 pricing for its Sony Reader.
Nevertheless, Amazon's eBook prices were almost always lower than that of its competitors such as
Sony and Barnes & Noble. A study by the Inkmesh eBook search engine reported that Amazon had
the lowest prices nearly 75 percent of the time.

34. Although Amazon's \$9.99 pricing policy was near or even sometimes below the price
Amazon paid to book publishers for certain mass market eBook content, its aggressive eBook pricing
practices succeeded in fueling Kindle sales and increasing Amazon's share of the eReader market.
According to Credit Suisse, as of February 2010 Amazon's Kindle eBooks occupied 90 percent of
the market for eBooks.¹

¹ Google Writes New Chapter in E-Book Saga, The eMarketer Blog, http://www.emarketer. com/blog/index.php/google-writes-chapter-ebook-saga/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2011).

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1 35. At least in part as a result of Amazon's pro-consumer practices, consumers rapidly 2 starting adopting new book reading habits, making eBooks hugely popular. The Association of 3 American Publishers reports that eBooks are the fastest-growing segment of the book publishing 4 industry. In July 2010, Amazon reported sales of eBooks for its Kindle in the second quarter of 2010 5 outnumbered sales of hardcover books for the first time. In February 2011, the New York Times 6 added an eBook bestseller list. 7 Hardcover books, specifically the sale of front list titles, form the core sales for the 36. 8 Agency Five (who in turn sell about 75to 85 percent of the fiction market). Publishers have the 9 highest margin per unit of sale from printed hardcovers which are sold to the trade (wholesalers, 10 booksellers, etc.) at discounts of 30 to 60 percent off the list price depending on the account. 11 37. While eBook sales provided additional incremental unit sales over physical books, in 12 an unrestrained market the margin per unit of sale for eBooks is lower than physical books. 13 38. Thus, publishers had the economic incentive to do two things: (a) slow down the rate 14 of eBook adoption, and (b) protect – and even increase – the margins for eBook sales. 15 39. By slowing down the rate of adoption and increasing prices, new entrants into the 16 digital market will be less inclined to demand a \$9.99 price point made popular by Amazon. An 17 article in *Psychology Today* that refers to this as anchoring: At issue is the phenomenon of "anchoring," discovered by Amos 18 Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. When people don't know what a 19 fundamentally new product should cost, they are strongly influenced by the first price they encounter. 20 40. Further, the Publisher Defendants knew that for the minority of consumers who in 21 response to price increases for eBooks under the new Agency model elected to make a purchase from 22 the print market, it would only benefit the publishers because the print margin is frequently larger 23 than eBook margins under the Agency model. 24 VI. UNLAWFUL AGREEMENT TO RESTRAIN TRADE OR COMMERCE 25 41. The \$9.99 standard eBook price Amazon set threatened the economic models of many 26 large publishers. With decreasing retail prices for eBooks, publishers feared the rapidly increasing 27 movement by consumers away from physical book purchases – on which publishers had built their 28 - 10 -CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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businesses for centuries. They also anticipated that, as the popularity of eBooks grew, Amazon and other retailers would pressure publishers to reduce their wholesale prices for eBooks, thereby reducing their profit-per-unit. Publishers were used to having the ability to help establish predictable retail prices based on longstanding pricing behavior in the paper book industry. Under the decadesold model, the publishers and their supply chain partners would agree on a standard discount schedule in which the retailer would purchase the book for a percentage below the suggested retail price, and the publishers would control the speed of pricing decay by phasing in discounted pricing through later release of paperback books ("windowing"). This phenomenon, known as intertemporal price discrimination, allowed publishers to maximize their profits by charging more to early adopters.

42. In response to Amazon's disruptive business model, the Publisher Defendants took steps to mitigate what they perceived to be the potential future reduced profits associated with eBook sales. For example, several major publishers, including HarperCollins, held back the release (reduced output) of eBook versions of some hardcover bestsellers by windowing the release a month or more after the hardcover release. For its part, Macmillan lowered its royalty rate for eBooks by 5 percent.

43. In addition to windowing techniques, Publisher Defendants also tried to pressure Amazon to raise retail prices on eBooks; but Amazon steadfastly refused. Absent coordination, the Publisher Defendants were unable to force Amazon to raise its eBooks retail prices. Given Amazon's dominant market share for eBook sales, each publisher knew that if it tried to unilaterally insist on raising retail prices it would immediately lose eBook sales and market share to its rivals.

44. Amazon's success was also causing concern in other quarters. Specifically, Apple
had strong incentives to help the Publisher Defendants force Amazon to abandon its pro-consumer
pricing. Apple knew that devices like the Kindle are characterized by strong network effects; that is,
the value of a Kindle to an individual purchaser rises as the total number of purchasers increase.
This occurs because growth in the installed base attracts additional and superior content and drives
down prices. Because of these network effects, Apple knew that if Amazon were allowed to
continue to solidify its dominant position in the eBook market, these network effects would make it
nearly impossible to dislodge Amazon in the near-term. Apple knew the power of this strategy

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because it had used a virtually identical strategy to dominate the sale and distribution of digital music files.

45. Apple's interest in entering the eBooks market was not simply to profit from the sale of eBooks. Apple believed it was necessary to enter the eBooks market because it viewed Amazon and its Kindle platform as a long-term threat to its dominant position in the sale and marketing of mobile devices designed to distribute, store and access digital media, and Apple's iOS content distribution platform. These devices included the Apple iPhone, iPod, and iPad.

46. At the same time, Amazon's pro-consumer pricing meant that in order to enter the eBooks market, Apple would likely be forced to sell at least some eBooks near or below the input cost for an extended period of time. Indeed, to gain market share, Apple might even be forced to offer eBooks at an even lower price than Amazon offered. Apple and the Publisher Defendants thus shared a common anticompetitive interest in forcing Amazon (and the rest of the market) to raise the prices for eBooks.

47. Recognizing Apple's interest in protecting and expanding its dominant position in the sale and marketing of mobile devices designed to distribute, store and access digital media, Amazon had already taken steps to compete with Apple. After numerous commentators observed that Apple's popular App Store offered 70 percent of royalties to software application publishers, Amazon began a program that offered 70 percent royalties to Kindle publishers who agreed to certain conditions. In order to be eligible, authors were required to list their books for between \$2.99 and \$9.99 on the Kindle, and the price had to be at least 20 percent below the lowest list price for the print edition.

48. In January 2010, Apple and the Publisher Defendants agreed to a plan that would allow Apple to erode Amazon's market position and benefit Apple and the Agency 5 by raising prices on first release eBooks.

49. On January 23, 2010, industry newsletter *Publishers Lunch* reported that Apple had negotiated agreements with Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin and Simon & Schuster to switch from a wholesaler-retailer model to an "Agency model" for eBook sales.

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50. Four days later, on January 27, 2010, Apple announced a multi-function tablet device called the iPad. One of the functions of the iPad was the ability to read eBooks. This put Apple into direct competition with Amazon, who at the time of the iPad's release, had an overwhelming share of the markets for eBooks and eReaders.

5 51. When Apple announced the iPad's debut in January 2010, its CEO Steve Jobs 6 indicated that Apple had agreements in place with five of the six largest publishing houses – 7 Hachette Book Group, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin, and Simon & Schuster – to provide eBook content for the new device.² Those agreements were based on a so called "Agency model" 8 9 which gives publishers the ability to set eBook prices and makes Apple a distribution agent for sales to consumers.³ Apple receives a thirty-percent commission from each eBook sale through Apple's 10 11 online bookstore, with the remaining seventy percent going to publishers (who in turn then compensate the authors pursuant to whatever arrangement exists between the publisher and author).⁴ 12 13 The publishers' authority to price under their agreements with Apple, however, is restrained as the 14 contracts contain a formula that ties eBook prices to the list prices of comparable print editions. This 15 common formula agreed to by the Publisher Defendants and Apple operates to increase, standardize, 16 and stabilize most first-release general fiction and nonfiction titles. The effect of this term will 17 increase and stabilize eBook prices to a range of \$12.99 to \$14.99 for most general fiction and nonfiction titles.⁵ Apple and the Publisher Defendants also agreed that the Publisher Defendants 18 19 would not set prices of eBooks offered through other distribution channels (e.g., Amazon's Kindle store) below the prices the Publisher Defendants sold through the iBookstore (the "MFN Clause").⁶ 20

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- ² Motoko Rich, *Books on iPad Offer Publishers a Pricing Edge*, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 2010, at B6.
- ³ Motoko Rich, *Apple's Prices for E-Books May Be Lower Than Expected*, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 2010, at Bl0.
- ⁴ *Id.*; Motoko Rich & Brad Stone, *Publisher Wins Fight on E-Books*, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 2010, at Bl.
- ⁵ Rich, *supra* note 3; *see also* Jeffrey Trachtenberg & Geoffrey A. Fowler, *E-Books Pricing Put Into Turmoil*, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 2010, at A.

⁶ Rich, *supra* note 3. The agreement also reportedly contains language allowing Apple to obligate publishers to discount eBook prices on bestsellers below the \$12.99 to \$14.99 range in order to compete with brick-and-mortar bookstores and competing online sites. *Id.*

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52. The effect of the MFN Clause, combined with the pricing formula tied to physical book prices, was to increase prices and reduce competition for the eBooks of the Publisher Defendants, specifically for the price of most newly released adult fiction and nonfiction eBooks; this resulted in increasing and stabilizing eBook prices and eliminated competitive pricing. Apple coordinated these agreements with the Agency 5. On information and belief, in the course of entering into agreements with Apple, Apple and the Agency 5 communicated the terms of the agreements and pricing information with each other, including signaling to each other that they would agree to the MFN Clause and price formula that would increase and standardize pricing to a range between \$12.99 to \$14.99.

53. It was well understood and intended by the Publishing Defendants and Apple that their agreements would raise prices for consumers of eBooks. For example, on February 2, 2010, Rupert Murdoch, News Corp. CEO, indicated he was unhappy with Amazon's prices and that the agreement with Apple would help to achieve "higher prices."

54. In contrast to the Agency model, under the wholesale distribution model that traditionally has governed their relationships with brick-and-mortar bookstores and other online sellers like Amazon, publishers essentially "sold" their products to retailers for a fixed (wholesale) price – typically half the list price of the print edition – and surrendered control over the final price ultimately charged to consumers.⁷ In order to spur demand for eBooks (as well as for its own eReader, the Kindle), Amazon set \$9.99 as the standard price for most new releases, even though at times Amazon purchased the content near or above \$9.99.⁸ Notwithstanding Amazon's pricing has driven rapid adoption of eBook sales, publishers have disapproved of Amazon's discount model,

- ⁷ Donald Marron, *How Should We Price E-books*, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 23, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Donald-Marron/2010/0805/How-should-we-price-e-books; Paul Biba, *Why Smashwords Moved to "Agency Pricing" – Explained by Mark Coker*, http://teleread.com/paul-biba/why-smashwords-moved-to-agency-pricing-explained-by-markcoker/, Dec. 2, 2010 (reviewing traditional wholesale model for pricing and distributing books and chronology of shift to agency arrangements).
 - ⁸ Rich & Stone, *supra* note 4; Erica Naone, *iPad Rattles the e-Bookshelves*, Tech. Rev., Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/24443/?a=f ("Under its existing model, Amazon buys books from publishers for a set fee in bulk [and] reportedly often pays publishers more than \$9.99 for some books, selling them at a discount in order to drive adoption of the Kindle").

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fearing it would lead to lower sales of hardcover books and, in the long term, it would condition consumers to expect lower price points for all books.⁹

55. Once the Publisher Defendants and Apple agreed to the radical switch to the Agency model, the Publisher Defendants approached Amazon to require it to switch to a similar structure.
The showdown between Amazon and Macmillan in particular was widely chronicled in the press.

56. Macmillan reportedly proposed that Amazon agree to sell Kindle editions of
Macmillan's books as an agent, on the same 70/30 terms contained in the Publisher Defendants'
agreement with Apple.¹⁰ Alternatively, Macmillan offered to permit Amazon to keep purchasing
eBooks under the existing wholesale model, but warned that it would begin delaying release of those
eBook editions (reducing output) until seven months after publication of the hardcover edition.¹¹
The latter offer would have crippled Amazon's competitive position against Apple.

57. MacMillan was able to threaten Amazon with this ultimatum even though Amazon at the time possessed ninety-percent of the market share for eBook sales, because, on information and belief, Macmillan knew each of the other Publishing Defendants had reached similar agreements with Apple. Like Macmillan, the other Publisher Defendants and Apple had agreed to a pricing formulae and MFN clauses, assuring themselves that Amazon would be closed out of the market for the Publisher Defendants' eBook titles unless Amazon agreed to allow the Publisher Defendants to raise prices.

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- ⁹ See, e.g., Jack Shafer, *Does the Book Industry Want to Get Napstered?*, Slate, July 15, 2009, http://www.slate.com/of/2222941/; Stone & Rich, *supra* note 1 (explaining that the attraction of the agency model to publishers is driven by their "fear that Amazon has accustomed buyers to unreasonably low prices' and their conviction that "if Kindle were to maintain its dominant position [in eBook sales], it could force publishers to lower their wholesale prices").
- ¹⁰ Brad Stone & Motoko Rich, *Amazon Removes Macmillan Books*, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 2010, at B4. *See also* Letter from John Sargent to All Macmillan authors/illustrators and the literary agent community (Jan. 30, 2010) (Sargent Letter), available at

26 http://www.publishersmarketplace.com/lunch/macmillan_30jan10.html.

¹¹ See Stone & Rich, supra note 10 (quoting Sargent as saying "I told [Amazon] that they could stay with their old terms of sale, but that this would involve extensive and deep windowing of titles"); Sargent Letter, supra note 10.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

58. Amazon made an initial effort to fight by pulling all Macmillan titles off both the Kindle site and Amazon.com.¹²

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59. Amazon briefly ceased sales of Macmillan titles; however, by the end of the weekend, the books were back for sale and Amazon had bowed to Macmillan's demands.¹³ In a strongly worded message on its website, Amazon stated, "We have expressed our strong disagreement and the seriousness of our disagreement by temporarily ceasing the sale of all Macmillan titles. We want you to know that ultimately, however, we will have to capitulate and accept Macmillan's terms because Macmillan has a monopoly over their own titles, and we will want to offer them to you even at prices we believe are needlessly high for e-books." Very soon after, Amazon entered into agency agreements with each of the four other major publishers that had signed on with Apple.¹⁴

60. Hachette also forced Amazon to switch to the Agency model. On April 1, 2010, Amazon posted the following message on its website: "[Hachette] has disallowed the sale of ebooks except on agency terms effective as of 12:01 am this morning. We came to terms late last night but we cannot be operationally ready to sell their ebooks on agency terms until two days from now – April 3 – when we will also cut over for the other publishers that are switching to agency. If we can get a two day extension from Hachette to continue selling their ebooks under the prior terms, we can have the Hachette ebooks promptly back for sale today. If not, then they will be back on April 3."

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¹² Stone & Rich, *supra* note 10. Amazon did, however, permit the continued sale of Macmillan books by third parties on Amazon.com. *See* Sargent Letter, *supra* note 10.

 ¹³ See Whose Move? Amazon and Macmillan Vie for Position, L.A. Times, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/jacketcopy/2010/oz/amazon-macmillanconflict.html (quoting Amazon letter to Kindle customers indicating that "despite its strong disagreement" Amazon was giving in to Macmillan's terms because "Macmillan has a monopoly over their own titles, and we will want to offer them to you even at prices we believe are needlessly high for e-books"); Trachtenberg & Fowler, *supra* note 5. Shortly thereafter, Sony reportedly also switched over to the agency model. John Timmer, *E-book Prices to Rise as Amazon, Sony Adopt Agency Model*, Apr. 2010, http://www.arstechnica.com/gadgets/news/2010/04/e-book-prices-to-rise-asamazon-sonyadopt-agency-model.ars. Google has apparently also given in to publishers' demands and is offering them agency agreements to participate in its recently launched Google e-books store. Murad Ahmed, *E-books: Publishers Poised for Victory in Latest Battle*, The Times (London), Feb. 15, 2010; Samo & Kellogg, *Google to Take on Amazon, Apple, Barnes & Noble with New e-book Store*, L.A. Times, Dec. 6, 2010, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/12/google-amazon-apple-barnesnoble-with-new- e-book-store-kindle.html.

At that point Random House was the only one of the six major U.S. publishers to stick with the wholesale distribution model. See Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, *Random House Balks at Apple's Book Pricing*, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 2010, at B4; Marron, *supra* note 7.

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61. Penguin also forced Amazon to adopt the Agency model. On April 1, 2010, Penguin sent a letter to its agents and authors that read, in part: "In recent weeks we have been in discussion with our retail partners who sell eBooks, including Amazon, to discuss our new terms of sale for eBooks in the U.S. At the moment, we have reached an agreement with many of them, but unfortunately not Amazon – of course, we hope to in the future. Your newly released eBook is currently not available on Amazon, but all of your eBooks released prior to April 1st are still for sale on their site. . . . Our conversations with Amazon are ongoing and we do hope to continue our longterm relationship with them."

62. On information and belief, HarperCollins and Simon & Schuster similarly pressured Amazon to adopt the Agency model in the same time period.

63. As a result of the coordinated and unlawful conduct of the Defendants, Sony and Barnes & Noble have also been forced to adopt the Agency model for eBook pricing.

64. Consumers were clearly angered by the switch to the Agency model and the anticipated rise in eBook prices that it would engender. In March 2010, after the switch was announced but before it was effectuated, eBook sales increased 184 percent. Some Kindle users posting in various online communities attributed the sudden spike in eBook sales to a last ditch effort by readers to stock up on eBooks before the switch to the Agency model. One such user stated: "Myself and another kindle owner definitely bought more books before Agency model, perhaps 8 each."

65. On information and belief, the Publisher Defendants' increase in prices resulted in a short-term reduction in eBook sales revenues under the Agency model. The Publisher Defendants accepted this short-term reduction in sales and profits in exchange for the ability to raise retail prices and extra supra-competitive profits in the long term.

66. Collusion was a necessary ingredient of the Publisher Defendants' anticompetitive plan to gain direct control over eBook pricing. If they had not all conspired to force retailers like Amazon to adopt the Agency model under the same terms and at the same time, consumers would have simply reacted to rising eBook prices by choosing to purchase their eBooks from publishers or retailers who did not participate in the Agency model.

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1	67. Indeed,	this is exactly what happened in the case of Random House, the only big six
2	publisher who did not c	onspire with Apple to adopt the Agency model in early 2010. Random
3	House continued to use	the wholesale model, allowing Amazon and other eBook distributors to price
4	eBooks below the Ager	ncy 5. In 2010, Random House saw a 250 percent increase in eBook sales in
5	the United States in 20	0 and an 800 percent increase in the United Kingdom.
6	68. As a res	ult of Random House being willing to allow price competition, Apple – per its
7	agreements with the Ag	gency 5 – refused to allow Random House to sell its books through Apple's
8	iBookstore. Absent the	anticompetitive restraints agreed to by Apple and the Publisher Defendants,
9	Apple would not have a	an economic incentive to force Random House to utilize the Agency model.
10	Instead, Apple would s	eek the widest possible selection of eBooks whether or not sold directly or
11	through the Agency mo	del. In banning Random House books from its iBook store, Apple acted
12	pursuant to the conspira	acy outlined above and with the purpose and intent of forcing Random House
13	to join the cartel it had	helped to create and raise prices. Random House switched to the Agency
14	model effective March	1, 2011.
15	69. The fact	that Apple brokered the simultaneous switch to the Agency model, and the
16	Publisher Defendants a	greed to standardize higher eBook prices, is amply demonstrated by a January
17	2010 interview in whic	h Apple CEO Steve Jobs told Walt Mossberg of the Wall Street Journal that
18	Amazon's \$9.99 pricin	g for eBooks was about to end:
19	Mossber	g: Why should [a consumer] buy a book for \$14.99 on your device when she can buy one for \$9.99 from
20		Amazon or Barnes & Noble?
21	Jobs:	That won't be the case.
22	Mossber	g: You won't be \$14.99 or they won't be \$9.99?
23	Jobs:	The prices will be the same Publishers are actually withholding their books from Amazon because they're
24		not happy. (Emphasis added.)
25	70. Absent A	Apple's knowledge of and participation in the unlawful conspiracy, Steve Jobs
26	would not have been at	le to predict future eBook pricing with such startling accuracy.
27	71. The Pub	lisher Defendants and Apple could not have switched to the Agency model
28	without a coordinated e	ffort because eBooks are substitutes for each other. For example, if a - 18 -
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consumer saw that a title listed through Apple's iBookstore was \$14.99, and was also available at \$9.99 if purchased through Amazon's Kindle App, the consumer could simply just load the least expensive version of the eBook title onto his eReader device. Moreover, if one publisher's eBook title was priced at \$14.99, versus a comparative title available through Amazon at \$9.99, there is a risk that the consumer would forego the more expensive title and choose to purchase the less expensive, differently titled eBook. Thus, no single major publisher would risk such loss of sales and insist on the Agency model by itself. Thus, as a matter of economics, the Agency model works only if there is an agreement by a significant number of publishers to the new pricing model. Moreover, the shift to the Agency model occurred simultaneously and almost overnight – under any definition this shift constitutes a radical, structural change to a business model that has been in existence for decades.

72. The anticompetitive nature of this conspiracy, and the Publisher Defendants' motivation to control eBook pricing, is also revealed by the fact that certain eBooks are now priced the same as – or even higher than – the price for the same titled physical book. Yet, the printing and distribution costs of hardcover books are greater. Thus, absent anticompetitive motivation and conduct, the difference in prices between hardcover books and eBooks would be greater. However, this is often not the case as publishers are motivated to raise eBook prices to levels close to hardcover books. The Amazon model was a direct threat to accelerating the decay of hardcover book sales (and margins).

73. Jobs and Apple would not have agreed to go to the Agency model unless they knew the Publisher Defendants would not sell their eBooks through other distribution channels at lower prices. Absent such an agreement, Apple could not have competed at the higher prices for eBooks if it did not coordinate with the Publisher Defendants to ensure Apple was not the only eReader platform agreeing to the Agency model and higher, standardized prices.

25 74. Apple conspired with the Publisher Defendants to switch to the Agency model and 26 artificially inflate the price range of eBooks in order to cut into Amazon's substantial share of the 27 markets for eBooks and to prevent Amazon from emerging as a serious competitor to its mobile 28 platforms for the distribution, storage and access of digital media. - 19 -

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75. Apple's strategy for gaining market share at the expense of Amazon was successful.
According to a 2010 survey conducted by ChangeWave, between August and December 2010, the iPad's share of the U.S. eReader market rose 16 percentage points and the Kindle's fell 15 percentage points.

76. The trend of Apple's increasing market share and Amazon's declining share is predicted to continue. Of the respondents in the ChangeWave survey planning on buying an eReader in the next 90 days, 42 percent said they'd like an iPad, while only 33 percent said they'd opt for a Kindle.

77. In addition, a Credit Suisse analyst announced in February 2010 that, as a result of the switch to the agency pricing model, he expected Amazon's share of the eBooks market to fall from 90 percent to 35 percent over the next five years.

78. The Publisher Defendants have used the pricing formula contained in the agency agreements to coordinate pricing for eBooks across retailers and to restrain competition in the market. For example, the prices of the following current or former bestselling eBooks are identical at Amazon, Sony, Apple and Barnes & Noble: *Don't Blink* (Hachette, \$14.99); *The Kite Runner* (Penguin, \$12.99); *Heart of the Matter* (St. Martin's Press/Macmillan, \$9.99); and *Best Friends Forever* (Simon & Schuster, \$11.99).

79. As a result of the unlawful anticompetitive actions alleged above, the price of eBooks has soared. eBooks now often cost more than their print counterparts. For example, at Amazon.com the price of *The Kite Runner* (Penguin) costs \$12.99 in Kindle version and \$8.82 as a paperback. Other examples of this price discrepancy among current and former bestselling titles on Amazon.com include: *Don't Blink* (Hachette, \$14.99 digital and \$14.74 hardcover); *Best Friends Forever* (Simon & Schuster, \$11.99 digital and \$10.79 paperback); *Heart of the Matter* (St. Martin's Press/Macmillan, \$9.99 digital and \$8.03 paperback); and *The Art of Racing in the Rain* (HarperCollins, \$9.99 digital and \$7.99 paperback).

80. In addition, because the price of eBooks is no longer set by the retailer, promotional
discounts and customer reward programs have effectively ended as to eBook sales.

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81. By coordinating and entering into the above agreements, Apple and the Publisher Defendants have raised, stabilized, and standardized eBook prices. Absent this anticompetitive conduct, eBook prices would be lower and there would be price competition.

82. The Publisher Defendants have not required an Agency model for internet sales of physical books. One can see the effect of the conspiracy was to increase and standardize pricing for eBooks, compared to the diverse competitive pricing for internet sales of the physical book for the same title under the wholesale model.

(a) The following is a screen capture from Amazon.com displaying standardized higher prices for eBooks sold by the Publisher Defendants:

New York Times® Bestsellers Fiction, Nonfiction, and Advice & How-To

Against All Enemies

Kindle Price: \$12.99

arbara

Delinsky

Tom Clancy, Peter Telep



Smokin' Seventeen: A Stephanie Plum... > Janet Evanovich List Price: \$28.00 Kindle Price: \$12.99



Silver Girl: A Novel > Elin Hilderbrand List Price: \$26.99 Kindle Price: \$12.99



DEVI

>J. Courtney Sullivan

Kindle Price: \$12.99

List Price: \$25.95

Maine

COLONY The Devil Colony: A Sigma Force Novel > James Rollins List Price: \$27.99 Kindle Price: \$12.99




The Girl Who Kicked the Hornet's Nest Stieg Larsson, Reg Keeland List Price: \$27.95 Kindle Price: \$12.99



The Paris Wife: A Novel > Paula McLain List Price: \$25.00 Kindle Price: \$12.99




Betraval of Trust: A J. P. Beaumont... J. A. Jance List Price: \$25.99 Kindle Price: \$12.99




Folly Beach: A Lowcountry Tale Dorothea Benton Frank List Price: \$25.99 Kindle Price: \$12.99






The Greater Journey > David G. McCullough List Price: \$37.50 Kindle Price: \$19.99




> Tina Fey List Price: \$26.99 Kindle Price: \$12.99



SEAL Team Six: Memoirs of an Elite... > Howard E. Wasdin, Stephen A. Templin, Stephen Templin List Price: \$26.99 Kindle Price: \$12.99



The Miracle of Freedom: 7 Tipping... > Chris Stewart, Ted Stewart List Price: \$28.99 Kindle Price: \$9.99



Reckless Endangerment: How Outsized... Gretchen Morgenson, Joshua Rosner List Price: \$30.00 Kindle Price: \$12.99

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(b) The following chart further details the standardization of supra-competitive pricing effectuated by the conspiracy:

Genre	Title	Author	Publisher	NYT Rank
Genne	The	Addior	Fubliatien	Nalik
Nonfiction	BOSSYPANTS	Tina Fey	Hachette	4
Fiction	NOW YOU SEE HER	James Patterson and Michael Ledwidge	Hachette	5
Nonfiction	LIES THAT CHELSEA HANDLER TOLD ME	Chelsea Handler	Hachette	8
Fiction	THE BOURNE DOMINION	Eric Van Lustbader	Hachette	9
Fiction	ONE SUMMER	David Baldacci	Hachette	11
Fiction	BURNT MOUNTAIN	Anne Rivers Siddons	Hachette	12
Nonfiction	THOSE GUYS HAVE ALL THE FUN	James Andrew Miller and Tom Shales	Hachette	15
Nonfiction	AREA 51	Annie Jacobsen	Hachette	18
Fiction	SILVER GIRL	Elin Hilderbrand	Hachette	22
Fiction	10TH ANNIVERSARY	James Patterson and Maxine Paetro	Hachette	31
Nonfiction	CHELSEA CHELSEA BANG BANG	Chelsea Handler	Hachette Average Hachette	34 e Price
Fiction	PORTRAIT OF A SPY	Daniel Silva	HarperCollins	2
Fiction	STATE OF WONDER	Ann Patchett	HarperCollins	8
Nonfiction	THROUGH MY EYES	Tim Tebow	HarperCollins	10
Nonfiction	LOST IN SHANGRI-LA	Mitchell Zuckoff	HarperCollins	11
Nonfiction	DOES THE NOISE IN MY HEAD BOTHER YOU'		HarperCollins	13
Fiction	BEFORE I GO TO SLEEP	S. J. Watson	HarperCollins	16
Fiction	THE DEVIL COLONY	James Rollins	HarperCollins	23
Nonfiction	MY DAD SAYS*	Justin Halpern	HarperCollins	24
Fiction	FOLLY BEACH	Dorothea Benton Frank	HarperCollins	32
			Average HarperCollin	s Price
Nonfiction	SEAL TEAM SIX	Howard E Wasdin and Stephen Templin	Macmillan	7
Nonfiction	RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT	Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner	Macmillan	9
Nonfiction	STORIES I ONLY TELL MY FRIENDS	Rob Lowe	Macmillan	16
Fiction	QUINN	Iris Johansen	Macmillan	18
Fiction	IRON HOUSE	John Hart	Macmillan	19
Fiction	SUMMER RENTAL	Mary Kay Andrews	Macmillan	28
Nonfiction	THE BELEIVING BRAIN	Michael Shermer	Macmillan	33
			Average Macmilla	n Price
Fiction	SPLIT SECOND	Catherine Coulter	Penguin	4
Fiction	AGAINST ALL ENEMIES	Tom Clancy	Penguin	10
Fiction	DEAD RECKONING	Charlaine Harris	Penguin	21
Nonfiction	CAR GUYS VS. BEAN COUNTERS	Bob Lutz	Penguin	25
Nonfiction	THE PSYCHOPATH TEST	Jon Ronson	Penguin	26
Nonfiction	ON CHINA	Henry Kissinger	Penguin	27
Nonfiction	THE SECRET KNOWLEDGE	David Mamet	Penguin	29
Fiction	THE HELP*	Kathryn Stockett	Penguin	29
Nonfiction	MOONWALKING WITH EINSTEIN	Joshua Foer	Penguin	31
Nonfiction	IF YOU ASK ME	Betty White	Penguin	32 34
Fiction	CALEB'S CROSSING	Geraldine Brooks	Penguin Average Pengui	
Fiction	A DANCE WITH DRAGONS	George R. R. Martin	Random House	1
Nonfiction	UNBROKEN	Laura Hillenbrand	Random House	2
Nonfiction	IN THE GARDEN OF BEASTS	Erik Larson	Random House	3
Fiction	HAPPY BIRTHDAY	Danielle Steel	Random House	3
Fiction	SMOKIN' SEVENTEEN	Janet Evanovich	Random House	6
Nonfiction	INCOGNITO	David Eagleman	Random House	12
Fiction	THE GIRL WHO KICKED THE HORNET'S NEST		Random House	13
Nonfiction	DEMONIC	Ann Coulter	Random House	14
Fiction	MAINE	J. Courtney Sullivan	Random House	14
	THE PARIS WIFE			
Fiction		Paula McLain	Random House	15
Fiction	STAR WARS-CHOICES OF ONE	Timothy Zahn	Random House	17
Nonfiction	THE SOCIAL ANIMAL	David Brooks	Random House	17
Nonfiction	THE TRIPLE AGENT	Joby Warrick	Random House	19
Fiction	THE SILENT GIRL	Tess Gerritsen	Random House	20
Nonfiction	ABSOLUTE MONARCHS	John Julius Norwich	Random House	20
Nonfiction	SUPERGODS	Grant Morrison	Random House	22
Nonfiction	SEX ON THE MOON	Ben Mezrich	Random House	23
Fiction	SISTERHOOD EVERLASTING	Ann Brashares	Random House	24
Fiction		Glen Duncan	Random House	
	THE LAST WEREWOLF			25
Fiction	CONQUISTADORA	Esmeralda Santiago	Random House	27
Fiction	DREAMS OF JOY	Lisa See	Random House	30
Fiction	THE LAND OF PAINTED CAVES	Jean M. Auel	Random House	33 Brice
		<u>م</u>	Average Random Hous	e Price
Nonfiction	A STOLEN LIFE	Jaycee Dugard	Simon & Schuster	1
Nonfiction	THE GREATER JOURNEY	David McCullough	Simon & Schuster	5
Nonfiction	OF THEE I ZING	Laura Ingraham	Simon & Schuster	6
Fiction	THEN CAME YOU	Jennifer Weiner	Simon & Schuster	7
	WORLD OF WARCRAFT: THRALL			
Fiction		Christie Golden	Simon & Schuster	26
Nonfiction Nonfiction		Michelle and Jim Bob Duggar	Simon & Schuster	28
Nontiction	NOTHING DAUNTED	Dorothy Wickenden	Simon & Schuster	35 r Price
Nonnetion				
Normetion	THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS	Corey Taylor	Non-Big Six	21
Nonfiction			NUM D' O'	30
Nonfiction Nonfiction	THE MIRACLE OF FREEDOM	Chris Stewart and Ted Stewart	Non-Big Six	
Nonfiction		Chris Stewart and Ted Stewart Alice LaPlante	Non-Big Six	35
Nonfiction Nonfiction	THE MIRACLE OF FREEDOM			35

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	-	-		te internet displaying examples of poks contained in ¶ 80(a):
	OOK			PRICE RANGES
	JOOK	67 total offer	s. Range:	\$172.70. New hardcover edition.
		Low: \$14.95 + \$3.99 shipping	New	Seller: janet wolfe Seller Rating: ★★★★★★ <u>94% positive</u>
				over the past 12 months. (174 total ratings) In Stock. Ships from PA, United States.
		Median:		Domestic shipping rates and return polic
McC	DAVID ULLOUGH	\$99.99	New	Seller: Dexter's Book Cellar
	EATED	+ \$3.99 shipping		Seller Rating: ************************************
JOI	URNEY IERICANS IN PARIS			In Stock, Ships from CT, United States, Expedited shipping available, <u>International & domestic shipping rates</u> and <u>return policy</u> .
	些			First Printing. Signed boldly by the author directly to the title page. The book is fine in a fine dust jacket, which is no <u>> Read more</u>
A AN A		High:	11 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -	
		\$187.65 + \$3.99 shipping	New	Seller: Origin Seller Rating: ★★★★★ <u>99% positive</u> over the past 12 months. (250 total ratings)
				In Stock. Ships from NH, United States. International & domestic shipping rates and <u>return policy</u> .
				NEW! The Greater Journey: Americans in Paris. Pages: 558. Good service!
att data to the set	net a common Design (Net york)	Total offers:	97. Range	e: \$26.94. New hardcover edition.
CHA	RLAINE DDIC	Low:		
	NNIS.	\$12.95 + \$3.99 shipping	New	Seller: THE BOOK SHACK
A		+ 40.00 shipping		Seller Rating: ******* <u>98% positive</u> over the past 12 months. (7,262 total ratings)
DEAL				In Stock. Ships from PA, United States. <u>Domestic shipping rates</u> and <u>return policy</u> .
RE	CKONING			ITEM IS BRAND NEW. SHIPPING TIME CAN RANGE FROM 5 TO 14 DAYS. I STRIVE FOR 100% CUSTOMER SATISFACTION. IF YOU

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PRICE RANGES BOOK 1 2 Median: Seller: squirreledawaybooks New \$26.31 3 + \$3.99 shipping Seller Rating: ***** 98% positive over the past 12 months. (2,121 total ratings) 4 In Stock. Ships from MI, United States. Expedited shipping available. 5 International & domestic shipping rates and return policy. 6 Email us for a photo! -- Binding: Hard Cover --Book Condition: NEW -- Dust Jacket: NOT ISSUED -- Series: Southern Vampire My ... 7 » Read more High: 8 Seller: most_lovely_books \$39.89 New + \$3.99 shipping Seller Rating: ***** 91% positive over 9 the past 12 months. (43 total ratings) 10 In Stock. Ships from WA, United States. Expedited shipping available. Domestic shipping rates and return policy. 11 Brand New! In stock! 12 Total Offers: 44. Range: \$18.04. New hardcover edition. 13 Low: 14 Seller: cseereader New \$7.95 + \$3.99 shipping Seller Rating: ***** 97% positive over the past 12 months. (53,971 total ratings) 15 16 In Stock. Ships from GA, United States. Expedited shipping available. AN Domestic shipping rates and return policy. 17 BRAND NEW FULL SIZE RETAIL EDITION -NOT A BOOK CLUB EDITION - BOOKSTORE 18 QUALITY - EXCELLENT BUY!!! Median: 19 New Seller: indoobestsellers \$16.58 20 + \$3.99 shipping Seller Rating: ***** 87% positive over the past 12 months. (118,999 total ratings) 21 In Stock. Ships from NJ, United States. Domestic shipping rates and return policy. 22 **BRAND NEW** 23 High: New Seller: powells books \$25.99 **BEAUMONT NOVEL** + \$3.99 shipping 24 Seller Rating: ***** 97% positive over the past 12 months. (341,468 total ratings) In Stock. Ships from OR, United States. 25 Expedited shipping available. International & domestic shipping rates and return policy. 26 Legendary independent bookstore online since 1994. Reliable customer service and no-hassle return policy. 27 28 - 24 -CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

BOOK		PRICE RANGES
	Total offers: 58. Rar	ge: \$39.74. New hardcover edition.
	Low:	
	\$10.25 New	Seller: Anne Tracey
	+ \$3.99 shipping	Seller Rating: ★★★★★ <u>98% positive</u> over the past 12 months. (61 total rating:
		In Stock. Domestic shipping rates and return policy
		BRAND NEW AND IN PERFECT CONDITIO
	Median:	
JAMES PATTERSON	\$27.99 New	Seller: powells_books
NOW YOU	+ \$3.99 shipping	Seller Rating: ***** 97% positive over the past 12 months. (341,464 total ratings)
		In Stock. Ships from OR, United States. Expedited shipping available. <u>International & domestic shipping rates</u> and return policy.
DEMAILI		Legendary independent bookstore online since 1994. Reliable customer service and no-hassle return policy.
C MICHAEL LEDWIDCE	High:	
	\$49.99 New	Seller: Kwik Ship
	+ \$3.99 shipping	Seller Rating: ★★★★★ <u>99% positive</u> over the past 12 months. (473 total ratings)
		In Stock. Ships from CA, United States. Domestic shipping rates and <u>return policy</u> .
		Amazon Inventory in that this item ships direct from Amazon Warehouse with a 100% money back guarantee from Kwik Ship for any <u>» Read more</u>
	71 total offers. Rang	e: \$19.97. New hardcover edition.
SEAL	Low: \$12.35 New	Seller: cseereader
TEAM SIX	+ \$3.99 shipping	Seller Rating: ****** 97% positive over the past 12 months. (53,969 total ratings)
		In Stock. Ships from GA, United States. Expedited shipping available. <u>Domestic shipping rates</u> and <u>return policy</u> .
MEMOIRS OF		
MEMOIRS OF AN ELITE NAVY SEAL SNIPER HOWARD E, WASDIN		BRAND NEW FULL SIZE RETAIL EDITION - NOT A BOOK CLUB EDITION - BOOKSTORE QUALITY - EXCELLENT BUY!!!

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BOOK			PRICE RANGES
	\$22.04	New	Seller: AbeBooks Marketplace 2
	+ \$3.99 shipping		Seller Rating: ★★★★★★ 94% positive over the past 12 months. (1,055 total ratings)
			In Stock. Expedited shipping available. Domestic shipping rates and return polic
			This book is sold by Book Lovers USA, shipping from Woodstock, GA - Seller on AbeBooks Marketplace. Binding: HARDCOVER // The <mark>» Read more</mark>
	High: \$32.22	New	Seller: charlestonsoon
	+ \$3.99 shipping 3		Seller Rating: ******* 94% positive over the past 12 months. (9,005 total ratings)
			In Stock. Ships from SC, United States. Domestic shipping rates and return policy

84. In March 2011, European Union antitrust regulators, working closely with Britain's Office of Fair Trading, made unannounced raids on several eBook publishers in several countries. According to the Associated Press, the European Commission had "reason to believe that the companies concerned may have violated EU antitrust rules that prohibit cartels and other restrictive business practices."

85. According to industry newsletter *Publishers Lunch*, the Texas Attorney General has launched an inquiry that "appears to focus on pricing practices for eBooks and Apple's entrance into the [e-book] market in particular."

86. The Wall Street Journal reported that at least two major publishers, Hachette and HarperCollins, were under scrutiny by the Texas Attorney General.

87. Connecticut's Attorney General has also launched an inquiry. After a preliminary review, Attorney General Richard Blumenthal commented, "These agreements among publishers, Amazon and Apple appear to have already resulted in uniform prices for many of the most popular eBooks – potentially depriving consumers of competitive prices."

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1 88. Blumenthal also said, "Amazon and Apple combined will likely command the 2 greatest share of the retail eBook market, allowing their most-favored-nation clauses to effectively 3 set the floor prices for the most popular eBooks. Such agreements – especially when offered to two 4 of the largest eBook retail competitors in the United States – threaten to encourage coordinated 5 pricing and discourage discounting." 6 89. On information and belief, all of these antitrust inquiries are ongoing. 7 VII. ANTITRUST INJURY 8 90. But for Defendants' conspiracy to restrict the price range of eBooks through the 9 switch to the Agency model of eBook pricing, the price of eBooks would be substantially lower than 10 their current price. Moreover, consumers would have enjoyed additional features such as 11 promotional discounts and rewards programs traditionally offered by retailers. 12 91. As a direct result of Defendants' anticompetitive actions, competition in the market 13 for eBooks has been restrained. 14 VIII. NATIONWIDE FEDERAL DIRECT PURCHASER CLASS 92. 15 Prior to the adoption of the Agency model, Apple, Amazon, Barnes & Noble and 16 Sony acted as resellers of eBooks through their eReaders, and they set retail prices in response to 17 unrestrained market forces. John Sargent, the CEO of Macmillan, explained this "retail model" of 18 selling e-books on his corporate blog as follows: "publishers sell to retailers, who then sell to readers 19 at a price that the retailer determines." 20 93. Under the Agency model, publishers set the retail prices of eBooks consumers 21 purchase and the publishers pay Amazon, Apple, Barnes & Noble and Sony a fixed commission of 22 30 percent of the retail price. John Sargent, the CEO of Macmillan explained this Agency model as 23 follows: "publishers set the price, and retailers take a commission on the sale to readers." 24 (emphasis added). 25 94. Under the Agency model, the "agents" – e.g., Amazon or Apple – do not set or 26 modify retail pricing. Rather under the Agency model, the Publisher Defendants are deemed to 27 control the retail sales price offered to consumers. 28 - 27 -


CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1	95. Under the Agency model, consumers purchase directly from the Publisher Defendants
2	a license for limited use (i.e., reading) of the eBook content. The Publisher Defendants do not sell
3	the "eBook" to Amazon or Apple, and these platforms (Apple and Amazon) do not hold title to
4	eBook content. Moreover, a physical product is not transferred from publisher to retailer or from
5	retailer to consumer. Rather, in the context of eBook "sales" under the Agency model, the Publisher
6	Defendants are selling access to the publishers' copyrighted works directly to consumers.
7	96. Apple's user agreement for its iBookstore expressly acknowledges that consumers
8	directly purchased from publishers under the "Agency model," which it has forced on all other
9	distributors of eBooks. Specifically, Apple's user agreement states as follows:
10	Apple is acting as agent for the Publisher in providing each such iBookstore Product to you; Apple is not a party to the transaction
11	between you and the Publisher with respect to that iBookstore Product; and the Publisher of each iBookstore Product reserves the right to
12	enforce the terms of use relating to that iBookstore Product. The Publisher of each iBookstore Product is solely responsible for that
13	iBookstore Product, the content therein, any warranties to the extent that such warranties have not been disclaimed, and any claims that you
14	or any other party may have relating to that iBookstore Product or your use of that iBookstore Product. ¹⁵
15	97. Amazon likewise makes clear in its terms and conditions that the publishers are the
16	entities who are selling use of the content to consumers:
17	For the purposes of this Agreement:
18 19	"Content Provider" means the party offering Digital Content in the Kindle Store, which may be us or a third party; however, for Digital
20	Content designated as active content in the Kindle Store, "Content Provider" means the publisher of the Digital Content.
21	Use of Digital Content. Upon your download of Digital Content and
22	payment of any applicable fees (including applicable taxes), the Content Provider grants you a non-exclusive right to view, use, and display such Digital Content on unlimited number of times, sololy on
23	display such Digital Content an unlimited number of times, solely on the Kindle or a Reading Application or as otherwise permitted as part of the Service, solely on the number of Kindles or Other Devices
24	specified in the Kindle Store, and solely for your personal, non- commercial use. Unless otherwise specified, Digital Content is
25 26	licensed, not sold, to you by the Content Provider. The Content Provider may include additional terms for use within its Digital Content. Those terms will also apply, but this Agreement will govern
27 28	¹⁵ Additional iBookstore Terms and Conditions; Purchase of iBookstore Products, http:// www.apple.com/legal/itunes/us/terms.html#APPS (last visited Aug. 8, 2011). CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 28 -

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in the event of a conflict. Some Digital Content, such as Periodicals, may not be available to you through Reading Applications.¹⁶

98. When a consumer purchases an eBook for use on his or her Kindle or Kindle App, Amazon displays that the price is set by the publisher if an agency agreement is in place. The following screen captures demonstrate this and compares pricing between eBooks and physical books:





Dead Reckoning: A Sookie Stackhouse

Novel [Kindle Edition]

★★★☆☆ 🗹 (<u>687 customer reviews</u>) | 🌔 Like (486)

Kindle Price: **\$14.99** includes free wireless delivery via *Amazon Whispernet* **Sold by:** Penguin Publishing

This price was set by the publisher

• Text-to-Speech: Enabled 🗹

Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here.

For	mats	Amazon Price	New from	Used from
	Kindle Edition		\$14.99	84.
Đ	Hardcover	\$16.65	\$12.95	\$12.94
	Paperback	\$7.99	\$7.99	8 .
÷	Audio, CD, Audiobook, Unabridged	\$23.09	\$16.35	\$19.75
	Audible Audio Edition, Unabridged	\$23.95	or Free with 30-day free t	

Betrayal of Trust: A J. P. Beaumont Novel

[Kindle Edition]

Print List Price: **\$25.99**

Kindle Price: **\$12.99** includes free wireless delivery via *Amazon Whispernet* You Save: **\$13.00** (50%)

Sold by: HarperCollins Publishers

This price was set by the publisher

- Text-to-Speech: Enabled 🗹
- Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here.

Formats	Amazon Price	New from	Used from
Kindle Edition		\$12.99	
Hardcover	\$16.92	\$7.95	\$7.50
Paperback, Large Print	\$16.37	\$15.20	\$15.43
Audio, CD, Audiobook, Unabridged	\$26.39	\$24.00	\$17.55
Audible Audio Edition, Unabridged	\$23.95	or Free with / 30-day free tr	

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rint	List Price: \$27.99			
	dle Price: \$12.99 incl Amazon Wh	ispernet	vireless deli	very
	'ou Save: \$15.00 (54%	1		
1	Sold by: Hachette Bo	NG 1997 NG 1978 NG 1997		
	This price wa	as set by th	he publishe	r
Do	n't have a Kindle? <u>Get γο</u>	ur Kindle her	<u>e</u> .	
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Conserved and the second	rmats	Amazon	New from	from
For	rmats Kindle Edition	Amazon Price 		from
For +	rmats Kindle Edition Hardcover	Amazon Price \$15.30	New from \$12.99 \$9.00 \$10.19	Usec from \$7.99
For +	Kindle Edition Hardcover Paperback	Amazon Price \$15.30 \$10.19 \$13.59	New from \$12.99 \$9.00 \$10.19	from \$7.99

SEAL Team Six: Memoirs of an Elite Navy

SEAL Sniper [Kindle Edition] <u>Stephen Templin</u> (Author), <u>Howard E. Wasdin</u> (Author)

★★★★☆ [v] (142 customer reviews) | [100]

Print List Price: \$26.99

Kindle Price: **\$12.99** includes free wireless delivery via Amazon Whispernet You Save: **\$14.00** (52%)

Sold by: Macmillan

This price was set by the publisher

- Text-to-Speech: Enabled 🗹
- Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here.

For	mats	Amazon Price	New from	Used from	
	Kindle Edition		\$12.99		
Đ	Hardcover	\$15.19	\$12.35	\$13.45	
Đ	MP3 CD, Audiobook, Unabridged	\$19.77	\$18.57	\$18.00	
	Audible Audio Edition, Unabridged	\$16.95 or Free with Audible 30-day free trial			

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Share your own customer images

99. In addition, after purchasing an eBook from a publisher selling an eBook pursuant to the Agency model, the confirmation of sale shows that the publisher is the entity selling the eBook to the purchaser:

Order Summary: Details: Order #: D01-2220747-7578556 Subtotal of items: \$11.99 -----Total before tax: \$11.99 Tax Collected: \$0.00 Total for this Order: \$11.99 The following item is auto-delivered to your Kindle or other device. You can view more information about this order by clicking on the title on the Manage Your Kindle page at Amazon.com. The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century [Kindle Edition] \$11.99 Sold By: Random House Digital, Inc. 100. Because "the price" that Plaintiffs and consumers "have paid directly is the one that was unlawfully fixed," In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., No. C 04-02676, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97009, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2010), Plaintiffs and eBook consumers are direct purchasers of eBooks. 101. Because the simultaneous adoption of the Agency model represents a "conspiracy among horizontal competitors at the retail level to fix retail prices," the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) "does not prevent this garden variety price-fixing" claim." State of Ariz. v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1984). 102. Plaintiffs sue on behalf of a class of persons pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 under federal law. The Federal Class consists of all persons in the United States who purchased eBooks published by one of the Agency 5 directly from a Publisher Defendant after the adoption of the Agency model by that publisher. Excluded from the Federal Class are Defendants, their employees, co-conspirators, officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors and wholly or partly owned subsidiaries of affiliated companies. - 32 -CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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1	103. The persons in the Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all members is		
2	impracticable under the circumstances of this case. Although the precise number of such persons is		
3	unknown, the exact size of the Class is easily ascertainable, as each Class member can be identified		
4	by using Defendants' records and/or the records of its distributors or retailers. Plaintiffs are		
5	informed and believe that there are many thousands of Class members.		
6	104. There are common questions of law and fact specific to the Class that predominate		
7	over any questions affecting individual members, including:		
8	(a) Whether Defendants unlawfully contracted, combined and conspired to		
9	unreasonably restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by agreeing to switch to the		
10	Agency model of eBook pricing and by agreeing to restrict the price range of eBooks;		
11	(b) Whether Defendants' actions in entering the agency agreements alleged above		
12	violated California law;		
13	(c) Whether consumers and Class members have been damaged by Defendants'		
14	conduct;		
15	(d) Whether punitive damages are appropriate;		
16	(e) Whether Defendants should disgorge unlawful profits;		
17	(f) The amount of any damages; and		
18	(g) The nature and scope of injunctive relief necessary to restore a competitive		
19	market.		
20	105. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the Class' claims, as they arise out of the same course		
21	of conduct and the same legal theories as the rest of the Class, and Plaintiffs challenge the practices		
22	and course of conduct engaged in by Defendants with respect to the Class as a whole.		
23	106. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiffs have		
24	retained Class Counsel who are able and experienced class action litigators.		
25	107. Resolution of this action on a class-wide basis is superior to other available methods		
26	and is a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy because in the context of this litigation, no		
27	individual class member can justify the commitment of the large financial resources to vigorously		
28	prosecute a lawsuit against Defendants. Separate actions by individual class members would also CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 33 -		
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create a risk of inconsistent or varying judgments, which could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants and substantially impede or impair the ability of Class Members to pursue their claims. A class action also makes sense because Defendants have acted and refused to take steps that are, upon information and belief, generally applicable to thousands of individuals, thereby making injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole.

IX. NATIONWIDE CALIFORNIA LAW CLASS

108. Upon information and belief, the unlawful course of conduct alleged above was created, adopted, ratified and/or implemented at the corporate headquarters of Apple located in Cupertino, California and a substantial part of the anticompetitive conduct took place in California.

109. Communications between publishers were conducted utilizing Apple, a California corporation, as an intermediary.

110. One of the chief architects of the unlawful conspiracy, Steve Jobs, is a resident of California and the CEO of Apple computers.

111. Apple has acknowledged that California law applies to it nationwide with respect to the sale and purchase of eBooks. Specifically, Apple's iBookstore terms and condition provide that "[a]ll transactions on the App and Book Services are governed by California law, without giving effect to its conflict of law provisions." Apple's iBookstore terms and conditions also provide that "any claim or dispute with Apple or relating in any way to your use of the App and Book Services resides in the courts in the State of California."

112. Plaintiffs sue on behalf of a nationwide California law class of persons pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. The California Law Class consists of all persons in the United States who purchased eBooks published by one of the "Agency Five" publishers after the adoption of the Agency Model by that publisher. Excluded from the California Law Class are Defendants, their employees, co-conspirators, officers, directors, legal representatives, heirs, successors and wholly or partly owned subsidiaries of affiliated companies.

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X. INDIRECT PURCHASER CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

113. In the event Plaintiffs are not a direct purchaser and the Court determines thatCalifornia law does not apply nationwide, plaintiff brings the following class allegations.CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT- 34 -

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1	114.	Plainti	iffs also brings this action on their own behalf and as a class action pursuant to	
2	Rule 23 of the	e Federa	al Rules of Civil Procedure and/or respective state statute(s), on behalf of all	
3	members of t	members of the following classes (collectively, the "State Classes") with respect to claims under the		
4	antitrust statutes of each of the following jurisdictions: ¹⁷			
5		(a)	Arizona: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
6			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
7		(b)	California: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
8			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
9		(c)	District of Columbia : All persons who purchased an eBook published by a	
10			Publisher Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
11		(d)	<u>Florida</u> : All persons who purchase an eBook published by a Publisher	
12			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
13		(e)	Hawaii: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
14			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
15		(f)	<u>Illinois</u> : All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
16			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
17		(g)	Iowa: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
18			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
19		(h)	Kansas: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
20			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
21		(i)	Maine: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
22			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
23		(j)	Michigan: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
24			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
25		(k)	Minnesota: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher	
26			Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.	
27	¹⁷ A den	nand let	ter will be sent under Massachusetts law and an amendment adding claims	
28	under Massac	chusetts	law will be made in 30 days if necessary.	
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1	(1)	Mississippi: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
2		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
3	(m)	Montana: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
4		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
5	(n)	Nebraska: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
6		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
7	(0)	Nevada: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
8		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
9	(p)	New Hampshire: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a
10		Publisher Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
11	(q)	New Mexico: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
12		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
13	(r)	New York: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
14		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
15	(s)	North Carolina: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a
16		Publisher Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
17	(t)	North Dakota: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a
18		Publisher Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
19	(u)	Oregon: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
20		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
21	(v)	South Carolina: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a
22		Publisher Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
23	(w)	South Dakota: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a
24		Publisher Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
25	(x)	Tennessee: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
26		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
27	(y)	Utah: All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
28		Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
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1	(z) <u>Vermont</u> : All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
2	Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
3	(aa) <u>West Virginia</u> : All persons who purchased an eBook published by a
4	Publisher Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
5	(bb) <u>Wisconsin</u> : All persons who purchased an eBook published by a Publisher
6	Defendant after the Agency model pricing was adopted.
7	FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
8	VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1)
9	115. Each of the foregoing allegations is incorporated in this claim for relief.
10	116. Plaintiffs do not believe it is necessary to prove a relevant market. To the extent one
11	is required, the relevant product market is eBooks.
12	117. To the extent required the relevant geographic market is the entire United States.
13	118. Defendants by and through their officers, directors, employees, agents and other
14	representatives have entered into an unlawful agreement, combination and conspiracy in restraint of
15 16	trade. Specifically, Defendants have unlawfully agreed to artificially inflate the retail price range of
10	eBooks by switching to an Agency model in which eBook prices are determined using a common
17	formula across individual books and publishers. These unlawful agreements have unreasonably
19	restrained price competition among retailers for eBook sales.
20	119. Plaintiffs and the Class members have been injured and will continue to be injured in
20	their businesses and property by paying more for eBooks than they would have paid or would pay in
22	the future in the absence of Defendants' unlawful acts.
22	120. Plaintiffs and Class members are direct purchasers because the Publisher Defendants
24	set the retail price for eBooks, and Amazon, Apple and other eBook distributers are acting only as
25	agents.
26	121. Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to an injunction that terminates the ongoing
27	violations alleged in this Complaint.
28	
_0	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 37 -

1	SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION		
2	VIOLATION OF THE CARTWRIGHT ACT (California Business & Professions Code §§ 16720, <i>et seq</i> .)		
3	122. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully		
4 5	set forth herein. This claim is asserted by the nationwide California class and/or as a subclass if the		
6	Court rules California law does not apply nationwide.		
7	123. Since 2010 and up to the present time, Defendants conspired, and agreed and continue		
8	to combine, conspire and agree to unreasonably restrain the market for eBooks, in violation of		
o 9	California Business and Professions Code sections 16720, et seq., by signing the agency agreements		
10	as alleged above.		
10	124. As a direct consequence of the agreements, competition in the market eBooks has		
12	been restrained, suppressed and eliminated. Class members have been deprived of the benefit of a		
12	free, competitive marketplace for eBooks.		
14	THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION		
15	VIOLATIONS OF STATE ANTITRUST AND RESTRAINT OF TRADE LAWS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES		
16	125. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully		
17	set forth herein.		
18	126. For each of the states set forth below, a significant volume of intrastate commerce was		
19	impacted by Defendants' illegal conduct as alleged above. That is, purchases of eBooks occurred in		
20	each of the states at supra-competitive prices due to Defendants' illegal conduct.		
21	127. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Arizona Revised Statutes,		
22	§§ 44-1401, et seq.		
23	128. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated California Business and		
24	Professions Code, §§ 16700, et seq.		
25	129. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated District of Columbia Code		
26	Annotated §§ 28-4501, et seq.		
27	130. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated the Florida Deceptive and		
28	Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201, et seq.CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT- 38 -		
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1	131.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Hawaii Revised Statutes		
2	Annotated §§ 480-1, et seq.			
3	132.	132. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated the Illinois Antitrust Act,		
4	Illinois Compiled Statutes, §§ 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/1, et seq.			
5	133.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Iowa Code §§ 553.1, et seq.		
6	134.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Kansas Statutes Annotated,		
7	§§ 50-101, et seq.			
8	135.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated the Maine Revised Statutes, 10		
9	M.R.S. §§ 1101, et seq.			
10	136.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Michigan Compiled Laws		
11	Annotated §§ 445.773, et seq.			
12	137.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Minnesota Annotated Statutes		
13	§§ 325D.49, et seq.			
14	138.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Mississippi Code Annotated		
15	§§ 75-21-1, et seq.			
16	139.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Montana's Unfair Trade		
17	Practices and	Consumer Protection Act of 1970, Mont. Code, §§ 30-14-103, et seq.		
18	140.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Nebraska Revised Statutes		
19	§§ 59-801, et	seq.		
20	141.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Nevada Revised Statutes		
21	Annotated §§	598A.010, et seq.		
22	142.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated New Mexico Statutes		
23	Annotated §§	57-1-1, <i>et seq</i> .		
24	143.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated New Hampshire Revised		
25	Statutes §§ 35	56:1, <i>et seq</i> .		
26	144.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated New York General Business		
27	Laws §§ 340,	et seq.		
28				
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1	145.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated North Carolina General Statutes	
2	§§ 75-1, et seq.		
3	146.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated North Dakota Century Code	
4	§§ 51-08.1-01	, et seq.	
5	147.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Oregon Revised Statutes	
6	§§ 646.705, e	t seq.	
7	148.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated South Carolina's Unfair Trade	
8	Practices Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10, et seq.		
9	149.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated South Dakota Codified Laws	
10	§§ 37-1-3.1, et seq.		
11	150.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Tennessee Code Annotated	
12	§§ 47-25-101, et seq.		
13	151.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-	
14	911, et seq.		
15	152.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453,	
16	et seq.		
17	153.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1,	
18	et seq.		
19	154.	By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have violated Wisconsin Statutes §§ 133.01,	
20	et seq.		
21	155.	As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct, Class Members in	
22	each of these	states have been injured in their businesses and property in that they paid more for	
23	eBooks than t	hey would have paid absent the Defendants' unlawful conduct.	
24		FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION	
25		VIOLATION OF THE UNFAIR COMPETITION ACT (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.)	
26	156.	Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully	
27	set forth herei	n.	
28	CLASS ACTION C	omplaint - 40 -	
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157. Defendants have engaged in and are still engaged in acts of unfair competition, as defined in California Business and Professions Code sections 17200, *et seq.*, including but not limited to violation of California Business and Professions Code sections 16720, *et seq.*, as alleged above.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

158. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

159. To the detriment of Plaintiffs and members of the Class, Defendants have been and continue to be unjustly enriched as a result of the unlawful and/or wrongful conduct. Defendants have unjustly benefited through the sale of eBooks at an inflated, anticompetitive monopoly price to consumers.

160. Between the parties, it would be unjust for Defendants to retain the benefits attained by their actions. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Class seek full restitution of Defendants' enrichment, benefits and ill-gotten gains acquired as a result of the unlawful and/or wrongful conduct alleged herein.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

161. Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury of all the claims asserted in this Complaint. .

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants as follows:

A. Certification of the action as a Class Action pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil
 Procedure 23, and appointment of Plaintiffs as Class Representatives and their counsel of record as
 Class Counsel;

B. A declaration that Defendants' conduct constituted a conspiracy and that Defendants
 are liable for the conduct or damage inflicted by any other co-conspirator;

26 C. A declaration that the pricing formula contained in the agency agreements described
27 above is unlawful;

D. Restitution and/or damages to Class members for the purchase of eBooks; CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 41 -

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E. Actual damages, statutory damages, punitive or treble damages, and such other relief as provided by the statutes cited herein; F.

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Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest on such monetary relief;

Equitable relief in the form of restitution and/or disgorgement of all unlawful or G. illegal profits received by Defendants as a result of the anticompetitive conduct alleged in herein:

H. Equitable relief enjoining the Publisher Defendants from pricing eBooks using the pricing formula contained in the agency agreements;

I.

The costs of bringing this suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees; and

J. All other relief to which Plaintiffs and members of the Class may be entitled at law or in equity.

DATED: August 9, 2011

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