

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL DAVID KAUFMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
M. E. SPEARMAN, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. [15-cv-02777-JD](#)

ORDER ON MOTIONS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 45, 47, 48, 52, 54

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 7, 2016, the Court ordered service on defendants Dr. Branch, Dr. Bright and Warden Spearman finding that plaintiff had presented a cognizable claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Plaintiff stated that he was allergic to gluten, soy, and dairy and defendants had ignored letters from outside doctors to this effect. As a result he had required four Benadryl or cortisone injections after severe allergic reactions. He alleged that defendants denied he has a food allergy which had resulted in plaintiff not receiving the minimal nutritional calories and additional allergic reactions.

The defendants were served and the case was stayed and referred to the pro se prisoner settlement program at the parties' request. The case did not settle, but plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint. The Court dismissed the supplemental complaint with leave to amend and plaintiff filed an amended supplemental complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the Court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *Id.* at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Id.* at 570. The United States Supreme Court has explained the “plausible on its face” standard of *Twombly*: “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges that he has severe food intolerances that defendants have not properly addressed. Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. *See Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); *McGuckin v. Smith*, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), *overruled on other grounds*, *WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller*, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need.

1 *See McGuckin*, 974 F.2d at 1059.

2 Adequate food is a basic human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. *See Keenan v.*
3 *Hall*, 83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996), *amended*, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). The Eighth
4 Amendment right to food was clearly established as of at least 2001. *Foster v. Runnels*, 554 F.3d
5 807, 815 (9th Cir. 2009). Denial of food service presents a sufficiently serious condition to meet
6 the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference analysis. *See, e.g., id.* at 812
7 (denial of 16 meals over 23 days was “a sufficiently serious deprivation because food is one of
8 life's basic necessities”); *id.* at 812 n.1 (denial of 2 meals over 9-week period was not sufficiently
9 serious to meet objective prong of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference). The Eighth
10 Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need
11 not be pleasing, aesthetically, or otherwise. *See Graves v. Arpaio*, 623 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir.
12 2010) (per curiam) (Eighth Amendment requires that pretrial detainees be given food that meets or
13 exceeds the Department of Agriculture’s Dietary Guidelines).

14 The allegations in the amended supplemental complaint are substantially similar to the
15 allegations in the underlying complaint. Plaintiff also names the same defendants that have
16 already been served. Defendants argue that certain claims should be screened out because plaintiff
17 has annexed several exhibits including a doctor’s report that found plaintiff would receive no
18 benefit from a special diet. The case will continue against the same defendants with the same
19 claims previously found cognizable. While plaintiff has included additional exhibits, his
20 allegations are still sufficient to proceed at this stage of the litigation.

21 Plaintiff has also requested the appointment of counsel. The Ninth Circuit has held that a
22 district court may ask counsel to represent an indigent litigant only in “exceptional
23 circumstances,” the determination of which requires an evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of
24 success on the merits, and (2) the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of
25 the complexity of the legal issues involved. *Terrell v. Brewer*, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir.
26 1991). Plaintiff does not proceed in forma pauperis and he has not made a showing that he is
27 indigent. Plaintiff has also presented his claims adequately, and the issues are not complex. The
28 motion to appoint counsel is denied.

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff's motion for an extension of time (Docket No. 45) is **GRANTED** and the Court has reviewed the amended supplemental complaint.

2. Defendants' motion to screen the amended supplemental complaint (Docket No. 47) is **GRANTED**.

3. Defendants' motion to stay discovery pending screening (Docket No. 48) is **DENIED** because the complaint has been screened and continues.

4. Plaintiff's motion for a default judgment (Docket No. 52) is **DENIED** because defendants have properly responded to the complaint.

5. Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel (Docket No. 54) is **DENIED**.

6. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than sixty days from the date of service, defendant shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and shall include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from the events at issue. If defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the Court prior to the date his summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff.

b. At the time the dispositive motion is served, defendant shall also serve, on a separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by *Rand v. Rowland*, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and *Wyatt v. Terhune*, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003). *See Woods v. Carey*, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (*Rand* and *Wyatt* notices must be given at the time motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss for nonexhaustion is filed, not earlier); *Rand* at 960 (separate paper requirement).

c. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with the Court and served upon defendant no later than thirty days from the date the motion was served upon him. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed "NOTICE -- WARNING," which is

provided to him pursuant to *Rand v. Rowland*, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and *Klinge v. Eikenberry*, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

If defendant files a motion for summary judgment claiming that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), plaintiff should take note of the attached page headed "NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION)," which is provided to him as required by *Wyatt v. Terhune*, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003).

d. If defendant wishes to file a reply brief, he shall do so no later than fifteen days after the opposition is served upon him.

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.


7. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendant, or defendant's counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants or defendants' counsel.

8. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No further Court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

9. It is plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed "Notice of Change of Address." He also must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 24, 2017



JAMES DONATO
United States District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL DAVID KAUFMAN,
Plaintiff,

v.

M. E. SPEARMAN, et al.,
Defendants.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 24, 2017, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Joel David Kaufman
AT3133
P.O. Box 705
Soledad, CA 93960

Dated: February 24, 2017

Susan Y. Soong
Clerk, United States District Court

By: 
LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the
Honorable JAMES DONATO