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the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDOLPH BOLDEN,

Plaintiff.

No. C 13-3919 EDL (PR)

٧.

ORDER DISMISSING WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

DR. MACK, et. al.,

Defendant.

Plaintiff, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *Id.* at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."" *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint "does not need detailed factual

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allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained the "plausible on its face" standard of Twombly: "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Legal Claims B.

Plaintiff alleges the defendant doctors from his prison and an outside hospital were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059.

A "serious" medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id.

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The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a "serious" need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60.

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only "be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists," but he "must also draw the inference." Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175. 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). "A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim." Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). In addition "mere delay of surgery, without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical indifference.... [Prisoner] would have no claim for deliberate medical indifference unless the denial was harmful." Shapely v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiff states that he requested to see medical personnel after his left leg became swollen and painful in September 2012. Plaintiff was provided several medications, several laboratory tests were taken and he was seen by a radiologist who diagnosed plaintiff with bolus lung disease. Plaintiff was taken and treated at Nativadad Medical Center, an outside hospital in November 2012. Plaintiff states an "IVC Filter" was placed into his body that is changed every two weeks and he also receives regular medication and shots to treat the bolus lung disease.

Plaintiff alleges that defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in their treatment, yet provides no support for this assertion. He states they

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are not helping him to overcome the disease and should transfer him to a prison medical facility, but provides no other information on how this would help his condition. Based on his complaint and exhibits, it appears plaintiff has been receiving a great deal of treatment and there is nothing to demonstrate any failures to take reasonable steps to treat him. Simply stating the treatment has been insufficient, without more, fails to state a constitutional violation. Plaintiff must describe the adequate medical care that he states is being denied. Plaintiff's bare allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Igbal. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Igbal, 556 U.S., at 678. Plaintiff must also describe the specific acts of each defendant. The complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend for plaintiff to provide more information regarding the inadequacies of the medical care he is receiving and how it violated the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff also names as a defendant a doctor at the outside hospital, though plaintiff must demonstrate that this defendant is a state actor. A private individual's conduct constitutes action under color of state law if it is "fairly attributable" to the state. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988). Conduct that allegedly caused the deprivation of a federal right may be fairly attributable to the state if (1) the deprivation is caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is responsible; and (2) the party charged with the deprivation is a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. See Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Casey, 67 F.3d at 1414 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 937).

CONCLUSION

1. The complaint is **DISMISSED** with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an

amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of this action.

2. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed "Notice of Change of Address," and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1/2 2013.

United States Chief Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDOLPH BOLDEN,	Case Number: CV13-03919 EDL
Plaintiff,	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
v.	
DR MACK et al,	
Defendant.	

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 17, 2013, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Randolph Bolden C-24526 Salinas Valley State Prison A1-125 Low P.O. Box 1050 Soledad, CA 93960-1050

Dated: September 17, 2013

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk By: Lisa R Clark, Deputy Clerk