1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MONROE JONES, No. C-12-3062 TEH (PR) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 13 v. 14 DOCTOR VIVAS and SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY JAIL MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner and frequent litigant in this 18 Court, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 19 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent 20 to his serious medical needs because they refused to provide him 21 with pain medication for his chronic back and neck pain. 2.2

with pain medication for his chronic back and neck pain. He also seeks to proceed <u>in forma pauperis</u> (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) was enacted, and became effective, on April 26, 1996. It provides that a prisoner may not bring an IFP civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 % if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while

United States District Court For the Northern District of California incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

6 For purposes of a dismissal that may be counted under 7 § 1915(g), the phrase "fails to state a claim on which relief may be 8 granted" parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation, the word "frivolous" 10 refers to a case that is "of little weight or importance: having no 11 basis in law or fact," and the word "malicious" refers to a case 12 "filed with the `intention or desire to harm another.'" Andrews v. 13 <u>King</u>, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Only 14 cases within one of these three categories can be counted as strikes 15 for § 1915(g) purposes. Id. Dismissal of an action under 16 § 1915(g) should only occur when, "after careful evaluation of the 17 order dismissing an [earlier] action, and other relevant 18 information, the district court determines that the action was 19 dismissed because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a 20 claim." Id.

Andrews requires that the prisoner be given notice of the potential applicability of § 1915(g), by either the district court or the defendants, but also requires the prisoner to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion that § 1915(g) does not bar pauper status for him. <u>Id. Andrews</u> implicitly allows the Court to raise the § 1915(g) problem <u>sua sponte</u>, but requires the Court to notify

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the prisoner of the earlier dismissals it considers to support a
\$ 1915(g) dismissal and allow the prisoner an opportunity to be
heard on the matter before dismissing the action. Id. at 1120. A
dismissal under § 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed with
his action as a pauper under § 1915(g), but he still may pursue his
claims if he pays the full filing fee at the outset of the action.

7 A review of dismissal orders in Plaintiff's prior prisoner 8 actions reveals that Plaintiff has had at least three cases 9 dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or 10 failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In ruling 11 on the defendants' motion to dismiss in Jones v. Spaeth, C 07-0677 12 BLW (E.D. Cal. March 31, 2010), the court addressed the same claim 13 Plaintiff asserts here, that medical staff refused to provide him 14 with prescribed pain medication. The Spaeth court held that the 15 defendants had met their burden of producing documentary evidence 16 that allowed the district court to conclude that the plaintiff has 17 filed at least three prior actions that were dismissed because they 18 were "frivolous, malicious or fail[ed] to state a claim." Spaeth, 19 C 07-0677 BLW at 4. The Spaeth court based its opinion, in part, 20 upon Jones v. Wood, C 99-2277 BTM (LSP) (S.D. Cal. December 14, 21 1999), where the Honorable Barry Moskowitz had determined that 22 Plaintiff Monroe Jones could not proceed IFP because he had 23 previously accumulated eleven dismissals that counted as strikes 24 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). <u>Spaeth</u> at 4. The <u>Spaeth</u> court also 25 counted as a strike Jones v. Law Librarian Folsom State Prison, 999 26 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished decision) where the Ninth 27

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Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice for
 failure to state a claim Plaintiff's complaint alleging he had a
 right to a pen under case law governing access to the courts.
 Spaeth, C 07-0677 BLW at 5.

5 Plaintiff is now given notice that the Court believes the 6 following dismissals may be counted as dismissals for purposes of 7 § 1915(g): <u>Spaeth</u>, No. C 12-0677 BLW; (dismissing deliberate 8 indifference complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Law Librarian 9 Folsom State Prison, 999 F.2d 543 (affirming district court's 10 dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 11 granted); Jones v. Chief Deputy Pat Cassidy, et al., C 09-2625 RMW 12 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2009) (dismissing parole revocation complaint for 13 failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted); and 14 Jones v. Briggs, C 05-1277 LJO (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2008) (listing 15 eight cases filed by Plaintiff that had been dismissed on grounds 16 that counted as strikes under § 1915(g) and dismissing complaint 17 under § 1915(g)).

Therefore, Plaintiff may proceed IFP only if he is seeking relief from a danger of serious physical injury which is "imminent" at the time of filing. <u>Andrews v. Cervantes</u>, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). <u>See also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie</u>, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc); <u>Medberry v. Butler</u>, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 1999). He does not appear to be in such danger.

In light of these dismissals, and because Plaintiff does not appear to be under imminent danger of serious physical injury, he is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing no later than thirty (30)

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days from the date of this Order why IFP status should not be denied and this action should not be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If Plaintiff is so inclined, he may avoid dismissal by paying the \$350.00 filing fee. In any event, the Court will continue to review under § 1915(g) all future actions filed by б Plaintiff while he is incarcerated in which he seeks IFP status. Failure to file a timely response or failure to pay the full filing fee will result in the dismissal of this action without further notice to Plaintiff. IT IS SO ORDERED. Hette thankens DATED *08/08/2012* THELTON E. HENDERSON United States District Judge G:\PRO-SE\TEH\CR.12\Jones v Vivas 12-3062-1915g osc.wpd