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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

YANA ZELKIND,  
Plaintiff,  
v.  
FLYWHEEL NETWORKS, INC.,  
Defendant.

Case No. [15-cv-03375-WHO](#)

**ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO  
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY  
ACTION**

Re: Dkt. No. 23

**INTRODUCTION**

Defendant Flywheel Networks, Inc. contends that plaintiff Yana Zelkind is required to arbitrate the claims in her complaint for sexual harassment pursuant to a Dispute Resolution Protocol (“DRP”) that was included within the Terms and Conditions Agreement (“TCA”) she signed at the beginning of her employment with Flywheel. Mot. at 3 [Dkt. No. 23]. Zelkind argues that the arbitration clause is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Dkt. No. 30. Because the arbitration clause clearly and unmistakably assigns the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator, I GRANT the motion to compel and STAY this matter.

**BACKGROUND**

On July 28, 2014, Flywheel, a technology company that connects consumers with residential real estate agents, hired Zelkind as a Sales Representative in its Sacramento office.<sup>1</sup> Flywheel is a customer of TriNet, which provides payroll processing and certain human resources services for Flywheel. TriNet refers to its customers as “worksite employers” and maintains an online portal for the employees of its worksite employers in order to access certain employment

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this motion, I rely primarily on the facts Flywheel provided by declaration as Zelkind neither contested them nor offered any evidence on her own behalf. If there is a factual basis on which to dispute arbitrability, Zelkind did not provide it.

1 records and information. This online portal, called “TriNet Passport,” is a password protected  
2 environment that can only be accessed using each employee’s username and unique password.

3 On July 30, 2014, two days after beginning her employment, Zelkind logged on to the  
4 TriNet Passport. Upon signing in, Zelkind was electronically presented with TriNet’s TCA, which  
5 included the DRP. The TCA is an approximately four page long document, which encompasses a  
6 subsection containing the DRP, which in turn is approximately one page long. Belloise Decl., Ex.  
7 A [Dkt. No. 26] (“Agreement”). The TCA states in pertinent part as follows:

8 1. Co-Employment vs. Standard Employment

9 TriNet is a licensed professional employer organization (“PEO”)  
10 headquartered in San Leandro, California.

11 If your relationship with TriNet is beginning because the company  
12 at which you work has become TriNet customer, this means that  
13 your company has entered into a customer service agreement with  
14 TriNet to share certain employer responsibilities as co-employers.  
15 This means TriNet will be your employer of record for  
16 administrative purposes and will process payroll, sponsor and  
17 administer benefits, and provide certain human resources services.  
18 As your worksite employer, your company retains the  
19 responsibilities of directing your day-to-day work and managing its  
20 business affairs. This TCA addresses your relationship with TriNet  
21 and you and your worksite employer have and will continue to have  
22 additional terms and conditions of employment.

23 ...  
24 9. Dispute Resolution Protocol (“DRP”)

25 a. How The DRP Applies

26 This DRP covers any dispute arising out of or relating to your  
27 employment with TriNet. The Federal Arbitration Act applies to  
28 this DRP. Also, existing internal procedures for resolving disputes,  
as well as the options of mediation, will continue to apply with the  
goal being to resolve disputes before they are arbitrated. This DRP  
will survive termination of the employment relationship. With only  
the exceptions described below, arbitration will replace going before  
a government agency or a court for a judge or jury trial.

29 ...  
30 f. Enforcement Of The DRP

31 This DRP is the full and complete agreement relating to arbitration  
32 as the means to resolve covered disputes between you and TriNet  
33 and between you and your worksite employer unless the DRP is  
34 waived by your worksite employer or superseded by other terms and  
35 conditions of your employment with your worksite employer. If any  
36 portion of this DRP is determined to be unenforceable, the  
37 remainder of this DRP still will be enforceable, subject to the  
38 specific exception in section d, above.

With respect to covered disputes, each party waives any rights under  
the law for a jury trial and agrees to arbitration in accordance with  
the terms of this DRP.

Agreement ¶¶ 1, 9.

1 The last subsection of the TCA is entitled “Acknowledgement” and provides, in part, as  
2 follows:

3 By clicking below, I am acknowledging that I have read and  
4 understand the contents of this Terms and Conditions Agreement  
(including, but not limited to, the DRP), that I have the  
5 responsibility to read and familiarize myself with the TriNet  
6 Employee Handbook and Additional Policies for my company and  
that I agree to abide by the terms and conditions set forth above and  
the policies and procedures set forth in the Employee Handbook and  
Additional Policies.

7 *Id.* at ¶10. Zelkind agreed to the TCA by providing her email address and clicking on the button  
8 marked “I Accept.”<sup>2</sup>

9 According to the complaint she filed in state court, Zelkind experienced severe and  
10 pervasive sexual harassment by her Flywheel coworkers that caused her to suffer from anxiety and  
11 acute depression. Complaint at 5-11. She was fired one day after reporting the harassment to  
12 Flywheel management. Complaint at 9. She alleges multiple violations under California Fair  
13 Employment and Housing Act as well as a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional  
14 Distress. *Id.* at 12-17. Flywheel’s present motion to compel arbitration of Zelkind’s claims and  
15 dismiss her complaint or, in the alternative, stay the proceedings was heard on October 7, 2015.  
16 Zelkind’s counsel failed to appear.<sup>3</sup>

### 17 LEGAL STANDARD

18 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs the motion to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C.  
19 §§ 1 *et seq.* Under the FAA, a district court determines (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate  
20 exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. *Lifescan, Inc. v.*  
21 *Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc.*, 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). “To evaluate the validity of  
22 an arbitration agreement, federal courts should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the  
23

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24 <sup>2</sup> Flywheel expressly notes that there is also a “Reject” button next to the “I Accept” button,  
25 “whereby the [employee] could choose not to accept the terms of the DRP.” Mot. at 3. However,  
26 according to the TCA, acknowledgement and acceptance of the agreement is a condition of one’s  
27 employment with TriNet. Agreement at 1.

28 <sup>3</sup> The Court attempted to reach Zelkind’s counsel after he failed to check in for the hearing. He  
responded by email that he had a personal emergency and had miscalendared the hearing date.  
Previously, he failed to file an opposition brief timely, failed to seek leave of court to file the  
untimely brief until prompted by me, and failed in other ways to file pleadings that comply with  
the Local Rules. Counsel should either read and comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  
and the Local Rules and Standing Orders of this Court or reconsider practicing in federal court.

1 formation of contracts.” *Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.*, 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003)  
2 (citation omitted). If the court is satisfied “that the making of the arbitration agreement or the  
3 failure to comply with the agreement is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the  
4 parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4.  
5 “Any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”  
6 *Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc.*, 175 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1999).

## 7 DISCUSSION

8 “Generally, in deciding whether to compel arbitration, a court must determine two  
9 ‘gateway’ issues: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2)  
10 whether the agreement covers the dispute.” *Brennan v. Opus Bank*, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir.  
11 2015). Under federal law, “[t]he question whether parties have submitted a particular dispute to  
12 arbitration ... is an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably  
13 provide otherwise.” *Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (internal  
14 citations, quotation marks, and modifications omitted); *see also id.* But if the parties clearly and  
15 unmistakably assign the arbitrability question to the arbitrator, a court will enforce the provisions  
16 of the agreement that delegate such determinations unless there is a specific challenge to the  
17 delegation clause itself. *Brennan*, 796 F.3d at 1132. In the absence of a specific challenge, “the  
18 court should perform a second, more limited inquiry to determine whether the assertion of  
19 arbitrability is ‘wholly groundless.’” *Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp.*, 466 F.3d 1366, 1371  
20 (Fed.Cir.2006).

### 21 I. CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE DELEGATION OF ARBITRABILITY

22 Flywheel contends that the parties have “clearly and unmistakably agreed” to delegate the  
23 resolution of any dispute regarding the arbitrability of Zelkind’s claims to an arbitrator. Mot. at 6.  
24 Flywheel points to paragraph 9(d) of the DRP: “[t]he specific provisions of this DRP and the  
25 applicable rules of [American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)] or [Judicial Arbitration and  
26 Mediation Services, Inc. (“JAMS”)] will direct the arbitrator in decision regarding the  
27 enforceability of this DRP and in conducting the arbitration.” Agreement at ¶9(d). Both the AAA  
28 and JAMS provide for arbitration rules that grant the arbitrator the power to decide disputes over

1 the existence, validity, and scope of an arbitration agreement. Rule 6(a) of the Employment  
2 Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures for AAA states that “[t]he arbitrator shall have the  
3 power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence,  
4 scope or validity of the arbitration agreement.” AAA Emp. R. 6(a). Similarly, Rule 11(b) of the  
5 JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules & Procedure provides: “Jurisdictional and arbitrability  
6 disputes, including disputes over the formation, existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the  
7 agreement under which Arbitration is sought, and who are proper Parties to the Arbitration, shall  
8 be submitted to and ruled on by the Arbitrator. Unless the relevant law requires otherwise, the  
9 Arbitrator has the authority to determine jurisdiction and arbitrability issues as a preliminary  
10 matter.” JAMS Emp. R. 11(b).

11 The Ninth Circuit has held that incorporation of an arbitrator's arbitration rules constitutes  
12 clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. *Brennan*, 796  
13 F.3d at 1131 (“We therefore hold that the district court did not err in concluding that these parties’  
14 incorporation of the AAA rules constituted “clear and unmistakable” evidence of their intent to  
15 submit the arbitrability dispute to arbitration.”); *Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G.*, 724 F.3d  
16 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We see no reason to deviate from the prevailing view that  
17 incorporation of the [arbitrator’s] arbitration rules is clear and unmistakable evidence that the  
18 parties agreed the arbitrator would decide arbitrability.”) Here, parties have met this requirement  
19 by incorporating both the AAA and JAMS rules into the DRP. Agreement at ¶9(c)(“Arbitration  
20 begins by bringing a claim under the applicable employment arbitration rules and procedures of  
21 either the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) or the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation  
22 Services, Inc. (“JAMS”), as then in effect and as modified by any superseding provisions of this  
23 DRP.), ¶9(d)(“The specific provisions of this DRP and the applicable rules of the AAA or JAMS  
24 will direct the arbitrator in decisions regarding the enforceability of this DRP and in conducting  
25 the arbitration.”) By doing so, the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed to allow the  
26 arbitrator to decide the arbitration provision’s application, validity, and scope.

27 **II. WHOLLY GROUNDLESS INQUIRY**

28 Having determined that the parties assigned the arbitrability question to the arbitrator, I

1 must now perform a second analysis as to whether the assertion of arbitration is “wholly  
2 groundless.” *Qualcomm*, 466 F.3d at 1371. To do so, I “look to the scope of the arbitration clause  
3 and the precise issues that the moving party asserts are subject to arbitration,” but I do not  
4 determine whether Zelkind’s claims are in fact arbitrable. *Id* at 1374. This limited inquiry  
5 prevents a party from “asserting any claim at all, no matter how divorced from the parties’  
6 agreement to force arbitration.” *Id.* at 1373 n.5. If a court finds that the assertion of arbitrability is  
7 not “wholly groundless,” then it should stay the action pending a ruling on arbitrability by an  
8 arbitrator. *Id.* at 1371.

9 Flywheel’s assertion that Zelkind’s claims should be arbitrated is not “wholly groundless.”  
10 In cases involving PEOs, such as TriNet, the issue of whether the arbitration agreement applies to  
11 both the worksite employer and the PEO is a factual inquiry. *See Coup v. Scottsdale Plaza Resort,*  
12 *LLC*, 823 F. Supp. 2d 931, 955 (D. Ariz. 2011) (finding that the arbitration agreement, which only  
13 referenced the PEO and not the worksite employer, applied to plaintiffs’ Title VII claims when the  
14 worksite employer did not have its own employees but instead all of its workers were employed  
15 by the PEO as “on-call employees,” were given the PEO employee manuals, and attended  
16 employee training and orientations sessions with the PEO); *Nereim v. Premara Fin., Inc.*, No. 14-  
17 cv-00096, 2014 WL 2882692, \*1-2 (W.D.N.C. June 25, 2014) (holding that the arbitration  
18 agreement clearly applied to both the PEO and the worksite employer when it read “I and [PEO]  
19 agree that any legal dispute involving [PEO], Company, or any benefit plan, insurer, employee,  
20 officer, or director of [PEO] or Company (all of which are beneficiaries of this agreement to  
21 arbitrate and waiver of jury trial) arising from or relating to my employment, wages, leave,  
22 employee benefits, application for employment, or termination from employment will be resolved  
23 exclusively through binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator....”).

24 Here, the TCA begins by describing the relationship between TriNet and Flywheel,  
25 informing the reader that “your employer has entered into a customer service agreement with  
26 TriNet to share certain employer responsibilities co-employers.” Agreement at ¶1. It goes on to  
27 explain that “[t]his TCA addresses your relationship with TriNet and your worksite employer have  
28 and will continue to have additional terms and conditions of employment.” *Id.* According to the

1 TCA, the DRP is intended as the “full and complete agreement relating to arbitration as the means  
2 to resolve covered disputes between you and TriNet and between you and your worksite  
3 employer” unless otherwise supersede or waived. *Id.* at ¶9(f). Covered disputes are those “arising  
4 out of or relating to your employment with TriNet.” *Id.* at ¶9(a)


5 This precise agreement has already been addressed in *Langford v. Hansen Technologies,*  
6 *LLC*, Civ. No. 3:14-cv-1870 (S.D. Cal., Nov. 19, 2014). Cooper Decl., Ex. P [Dkt. No. 24-16]. In  
7 *Langford*, a case involving allegations of disability discrimination by the onsite employer, the  
8 court found that the DRP applied to the worksite employer and was not unconscionable. *Id.* at 7.  
9 The court relied primarily on the sections quoted above to hold that the DRP makes clear that it  
10 applies to both TriNet and the worksite employer. *Id.* at 4-5. I find similarly. Because the  
11 allegations at issue relate to Zelkind’s employment with TriNet, they fall within the scope of the  
12 DRP. Neither party contends it waived the DRP or that the DRP was superseded by another  
13 agreement. Therefore, as the DRP indicates, it functions as the full and complete agreement for  
14 covered disputes between the Zelkind and Flywheel.

15 **CONCLUSION**

16 Flywheel’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. This action is STAYED pending  
17 the arbitrator’s determination whether Zelkind’s claims are arbitrable and, if they are, the  
18 resolution of the arbitration. The parties shall jointly advise me within 10 days of (i) the  
19 arbitrator’s determination that the claims are not arbitrable, (ii) the arbitrator’s award, in the event  
20 that the arbitrator determines that the claims are arbitrable, or (iii) the settlement of this dispute.  
21 The parties shall file a Joint Status Report every six months, beginning six months from the date  
22 of this Order, apprising the Court of the status of the arbitration.

23 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

24 Dated: October 16, 2015



25  
26 WILLIAM H. ORRICK  
United States District Judge