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28UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIAKYLE DAVID BIEDMA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL CLARK, et al.,
Defendants.Case No. [14-cv-02853-RS](#)**ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT****I. INTRODUCTION**

Plaintiff Kyle David Biedma was in the wrong place at the wrong time. Unfortunately for him, the “wrong place” was the side yard of his mother’s house, where he was living, and the “wrong time” was when the police were attempting to apprehend Eric Pineda Diaz, a felon on the loose. The upshot was that Santa Rosa Police Department (“SRPD”) canine Taz sunk his teeth into Biedma’s arm and pulled him to the ground. Defendant Officer Michael Clark gave the order to attack. The SRPD officers soon understood that they had made a mistake and called for an ambulance to take Biedma to the hospital to treat his wounds. Clark followed Biedma to the hospital, where he explained to him why he ordered Taz to attack. During that conversation, Clark asked Biedma to confirm the officer’s version of what happened before the dog bite, but Biedma had in many respects a different recollection.

The next day, Clark drafted an incident report recounting the events of the previous night. In it, Clark wrote that the case should be referred to the Santa Rosa County District Attorney to consider filing charges for resisting arrest. The prosecutor followed the recommendation and

1 charged Biedma with the criminal offense of resisting arrest. After a trial, the jury acquitted
2 Biedma of the charge.

3 Biedma initially filed this lawsuit in state court and the defendants removed the action.
4 After motion practice, Biedma filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) advancing five claims
5 for relief. Defendants move for for summary judgment with respect to Claim 3 (false
6 imprisonment under California law) and Claim 5 (federal constitutional rights violations). In the
7 SAC, Biedma offers numerous theories, under his fifth claim, as to how defendants violated his
8 constitutional rights, including violations of the Fourth Amendment¹ of the U.S. Constitution, in
9 particular: (1) that defendants conducted a search of his home without a warrant or probable cause
10 in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) that defendants seized him without probable cause; (3)
11 that defendants used unreasonable force to seize him; (4) that defendants unreasonably detained
12 him at the hospital; and (5) that Clark maliciously caused his prosecution.² In addition, Biedma
13 claims that defendants violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by interrogating him in custody
14 without informing him of his constitutional rights. Defendants argue that no reasonable jury could
15 find that they violated the Fourth Amendment under all but one of these theories; they have not
16 moved for summary judgment on Biedma’s unreasonable force claim.

17 Biedma concedes that he cannot prevail on his claims relative to his interrogation under the
18 Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and therefore summary judgment must be entered in defendants
19 favor. Defendants have demonstrated that exigent circumstances justified entering into the
20 curtilage of Biedma’s home, and so their motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to
21 Biedma’s claim that they violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered his property.

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24 ¹ The SAC references violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Given that defendants
25 are county and not federal employees, Biedma’s reference to the Fourteenth Amendment is
26 apparently a mere acknowledgement that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the provisions of the
27 Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights at issue applicable to county and state actors. He does
28 not assert a freestanding Fourteenth Amendment claim.

26

27 ² Biedma also avers that Clark’s role in causing Biedma’s prosecution for resisting arrest violated
the First and Eighth Amendments. Defendants do not challenge these theories of liability.

28

1 Material disputes of fact remain, however, with respect to Claim 3 (false imprisonment) and those
2 parts of Claim 5 alleging an unreasonable seizure and malicious prosecution under the Fourth
3 Amendment. Because defendants did not challenge Biedma’s additional grounds under the Fifth
4 Claim for Relief—that they used unreasonable force—the jury will consider that claim, as well.

5 **II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

6 On April 6, 2013, the SRPD officers were searching for Eric Pineda Diaz who was wanted
7 for corporal injury on a spouse, violation of felony probation, grand theft, participating in a street
8 gang, and misdemeanor vandalism. Clark Decl. ¶ 4. SRPD officers learned that Diaz was hiding
9 at 950 Kingwood Street in Santa Rosa, and so they positioned themselves near the front and back
10 of the house. Clark believed Diaz would try to escape through the back door and run through
11 Biedma’s back yard. To block this escape route Clark, Taz, and Officer Gillotte stood in the
12 fenced back yard of 927 Saracen, Biedma’s home, adjacent to 950 Kingwood. Clark Decl. ¶ 8.
13 927 Saracen had a metal gate, which Clark expected Diaz to jump over in the event of an escape.
14 Officers Isachsen and Snetsinger stood near the driveway of 925 Saracen, the house to the south of
15 927 Saracen. Clark Decl. Ex. J, Incident Report.

16 Around 11:45 p.m., Biedma woke up and decided to smoke a cigarette. He went to
17 retrieve them from his car, which was parked near the back of the house. Grady Decl. Ex. 1, Tr.
18 Criminal Trial at 100:20-101:8. He threw on a black hoodie over the red basketball shorts he was
19 wearing and put on black tennis shoes before going outside. Id. at 101:16-21. At approximately
20 the same time, Clark heard another officer knock on the door of 950 Kingwood and order Diaz to
21 surrender. Soon thereafter, he heard a sound of someone moving the metal fence in the back yard
22 at 927 Saracen. Clark Decl. ¶ 10. No lights illuminated the back yard of 927 Saracen, which
23 accordingly was very dark. Id. ¶ 11; Tr. Criminal Trial at 103:11-17. As Biedma was walking to
24 his car, Isachsen briefly shined a flashlight on him from a distance. Clark Decl. Ex. J, Incident
25 Report. Biedma saw the light, thought nothing of it, and kept walking at a casual pace towards his
26 car. Tr. Criminal Trial at 103:18-104: 5. There is considerable disagreement about what occurred
27 next.

1 Clark insists he thought Biedma was Diaz because the two men are approximately the
2 same height, weight, and age, and the red shorts appeared to be the same color associated with
3 Diaz’s gang. Biedma’s face was slightly obstructed because his hood was over his head.
4 Biedma’s hands were in the front pouch of the hoodie. Clark Decl. ¶ 11. Clark claims that he
5 identified himself as a police officer and ordered Biedma to get on the ground. Id. ¶ 12.
6 According to Clark, Biedma kept walking, so he shined the light on himself and Taz and warned
7 Biedma that Taz would be ordered to bite if Biedma did not stop. Clark Decl. ¶ 13. Biedma did
8 not stop walking. Id. In the incident report, Clark wrote that Biedma “said something” and
9 continued to walk “as if to try and pass . . . on the left side.” Clark Decl. Ex. J, Incident Report.
10 Clark insists that he told Biedma to get onto the ground two or three more times and that Gillotte
11 also issued such a command. Clark Decl. ¶ 12. Gillote, however, denies that he commanded
12 Biedma to get down. Gillotte Dep. at 73:21-22. When Biedma did not stop, Clark released Taz,
13 who bit Biedma’s arm and brought him to the ground. Clark originally stated that only fifteen
14 seconds elapsed between his first sighting of Biedma and his release of Taz, with at the time
15 approximately three feet between them. Tr. Criminal Trial at 76:2-7.

16 Biedma has a very different recollection of events. At his criminal trial Biedma testified
17 that, while he was walking to his car, he suddenly heard someone order him to get down on the
18 ground. Upon hearing the command he immediately stopped walking and put his hands in the air.
19 Id. at 104:6-15; Grady Decl. Ex. 2, Biedma Dep. at 37:17-21. Approximately three seconds later,
20 Taz bit his arm and pulled him to the ground. Tr. Criminal Trial 104:20-24; Biedma Dep. at
21 42:22-25, 45:22-25. Biedma denies that Clark or any other officer ordered him to lie on the
22 ground more than once. Tr. Criminal Trial at 107:23-25; Biedma Dep. 59:20-24. He also denies
23 that the officers identified themselves as police officers, that Clark illuminated himself, or that
24 Clark warned him that Taz would bite. Tr. Criminal Trial at 107:26-108:11, 111:11-23.

25 Once Biedma was on the ground, the officers realized he was not their target. They called
26 an ambulance to attend to Biedma’s wounds, and medical personnel transported him to the
27 hospital for treatment. Clark followed Biedma to the hospital, where they spoke about the incident

1 while Biedma received medical treatment. Clark recorded parts of the conversation with a body
2 camera.³ In his declaration, Clark states that his “intent was to explain what happened.” Clark
3 Decl. ¶ 17. At his deposition, however, Clark said that he had already decided to write a report of
4 the incident and refer the case to a prosecutor for possible prosecution for resisting arrest. Clark
5 Dep. (Rough Tr.) at 133:9-14.

6 In the hospital, Biedma started by explaining his side of the story:

7 I walked out, and I saw—I saw the officers off in the distance, shining a flashlight
8 at me. . . . So I thought nothing of it. I was like, okay, well maybe something’s
9 going on over there that I don’t understand. I’m just doing my own thing, going to
10 my car, and then bam, ran into you. . . . You know, “Get on the ground.” And I
11 was, like, so startled man. I was just like, whoa. You know, believe me, I had my
12 keys and my phone in my—my hand. And I was like—I wanted to get on the
13 ground, I guess I just didn’t get on the ground fast enough.

14 Clark Decl. Ex. H, Tr. Interrogation at 2:11-3:2. Clark interjected to ask Biedma if he had
15 responded to the command to get down by saying “fuck you,” which Biedma denied. *Id.* at 3:3-6.
16 Clark also described Diaz’s crimes, why the police were conducting surveillance around Biedma’s
17 home, and how he came to be mistaken for Diaz. Clark showed Diaz’s picture to Biedma, who
18 disagreed with the notion that Diaz looked anything like him. See *id.* at 6:1-14. Near the end of
19 the conversation, Biedma thanked Clark for the explanation and said, “that dog fucked me up,
20 man.” “It would have been one thing, if, like he just bit my arm, and I was probably trying to hit
21 him or something. But I got down on the ground because obviously you all were there, so
22 And he continued to maul my arm, so” *Id.* at 8:12-9:2. As the conversation wound down,
23 Clark told Biedma that they could be “blood brothers” because they have the same scars and
24 “[c]hicks dig scars.” *Id.* 9:24-25. Clark left Biedma a detention certificate pursuant to Santa Rosa
25 Penal Code Section 849.5, which requires documentation of any arrest and release without filing
26 an accusatory pleading. See Clark Ex. I, Detention Cert.

26 _____
27 ³ The video begins while Biedma is speaking. The video does not establish whether Biedma
28 consented to being recorded or knew that Clark was videotaping the interaction.

1 the light most favorable to that party, could resolve the material issue in his or her favor. *Id.* at
2 248-49.⁵

3 **IV. DISCUSSION**

4 **A. Claim 3: California False Imprisonment**

5 Under California law, a police officer may be liable for false arrest or imprisonment by
6 confining another “without lawful privilege.” *Asgari v. City of Los Angeles*, 15 Cal. 4th. 744, 757
7 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A warrantless arrest by a peace officer for a
8 misdemeanor is lawful only if the officer has reasonable cause to believe the misdemeanor was
9 committed in the officer’s presence.” *Johanson v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles*, 36 Cal.App.4th 1209,
10 1216 (1995); see also Cal. Penal Code § 836(a).

11 Here, there are significant disputes of material fact as to whether Clark had reasonable
12 cause to believe Biedma was resisting arrest. Clark and Biedma offer conflicting narratives about
13 how many times the officers told him to lie down on the ground, whether the officers identified
14 themselves, and the time that transpired between the order to lie on the ground and the release of
15 the dog. If a jury believes Biedma’s version of events, which indeed the criminal jury may have,
16 then Clark did not have a reasonable basis to arrest Biedma for resisting arrest.

17 Defendants also contend that they had reason to believe Biedma was Diaz, and therefore
18 the arrest was proper. “A police officer must use reasonable prudence and diligence to determine
19 whether a party being arrested is the one described in the warrant.” *Lopez v. City of Oxnard*, 207
20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7 (1989). “The duty unquestionably rests upon an officer to promptly execute a
21 warrant but the officer also owes a duty to the public and to the party about to be arrested. If he
22 carelessly arrests the wrong party he is liable for the damages caused.” *Smith v. Madruga*, 193
23 Cal. App. 2d 543, 546 (1961) (internal quotation marks omitted).

24
25 ⁵ Defendants do not argue that qualified immunity compels entry of summary judgment in their
26 favor. They focus exclusively on whether Biedma can prove a constitutional violation without
27 ever referencing whether the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). Because defendants did not raise the issue of
qualified immunity, the court will not address it.

1 A reasonable jury could find that Clark unreasonably concluded Biedma was Diaz.
2 Although it was dark outside, Clark stated with certainty that he had a good look at Biedma and
3 was certain he saw Diaz. Tr. Criminal Trial at 57:25-26. Although Biedma’s hoodie was above
4 his head, Clark noted that he could see Biedma’s facial hair, and there are considerable differences
5 between Biedma’s appearance and that of Diaz. The latter has darker skin complexion than
6 Biedma, a very large, visible neck tattoo, thick eyebrows, a straight hairline, and full lips. In
7 contrast, Biedma does not have any visible tattoos, has a widow’s-peak hairline, thin lips, and thin
8 eyebrows. Compare Clark Decl. Ex. D, Diaz Photo, with id. Ex. L, Biedma Photo. A jury might
9 conclude that Clark could have identified the differences had he looked more carefully.
10 Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.

11 **B. Claim 5: Fourth Amendment Violations**

12 1. Unreasonable Seizure by Dog Bite

13 Like claims for false imprisonment under California law, whether an officer unlawfully
14 seizes a person in violation of the Fourth Amendment turns on “whether the arresting officer[] had
15 a good faith, reasonable belief that the arrestee was the subject of the warrant.” *Rivera v. Cty. of*
16 *Los Angeles*, 745 F.3d 384, 389 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing *Hill v. California*, 401 U.S. 797, 804
17 (1971)). For the reasons discussed above, a reasonable jury could conclude Clark did not have a
18 basis to believe Biedma was resisting arrest or that he was Diaz. Accordingly, defendants’ motion
19 to dismiss the Fifth Claim for Relief on this theory must be denied.

20 2. Unreasonable Seizure at the Hospital

21 The SAC avers that defendants subjected Biedma to an unreasonable seizure when Clark
22 spoke with him in the hospital. Biedma now concedes that no reasonable jury could conclude that
23 Clark unreasonably detained him, and therefore summary judgment must be entered for
24 defendants on this theory of liability.

25 3. Malicious Prosecution

26 Ordinarily, “[a] prosecutor’s independent judgment may break the chain of causation
27 between the unconstitutional actions of other officials and the harm suffered by a constitutional

1 tort plaintiff.” *Beck v. City of Upland*, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, even if an
2 officer makes an arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment, he cannot
3 be held liable for malicious prosecution unless the plaintiff offers evidence to rebut the
4 presumption of prosecutorial independence. See *id.* at 862-64. Evidence that the prosecutor did
5 not exercise independent judgment may include, (1) “the prosecutor was pressured by police or
6 was given false information”; (2) “the prosecutor relied on the police investigation and arrest when
7 he filed the complaint instead of making an independent judgment on the existence of probable
8 cause for the arrest”; or “(3) the officers otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that
9 was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings.” *Beck*, 527 F.3d at 862-63
10 (internal quotation marks, alteration, footnote, and citations omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s account of
11 the incident in question, by itself, does not overcome the presumption of independent judgment.”
12 *Newman v. Cty. of Orange*, 457 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted).

13 Biedma has presented evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the
14 prosecutor relied on Clark’s report to file the criminal charges without conducting an independent
15 investigation. The Santa Rosa District Attorney’s office occasionally sends requests for further
16 investigation before filing criminal charges. *Clark Dep.* at 131:17-22. The record reflects no such
17 request by the district attorney to prepare for Biedma’s case. *Id.* Moreover, Clark could not recall
18 whether he met with the prosecutor before Biedma’s criminal trial and could not recall responding
19 to any requests from the prosecutor before receiving the subpoena to testify. *Id.* at 127:11-24.

20 Critically, Biedma does not currently have access to information about the prosecutor’s
21 decisionmaking process. Biedma has sent subpoenas to the Santa Rosa District Attorney’s office
22 to uncover evidence of any pre-charging investigation, but the district attorney has moved to quash
23 the subpoena. When “invocations of privilege render ‘relevant evidence’ concerning the
24 prosecutor’s decision to prosecute unavailable, no presumption of prosecutorial independence
25 arises, and the plaintiff need not rebut it.” *Beck*, 527 F.3d at 869 (quoting *Smiddy v. Varney*, 665
26 F.2d 261, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by *Beck*, 527 F.3d at 865). Nothing
27 in the record suggests that the prosecutor conducted any independent investigation, and so the

1 Santa Rosa District Attorney’s invocation of privilege undermines Biedma’s ability to prove his
2 case. As such, defendants cannot rely on the presumption of independence.

3 That the prosecutor relied upon the incident report alone does not end the inquiry; Biedma
4 must also present evidence other than his testimony from which a jury could reasonably conclude
5 that Clark submitted a false report. Newman, 457 F.3d at 994. Biedma has met that burden. To
6 start, there are some inconsistencies between the report and Clark’s subsequent testimony. In the
7 report, Clark wrote that Gillote ordered Biedma to lie down on the ground. Clark Ex. J., Incident
8 Report. At his deposition, Gillote denied ever giving a verbal order. Gillote Dep. at 73:21-25. In
9 addition, Clark initially testified that Biedma closed ten feet in ten seconds during which Clark
10 supposedly illuminated himself and Taz and issued multiple warnings.⁶ Tr. Criminal Trial at
11 76:2-7. Biedma points out that a jury may conclude Clark would not have had enough time to do
12 all of this in such a short time window while still maintaining control of Taz.

13 Biedma also challenges whether Clark decided to forward the case to the prosecutor before
14 or after speaking with him in the hospital. He suggests that Clark submitted a false report and
15 urged criminal prosecution so as to immunize himself from civil liability. Biedma notes that Clark
16 did not arrest him for resisting arrest. Indeed, Clark emphasized that Biedma was not under arrest
17 and left him with a detention certificate. Clark Decl. Ex. I, Detention Cert.; Ex. J, Incident Report
18 (“Biedma was upset and stated that the only thing he had been told was that he had been arrested.
19 I told Beidma [sic] that he was not under arrest and as soon as he was done being treated he could
20 leave.”). The fact that Clark did not arrest Biedma on the spot may undermine Clark’s subsequent
21 assertion that he believed Biedma had committed a criminal offense. Santa Rosa Penal Code
22 Section 849 precludes officers from releasing an individual without taking him before a magistrate
23 except in three circumstances: (1) insufficient grounds to make a criminal complaint against the
24 person arrested; (2) the person was arrested for intoxication only; or (3) the person was arrested
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27 ⁶ Clark testified that he first saw Biedma from about fifteen to twenty feet away, but that he
28 released Taz when Biedma was six to three feet away. See Tr. Criminal Trial at 57:5-7, 76:2-7.

1 for being under the influence of a narcotic. See Clark Decl. Ex. I, Detention Cert. (citing Santa
2 Rosa Penal Code § 849). The only exception applicable to Biedma on April 7 was that there were
3 insufficient grounds to file a criminal complaint against Biedma. That Clark changed his mind
4 between releasing Biedma and filing his incident report at the very least calls into question the
5 conclusions contained within it.

6 Clark’s videotaped conversation with Biedma immediately after the incident, and
7 Biedma’s statements shortly after the event also comprise relevant evidence.⁷ Biedma vehemently
8 denies Clark’s version of events in the video and continued to deny those events throughout the
9 criminal prosecution, as well. Discrepancies also exist between Clark’s account of the hospital
10 conversation and what appears on the video. For example, while Clark wrote that Biedma knew
11 the people who shone a light on him were officers, Biedma makes no such admission on the video.
12 Compare Clark Decl. Ex. J., Incident Report, with Clark Decl. Ex. H, Tr. Interrogation.
13 Furthermore, Clark apparently thought Biedma responded to the command to get on the ground by
14 saying, “Fuck you.” Tr. Interrogation at 3:3-5. Biedma denied that he said that—or anything at
15 all. Id. at 3:3-6. In the incident report, however, Clark’s version adjusts somewhat: “Biedma said
16 something to me . . . I could not make out what he said.” Clark Decl. Ex. J, Incident Report. A
17 jury could reasonably conclude that Clark’s narrative about the incident evolved, and therefore
18 question the report’s accuracy.

19 Biedma also suggests that Clark exaggerated whether he feared for his safety. To support
20 this contention, he notes that SRPD has a policy that requires officers to draw their service
21 weapons when they “reasonably believe[] it may be necessary to use a firearm . . . when . . . there
22 exists a possibility of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or other persons.” Grady Decl.
23 Ex. 8, SRPD Policy No. 304.4(a)(2). However, Clark did not draw his service weapon, Clark
24 Dep. at 115:24-116:16, and Gillote did not mention drawing his weapon in his incident report.⁸

25 _____
26 ⁷ Neither party has challenged the admissibility of the video or transcription of the interrogation.

27 ⁸ At his deposition, Gillote could not recall whether he drew his service weapon. Gillote Dep. at
28 84:8-10.

1 See Grady Decl. Ex. 6, Supp. Incident Report. A reasonable juror could conclude that the officers
2 never drew their weapons, and therefore did not actually believe that Biedma was a threat to their
3 safety.

4 The disputed facts about what occurred right before Taz bit Biedma matter. If the jury
5 believes Biedma’s version of events, then he has made a claim of malicious prosecution. Should
6 the jury accept Clark’s version of events, then Biedma’s malicious-prosecution claim will fail.
7 Importantly, Biedma has pointed to evidence in the record that may cause the jury to question
8 Clark’s version of events. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment must be denied.

9 4. *Warrantless Entry onto Biedma’s Property*

10 Biedma avers that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by entering into the side
11 yard without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
12 their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
13 violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[T]he
14 government conducts a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it ‘physically
15 occupies private property for the purpose of obtaining information.’” *Patel v. City of Montclair*,
16 798 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2015) (*United States v. Jones*, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012)) (internal
17 alteration omitted). “[A] mere trespassory entry onto private property does not constitute a
18 search.” *Id.* Rather, trespass onto private property violates the Fourth Amendment “only with
19 regard to those items (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) that it enumerates.” *Jones*, 132 S. Ct.
20 at 953 n.8.

21 The protections that the Fourth Amendment provides the home extend to the curtilage,
22 “defined . . . by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may
23 expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.” *Oliver v. United*
24 *States*, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).⁹ Those factors include: “the proximity of the area claimed to be

25 _____
26 ⁹ Defendants insist that criminal cases addressing the scope of the Fourth Amendment are merely
27 persuasive authority and not binding in the context of a § 1983 suit. Def. Reply Br. at 7. The
28 Supreme Court, however, has never held that the Fourth Amendment is broader when a person
challenges officers’ actions in a motion to suppress evidence than in a civil rights lawsuit. Indeed,

1 curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the
2 nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area
3 from observation by people passing by.” Id. at 300.

4 There is little dispute that Clark and Gillote entered the curtilage of Biedma’s property. In
5 the incident reports and at the criminal trial, both Gillote and Clark stated that they were in the
6 side yard at 927 Saracen. Tr. Criminal Trial at 12:17-24, 14:15. Diagrams of the scene indicate
7 that Gillote and Clark were in the side yard. See Clark Decl. Ex. E. At trial, Gillote testified that
8 he was standing next to the garage, which is on the property.¹⁰ Tr. Criminal Trial at 25:2-11. The
9 fences along the side of the yard create an enclosure around the home and create a barrier between
10 the property and the public street. In addition, there were many trees in the side yard that obstruct
11 clear views into the home. Id. at 12:17-24, 14:1-5. From these facts, a reasonable juror could
12 easily conclude that Biedma expected the side yard to remain private.

13 Indeed, defendants concede that Clark and Gillote entered the curtilage without a warrant.
14 See Defs.’ Reply Br. at 7. Nevertheless, they argue that they did not need a search warrant to enter
15 into the curtilage because they did not search the property. However, an officer need not actually
16 search the home or the curtilage to violate the Fourth Amendment; physical occupation of a
17 protected space is sufficient. Patel, 798 F.3d at 898. As such, because Clark and Gillote did not
18 have a warrant, they must identify an exception to the warrant requirement to justify entry into the
19 curtilage of Biedma’s home.

20 They contend that there were exigent circumstances—namely hot pursuit of a fleeing
21 felon—to justify the entry. Officers may enter a home when “the exigencies of the situation make
22 the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
23

24 when addressing whether officers violated a civil plaintiff’s rights, the Supreme Court routinely
25 references criminal cases. See, .e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S. ct. 2074, 2080-81
26 (2011) (citing civil and criminal cases to address the scope of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009) (citing criminal cases addressing the
consent-once-removed doctrine).

27 ¹⁰ At his deposition, Gillote denied that he was in the side yard. Gillote Dep. at 57:13-17.

1 under the Fourth Amendment.” *United States v. Struckman*, 603 F.3d 731, 743 (9th Cir. 2010)
2 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has “defined those situations as (1) the need
3 to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, (2) the need to prevent the imminent
4 destruction of relevant evidence, (3) the hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; and (4) the need to
5 prevent the escape of a suspect.” *Id.*

6 While defendants contend that each situation is applicable here, only the fourth ground
7 provides the basis for their warrantless entry onto Biedma’s land. Clark and Gillote have not
8 presented any evidence that would have lead them to believe they had to stand in Biedma’s side
9 yard to prevent physical harm to others or the destruction of evidence. “[H]ot pursuit’ means
10 some sort of chase.” *United States v. Santana*, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976). Absent an active
11 chase, police officers may not enter property without a warrant. See *Struckman*, 603 F.3d at 744
12 (“There was no chase here—no “pursuit” of Struckman, hot or cold.”).

13 Clark and Gillote have, however, provided reason to believe they needed to stand in the
14 side yard to prevent Diaz’s escape. Clark declares that he knew Diaz was inside 950 Kingwood
15 and that an informant indicated that Diaz would try to escape from the back door. Clark Decl. ¶ 7.
16 Clark, Gillote, and Taz were positioned to block this expected escape route while other SRPD
17 officers knocked on Diaz’s front door. These are “specific articulable facts” that justify Clark’s
18 decision to stand where he did. *Struckman*, 603 F.3d at 743. Accordingly, no reasonable juror
19 could conclude that defendants’ entry into the curtilage of Biedma’s home violated the Fourth
20 Amendment and summary judgment must be entered for defendants on that aspect of the Fifth
21 Claim for Relief.

22 **C. Claim 5: Fifth and Sixth Amendment Violations**

23 As part of the Fifth Claim for Relief, the SAC includes a claim for violations of the Fifth
24 and Sixth Amendments based on the theory that Biedma was in custody in the hospital when he
25 and Clark spoke. Biedma now concedes that he cannot prevail on these claims, and so summary
26 judgment is entered for defendants with respect to this theory of liability in Claim 5.


27 **V. CONCLUSION**

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Because defendants have demonstrated that no reasonable jury could conclude they violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered the curtilage of Biedma’s home to prevent Diaz’s escape, their motion for summary judgment must be granted with respect to this aspect of his Fifth Claim for Relief. Moreover, because Biedma concedes that he cannot prevail on claims of Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations, summary judgment must be entered in defendants’ with respect to those theories of liability. Biedma has demonstrated that material disputes of fact remain with respect to his claims for unreasonable seizure, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be denied with respect to those claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 18, 2015


RICHARD SEEBORG
United States District Judge